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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Since the late 1990s the government of Malaysia has increased emphasis on its 
Intensification of Research in Priority Areas (IRPA) program, focusing scientific research in 
universities and government research institutes (GRIs) on activities most likely to enhance 
national economic performance. The IRPA’s main purpose is to fund commercially viable 
research for the benefit of business.  However, its 2001 mid-term review showed its rates and 
volumes of commercialization and technology transfer (CTT) to be inadequate.   
 
This study aimed to explain the perceived low rate of adoption and commercialization of 
scientific knowledge in manufacturing in Malaysia by exploring the actions of companies, 
universities and GRIs. Two main models of technical change, the Technik and the STH ones, 
were used.    
 
Fieldwork was carried out in Malaysia. Purposive sampling led to selection of 60 
interviewees: 23 managers and professionals from companies, 17 scientists, eight 
Technology Transfer Office officers, six senior research administrators, three venture 
capitalists, two journalists and a politician. The interviews were open-ended.   
 
It was seen that research findings were not always relevant to company interests, and 
companies often preferred their own or adopted, sometimes reverse-engineered, technology. 
Government CTT funds did not help much in with design, prototypes and pilot plants. 
Inadequate communication and lack of trust influenced the low uptake of research findings.  
 
The commercial relevance of much scientific research was questioned. More government 
support for company risk-taking appeared to be needed. Differences in attitude and poor 
understanding of policies and principles tended to contribute to low uptake. Managers, 
professional, scientists, Technology Transfer Officers, senior research administrators, venture 
capitalists needed more flexibility, knowledge and skills to respond to profit-driven research 
findings.  A specifically Malaysian approach to CTT was advocated. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
First, in this chapter, the main aim of the thesis is described, and explained briefly. Next, the 
research questions are spelt out in five short sections, the research methods described in the 
next, and the main contents of each of the chapters that follow are explained in the final one.  
Relevant literature is referred to at various points, but the task of reviewing of it is largely 
undertaken in the next chapters. 
 
 
THE PROBLEM 
 
The Main Aim of the Thesis  
This is to describe, investigate and explain the perceived low rate of adoption and 
commercialisation of inventions and knowledge in Malaysian manufacturing companies 
(Economic Planning Unit [EPU], 1996, 2001). This aim is pursued in the knowledge that 
Malaysia is still a developing country, in spite of its generally high rates of economic growth 
since the early 1990s, and to a smaller extent before.  
 
 2
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MALAYSIA  
 
Research and Development (R and D) is regarded by the Malaysian government as critical 
for accelerating technical change. Malaysian researchers and engineers in universities and 
government research institutes have generated many discoveries, inventions, significant 
developments of products and processes, and so on. However, more downstream industrial 
and commercial activities such as detailed product design, mainstream and/or incremental 
improvement to improved manufacturing processes, marketing and selling do not appear to 
have followed on the scales desired and possible (Muhammad, 2003; National Productivity 
Corporation [NPC], 2003). Both the pace and the volume of commercialisation are causes for 
concern, as are both indigenous technology transfer and that involving foreign companies.  
 
Government intervention in industrial and technical development can be traced to Malaysia’s 
Five Year Plans, which began in 1971. For the Seventh Malaysian Plan, from 1996 until 
2000, a program of Intensification of Research in Priority Areas (IRPA) included approval of 
a total of 3,705 projects worth RM698.3 millions or £116 million, a significant sum for a 
developing country with a population of 25 millions. From 2001 to 2005, a similar sum from 
the same budget was made available to support the same kind of technical development.  The 
purpose of the IRPA Program is to focus R and D activities on developments with potential 
to enhance national economic performance.  
 
The Malaysian National Council for Scientific Research and Development (NCSRD) 
allocates grants for IRPA. In doing so it follows four principles. (EPU, 2001).   These are, 
first, to fund commercially viable developments which have high national priority.  Second, 
projects are selected to help satisfy various gaps in the efforts of and needs of Malaysian 
industry. Third, projects should enhance collaborative efforts between researchers and 
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research institutions. Finally, they should enhance R and D links between relevant public 
sector actors and firms.  However this government intervention can be questioned inasmuch 
as the rates and volumes of commercialisation of broadly defined publicly-financed R and D 
have been low, especially but not exclusively in small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) 
(MASTIC, 2000; NPC, 2003; Sadullah, 2002). 
 
Malaysia’s government wishes to see its economy develop into a so-called knowledge one, 
ostensibly like those of Japan, North America and the European Union, in which the abilities 
of expert employees, human capital, are often thought to be ultimately more important for 
organizational success and national prosperity than financial and physical capital. As already 
noted, Malaysia has a population of 25 million, and its GDP per capita is about £4,500. Its 
rates of growth of GDP in 2000, 2001 and 2002 were 8.5%, 0.4% and 4.2% respectively. 
With 127,316 square miles, Malaysia is slightly larger than Mexico. It has a tropical climate, 
very or quite high levels of literacy and school attendance, and a workforce of nearly 10 
million. Malaysia has made strong attempts to achieve the target of attaining a 60:40 ratio of 
science and engineering to arts student enrolments in public and private universities, and 
other tertiary institutions have been established with an emphasis on technical and scientific 
disciplines.   
 
In 2002, about 27% of Malaysian’s employees were in manufacturing, 21% in services, 
including government, 17% in trade and tourism, 14% in agriculture, 8% in construction, 6% 
in finance, 5% in transport and communications, 0.8% in utilities, and 0.4% in petroleum. 
Malaysia’s exports of merchandise were worth US $94 billions in 2002, and included 
electronics, electrical products, palm oil, petroleum, liquefied natural gas, clothing and 
timber. Malaysia’s main export markets were, by value, the USA 20%, Singapore just over 
17%, and Japan 11%.  It is a federal parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy. 
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Malaysia wishes to become a wealthy, independent nation with a sophisticated economy. 
However, many of its manufacturers, and especially those with SMEs, appear reluctant to be 
innovative, both technically and commercially, on the scale and at the speed desired by the 
government (MASTIC, 2000; Chze, 2003). Certain problems that concern Malaysia’s leaders 
are attributable in varying degrees to the ethnic composition of the country. This is about 
65% indigenous Malaysian or Bumiputera, about 26% Chinese, about 8% Indian, about 1% 
other (Department of Statistics, 2003). Traditionally the Chinese Malaysians have been the 
most entrepreneurial of these ethnic groups, with the Bumiputera people, while far from 
lacking in entrepreneurial qualities, lagging some way behind them (Badawi, 2003).  
However some 75% of the many manufacturing companies in Malaysia are Chinese-owned, 
and these appear to be as likely as any others to fail to be as innovative as they could be.   
 
Malaysia has put significant efforts into technology development, given the sizes of its 
population and of its GDP. However, putting more effort into R and D does not necessarily 
lead to more innovation and commercialisation and to higher company profits (Cebon and 
Newton, 1999; Dodgson and Hinze, 2000).  Restraints on, or hindrances to 
commercialisation, efforts are thought to include weaknesses in the process of effective 
technology transfer between research centres and companies (Conceição, Heitor and 
Oliveira, 1998; Salmenkaita and Salo, 2002; Hayashi, 2003; Jacob, Lundqvist and Hellsmark, 
2003), cultures of financial risk aversion in companies (Conceição, Heitor and Oliveira, 
1998; Feldman and Ronzio, 2001; Gambardella, 2002), lack or faulty provision of venture 
capital (Feldman and Ronzo, 2001; Conceição, Heitor and Oliveira, 1998), and lack of 
entrepreneurial skills and ‘spirit’ (Colombo and Delmastro, 2003).  Further, the outputs of 
university researchers and staff of government agencies have rarely been the most 
mainstream or traditional sources of technical change, which is usually industry-based, and 
incremental and/or continual. 
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Another interesting facet of the investigation concerns the understanding of relevant facts and 
ideas and the motives of Malaysia’s leaders. They appear to be strong believers in the 
contemporary and, in the developed economies, fashionable, rhetoric of globalisation, 
accelerating change and the knowledge economy, although these notions have been subject 
to serious criticism by some sophisticated researchers in their countries of origin (see, for 
example, Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Harzing and Sorge, 2003; Sorge and van 
Witteloostuijn, 2004).  Do these leaders really believe in all or some of the rhetoric? Or is it 
just used for convenience as part of a worldwide and legitimatory language of management 
(Bendix, 1956; Child, 1969; Enteman, 1993; Glover and Tracey, 1997; Glover, 2003). To 
help understand what they may genuinely believe and think, consideration has been given to 
their social and educational backgrounds and to their actions and apparent values over a 
number of years. Similar considerations have been applied to the wording of questions asked 
of all those interviewed, and to the replies that they gave.  
 
 
REPRISE AND FURTHER POINTS  
 
We have seen that the main concern of this thesis is the perceived low rates of uptake and 
commercialisation by Malaysian companies of the outputs of government-funded research 
and invention. The Malaysian government makes its efforts in this area through its ambitious 
Five Year Plans for its country’s economy. The relevant efforts take the form its IRPA. This 
operates with four principles, as noted above, and which are used when the NCSRD allocates 
grants for its R and D projects. The principles are largely concerned with better use of R and 
D, and with making it more effective through enhanced collaboration.  One important factor 
which was mentioned above is the unsurprising tendency for low perceived uptake of 
commercialisation to be more characteristic of SMEs than of larger firms. We have also 
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noted how, in most countries, problems with commercialisation include risk aversion in 
companies, inadequate management of the provision of venture capital, lack of 
entrepreneurial skills and attitudes, and lack of effective technology transfer between 
research centres and companies. Only the last of these appears to be more problematic 
Malaysian than in most other countries (Conceição, Heitor and Oilveira, 1998; Hayashi, 
2003; Jacob, Lundqvist and Hellsmark, 2003). Finally, the rather arm’s-length language or 
rhetoric used in this context by the Malaysian government has also been noted. 
 
In the literature on government participation in so-called science and technology 
development, several writers have offered reasons why government action is desirable 
(Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2002). In essence, a government is in a stronger position than most 
companies to obtain information about engineering inventions, scientific discoveries, new 
products and processes and so on. It is also more able to foster, manage and monitor the work 
of researchers, research institutes and universities. Further, it is clearly in a far stronger 
position to monitor the activities and development of whole industrial sectors than almost all 
individual companies can be. Therefore, it and its agents in universities and research 
institutes have both the capacities, and indeed the responsibilities, to inform, to encourage 
and to work with them (Hayashi, 2003, pp.1440).   
 
 
TOWARDS AN ANSWER?  
 
Both the relevant academic literature and the writer’s experience suggest that Malaysia’s 
difficulties with commercialisation are not particularly unusual. However, and as already 
noted, Malaysia appears to have a particular problem as regards the process of managing 
technology transfer from researchers and research institutes to companies through to markets, 
 7
with each kind of party involved partly at fault. This may be because Malaysia is still a 
developing country with a fast-growing economy, which is lacking in long experience of the 
relevant processes.   
 
According to Laperche (2002, p. 149), ‘the successful commercialisation of public research 
is the result of the application of an “organic paradigm” consisting of the four closely 
interacting factors of legislation, the economic environment and entrepreneurship, technical 
progress and university strategy’. Countries with very successful technically advanced 
industries like Germany, Japan and USA, and indeed to the United Kingdom in many 
respects, do seem to generate synergy between the main actors involved: government, 
industrial, educational and scientific, financial and legal, and they do also generally have 
long experience of the relevant processes and of appropriate building, use and adaptation of 
institutions. 
 
 
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
 
This thesis is concerned with two main and two secondary questions, and with an important 
underlying issue.  The two main ones address the main issue discussed above, inadequate 
uptake and commercialisation, by Malaysian industrial companies, of inventions and 
knowledge produced on their behalf by research government institutions, universities and 
others. 
 
First, why do many Malaysian firms apparently fail to make use of relevant discoveries, 
inventions, ideas and knowledge produced by Malaysian government research institutes, 
universities and others? 
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Second, why do the government research institutes and the universities and other researchers, 
whose work is funded by government and intended to be commercialised by Malaysian 
industry, apparently fail to persuade many companies to use their discoveries, inventions, 
ideas and knowledge? 
 
The two secondary questions concern two general possibilities that could be useful to explore 
because asking the relevant questions might bring important underlying assumptions that 
might simply have been taken for granted, out into the open:  
 
First, could there be a specifically Malaysian route to the commercialisation of inventions 
and knowledge? And if so, to what extent is the Malaysian government aware of this and 
able to use it? 
 
It was suspected that Malaysia is not particularly unique in this regard (for being unique!). 
Yet it was also recognised that even minor differences might have important practical 
implications. 
 
Second, do Malaysia’s government and its research managers and specialists provide 
information about relevant inventions and knowledge to companies in appropriate and 
persuasive ways? This was important because relevant problems could be ones of substance 
or ones of presentation. 
 
The underlying issue, noted at the end of the previous section, concerns the general character 
and status of relevant interaction between government, industrial, educational and financial 
interests and institutions. Many observers of the technical and commercial success of 
advanced industrial countries and sectors, and of various industrial regions and districts, have 
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emphasized the importance of productive relationships between such interests and 
institutions in them. In Malaysia, equivalent institutions and relationships tend to be newer, 
more small-scale and more fragmented. Therefore it might not be surprising to discover that 
technology transfer and commercialisation processes in Malaysia, with its developing 
economy, are rather less efficient than those in more developed economies.  Further, hard-
pressed managers of SMEs may be particularly suspicious of some of the language used by 
advocates of such processes, which may appear to them to be a little too detached from 
reality and complicated for comfort.   
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS   
 
To investigate these phenomena, a programme of 60 semi-structured interviews was 
conducted. The interviewees comprised 23 company managers and professional, 17 
scientists, eight technology transfer office staff (TTO), six senior research administrators, 
three venture capitalists, two journalists and a politician.  A few organizations which granted 
interviews also supplied some useful documentary data.  
 
Relevant sources of knowledge and information about Malaysia’s economy, its economic and 
general history, geography, government, politics and society have also been consulted. Full 
details of the research methods and of the reasons for choosing them, and of their necessary 
and other limitations, are spelt out in chapter 5 below.  
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THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS   
 
In the next chapter, Malaysian industry and its organisation, strengths and weaknesses, and 
possible futures, are described and explored. This is done in the context of discussions of the 
nature of Malaysian society and of industrialisation. The latter is a formerly very influential 
notion which is no longer the subject of social scientific attention in the established industrial 
countries on anything like the scale that it enjoyed eighty or even forty years ago. However 
an important assumption of this thesis is that industrialisation is the master process of human 
development since the sixteenth century, and that although it may not be possible to forecast 
the time of its ending with anything remotely like precision, it is incomplete, not only in 
developing countries, but in virtually all countries including the most highly developed 
‘advanced industrial’ ones like France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the USA 
(Ackroyd, Glover, Currie and Bull, 2000; Glover, 2003).  
 
In this chapter, various general and other relevant features of Malaysia’s history, 
government, economy and society are noted.  Three particular foci are: the organization of 
relevant civil service departments; economic and employment structure; and the educational, 
ethnic, occupational and social backgrounds of Malaysia’s administrative, educational, 
industrial, political and scientific elites.   
 
Malaysia’s economy is subdivided into four categories. Energy and extraction, including 
agriculture, fishing and forestry, is the first. Malaysia produces a considerable amount of 
crude oil, liquefied natural gas and hydroelectric power, with considerable state involvement. 
In 2002 about 17% of its labour force is in agriculture. The second category consists of 
manufacturing (24.1%) and construction (8.5%), which includes automobiles, building, civil 
engineering, ceramics, chemicals, clothing, electrical and electronic goods, engineering 
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construction, furniture, plastics, rubber products and steel. The third category consists of 
directly goods-related services (49.9%), those which feed into or off manufacturing and 
construction. Examples include architecture, distribution, garage services, investment 
analysis, marketing research, plumbing, retailing, software engineering, and.  Fourth and 
finally, there are government and other public services like defence, taxation, education, and 
health care.   
 
Finally in Chapter 2, a number of conventional business strategy measures, namely the 
Boston Matrix, PEST analysis, SWOT analysis and Michael Porter’s five forces, are applied 
to the Malaysian economy in general and to industry and to important industrial sectors in 
Malaysia in particular. This is done to help develop understanding of Malaysia’s economy. 
Suggestions are then made, using my own thinking and the evidence of others, about barriers 
to commercialisation in Malaysia. Finally, various possible and likely futures, sustainable 
and other, of Malaysia’s economy, are considered.   
 
In chapter 3, 25 relevant concepts are explored. They are: Kunst, Wissenschaft and Technik, 
respectively the German words for the fine and performing arts, broadly defined science, 
engineering and technology, the arts and humanities and other ‘making and doing’ subjects; 
commercialisation, culture, design, development, discovery, production, sustainable 
development, entrepreneurship, innovation, invention, (the) management of change, 
performance, research and development (R and D), science, success, technical change, 
technological change and technology transfer.  The three German concepts, which have 
direct counterparts in the most other Continental European languages, are relevant because 
together they constitute a different and arguably more realistic system for classifying subjects 
for study and of describing the relationship between the academic world and the practical one 
than that used in the main English speaking countries.  The difference has major implications 
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for this study, because it suggests that certain assumptions from the latter countries, 
influential in theorising about commercialization and technical change in the developing 
world, may be misleading. Commercialisation is a fairly uncontentious if slightly complex 
notion concerned with making ideas and inventions profitable. Culture is a much more 
complicated idea, one which ‘says so much because it says so little’, and which, when it is 
used explicitly, tends to involve writers glossing over its essence (Sorge, 1982-83). 
Hopefully the discussion of it in chapter 3 shows how it can be used both unambiguously and 
helpfully. The nature and generally underrated role of design in technical change and 
innovation, including commercialisation, is also clarified in this chapter. Development is 
considered as something that Malaysia is still undergoing in many respects and in several 
ways which have specific relevance to the study.  Engineering and engineers are words 
which are often conspicuous by their absence in academic discussions of technical change 
and commercialization.  Technology and technologist are often preferred.  Yet, in most 
industrial and other countries, at least 90% of so-called technologists are engineers by 
qualification and job title (Glover and Kelly, 1987).  To describe engineering as an ‘-ology’ 
when it main outputs consist, not of scientific papers free for anyone to read, but mainly of 
three-dimensional artefact for sale, is normal in English-language discussions of relationship 
between science and engineering, in which the latter often precedes the former because it is 
mistakenly regarded as the main sources of development of the latter (Fores and Rey, 1979).  
Entrepreneurship is discussed because of its apparent value in commercialisation, and 
because the research evidence on it does indeed have considerable relevance to this study, 
both in detail and more generally. 
 
The same points obviously apply with innovation and invention. Innovation is more than 
invention.  Obviously, for an invention to be profitable, finance, design and marketing need 
to be involved: a technical development has to be commercialised.   However innovation 
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often does more than improve techniques, product and profit.  It can help to spawn and 
spread generic technologies that develop industries and large-scale patterns of consumption 
too.  Regarding invention, there is a longstanding element of controversy in debates about the 
contributions of the unpredictable technical ingenuity of much of engineering and of new 
scientific knowledge to the process (Sorge and Hartmann, 1980).  Insofar as some of the 
views expressed in these debates may be mistaken or irrelevant in particular situations, they 
may affect the actions of companies, government advisers and so on in unhelpful ways.  
 
The literature on the management of change contains some widely publicised prescriptions 
likely to be relevant to the present study, and these are discussed in some detail in this 
chapter.  There are relevant mainly because most writers on the subject stress the need for 
managers of change to understand the backgrounds, interests, attitudes and influences on 
those whose lives will be affected, and because there at least some indications that the 
language and actions of those involved and affected in Malaysia that suggest the relevant 
changes could be managed with greater sensitivity and more effect.    
 
Also clearly relevant, the notion of performance has many meanings, some less objective 
than others, so that a definition that is both relevant for present purposes and broadly valid is 
developed. R and D is another term covering a wide range of activities, and it is also 
controversial as regards the contributions of unpredictable technical ingenuity and existing 
(including new) scientific knowledge to technical change. This controversy is considered and 
resolved, at least for present purposes, in chapter 3. Science is usually defined using phrases 
like ‘verifiable knowledge of phenomena’ (Fores, 1976).  Its role in technical change (and 
commercialization) is more controversial than many policy-makers assume.  The notion, or 
rather many notions, of success, are dealt with, and they receive the same kind of treatment 
as that, or those, of performance, in that a valid and reliable definition, one concerned with 
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the quality, volume and influence of output overtime, is developed.  The main difference 
between the definitions of performance and those of success is concerned with influence.  
Success is thought of as a high level of performance (taking circumstances into account) that 
is influential or which has the potential to be so.  Sustainable development, that which does 
not consume the earth’s resources at faster rates than the ones at which they can be renewed, 
has relevance for business, industry and government everywhere.  Technical change is 
defined as accurately and unambiguously as possible, against a historic backcloth in which 
engineering and science have been conflated and confused.  Technology transfer is a notion 
that covers a number of ways of which expertise and knowledge are used in new contexts and 
in ways that are commercially viable.   
 
Chapter 4 reviews thinking about the nature and state of technical change and 
commercialisation in Malaysia. First, points from chapter 3 are taken, along with relevant 
theoretical accounts and evidence-based debates, to discuss two master models of technical 
change, the ‘linear’ applied science (or science leads to technology leads to hardware) and 
the technique (or Technik) ones (Sorge and Hartmann, 1980). A tendency of the writer to 
prefer the latter is explained along with reasons why this preference does not exclude valid 
aspects of the former. Second, there is a discussion of commercialisation and innovation, of 
different kinds of them, of the institutions and kinds of individual involved, and of the history 
of relevant theories.  Third, a number of relevant historical and other comparative dimensions 
are explored, such as the characteristics of technical change and commercialisation in 
different stages of industrialization, in different sectors and parts of the world, and relevant 
features of national and organizational learning.  Finally, in chapter 4, overviews of what are 
known about innovation and commercialisation in Malaysia and of how they are influenced 
and organized, are presented.  
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In chapter 5 the reasons for deciding to use interviews of relevant interested parties, such as 
company owners and managers, professionals and politicians, civil servants and government, 
and university researchers in Malaysia, as the main sources of data, are explained, as are 
those for selecting the populations from which the samples of interviewees came. Relevant 
philosophical assumptions and their methodological implications for the study are discussed.  
The choice of critical realism as the research philosophy, and the definition and choices of 
the qualitative elements of the study are explained.  Expectations about and, as far it was 
possible to discover, the reality of, response and response bias, are explained.  Finally the 
limitations of the study are accounted for.   
 
The next three chapters, 6, 7 and 8 explore the findings and in relation to the two main and 
two secondary research questions, and more in more diffuse ways, to the underlying issue 
described along with them above.   
 
Chapter 6 addresses the reasons why many Malaysian firms, especially SMEs, do not make 
as much use of inventions, ideas and knowledge produced by Malaysian government 
research institutions, universities and others, as the latter want or expect them to. Conversely, 
chapter 7 is concerned with why the government research institutions and the universities, 
whose work is designed to be commercialised by Malaysian industry, apparently fail to 
persuade many companies to use their discoveries and inventions. Chapter 8 focuses on what 
seemed at the outset the uncertain possibility of a specifically Malaysian route to their 
commercialisation and discusses and draws conclusions from the complex reality of relevant 
findings. The titles of these three chapters are, respectively, Company Perspectives, 
Scientists’ and Public Perspectives, and Discussion: A Malaysian Way? All of these chapters 
are concerned at various times, in generally low-key but often quite significant ways, with 
the presentation versus substance issue of the fourth research question, meaning the second 
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of the secondary ones, and also with the very important underlying issue of fruitful 
institutional co-operation in a fast-developing economy.   
 
Chapter 9 consists of the conclusions and recommendations.  It presents the theoretical 
contribution of the thesis.  It summarises all that precedes it.  It also describes the ways in, 
and the extents to which, the research questions have been answered and the underlying issue 
addressed. By doing this it arrives at a conclusion about how the main aim of the 
investigation has been achieved. The limitations of the investigation and the theorising 
presented herein are noted. In latter part of this final chapter, some ideas about future 
research are presented and discussed.  The ideas include ones for methodology developments 
(e.g. the use of case studies and longitudinal studies); research which focuses on sectoral 
dimensions, (comparing and contrasting CTT in different industries; and research which 
explores regional dimensions of innovation (in Malaysia).  Finally, the main academic and 
policy conclusions are spelt out, including their implications for theory and for practitioners 
in industry and commerce, government and administration, science and education, and 
finance.   
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
MALAYSIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 
 
 
  
INTRODUCTION  
 
In the first chapter some of the hindrances to commercialisation in Malaysia were noted.  In 
this chapter, the background of Malaysia and its industrialization are described and 
discussed.  The background are includes the geography, demography, resources, history, 
society, economics, politics and government and the economic development of Malaysia.  
Discussion of education that emphasises the philosophy of Malaysian education from the pre-
colonial era to the present is followed.   
 
The industrial policy adopted by the country is discussed in detail.  It considers the role of the 
government in developing industrial policy in terms of its five year more long term plans.   
There were series of policy developed by the government and related to the needs of it in the 
industrial development especially the problems of it.   Important specific factors such 
availability of natural resources and the openness of the economy has affected economic 
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development.  A wider context of development in Malaysia is briefly focuses on 
globalization and its affects on developing countries.  Many economic difficulties are based 
on the influence of more developed countries’ policy on them.   
 
 
GEOGRAPHY, POPULATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES    
 
Malaysia is in South East Asia, and its combine’s three major geographical parts, the 
Peninsular States, where the population is most concentrated, Sarawak, and Sabah.  The first 
one the Peninsular, more developed in terms of infrastructure, while Sarawak and Sabah are 
richer than Peninsular in natural resources and occupy the northern and western parts of the 
island of Borneo.  
 
Malaysia has many races, several religions and many cultures.  Based on the Malaysian 
government‘s 2000 Census, its population was 23 million compared to 18 million in 1991, 
with an annual growth rate of 2.6% over the period.  In terms of ethnic composition, the 
Bumiputera, the indigenous Malaysians, comprised 65.1%, Chinese 26.0% and Indians 7.7%.  
80% of its population are in the Peninsular States.  This demographic structure mainly 
evolved with immigration from China and India during the British colonial rule, from 1895 
to 1957.      
 
Using its natural resources, and with help from its immigrant labour from India and China, 
Malaysia became the world’s major exporter of natural rubber and tin during the colonial 
period.  Palm oil, together with timber, cocoa, pepper, pineapples, fisheries, livestock, 
coconut, fruits and tobacco, dominated the output growth of its agriculture. Palm oil is still a 
major foreign exchange earner. Tin and petroleum are the two main mineral resources of the 
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Malaysian economy.  In the nineteenth century and for the most of twentieth, tin 
predominated in the extraction sector of the economy.  In 1972 crude petroleum and liquefied 
natural gas took over from tin as the dominant export products of that sector.  Since then, the 
contribution of tin has declined significantly.  Crude petroleum and liquefied natural gas, 
which were discovered in oilfields offshore from Sabah, Sarawak and Terengganu, have 
contributed much to exports in particular and to the economy in general.  
 
 
HISTORY AND POLITICAL BANCKGROUND 
 
Early Malay kingdoms, namely Langkasuka (Kedah), Srivijaya (Palembang), and Majapahit 
(Java) existed from the ninth century. The emergence of the Malacca Sultanate in the early 
fourteenth century is widely held to mark the beginning of the known history of Malaysia.  
The Islamic Empire of the Malacca Sultanate covered the whole of Peninsular Malaya and 
the eastern coast of Sumatra and Brunei.  Malacca enjoyed widespread fame, in Europe as 
well as the East, as a port for East-West trade. The encroachment of Western powers began 
with the Portuguese conquest of Malacca in 1511.  The Dutch followed in 1641 (Winstedt, 
1962; Simandjuntak, 1969; Snodgrass, 1980).  Following the fall of the Malacca Sultanate, 
independent states emerged throughout the Peninsula, beginning with Johor in the mid-
seventeenth century, Negeri Sembilan and Terengganu in the early eighteenth century, 
Kelantan in 1764, Selangor in 1766, Perlis in 1843, Pahang in 1881 and Johor in 1885.   
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, nine kings were in power. In the mid-eighteenth 
century British traders established trading ties with the Malay kings.  The British traders 
eventually set up trading ports and took over Pulau Pinang (1786), and Singapore, which was 
previously called Temasik, in 1819.  With the endorsement of an Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 
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1824 the Britain tightened its grip on the Peninsula.  It established the Straits Settlements in 
1826.  The Straits Settlement consisted of Penang, Melaka and Singapore.  They formed a 
British Crown Colony with a governor who was also the High Commissioner to the Malay 
States. The Federated Malay States were formed in 1896, and they consisting of Perak, 
Pahang, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan.  These states were administered by a British 
Resident General based in Kuala Lumpur.   
 
The Unfederated Malay States, formed between 1914 and 1919, consisted of Johor, Kedah, 
Terengganu, Perlis and Kelantan. They had a British Adviser.  The British Advice Officer 
offered advice these states except in matters concerning Malay customs and religion.  The 
states agreed to accept British protection and to have no dealings with foreign powers except 
through the British.   Later, in February 1942, Japanese forces invaded and seem occupied 
the entire Peninsula.  
 
Following the Japanese surrender on 14 August 1945, the return to British administration saw 
the adoption of new policies. In January 1946 the British government, proposed a Malayan 
Union, which was to unite the whole of the Peninsula (except Singapore), which was to 
become a separate colony.  The Malayan Union would have a governor and central 
government.  This curtailed the authority of the rulers and the states considerably.   The 
creation of the Malayan Union reduced the status of Malay rulers and led to a loss of Malay 
rights. The proposals were opposed and resisted strongly by the Malays.  They came out in 
force to oppose the Malayan Union.  Malay associations came together to form a political 
organization, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in 1946.  It was initially 
meant to fight against the British plan to reduce the Malay rulers’ powers.  The policies 
adopted in respect of ethnic relations had been largely those of the UMNO whose leaders 
have always taken pride in the country’s strong economic growth and orderly political 
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succession through democratic elections (Seah, 1977). In 1946 the Indians formed a political 
party known as the Malaysia Indian Congress (MIC) and in 1949, the Chinese formed their 
own political party, known as the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA).  The UMNO, the 
MCA and the MIC formed the Alliance Party, which was later called National Front in 1951.  
The party was formed because the British wanted proof that the non-Malays could co-operate 
with the Malay before it would consider giving them independence.    
 
As an essential condition of independence, the Malays were first given more political 
responsibility through a Legislative Council which was set up in 1951 (Milne and Mauzy, 
1978).  The British committed themselves to withdrawing from Malaya and insisted that 
Malaysia must be created quickly, regardless of the opposition, and they virtually ordered 
Malaya’s leader Tunku Abdul Rahman to stand firm against British (Jones, 2002).  The first 
general election in Malaya was held in 1955.  The Alliance won a sweeping majority on the 
platform of early independence.  A conference with the British government began in London 
in January and February 1956.  This was followed by several months’ work by a 
Constitutional Commission.  As a result, the Federation of Malaya become a sovereign 
independent nation on 31 August 1957.  After independence, a federation of eleven states 
was established with a parliamentary system and a constitutional monarch chosen from the 
nine Malay kings every five years. At this time, there were racial tensions in the Alliance and 
there was bargaining over the constitution by the three main communities (Simandjuntak, 
1969, pp. 105-117).  The representatives of each group jostled for advantages to protect the 
interests of their nationals.  However the constitution came to favour Malays (Seah, 1977).  
In the constitution the Malays and other Malay–related people were recognised as the 
indigenous group, or Bumiputera.  The constitutions contained articles that obliged the 
government to give special privileges to them respect with regard to the issuing of permits or 
licenses for the operation of certain businesses, educational opportunities, and positions in 
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public services.  The non-Malays were also granted full citizenship and they were known as 
non-Bumiputera, and there was to be no interference in their influence on the economy.  
 
SOCIETY, THE ECONOMY AND MARKETS 
 
As explained above, Malaysia is a plural society inherited from the British colonial era.  
Many Chinese and Indian immigrants were brought into Malaya to work in mining and 
rubber plantations, mostly during that era.  They were purposely separated from the Malays, 
who mostly lived in the rural areas. The Chinese were generally from southern China and the 
Indians were generally from southern India.  Together they have contributed greatly to the 
ethnically heterogeneous character of the population in Malaya.  By 1833-34 there were 
about 24,000 Chinese, 15,000 Indians and 8,000 other non-Malays in Malaya, when the total 
population of all Malaya was about 750,000 (Population Studies, 1980). 
 
The main British business interests focussed on tin and rubber, and large numbers of 
Chinese, Indians and Javanese immigrants from Sumatra entered Malaya.  The British 
encouraged migrants to work in mining and rubber plantations, resulting in close 
identification between race and economic function in the Malay, Chinese and India ethnic 
communities (Jomo and Gomez, 1999, pp.10-11).  Of Malaysia’s 18 million populations in 
1991, the Malays accounted for 61%, the Chinese about 28% and Indian 8%.  By 2000, these 
proportions were Malays 65%, Chinese 26% and Indian 8% respectively. The total 
population was 23 millions (Statistic Department, 2000). The population in 2007 was 27.1 
millions.   
 
Malaysia’s ethnic groups have had different historical experiences, not only before the major 
period of immigration, but also afterwards. In the British colonial era the Malays consisted of 
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a small aristocracy and a mass of peasants in the rural areas.  These peasants grew rice, 
fished and gathered jungle products.  The aristocrats monopolised trading and mining.  The 
former were effectively barred from social and the economic advancement.  The British were 
more involved in business and the Malay community lost its opportunity to be involved in 
trade and commercial activities (Snodgrass, 1980. pp. 29).   The British introduced an export-
based economic system that superseded trading and self-sufficiency.  The large influx of 
immigrant workers from China and India was the foundation of the ethnic, economic, social 
and political structure.  Now most Malays who are not employed in agriculture and 
extraction work in the public sector, whereas the Chinese are significantly more involved in 
trade and business, and most Indians still work on the rubber plantations. 
 
 
ECONOMIC POLICIES  
 
Rapid economic development took place under British colonial rule.  Rubber was introduced 
from Brazil in 1877 and was planted on a large scale in the early twentieth century.  The rich 
land near and around Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and Taiping was exploited for rubber planting and 
tin mining.  Rubber and tin mining production were the main contributors to Malaya’s export 
earnings.  Kings, the wealthy rulers, were able, through patronage, to command support from 
the middle class group of Malays.  The latter gave support to the Malay peasants.  This 
economic structure of Peninsular Malaya has been characterised as feudal by Drabble (2000).  
Malaya was long a major producer of both tin and rubber, causing the country to develop 
rapidly during the first half of the twentieth century.  Malaya was Britain’s most single 
profitable colony and contributed more foreign exchange in pounds sterling to British coffers 
than the rest of British Empire in the last quarter of the 19th century.   
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From 1970 to 1990, Malaysia implemented its New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP was 
an affirmative action economic policy based on ethnicity. Social unrest between races in 
1969 stimulated formulation of this new policy for economic development. The policy was 
introduced in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975). Two major features of the NEP were 
eradication of poverty among the entire population, and restructuring of society to remove 
identification of economic function with race. Combined with the NEP, the government has 
its first Outline Perspective Policy (OPP1) covering the period from 1971 to 1990. The OPP1 
policy had three main features, an industrialisation strategy, an economic framework and the 
national objectives as presented in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Outline Perspective Policy 1971-1990 
Industrialisation Strategy Economic Framework National Objectives 
 
1. Shift from import substitution to 
export orientation industries. 
2. Increase Bumiputera’skill, 
ownership and entrepreneurship 
3. Address income inequality 
4. Interdependence between 
economic development and 
equity 
5. Expand industrial development 
6. Promote human resource 
development 
 
 
1. New economic policy 
2. Economic expansion 
3. Economic 
diversification 
4. Economic balance 
 
1. National unity 
2. National integration 
3. Poverty eradication  
4. Eliminate identification of 
occupational by race 
5. Entrepreneurial economy 
6. Human resource development 
 
Source:  EPU, 2002 
 
The OPP 1 covered the 20 years from 1971 to 1990, and encompassed four national plans, 
namely the Second to the Fifth Malaysia Plans. These development plans were implemented 
in the framework of strategies of the NEP. As part of the restructuring of society, the OPP1 
also deliberately tried to reduce regional disparities between states and regions, especially 
those in the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia, as well as in Sabah and Sarawak. The 20-year 
time frame for attainment of objectives and targets set in the OPP1 for the restructuring of 
society was to end by the completion of the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990).    
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In the event, however, and due to the underachievement of the targets, the objective of 
equitable restructuring of society and wealth was carried forward to the OPP2 (1991-2000) 
under the Sixth and Seventh Malaysia Plans. The performance of the Malaysian economy 
under OPP1 had been satisfactory as far as the government was concerned, with the average 
GDP growth rate of 6.7 percent per annum, with the exception of 1985, when the country 
registered a negative growth rate. Exports grew by 9.2 percent per annum, exceeding the 7.15 
percent target. The OPP1 also saw distinct changes in the composition of exports from 
rubber, which declined from 33.4 percent in 1970 to 3.8 percent in 1990, to the contribution 
of oil and gas, which rose from 4 percent to 16 percent. 
 
Under the OPP1, the process of development involved the modernisation of rural areas, rapid 
and balanced growth of urban activities, and the creation of more share capital ownership 
among the Malays. The NEP thus called for a financial redistribution from the minority of 
wealthy non-Bumiputera racial groups to the Bumiputera.  Malays had not received a 
proportionate share in the general economic progress, particularly in the expanding non-rural 
sector. Of ownership of corporate wealth, 63 percent was in foreign hands, 35 percent other 
Malaysian, predominantly Chinese, and merely 2 percent Malay (Drabble, 2000, pp. 197-
198). In other words, this NEP was designed to address racial and regional imbalances in the 
ownership and control of wealth.  The NEP was seen as emphasising the reduction of the 
inter-ethnic economic disparities rather than poverty reduction (Gomez and Jomo, 1999).     
 
While the development of agriculture and industries based on natural resources remained 
important throughout the period, Malaysia looked increasingly to manufacturing to fuel 
economic growth.  Policies passed through several phases, each defined by a dominant 
strategy. The first phase, from 1958 to 1970; was first round of Import-Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISI).  From in 1970 to 1980 there was the first round of Export-Oriented 
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Industrialisation (EOI).  From in 1980 to 1985 there was the second round of ISI and from 
1986 and onwards; a return to EOI.  Underlying these phases were the successive five-year 
Malaysia Plans (numbers one to five in this period) from 1966 onwards, and the NEP from 
1970 to1990 (Drabble, 2000). 
 
Before the mid-1980s industrialisation policies comprised a range of initiatives scattered over 
time.  They included policies emphasising pioneer industries (1958), investment incentives 
(1968), and industrial co-ordination (1975). Atul (1994) concluded that during the period of 
the NEP, the role of manufacturing was emphasised more than anything else. The objectives 
of the post-1990 economic development policy were first set out in 1991 by Dr. Mahathir, 
who was former prime minister two months into the post-NEP period, when he presented his 
Vision 2020 plan.  Containing nine ‘central strategic challenges’, the plan’s goal was for 
Malaysia to achieve ‘fully developed country’ status by 2020, mainly by accelerating 
industrialisation, growth and modernisation.  
 
The nine main objectives of Vision 2020 were to establish, first, a united, peaceful, integrated 
and harmonious Malaysian nation. Second, it sought a secure, confident, respected and robust 
society that was committed to excellence. Third, a mature, consensual and exemplary 
democracy was desired. Fourth, it sought a ‘fully moral’ society with citizens strongly 
imbued with spiritual values and the highest ethical standards. Fifth, it sought a society that 
moulds its cultural, ethically and religiously diverse, liberal, tolerant and unified society. 
Sixth, society should be scientific, progressive, innovative and forward-looking. Seventh, it 
would be a caring society with a family-based welfare system. Eighth, it would be a caring 
society that was ‘economically just’, with inter-ethnic economic parity; and ninth, it would 
have a ‘fully competitive, dynamic, robust, resilient and prosperous economy’. This vision 
sought a more competitive, market-disciplined, outward-looking, dynamic, self-reliant, 
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resilient, diverse, adaptive, technologically proficient and entrepreneurial economy with 
strong industrial links, productive and knowledgeable human resources, low inflation, an 
exemplary work ethic and a strong emphasis on quality and excellence (Gomez, 1997, p. 
169) 
  
 Towards the end of 1990, the Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2), covering the period 
1991-2000 was formulated.  It was based on the policy called the New Development Policy 
(NDP). The NDP was built on the achievements of the OPP1, so as to accelerate the 
processes of eradicating poverty, and restructuring society to correct social and economics 
imbalances.  It provided a framework for achieving these socioeconomic objectives in the 
context of a rapidly expanding economy.  In formulating the NDP, the Government 
considered the views and proposals from various groups including those spelt out in the 
reports of the National Economic Consultative Council (NECC) on the post-1990 policy for 
the country. 
 
The government had endorsed national unity for the ultimate goal of socioeconomic 
development because it believes that a united society was fundamental to the promotion of 
social and political stability and sustained development. Development policies and strategies 
under the NDP, (covering the period 1990 to 2000), take the cognisance of the diversities of 
Malaysia, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious as well as regional, so that a harmonious, 
tolerant and dynamic society can be achieved. The NDP maintains the strategies of the NEP. 
Its new dimensions were first, the focus of the anti-poverty strategy on eradication of 
absolute poverty and at the same time reduction of relative poverty. Further, it focused on 
employment and the rapid development of an active Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial 
Community (BCIC) to help the meaningful participation of Bumiputera in more advanced 
sectors of the economy. Then, its relied more on the private sector to be involved in 
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economic restructuring by creating greater opportunities for its growth. Last, it focused on 
human resource development as a requirement for achieving the objectives of growth and 
redistribution.   These are of course the formal, stated, policies of the government.   
 
The stated objective of the NDP during the period of the OPP2 is to attain more balanced 
development, to help to establish a more just and united society. Building the thrust of the 
NEP in eradicating poverty and restructuring society, the NDP encompasses the social 
aspects.  The NDP tried to assure an optimum balance between the goals of economics 
growth and equity.   Further, it worked to ensure balanced development of the major sectors 
of the economy, and reducing and ultimately eliminating the social and economic inequalities 
and imbalances in the country, to promote a fairer and more equitable sharing of the benefits 
of economic growth by all Malaysians.  Also, it aimed to promote and strengthen national 
integration by reducing the disparities in economic development between Malaysia’s states 
and between urban and rural areas. This was also meant to help develop a progressive society 
in which all citizens enjoyed greater material welfare, while simultaneously being imbued 
with positive social and spiritual values, and a strong sense of national pride and 
consciousness.  
 
Promoting human resource development including creating a productive and disciplined 
labour force and developing skills for industrial development through a culture of merit, 
without jeopardising the restructuring objective.   The government also wanted to develop 
advanced engineering and strong scientific research, and educational planning and 
development, including building activities in generic technologies, and promoting an 
advanced technical and scientific culture as part as an advanced industrial economy.  There 
was also the aim of ensuring that, in the pursuit of economic development, adequate attention 
was given to the protection of the environment and ecology, to maintain the long-term 
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sustainability of the country’s development. 
 
For Mahathir Mohamad, the ex-prime minister (to 2003) of Malaysia, the Third Outline 
Perspective Plan (OPP3), which covers 2000 to 2010, marked the second phase of the plan to 
realise Vision 2020 that had been embarked on 1991. Since the launching of the New 
Economic Policy in 1971, the nation has clearly undergone rapid economic growth and 
attained significant social improvement, especially in the alleviation of poverty and social 
restructuring, for example by getting more Bumiputera people engaged in  business and 
industry.    
 
The success of these policies is apparent in the relative prosperity and quite harmonious 
ethnic relations that Malaysia enjoyed since the early 1970s.  Industrialisation and trade 
liberation have led to greater use of information and communications technology (ICT), 
helping to create a business environment in Malaysia which is more dynamic and productive 
than ever.  The OPP3 focuses on a few strategies for achieving sustainable growth.  The 
future competitive position of Malaysia will of course be influenced by how successful the 
country at innovation. Education and training are being developed by upgrading teacher 
training and by strengthening the teaching of English, and mathematics and other scientific 
subjects, for example.   
 
The main focus of the OPP3 period is the creation and promotion of new resources for 
growth in manufacturing, services and agriculture.  The sector strategies are intended to 
produce strong and sustainable growth.  The sector aims that will be pursued include 
strengthening manufacturing by developing industrial clusters and small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) as well improving standards and levels of education and training, and 
relevant developments in agriculture, services, utilities and infrastructure.  In OPP3 
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manufacturing has been into a phase of development.   This seeks to consolidate and 
strengthen the resilience and competitiveness of manufacturing as well as promoting new 
sources of growth.  At the same time, the development of industrial clusters is critical move 
for contributing to the future of manufacturing.   
 
Apart from OPP3, the National Vision Policy (NVP), which incorporates Vision 2020, 
introduced new policy. The NVP covers the period of 2000 to 2010.   It emphasises 
development on both domestic and international fronts, and necessitates a change in mindsets 
of policy makers and implementers and all other stakeholders involved in development.  One 
of the policies introduced in the NVP is acceleration of development capacity of industry and 
capabilities in engineering and science to enhance competitiveness further and to increase the 
use of information and communications technology (ICT) so as to enhance productivity.  The 
government has tried to improve the economic performance despite the problem of low 
Bumiputera share ownership.   
 
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS  
 
Many features of Malaysia’s civil service, including its management and organizational 
practices, were inherited from the period before 1957, when it was a British colony. Malaysia 
is a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. It consists of 13 states as well as 
two local territories, including Kuala Lumpur and Labuan Island. Each has its own head of 
state and elected assembly. Hereditary kings, under a unique system, elect one of their own to 
be the constitutional monarch, or Yang di-Pertuan Agong, of Malaysia for five years periods.  
Malaysia has a non-political, professional civil service, army and police force and also an 
independent judiciary. The Malaysian Parliament consists of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. These correspond very roughly, respectively to the UK’s Houses of Lords 
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and of Commons.  There are also the Senators, whether appointed or elected, serve six-year 
terms. Members of the House of Representatives are elected for five years.   Since Malaysia 
gained its independence from the UK on 31 August 1957, elections to the House of 
Representatives have been held regularly, every five years or less. The Prime Minister and a 
few ministers administer the Federal Government.  
 
Malaysia has fairly a strong new tradition of parliamentary democracy. The country has been 
ruled by the National Front coalition which is dominated by the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) since the first general election in 1957. As noted earlier, initially 
known as the Alliance Party, the coalition consists of the UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). The main reason for the 
formation of the Alliance Party was to claim independence for the Confederated Malay 
States.  In 1971, it was expanded to create the National Front, which presently consists of 14 
political component parties. The ‘Malaysian National Philosophy’ is the nation trust. This 
philosophy stands as the country’s guide to social unity and to its development.  
The formation and pursuit of the NEP by the government, as mentioned above, has been seen 
as failure by various critics.  Although its approaches to have sought to eradicate poverty and 
to reduce economic disparities between Malays and non-Malays, it critics have argued that 
most government projects and contracts have been awarded to those super-rich non-Malays 
who allied themselves to with the more wealthy and politically empowered Malays.  
Government leaders and politicians have been accused of abusing and violating the NEP and 
the Malaysian Plans and profiting from the system’s failures.  Many Malaysian leaders have 
been accused of corruption.  Based on the Transparency International, Corruptions 
Perception Index (CPI), Malaysia was ranked at 39 among 158 countries. This ranking is 
considered not good.   Its rating on the CPI is 5.1 compared to the highest ranking country, 
Iceland, with 9.7; Singapore was fifth with a CPI of 9.4.  Malaysia was categorised at 24 
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percent of people where corruption affects political parties (Transparency International, 
2003).  Political parties were perceived as far and away the most corrupt institutions in 
Malaysian society.  The UMNO has been accused of using political bribery to stay in power 
(Gomez and Jomo, 1999). 
 
EDUCATION  
 
Malaysia’s education system has a guiding philosophy based on the Malaysia National 
Philosophy, or Rukun Negara. One the objective of this is to achieve unity of all the 
Malaysian people.  A newly adapted philosophy is known as the National Ideology of 
Malaysia, and is based on the Vision 2020 of 1999.  The latter defines present and future 
human resource needs. As mentioned above, Vision 2020 was written to help implement the 
development of Malaysia based on its own determination of the nature of its values and 
development, so that the country would not copy of ideas of progress derived from other 
nations (Barjunid, 1996).  Education has become a major priority of the Malaysian 
government and a very large proportion, 27% in 2003, of the national budget has been 
allocated to it.  Literacy has improved since 1990s is revealed in Table 2.1.  Pre-school 
education starts from age five for two to three years, primary education is from age seven for 
five to seven years, lower secondary education is from age 13 for three years, upper 
secondary education is from age 16 for two years, post-secondary or sixth form education is 
from age 18 for one or two years, higher education at first degree level is from age 20 for 
three to five years, and postgraduate studies can last for one to five years.  
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Table 2.2: Malaysia, Illiteracy and School Completion 
Year 1998 1999 2000 
Illiteracy total (% age 15 and above) 
Illiteracy female (% of age 15 and above) 
Net primary enrolment (% relevant age group) 
Net secondary enrolment (% relevant group) 
    14.5 
    19.1 
      .. 
      .. 
    12.6 
  16.6 
   98.5 
   70.2 
12.1 
16.0 
.. 
.. 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators Database, 2003 
 
Malaysia’s education system serves about 4,800,000 school children and over 200,000 
students in university at home and abroad (Barjunid, 1996).  Governments have sought to 
tailor the system to suit Malaysia’s multifaceted society.  After the British left in 1957 
education was revamped.  The late Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia’s first Minister of Education, 
signed a Report of the Education Committee, known as the Razak Statement Report, in 
1956(Barjunid, 1996).  The aim has been is to develop a national education system that 
would contribute to the social, economic and political development for all the people of 
Malaysia.  The unity of the nation was a major educational concern.   This was the beginning 
of a specifically Malaysian curriculum. 
 
There then followed the 1960 statement report from Rahman Talib, which sought to speed up 
integration of the society (Barjunid, 1996). The ‘Rahman Report’ led to the Education Act of 
1961.  This was also intended to speed up the process of national assimilation and 
unification, and Bahasa Malaysia, the national language, became a compulsory subject in all 
primary and secondary schools and the only major medium of teaching.  Further, the Rahman 
Report emphasized technical and other vocational education, and religious education as a 
vehicle for the fulfilment of spiritual needs.        
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 In 1979, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, the ex-Prime Minister who was then the Education 
Minister, produced a report of the Cabinet Committee on the implementation of the 
‘Principles of Learning’ (Barjunid, 1996).  This sought to increase patriotism and the 
production of more skilled people for national development. It also prioritised balancing 
educational provision in urban and rural areas.  It wanted education, its management in 
education and the development of curricula to be tailored to Malaysian conditions.  In 1995 
and 1996, the Education Act of 1961 was amended to help Malaysians think more often and 
effectively, and into 21st century, about their futures.  The stated ideal for the Malaysian 
education system was one that sought to develop individuals who were responsible and 
capable of achieving high levels of personal well-being, as well as being able to contribute to 
the harmony and wealth of Malaysia.    
 
The education system is organised by the Ministry of Education (MOE).  This is the largest 
Ministry in the Malaysia’s government.  The public sector is the largest provider of education 
from primary schools through to universities.  Private sector education is governed closely by 
rules, regulations and procedures monitored by the Registrar of Schools and Teachers 
Division of the Ministry of Education. The main task of primary schools is to teach basic 
skills of reading, writing and arithmetic.  Secondary school pupils are divided into six often 
overlapping categories: regular, fully residential, vocational, technical, religious and special.  
 
In the 1980s greater priority was given to ‘science and technology’ due to the perceived 
needs of economic development. Vocational and technical pupils became foci of government 
attention in some respects.  To some extent, technical education has been reinforced to meet 
the country’s need for engineers for production, design, development and so on, and for less 
highly qualified technical competent and knowledgeable employees including skilled 
production staff.  A loan of US$40 million was given by the Asian Development Bank to the 
 35
Technical Education Project under the Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996-2000 (Asian 
Development Bank, 1997). The aims of this included improving the quality and expanding 
the capacity of Malaysia’s technical education by building four new technical schools and 
upgrading 17 other secondary vocational schools in Malaysia.  
 
Ingress (1979) studied Malaysian educational policy and its relationship with the 
occupational structure, and suggested that the government had had some success in using 
education to develop access to technical occupations. In the first Malaysian Plan, education 
had the major aim of restructuring society to increase economic equality, especially for the 
Malay population, and of narrowing gaps in educational opportunities between rich and poor, 
and between the various regions and races in the country.  However, Ingress felt that 
although the British had been seriously concerned with Malay education, they had developed 
two different strands of it.  One major action had been to use was the Malay primary schools 
to replace the Koran schools (Ingress, 1979).  This sought to avoid promoting social mobility 
and the social and the social dislocation believed likely to result from educating rural 
children beyond their stations so that they became discontented with rural life.  These schools 
were designed for mass education of a low level kind. The other strand of British education 
policy for Malays was aimed at small Malay elite.  Pupils were mainly from the Malay 
aristocracy, along with a few talented commoners who were meant to fill administrative 
positions in the civil service.  The selective English-medium schools were academically 
oriented and based on principles associated with British public schools and their traditions. 
Snodgrass (1980) argued that, in the post-independence era, the kinds of Malay people 
educated in these schools have had access to many higher forms of managerial posts.        
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INDUSTRIALIZATION IN MALAYSIA   
 
 In 1960s, Malaysia was faced with a problem of high unemployment, which rose to more 
than 8 per cent in 1969. The economy depended largely on exports of primary commodities 
such as rubber and tin, which made it vulnerable to price fluctuations in world markets. 
There was the added problem of income inequality between its racial groups.  The plans to 
diversify the economy were potentially helpful politically and socially, as well as 
economically.   
 
Government support also included enhancements to the environment for private investment. 
In addition to the provision of tax incentives, the Government provided infrastructure such as 
industrial estates, and power and telecommunications facilities. The Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority (MIDA) was established in 1967. This supports and co-ordinates all 
industrial development. The Pioneer Industries (Relief from Income Tax) Ordinance 1958 
was replaced by the Investment Incentives Act 1968, which provided a wider assortment of 
tax incentives. During the 1960s the private sector was left to assume the leading role in 
industrial development and this involved the development of sectors such as food, beverages 
and tobacco printing and publishing, building materials and chemicals and plastics, largely 
for domestic markets.  
 
In the 1970s strong efforts went into the promotion of export-oriented and labour-intensive 
sectors.  Unemployment was still high and the small domestic market constrained the 
economy’s development.  Lack of domestic capital and professional and managerial expertise 
also held back industrial development. To promote foreign direct investment (FDI), the 
Government enacted a Free Trade Zone Act in 1971, following which the Bayan Lepas Free 
Trade Zone was established in 1971.  Licensed Manufacturing Warehouse (LMW) facilities 
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were established in 1974. The Industrial Co-ordination Act 1975 was also passed to promote 
industrial and other sectors.  Nine Free Trade Zones (FTZs) were developed in 1974 to offer 
tax-free areas with liberal customs controls for manufacturers that assembled at least 80 
percent of their products locally.  However, and in spite of all these efforts, the industries 
concerned were largely labour-intensive with simple technologies (Lim, 1994).  The 
shallowness of technical and industrial development in this period clearly reflected its youth.   
 
To develop Malaysian industry beyond this stage, the government promoted investment in 
various ways.  An overseas investment promotion mission was organised in 1972. In 1992, a 
new investment office in New York was established as part of MIDA investment promotion 
drive for foreign direct investment (FDI).  The 1970s also witnessed the establishment of 
electrical and electronics industries and other more labour-intensive ones such as textiles.   
Such developments resulted in Malaysia becoming a leading exporter of semiconductors.  
Incentive packages were offered to promote various labour-intensive industries, and help 
from the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) was obtained to 
identify special projects for promotion and training of MIDA staff.  Malaysia thus embarked 
on a structural transformation from an agricultural economy to an industrial one.  The factors 
that have helped this transformation are inter-sectoral dependence, terms of trade being in 
favour of industrial sectors, and the openness of the economy. 
 
The 1980s constituted a decade of structural adjustment and of deregulation. In the first half 
of the 1980s industrial policy focused on the widening and deepening of the industrial base. 
Heavy industries such as the motor vehicle, steel and cement ones were developed. The 
Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) was established in this decade and the 
first Proton cars were made in 1984.  Heavy industrial projects are generally large-scale and 
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require large investment outlays, and have long gestation periods and offer relatively low 
rates of return (Lim: 1994, 247).  
 
For the indigenous natural resource-based sectors such rubber, palm oil, timber and cocoa, 
the government’s focus was directed towards increasing the processing of Malaysian 
resources for export.  In the mid-1980s Malaysia was also affected by a worldwide recession. 
Manufacturing recorded a 4.9 per cent growth rate from 1983 to 1986 compared to the 12 per 
cent annual growth rate of the 1970s. In 1986, the first Industrial Master Plan (IMP1) 
covering the period 1986-1990 was launched. The Promotion of Investments Act of 1986 
was replaced the Investment Incentives Act of 1968. Thus, this liberalisation instrument was 
designed to promote manufacturing.  It included raising the threshold levels connected to 
licensing requirements under the Industrial Co-ordination Act of 1975. Other development 
included liberalised action of foreign equity policy and granting expatriate position approvals 
for companies with certain levels of paid-up capital. These measures generated a surge in 
FDI inflows and created job opportunities. Oleo-chemical projects based on palm oil were 
established and Malaysia became a leading exporter of rubber-latex products and oleo-
chemicals. Manufacturing registered a growth rate of 13.4 per cent for the second half of the 
1980s.   
 
Industrial growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s resulted in labour shortages in the 1990s. 
The unemployment rate was 3.1 per cent and 2.5 per cent in 1995 and 1996.  This was said a 
situation of full employment. Table 2.3 shows the size of the labour force and rates of 
unemployment from 1982 to 2000.   
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Table 2.3: Labour Force and Unemployment Rate 1982-2000, Malaysia 
Year Labour force 
in thousands 
Unemployment rate as 
% of the labour force 
1982 5,431.4 3.4 
1983 5,671.8 3.8 
1984 5,862.5 5.0 
1985 5,990.1 5.6 
1986 6,222.1 7.4 
1987 6,456.8 7.3 
1988 6,658.0 7.2 
1989 6,779.4 5.7 
1990 7,000.2 4.5 
1991 - - 
1992 7,319.0 3.7 
1993 7,700.1 4.1 
1994 - - 
1995 7,893.1 3.1 
1996 8,616.0 2.5 
1997 8,784.0 2.5 
1998 8,883.6 3.2 
1999 9,151.5 3.4 
2000 9,616.1 3.1 
 
Source:  Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 2000 
 
From this amount, manufacturing and services employment constituted significantly more 
then 70 percent of the labour force in 2001, as shown in Table 2.4.    
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Table 2.4: Employment in Malaysia by Sector in 2001 
Year 2001 
Total 9,512,000 
Agriculture 17.0 % 
Mining 0.4 % 
Manufacturing 24.1 % 
Construction 8.5 % 
Services 49.9 % 
 
Source: Ministry of Trade, 2002 
 
To satisfy the needs of manufacturing over 200 industrial estates were established throughout 
the country from 1975.  These were developed by such government agencies as the State 
Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs), Regional Development Authorities (RDAs), 
the Port Authorities and the Municipalities. New industrial estates are continually provided 
by these agencies to meet increasing demand.  Private developers are also involved, as well 
as government agencies, in the development of industrial estates in different States. Foreign 
Trade Zones (FTZs) are designed specially for manufacturing companies, which make or 
assemble products mainly for export.  Free Trade Zone facilities are provided to export-
oriented companies to enable them to enjoy minimum customs formalities and duty-free 
imports of raw materials, component parts, machinery and equipment, as well as minimum 
formalities in the export of their finished products.  With this help from the government, 
manufacturing contributed most compared to other activities to GDP between 1999 and 
2003, as shown in Table 2.5:                                
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Table 2.5: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sectoral Origin (RM million), 1999-2003 (at 
1987 prices) 
Years 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fishing 
Manufacturing Mining and Quarrying Construction Services 
GDP 
(at market prices) 
2003** 19,114 
(3.4) 
72,470 
(8.5) 
16,629 
(2.5) 
7,772  
(4.5) 
132,454 
(5.9) 
232,447 
(5.6) 
2002* 18,478 
(1.1) 
66,808 
(5.1) 
16,217 
(2.0) 
7,434 
(3.8) 
125,117 
(5.3) 
219,400 
(4.1) 
2001 18,269 
(1.8) 
66,808 
(5.1) 
15,892 
(1.6) 
7,159 
(2.3) 
118,764 
(5.7) 
210,480 
(0.4) 
1999 17,596 
(0.5) 
56,841 
(11.7) 
15,344 
(6.9) 
6,926 
(4.4) 
106,292 
(4.5) 
193,422 
(6.1) 
 
* Estimates by Ministry of Finance 
** Forecast by Ministry of Finance 
Figures in brackets are annual percentage changes 
Source: Economic Report 2002-03, Ministry of Finance 
 
So far, 14 FTZs have been established. They are at Bayan Lepas, Prai, Prai Wharf, Batu 
Berendam, Tanjung Kling, Sungei Way, Ampang, Hulu Klang, Telok Panglima Garang, 
Johor Port, Jelapang, Kinta Phases I and II, Tanjung Gelang and Sama Jaya. Licensed 
Manufacturing Warehouse (LMW) facilities were established from 1974 onwards to enable 
export-oriented companies to set up factories in areas where the establishment of FTZs is 
neither practical nor desirable. Another objective for providing this kind of facility was to 
encourage the dispersal of industries. LMWs are accorded facilities similar to those accorded 
to factories operating in FTZs.  
 
The Malaysian government recognises a number of problems with its country’s 
industrialisation.  These are manufacturing’s narrow base, vulnerable industrial links,  
weaknesses in local supply of intermediate products, inadequate development of indigenous 
technology, small value added of products, rising labour costs in production,  and bottlenecks 
in transport and ports.  There are also serious shortages of skilled people, a need to diversify 
products and markets, various problems caused by protectionism, trade blocs and managed 
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trade, local private sector performance, a need for agrarian reform, and various resource and 
environmental problems (Gomez, 1997, p. 172).  To address these,  the government drew up 
its institutional framework under the Industrial Master Plan Two  (IMP2) from 1996 to 2005 
under which an Industrial Coordination Council (ICC), chaired by the Minister of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), to provide the policies and direction for its 
implementation.  The Council’s members consist of representatives of the public and private 
sectors. The Industrial Policy and Incentive Committee (IPIC), chaired by the Secretary 
General of MITI, steers and guides Industry Task Forces and considers policy proposals from 
them before its proposals are submitted to the ICC. Its members consist of representatives 
from the public and private sectors. Each Industry Task Force promotes the further 
development of its sectors.  Its focus is on enhancing industrial cluster-based development 
and manufacturing in its industry clusters with a view to enhancing their competitiveness. 
 
Government policies under the IMP2 have four main features.  First, there is an international 
orientation.  There is reorientation from being export-oriented to being ‘internationally-
oriented’.  The foci are on developing world-wide marketing, manufacturing and sales 
capabilities.  Second, they seek enhanced competitiveness. This is meant to be achieved by 
industrial cluster development, deepening and broadening industrial link.  Third, they seek 
improvements to relevant economic foundations. This includes the development and 
management of people and technology, enhancing diffusion capacity, physical infrastructure, 
administrative support, tax and non-tax incentives and business services. Fourth, they seek 
growth of Malaysian-owned manufacturing companies, particularly in the clusters. 
 
 
The IMP2 thus aims to develop more broadly-based, resilient and internationally competitive 
industries (MITI, 1996).  The government pursues two strategies.  Its so-called 
 43
Manufacturing Plus-plus strategy emphasises aspects of value chains like design and 
technical development, integrated supporting industries, packaging, distribution and 
marketing services.  It sought a shift from assembly-based and low value added activities, to 
the use of advance technology including automation and increased total factor productivity. 
The second strategy under the IMP2 was a cluster-based industrial development one with an 
emphasis on developing competitive industry clusters by integrating key industries, suppliers, 
supporting industries, supporting business services, infrastructure and institutions, generating 
backward and forward linkages, domestic spin-offs and value added, and the development of 
domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).   
 
Since 1991, the Government has made high levels of investment in R and D activities to help 
strengthen the technical capabilities of the nation with the ultimate objectives of accelerating 
growth and enhancing competitiveness. Policies and institutional reforms have been geared 
towards strengthening science and engineering and improving R and D. Even before the 
Government launched programmes to promote technology and R and D, Malaysia’s 
conducive investment environment had attracted multinational companies to establish or 
intensify their research and development activities in Malaysia as steps towards 
strengthening their operations there.  Multinational companies (MNCs), besides regarding 
Malaysia as an investment centre for manufacturing, have also begun to look at Malaysia as a 
research and development centre. Motorola, Intel, Grundig, Hewlett Packard, Komag, 
Matsushita, Robert Bosch and the Sony Corporation are among the companies which have 
set up R and D facilities in Malaysia.  However, Jomo (1993) argued that there are limited 
levels of technology transfer, technical innovation and of links into the domestic economy.  
These MNCs can apparently operate as enclaves with a few spin-offs to locally controlled 
firms.   
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Under the Malaysia Ministry of Science and Technology and Environmental (MOSTE), the 
Intensification of Research in Priority Areas (IRPA) Fund was launched in 1988 to provide 
financing for research in areas of new and emerging technologies such as automated 
manufacturing, electronics, biotechnology, information technology and advanced materials 
technology. The IRPA Scheme was redesigned in 1991 to ensure that R and D resources of 
the country are invested in areas that can enhance industrial efficiency, productivity and 
competitiveness as well in the creation of home-grown technologies.  The objective of this 
scheme is to direct the attention of Government-owned R and D agencies and universities 
with R and D facilities and capabilities in areas of commercialised R and D. Under the 
Seventh Malaysia Plan, R and D funding under the IRPA Programme was increased to RM1 
billion from the RM600 million under the Sixth Malaysia Plan, in line with its emphasis on 
productivity-driven growth (EPU, 1999).  The figure increased to RM1.2 billion under the 
Eighth Malaysia Plan.  
 
To enhance private sector participation in R and D, in the 1997 Malaysian budget, the private 
sector was provided with access to the IRPA Fund through the Industry R and D Grant 
Scheme (IGS) which was established to provide grants to business enterprises on a matching 
basis to undertake R and D in government-designed priority technology areas. The IGS links 
between private and public sector linkages in R and D activities. To support R and D 
activities, a Science and Technology Human Resource Development Fund was established in 
1989. Another catalyst for the commercialisation of R and D findings was the establishment 
of the Malaysian Technology Park (TPM) in 1988. The TPM’s main role is to support 
industrial entrepreneurship, especially the growth of advanced technology sectors, to promote 
industrial competitiveness, to encourage reverse engineering and to accelerate technology 
transfer; and provide a link between industry, government, other R and D institutions and 
universities.  
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Another institution linked to R and D in Malaysia is the Malaysian Technology Development 
Corporation (MTDC). Established in 1992, it focuses on the commercialisation of university 
research results. There is also the Malaysian Industry Government Group for High 
Technology (MIGHT) which was set up in 1993 to exploit innovative engineering research 
for new business opportunities. In addition to the various funds and schemes available to 
accelerate R and D activities and technological development such as the MTDC-administered 
commercialization Research and Development Fund (CRDF) and Technological Assistance 
Fund (ATF).  Contract R and D company, R and D company, In-house Research and Double 
Deduction for R and D are incentives for research and development are provided under the 
Promotion of Investments Act of 1986 and the Income Tax Act of 1967. 
 
 
MALAYSIAN DEVELOPMENT IN A WIDER CONTEXT   
 
The economic policies of the Malaysian government are based on fairly conventional 
approaches to development.   Since independence, the main policy has been to maximise 
GDP.  However there is growing concern about the rate of use of natural resources and about 
whether continued growth is sustainable.  The policies adopted by Malaysian government 
continued the colonial open-door approaches to trade and industry. Import substitution-based 
industrialization was the earliest policy adopted.  The strategy of the government in the post-
colonial era was to promote investments favourable to private enterprise (Lim, 1992).  A 
rather narrow base of sectors was promoted.  Its main components were electrical and 
electronic engineering and textiles and footwear.  High proportions of the intermediate inputs 
for these industries were imported. Various incentives have been introduced to help develop 
local capital goods industries and the domestic production of intermediate goods, in 
particular that of components for electrical and electronics ones.  As the import content is are 
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still high for many products, rapid responses to external economic pressures with a view to 
increasing domestic sourcing of raw materials have been limited.     
  
Athukorala (2005) argued that Malaysia’s economic development policy had a long way to 
go in bridging its ‘development gap’ with the East Asian NIEs, let alone with the major 
OECD countries.  It had been in the first phase of the East Asian model of export-led 
industrialization.  Its manufacturing sectors tended to make labour-intensive goods, using 
low-cost labour with intermediate inputs and capital goods.  The future growth of the 
Malaysian economy depended on its capacity to follow the ‘the second phase’ of the East 
Asian countries’ development, that of the 1970s, which had relied on higher capital inputs 
and more sophisticated manufacturing.   
 
Stiglitz (2002) argued that the IMF and the USA’s Treasury Department and the World Bank 
had forced weaker economies to do the opposite of what the United States has done and still 
does when faced with the economic difficulties.  While the USA practiced deficit spending in 
times of downturn, the USA and the IMF forced weaker economies to balance their budgets.  
In contrast to its own protectionism and its major government subsidies for sectors like 
agriculture, the USA had pressurised the smaller economies to drop all protection and to end 
all subsidies.  Regardless of specific circumstances or the national conditions, so-called ‘free 
market’ solutions were forced on all dependent countries, even when clear evidence showed 
that such policies had led to further economic distress.  The IMF had worsened the Asian 
economic crisis of the late 1990s and the economies of Russia and other formerly Communist 
countries which were forced to follow advice from the IMF and the USA.    
 
Jomo (2005) contended that global inequality based on the consequences of international 
economic liberalization or ‘globalization’, had affected international trade, investment, 
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finance, intellectual property and the form of international economic governance.  Most 
critics of international economic governance like Jomo (2005) and Stiglitz (2002) had 
suggested that the IMF had made serious policy errors that had reduced cumulative economic 
growth and welfare for hundreds of millions of people.  The IMF had seriously failed to help 
devise more effective crisis avoidance safeguards (Jomo, 2005).   
 
Many developing or ‘late industrializing’ countries have established export-processing zones 
(EPZs) but these are often seen as policy instruments benefiting MNCs from the first world 
rather than developing host countries (Adnan, Ali and Ali, 1996).  The liberal policies of 
developing countries had sought to encourage SMEs from the developed world that make 
standardised parts and products to relocate in developing low-cost countries.  However, this 
had only created, and would continue to create, inter-industry links with their larger 
counterparts overseas, rather than with local enterprises.  Therefore it would stifle the entry 
of local businesses into simpler kinds of manufacturing.   
 
Another problem with the practice and theory of globalization was the development of 
emerging technologies, for example, new developments in electronics, information 
technology, robotics, biotechnology and new advanced materials.  These are gradually 
absorbed into manufacturing processes and then begin to affect relative factor costs and 
comparative advantage.  Thus Rajah and Ishak (2001) stated that Malaysia’s lack of such 
‘technology-deepening’ potential had blocked the country’s capacity to move beyond simple 
and basic manufacturing activities to more original design and branding activities.  Rising 
production costs alongside the emergence of more attractive lower cost sites, such as China 
with its cost-advantage and economic overheating had threatened to stall further expansion.  
Yet although Malaysia was still a major source of primary products, there has been a 
significant shift in the country towards higher value-added manufacturing from the 1980s 
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onwards. In terms of the economic development as by evidenced growth of GDP from 1990 
to 2000 based on World Bank (2006, Table 4.1) estimates, Malaysia is now regarded as a an 
‘upper middle income country’.  The indicator showed that the GDP average growth for 1990 
to 2000 was 7 percent, and that from 2001 to 2004 it was 4.4 percent.  The decline in the 
latter period suggested that Malaysia became increasingly exposed to international trade and 
capital flows.   
 
A lengthy argument about the conventional conception of development was put forward by 
Turner (2001).  Conventional development theory had been developed by advocates of 
modernization, Dependency Theorists, and Marxists.   Some countries had been slower to 
develop than others; and some countries were more or less exploitative or exploited or 
independent than others, and such factors were responsible for economic disparities between 
developed and developing countries.  Most development theories adopted in developed 
countries and most supranational and international institutions and organizations concerned 
with development recognized the affluence of the rich countries as its goal. Thus all of the 
focus of thinking about development tended to be on increasing levels of industrialization, 
economic activity and wealth, trade, investment and living standards.  Such thinking had also 
assumed that by increasing the GNP, all other aspects of society beyond the purely economic 
would improve.   
 
However, the advocates of development theories in particular, and of capitalism in general, 
had led to economic failure in many developing Third World countries.  High proportions of 
their resources of land and labour now produced for export, while billions of their people 
remained poor, and their ecosystems deteriorated.   Others have argued against the 
inefficiency of globalization, as others perceived that globalization had not benefited most of 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union economics (Morrissey and Filatotchev, 
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2000).  Stiglitz (2002) criticized major international financial institutions for advising 
developing countries to embrace globalization by implementing formulaic and largely 
unsuccessful approaches to liberalizing their economies.  Since the markets were not 
immediately self-correcting, Stiglitz argued that a more balanced approach to economic 
development was needed.  This would consist of a return to less ideological policies 
promoting Keynesian counter-cyclical fiscal measures, gradual transitions towards freer 
markets rather than strong pressure to change quickly, and more involvement by the 
countries and peoples affected in devising the policies that they would pursue.   
 
Bose (2001), in his arguments against the free market ideology advocated by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), wrote that the ideology was belied by the facts.  Well-known 
elements of the relevant beliefs included the WTO’s dislike of direct production subsides for 
agriculture, its tendency to forget the fact that productivity varies for many reasons, its belief 
that world market prices are the only valid relevant criteria for guiding output, and that free 
trade is the only trustworthy engine of economic development.   However, for Malaysia, the 
WTO’s trade policy helped to create a recession in 1997 as a consequence of lack of short 
term regulation of foreign currency movement and the instability of the financial system 
(Salih, 2002).  Other dubious attributes included modest investment in R and D, which 
included the training of engineers, scientists and other professionals; technologies that meet 
internal conditions, but may not meet external ones; technical advances that were sound 
enough in Malaysia but not exportable; and limited access in many sectors to technology, 
funds and international markets.  
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CONTEXT I: INDUSTRIALIZATION, GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
 
Here we consider general background factors to Malaysia’s industrialization.  In the next, 
‘Context II’, section the facts of it are spelt out.  Although industrialization began in the UK 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, its basis was established much earlier on.  
Contemporary patterns of world trade owe their origins to the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries and the trade of European maritime nations like Spain, Portugal, England and the 
Netherlands.  Long before that, however more local trade had been evolving into a regional 
and international expansion of trade. At first, much international trade focused on luxury 
goods and other rare items.  Examples included spices and fine cloths and other exotic goods 
from distant parts of the world (Wallerstein 1979). However industrialization in the West 
from the eighteenth century was increasingly a stimulus to trade in commodities like cotton 
and relatively simple products like clothes, domestic hardware and simple machinery, and 
slaves.     
 
The UK, the USA, Germany and France dominated world manufacturing in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  The UK helped to spread manufacturing investment 
overseas since the middle of the nineteenth century, for example, for agriculture, transport, 
mechanical and chemical engineering.  Between the First and Second World Wars, 
manufacturing investment in Europe was largely in chemical and electrical engineering. 
After 1945, manufacturing was still dominated by industrial economies like those of the UK, 
Germany, France and the USA.  Seventy per cent of the world production was still 
concentrated in four countries and almost 90 per cent in only eleven countries.  Around 
1950s, Japan produced only 3.5 per cent of the world total (Dickens, 1998). 
 
 51
Freeman and Perez (1988) argued that industrialization had had five phases.  They called the 
first, from about 1770 to 1830-40, the First Industrial Revolution.  This had been based on 
use of steam power in textiles, iron working and potteries. The second phase was from the 
1830s to the 1880s.  It is involved using steam power for railways and in ships.  Also, 
machine tools emerged as a key sector, followed by transport equipment, some heavy 
engineering and synthetic dyes.    The third was from the 1880s to the late 1930s.  It was the 
age of electrical and heavy engineering.  The dominant industries produced steel ships, 
armaments, heavy chemicals, synthetic dyes and electrical machinery, and this phase also 
included the emergence of such industries as cars, aeroplanes, radios and various consumer 
durables.  The fourth phase was from the Second World War (1939-1945) and after, between 
1939 and the late 1970s.  The dominant industries were automobiles, aircraft, chemicals and 
petrochemicals, electronic engineering and various consumer durables.  The fifth phase 
(1980s and 1990s) was one of information, communication and so-called new technology. 
Electronic technologies, software, telecommunication, robotics, new materials, 
biotechnology, chemicals and aerospace dominated it.   
 
It is generally agreed that industrialization began in the middle of the eighteenth century in 
Britain on the basis of invention of, or the search, for better products and processes by small-
scale firms (Amsden, 1989).  Industrialization from around 1860 or 1870 to early 1900 in 
Germany, the USA and elsewhere occurred on the basis of innovation, or commercialization 
of inventions through processes sometimes involving more systematic problem solving, 
sometimes with the use so-called R and D laboratories of enterprises.  While these two 
modes of industrialization differed, if only in their degrees of ‘scientific’ input and firm 
organization, they shared one key characteristic, the generation of new techniques and 
technologies by leading companies (Amsden, 1990).  Developing them gave the UK, 
Germany and the USA sustained competitive advantages for long periods.   
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Hirst and Thompson (1996a, 1996b) and Sorge (2005) have cast great doubt on the idea that 
globalization is the master trend of our age, by pointing out that levels of international trade 
have long fluctuated over time and that resistance from nation states and grouping of them 
and the rises and the falls of nations and empires have long been affected by international 
economic relations.  Ackroyd, Glover, Currie and Bull (2000) and Glover and Walker (2007) 
suggested that the main trend in the more developed human societies since the sixteenth  or 
eighteenth, according to interpretation, century, has been a process that is more fundamental 
and permanent, and one which has not ended: industrialization.  The arguments of these 
authors also cast doubt on the currently popular ideas that the pace of technical and economic 
change is accelerating (see especially Ackroyd, Glover, Currie and Bull, page 290 to 294, 
including Table 14.1), and that competition between firms and between nations is 
intensifying.  They point to the very often more incremental character of technical change in 
the period from 1950 around to around 2000 and to its very often much more dramatic, 
fundamental and discontinuous character in the decades around 1900. They, especially 
Ackroyd (2002; also see Glover 2003), point to the growth of co-operation between firms 
with inside and across national boundaries, to suggest that conventional assumptions about 
intensifying competition, as well as those about accelerating change, are simplistic, and 
possibly dangerous because they may encourage unnecessarily aggressive business and 
government.   
 
However technical and commercial competitiveness, clearly remains crucial for developing 
countries that have insulated themselves or been insulated from world markets (Lall, 2001).  
Gaining competitiveness is often difficult, needing much more than relatively passive freeing 
up markets.  It has to be built, and generally the process is complex, demanding and costly 
(UNIDO 2002).  Stiglitz (2002) argued that growth of international trade since the 1960s, 
involving elements of globalization, has often harmed developing countries.  So-called 
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globalization had not brought them anticipated economic benefits.  Third World poverty had 
often increased and there have been serious economic crises in Asia and Latin America.  
Critics of globalization had accused the industrial countries of hypocrisy for promoting 
economic interconnectedness in ways that had only benefited themselves.   
 
By the 1990s, the term globalization had come to mean higher levels of trade between 
nations, and especially of trade within multinational companies (Hirst and Thompson, 1996a, 
1996b), as well as reduced trade barriers, more international capital flows, declining transport 
costs, the portability of new technologies and more integrated financial markets. 
Multinational companies (MNC) could readily transfer production, in whole or part, to 
wherever mixes of materials, infrastructure, skilled workers, employment costs and 
regulatory requirements offered the potential to compete in international markets.  Yet Hirst 
and Thompson argued that if globalization is conceived as a process that promotes cross-
border exchanges and transterritorial agencies at the expense of nation states, then it is 
dubious.   The problem for countries was loss of benefits of domestic governance and 
increased exposure to international pressures. Critical future threats would be climate change 
and its consequences, population turbulence, and inequalities of national income.  
Government would have to protect their populations and to monopolize and control the 
distribution of key resources either by political activity or military force.  Some major states 
had already thought about access to water and oil.    
 
Hirst and Thompson (2002) argued further about the limitations of globalization.  
Globalization had been defined as increasing trade interdependence and integration of 
investment. Ohmae (1991) had argued that power of nation states was increasingly irrelevant 
and being transcended, hollow and defective (also see Strange 1985).  However, there was no 
real increase of trade in goods between North America, Western Europe, Japan and other 
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parts of East Asian. Hirst and Thompson argued that, far from market exchanges sweeping 
unhindered across the world, real limits to the further expansion of international trade, set 
largely by the continuing power of national territories and borders, were likely to continue.  
Second, the real constraints on any further development of global trade were more likely to 
be institutional, social, and political, or geographical, rather than economic.  Third, there was 
some evidence that world trade growth had slowed in recent years (meaning in the early-to-
mid 1990s).  Globalization was broadening mainly from international trade, but there was 
nothing so new or so special about it since the 1970s, except the greater and faster 
internationalization of information, communication, finance, news and entertainment. 
 
Amaravodi (2003) claimed that the fourth industrial era started during the early twenty-first 
century. Steel and steam existed in the first industrial revolution; the second industrial era 
was one of electronics, and the third one of the Internet.   Amaravodi had found a few key 
innovations in fields such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Molecular Engineering and Power 
Generation. In the next decades, the fourth industrial era fuelled by evolution in power, 
genetics, space exploration and information in industries as diverse as utilities, retailing and 
pharmaceuticals as well as the government (ibid, pp. 373). 
 
From 1750 to 1850, the world has experienced economic changes in the international trade.  
The Northern countries experienced the shift from agriculture to industry, and their economic 
growth took off. In 1990 the world’s richest nation is 4,500% richer than the poorest; in 1870 
the figure was 900%, and before the first industrial revolution, beginning around the middle 
of the 18th century, Western European per capita incomes were only 30 % above those of 
China and India (Maddison, 1983; Bairoch, 1993).  Further, to this, the diverse figures by 
Maddison (1991), Baumol (1994) and Kuznets (1965) asserts that the big north-south income 
divergence appeared with the first Industrial Revolution.  Thus, the industrial revolution 
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caused rapid income divergence by triggering industrialization and growth take-off in Europe 
while incomes stagnated in the many poor nations (see Baumol 1994).  The world 
experienced rapid incomes divergence by triggering industrialization and growth take-off in 
Europe while income stagnated in poor nations (see Baumol 1994).  The world experienced 
rapid expansion of international trade.  The most striking feature of the Industrial Revolution 
concerns the increase of growth rates.  For example, the UK’s per capita income rose by 14% 
between 1700 and 1760, by 34% between 1760 and 1820, and by 100% between 1820 and 
1870 (Maddison 1983).  Moreover, since population growth also increased sharply during 
this period, due to better economic conditions, the UK’s GDP rose even faster than the per 
capita figures suggest. Crafts (1989) argued that at the same time the UK became a large 
food importer and a large exporter of industrial goods. He noted that in 1700, 18.5% of the 
labour force was in industry, in 1899, 29.5% and in 1840, 47.3%.  Hirst and Thompson 
(1996) argued that the success of East Asian newly industrialized countries (NIEs) is due to 
high savings and careful state intervention, not to laissez-faire.  This demonstrates that it will 
be hard for most LDCs to follow NIEs, especially if they are forced to accept the new 
liberalism of the World Trade Organization Therefore only a few labour intensive sectors are 
likely to flee to low-wage LDCs, and high levels f FDI will lead to volatile and fragile 
growth (Radice, 1997).   
 
Glover (1992) produced two arguments in favour of manufacturing, especially in Britain.  
First, most services do not add as much value compared to production and manufacturing, as 
they tend to be less capital intensive. The ‘strategic reason’ (p. 38), that most countries need 
to have some ability to make armaments if they are to defend themselves, is also relevant, as 
attempts to encourage growth of production are much more likely to succeed in countries that 
retain capacities for example such those for steel–making and machine-tool manufacture.  
The second argument is the ‘rise of the self-service economy’. The standard of living and 
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employment were increasing, dependent of manufacturing as households replace services 
with goods and because a high proportion of jobs in services are good-related or goods-
dependent rather than ‘pure’ services jobs (Godley, 1986; Cohen and Zysman, 1987).  
Ackroyd (2002) took this sound argument further into the early twenty-first century.   
 
The importance of industrialization to developed and developing countries was emphasised 
by Myrdal (1956), who that ‘industrialization, and the growth of that part of the working 
population that is engaged in industry, is therefore a means of rising national income per 
capita’.  Another major motive of industrialization is to improve the stability of foreign 
exchange earnings and the national income through the diversification of exports.  Uniform 
powers, transport and communication grids have improved international trades (Amaravodi, 
2003).  GNP growth rates have doubled in many countries and industries now beginning to 
stratify along national borders based on established competencies (Porter, 1990).  Factory 
automation are mostly engaged in Germany, Japan and Taiwan, while the technical 
development of such agricultural methods, such as genetic farming, hydroponics and soil 
engineering have increased agricultural yields (Shapiro, 1999). 
 
In the USA, Cohen and Zysman (1987) emphasised why, manufacturing matters.  It mattered 
to the wealth and power to the USA.  The point is the USA could not just shift out of 
manufacturing and only engage in services. They stressed the directness linkages between 
services employment and manufacturing. Services were a complement to manufacturing, not 
substitutes nor successors to it.  Their argument thus attacks the side of a services-based, 
‘post-industrial’ economy as the natural successor to an industry-based one, as in some 
versions of the ‘stages of development’ idea (1987a, p. 5).  In such a view, agriculture is the 
first stage of development, industry is the second, and a knowledge-base service economy is 
the third. Alic (1997) argued that a post-industrial economy is largely a services one; in the 
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United States, services firms accounted for about 80% employment, while the manufacturing 
share had fallen to 15 %. However, Glover (1992) argued that employment statistics for 
manufacturing and services tend to mislead.  The main change of employment out of 
agriculture had occurred in Britain after 1840. In 1840 more people worked in services than 
in either agriculture or manufacturing, and this had always been the case since then. And 
many, in fact most, jobs in manufacturing were of services kinds. Manufacturing 
employment had never ever approached a figure that exceeded all other kinds. Most services 
jobs, like those in retailing, depended for manufacturing for their existence. Most of people 
worked in quite routine and/or intellectually undemanding jobs. Further, many services were 
performed by manufactured goods, as when, for example, television and filmed 
entertainment replaced live entertainment, and washing machines bought by home owners 
replaced hand washing and public laundries.  
 
Those last arguments drew on those of Gershuny and Miles (1983).  They argued in some 
detail that there are tight links between services and manufacturing jobs.  Services 
complement manufacturing, just as, for example, there are tight links between agricultural 
production and the food processing industry.  There are many activities bound to farming that 
are backward links: crop dusters, veterinary surgeon, harvesters, tractor repairers, mortgage 
lenders, fertiliser salespersons, agronomists, chemists, and lorry drivers.   Other sectors such 
as finance, insurance and agricultural machinery and agricultural chemicals manufacturing, 
all linked to agricultural production.  The same points also applied to most services and 
manufacturing.   For Cohen and Zysman (1987), the organization of manufacturing 
production in the USA in the mid-1980s made the employment of perhaps 40 or 60 million 
Americans, half or two thirds of whom were conventionally counted as service workers, 
depend directly on manufacturing production.  Thus, Gershuny and Miles argued that many 
service workers did not ultimately produce services. Services occupations and employment 
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sectors divided into, first, goods-related services and, second, services ones proper (p. 34).  
Good-related jobs were such as those in communications, wholesaling, retailing, banking, 
finance, insurance, property, technical services, marketing research and advertising, the 
hiring, maintenance and repair goods and so on.  In general they produced inputs to 
manufacturing (upstream jobs) or depended on its outputs (downstream of factories).  In the 
second category, most ‘services jobs proper’ are goods-dependent, if not goods-related, 
because they could not be performed without use of hardware of some kind, examples 
included catering, dry cleaning, entertainment, hairdressing, health care, teaching and 
tourism. For Glover (1992:34), if the goods-related services jobs were added to those in 
manufacturing, or more broadly defined ‘industry’, then industrial/manufacturing jobs 
remained extremely important, and constituted at least a half and often considerably more of 
all jobs in many industrial countries.   
 
The transition that we are experiencing now therefore is not out of industry into services, but, 
forms one kind of industrial society to another.  Cohen and Zysman (1987) argued that there 
was no such a thing as post-industrial economy.  The wealth and power of a country 
depended on maintaining at least mastery and control of production, and another was that of 
Glover (1992) who noted how in the UK and other industrial countries, employment in 
services had come to include about two-thirds of labour forces (p. 33), with manufacturing 
only accounting for around a fifth or a quarter.  However, this suggestion of manufacturing 
as a source of employment and wealth was very misleading and should be avoided (Glover 
1992; Lawrence 1989; and Cohen and Zysman 1987).  The truth was that the significance 
and weight of manufacturing was growing, with its output and capital-intensiveness.  Glover 
(1992) also argued that manufacturing was the core activity around which most others 
revolved, even if it much of it took place outside relevant national boundaries, and that look 
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down on and to opt out of it was illogical in terms of pursuits of one’s own interests, and also 
selfish(p. 40).   
 
Most developed countries have experienced periods when economic success was 
synonymous with manufacturing.  Birmingham was once ‘the workshop of the world’ for 
example (Inkster 1999).  Success in manufacturing was linked to geopolitical power.   
Germany was defeated in two World Wars partly because of the production by the USA’s, 
the UK’s and the USSR’s industries of machines like tanks, and bomber aircraft.    
 
Cohen and Zysman (1987) argued that many sectors like farming, textiles and insurance did 
not perform their own R and D.  They were the users of R and D performed in supplying 
industries and in specialized non-industrial centres.  It was the historical development of an 
industry, its relations with its suppliers, and its competitive and institutional structures, not 
only or even necessarily the nature of its product, that influenced whether or where R and D 
would be performed.    
 
In his chapter under discussion Glover (1992: 188) suggested that for much of the last 
century, British education had over-valued the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and 
that this had led to an arm’s-length approach to manufacturing, and to top-heavy 
management of it.   This tended to make educated British people look down on engineering 
and industry.   
 
On Japan, since 1950, Maddison, Roa and Shepherd (2002) argued that to understand its 
economic growth from then to 1973, one must appreciate the contributions of capital, 
education and training, technical progress and the organization of production.   Also Japan 
had been a unified country for a long time, had a homogeneous culture and a single language, 
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had achieved a savings surplus long ago, and had possessed significant social capability, e.g. 
literacy, infrastructure and central government, had never been colonised, and its government 
played a positive economic role.  On human resource management (HRM) Legge (1989) had 
noted that some versions of it emphasised the importance of high commitment, workplace 
learning, and leadership for productivity.  Most American or British HRM models, had 
suggested that human resources were valuable assets of employers, not a variable cost and 
emphasised the potential of employees as sources of competitive advantage.    
 
However, and in ways rather opposed to the points about the importance of education and 
knowledge to industry from Maddison, Roa and Shepard (2002), and Legge (1989), Illich 
(1971) and Dore (1976) argued that expectations of formal educational institutions, and the 
institutions themselves, are often flawed.  Illich (1971), a Roman Catholic bishop in Central 
America, wrote that formal education’s mix of compulsion, indoctrination and certification 
created an authoritarian mentality.  He argued that the mere existence of schools discouraged 
and disabled the poor from taking control of their own learning.  Clearly, anyone who sees 
freedom and self-direction as essential to educational processes can recognise a contradiction 
between education and coercion.  Yet Illich is surely right to make his criticisms and to 
report his scepticism about the role of education in developing countries.  Illich  (1971: 34) 
recognised four distinct ‘channels’ which could contain all the resources needed for real 
learning; things; people who serve as models for skills and values; peers who challenges, 
argue, compete, co-operate, and have understanding;  elders, experienced people who really 
care about others and expose learners to confrontation through of criticism. For example he 
proposed skill exchanges which could allow people who could serve as models for skills and 
values to list their skills, the conditions under which they are willing to serve as models for 
others who want to learn skills, and how they can be reached.   
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Dore (1976) argued that the basic general education which some of the entrepreneurs and 
inventors of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries received was probably not 
irrelevant to their later achievements which were accomplished by ‘hard heads and clever 
hands’ (Ashby 1961).   Training took place almost entirely in the factories, mines, workshops 
and mills, and not in schools, providing the skills which fed Britain’s industrial advance 
(Dore 1976).  In the pioneer era of industrialization progress took place through invention or 
by its importation and development.     
 
According to Illich (1971) school was not the only institution could shape human visions of 
reality. The curricula of family life, crafts, health care, profession, and the media played 
important parts in the institutional of manipulation people.  They used various kinds of 
vision, language, and demands. Along similar lines, Dore (1976) argued that the imagination, 
creativity, honesty, curiosity, and determination to get to the bottom of things, and the desire 
to do a good job were unlikely to be bred in school.  To Illich, school enslaved people 
profoundly and systematically, since only school was credited with the function of showing 
people how to form critical judgements, and paradoxically, tried to do so by making learning 
about oneself, others and nature depend on a pre-packed process.  He argued that the 
discovery that most learning required neither could be manipulated nor planned and that 
‘each one of us is personally responsible for his or her own deschooling and only we have the 
power to do it’.  By deschooling Illich meant a process which individuals, organizations and 
societies should use to free themselves of the rigid and authoritarian assumptions, practices, 
structures and other institutions of formal education and professional and occupational 
formation and development.  Illich (1974) thus offered a critique of formal education and 
professions.  Lister (1974) agreed with Illich that the notion of deschooling increased the 
range of alternatives to school and school-limited education and life-long learning, and that 
these (too check) are both vital areas for development (p. 17). 
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Dore (1976) felt that schooling altered people’s capacities and will to do things.  These did 
not only depend on what people learned.  Education aspired to be about far more than 
qualifications, and a mere process of certification.  Employers needed to understand this 
better and to be more critical of formal qualifications and more informative about the abilities 
and attitudes that job really demanded.   
 
I support that Illich and Dore would have preferred German education and management to 
them in most other industrial countries.  According to Warner (1998), the typical German 
approach to starting jobs was based on their technical requirements.  Technical expertise was 
regarded more highly in Germany than management or other statuses.  In German 
companies, engineering skills and managerial expertise were often combined in the hands of 
owners and professionals. Managers in Germany were far keener on making things than 
those in most other developed countries.  German management (although according to Sorge 
1978, Lawrence 1992, and Locke 1996 Germany mistrust the whole idea of management) is 
traditionally specialist rather than generalist.  More than a half of senior and middle mangers 
in German industry have been educated as engineers, and German management was more 
task-oriented and technically focussed than most managers elsewhere. German managers 
focussed on details, avoided uncertainty and had fairly consistent ways of managing. 
Lawrence (1992) reviewed the Anglo-German comparative evidence and literature to discuss 
the well-known high status of German engineers, the unusual dominance of engineering as 
the main route into industrial management, the higher pay ranking of German engineers 
relative to most other management-level people in Germany and elsewhere.  Lawrence has 
also emphasised the strong learning by doing emphasis in German technical universities and 
companies (Lawrence, 1980; Hutton and Lawrence 19881).     
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CONTEXT II: THE MAIN FACTS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 
 
Malaysia’s economy has experienced rapid economic growth since 1960s.  This growth has 
been accompanied by low inflation and reduced unemployment. Manufacturing has played a 
decisive role in this contributing significantly to output, investment, employment and 
exports.  The export sectors have been at the forefront in improving the economy, but have 
made the country highly dependent on buoyancy foreign markets.  In East and South East 
Asia, foreign corporations have been major forces in the development of exports, especially 
of goods.  For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the shares of foreign affiliates in 
national exports were as high as 57% in Malaysia (all industries), 91% in Singapore (non-oil 
manufacturing) and less at 24% in Hong Kong (manufacturing) and 17% in Taiwan 
(manufacturing)  (UNCTAD (1995 p. 214). 
 
It seems sensible to make comparisons of GNP per capita (US$) in Malaysia with selected 
high income countries like Germany, Japan, the UK, and the USA, and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NIEs) like Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan,  and other 
ASEAN countries like  Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.  In 1990 Malaysia’s GNP 
per capita was $2,000, compared to $18,000 for Germany; $24,000 for Japan; $17,000 for the 
UK; and $22,000 for the USA.  In of relevant NIEs, the figure for Hong Kong was $12,000; 
$12,000 for Singapore; South Korea $5,000, and Taiwan $8,000.  In other ASEAN countries, 
GNP per capita for Indonesia was $562, to the Philippines was $720, and Thailand $1,404.  
By 1995, Malaysia’s GNP per capita (US$) had increased rapidly to $4,000, compared to 
Germany’s $30,000; Japan’s $38,000; the UK’s $21,000 and the USA’s $27,930.  Rapid 
increases also occurred in the NIEs and in other ASEAN countries.  For Hong Kong it was 
$23,000; Singapore, $28,000; South Korea, $10,000; and Taiwan, $12,000.  Indonesia and 
Philippines was $1,000, and Thailand was $3,000.  
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Data on GDP show that the slowdown of the world economy in 1998 and 2002 led by a 
downturn in many major industrial economies.  The economies of the USA and Japan 
performed badly for various reasons, and there was weakening domestic demand growth and 
consumer confidence in Europe.  Also, investment in information and communication 
technologies fell in most countries (EPU, Malaysia, 2002).  The slowdown that began in late 
2000 was influenced by the fall in ICT equipment and software spending, high interest rates, 
rising energy prices and a significant decline in equity prices, particularly of technology 
stock.  The fall of stock markets slowed down economic growth further through negative 
wealth effects leading to marked decline in domestic demand and continued weakening of 
consumer and business confidence. Manufacturing output was either static or reduced due to 
lagging sales and the resultant build-up in inventory, particularly in semiconductors and 
personnel computers, which then led to further cutbacks in production (Ministry of Finance, 
Malaysia, 2002).   
 
The average annual growth of industrial output for these countries in the same period (1998 
and 2002) was  Australia 3.1% and 2.8%, China 11.1% and 12.6%, France 1.4% and 1.5%, 
Germany 1.4% and negative 0.1%, India 6.9% and 6.0%, Japan 4.2% and negative 0.0%, 
Korea 11.4% and 6.2%, Malaysia 6.8% and 7.5%, Myanmar 0.5% and 10.5%, the 
Philippines’s negative 0.9% and 3.5%, Singapore 5.2% and 7.3%, Thailand 9.8% and 4.9%, 
United Kingdom 3.35 and 1.2%, United States’ 3.0% and 2% and Vietnam 4.4% and 11.9%. 
 
 
THE FOUR MAIN SECTOR GROUPS 
 
Four main sector groups in the economy are examined below.  The first is energy and 
extraction, which includes farming and fishing, natural gas, mining and crude oil.  The 
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second is manufacturing and construction.  The third and fourth are privately financed 
services and publicly financed ones.  Output in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 in farming, 
forestry and fishing was worth RM 17,415 million, RM 17,596 million, RM 17,943, RM 
18,269 million, and RM 18,478 million.  The contribution of manufacturing to GDP in those 
years was RM 50,899 million, RM 56,841 million, RM 67,717 million, RM 63,536 million 
and RM 66,629 million.  Private services, including finance, insurance, property and business 
services contributed RM 23,246 million, RM 24,976 million, RM 26,064 million, RM 28,548 
million and RM 30, 902 million (Ministry of Finance, 2003).  Manufacturing, finance, 
insurance, property and business services contain and consist of relatively fast growing 
sectors.  From 1990 to 2000 the average growth rates of other sectors, 0.5% for farming, 
10.4% manufacturing, 3.4% mining, 7.0% construction, and 8.3% for private and public 
services (EPU, Malaysia, 2001).  Details of the contribution of many sectors under these four 
main group sectors are given below.   
 
The energy and extraction sectors consists mainly of farming, fishing, forestry, crude oil, 
natural gas, crude oil and tin.  Farming, livestock, forestry and fishing contributed RM16,185 
million to GDP in 1987, RM17,308 million in 1990, in 1995 RM17,115 million and in 2000 
RM17,687 million.  Much of this growth was due to increases in hectares planted for palm 
oil and cocoa.  For example, in 1959, planted hectareage of palm oil was 51, 053 hectares, 
103,441 hectares in 1970, 545,462 hectares in 1980, with 912,131 in 1990 and 2,024,286 in 
2000 (Department of Statistics, 2001). 
 
Production of rubber in 1930 was 45,700 tonnes.  By 1950, production consisted of 703,700 
tonnes and in 1970, 1980, 1990 it was, 904,823 tonnes, 1,268,200 tonnes and 1,529,900 
tonnes respectively, and in 2000 it was 615,000 tonnes. This might suggest that the main 
weight of exports has been shifting in the last half century from primary products to 
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manufacturing and services.  Palm oil is cultivated largely as an estate crop, with 9.5% of the 
total hectares in the country under cultivation.  Farming, forestry, fishing and livestock 
contributed 28.8% of GDP in 1974, 22.9% in 1980, 18.8% in 1990, and 8.6% in 2000.  This 
reduction in contribution has been due variously to the volatility of primary commodity 
prices, to the development of synthetic substitutes, to growing emphasis on secondary and 
tertiary sector output, and to changes in intermediate and international markets and market 
conditions.   
 
Mining in the Malaysia Industrial Classification of 1972 (updated in 1979) is defined as the 
extraction, and improvement of minerals occurring naturally, including solids as coal and 
ores, liquids such as crude oil, and gases such as natural gas.   Production of crude petroleum 
was 52,000 tonnes in 1963.  As in the 1960s and 1970s, discoveries of oil and the growth of 
oil prices have generated the so-called ‘Dutch disease’, when Malaysia sought to extract the 
maximum rent from the exploitation of oil resources.  By 1980, oil production had increased 
to 12,245,000 tonnes.   In 1990, it was 29,556,000 tonnes.  The peak production was in 1998, 
at 33,934,000 tonnes.  In 2000 it was down to 31,931,000 tonnes.  Extraction of natural gas 
only started in 1973.  The data that follow refer to crude gas in gross extractions of associated 
gases.  The figures for the production of these in 1973 are 3,187,000 tonnes.  By 1982 it had 
increased to 113,565,000 tonnes.  The production of natural gas only began in 1983, when it 
amounted to 157,409,000 tonnes, increasing to 502,538,000 tonnes in 1990 and to 
1,598,325,000 tonnes in 2000.   The extraction sectors which include crude oil, natural gas 
and tin, contributed 6.1% to Malaysia’s exports in 1970 and 17.5% in 1990 (Department of 
Statistics, 2001).  The extraction sectors were producing around 7% of Malaysia’s GDP in 
the early 2000s.   The primary sector, although important to the economy, saw its share of 
GDP decline from 28.1% of GDP in 1990 to 18.3% in 2000. In contrast, the share of GDP 
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from the secondary sector, manufacturing and construction, expanded from 30.2% in 1991 to 
38.7% in 2000 (EPU 2004).   
 
Tin output has been falling for many years as reserves had fallen.  Production of crude oil 
and natural gas has increased over the three decades since 1970s.  This was partly due to 
higher revenues being expected from exports.  Efforts were made to increase the nation’s oil 
reserves, including the exploration of deep sea oil fields.  For example, 10 oil exploration 
wells and 13 development and production wells were identified in 2001 (EPU, 2001). 
 
Malaysia has been a significant producer of crude oil and natural gas since about 1980.  
Malaysia’s recorded reserves of crude oil declined by 17%, from 4.1 billion barrels to 3.4 
billion barrels from 1995 to 2000.  This was due mainly to the maturity of existing fields.  
Although new fields were discovered, they were smaller than previous ones.  The Petroleum 
Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS) ventured into upstream activities abroad by securing 
exploration acreage in Algeria, Angola, Chad, Gabon, Govan, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, 
Myanmar, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan and Vietnam (EPU, 2000).  As Malaysia’s domestic 
crude oil is of a premium quality, largely it was exported.  The value of all such exports was 
RM6.7 billion in 1995, RM14.24 billion in 2000 and RM9.13 billion in 2003.   
 
Malaysia accounted for approximately 14% of all world Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
exports in 2002.  Malaysia had about 75 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas 
reserves in 2003.  It exports this mainly to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.  The Bintulu 
Sarawak facility is the largest LNG liquefaction centre in the world, with a capacity of 23 
million metric tons per year (Petronas, 2003).  The government has a highly integrated form 
of involvement with Petronas, as this makes a substantial contribution of about 20% to 
government revenues in the forms of taxes, royalties and dividends.  The last 40 and 50 years 
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have seen both the output and the exports of the energy and construction sectors become 
more diverse, with most kinds of output growing, but with manufacturing and services 
becoming more important as components of both GDP and international trading activities.  
Oil, gas, and palm oil are the partial exceptions to these trends in the energy and extraction 
group.   
 
Manufacturing has been responsible for between 30% and a third of GDP since 1990s.  Of a 
total RM79,646 million worth of exports in 1990, manufacturing contributed 58.8%; farming 
including palm oil, rubber, forestry and fishing 19.6%; mining, which included crude oil, tin, 
and natural gas 18.3%’s and others 3.3%.  In 2000, of the total value of exports of RM 
373,307 million, manufacturing contributed 85.2%, farming 6.0%, mining 7.3% and other 
1.5%.  Among goods exported in 1990, semiconductors constituted 14.7%, electrical 
machinery 14.0%, textiles, wood, rubber, paper and petroleum products 10.4%, electronic 
equipment and parts 4.6%, transport equipment 2.4%, chemical products 1.8%, and other 
manufactures 10.8%.  The composition of manufactured exports has changed significantly, 
especially as regards electronic equipment and parts.   In 2000 electronic equipment and parts 
contributed the largest share of manufacturing exports at 26%, followed by semiconductors 
19.0%, electrical machinery 17.0%, other manufactures 10.3%, and textiles, wood, rubber, 
paper and petroleum products 8.4% and chemical products 0.8% (EPU, 2001). 
 
In evaluating the growth of manufacturing in terms of Total Factor Productivity (TFP), 
growth is recorded as positive and negative in different industries or sectors.  TFP in 
concerned with such things as how additional output comes from improvements to methods 
of production, with inputs of labour and capital unchanged.  It included the improvements in 
know-how, innovation, and employee education, skill and experience (EPU, 2000).  For 
example, for food and beverages, growth for between 1985 and 1990 was 5.6%.  This 
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increased to 9.7% from 1990 to 1995.  However, the growth of TFP from this sector was only 
2.5% from 1995 to 1999.  General machinery recorded growth of TFP from 1985 to 1990 of 
7.6%, and 11.0% and 13.3% from 1990 to 1995 and from 1995 to 1999 respectively.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the furniture industry recorded the fastest growth of TFP with figures 
ranging from a negative 2.6% to 7.3% and 9.8% in periods. TFP growth rates in 
manufacturing, in chemicals, rubber and plastic products, and transport equipment, were 
recorded as between 1990 until 1999.  However the parts of the rest of the manufacturing 
group in which growth was positive included textiles and apparel, wood products, paper and 
printing, glass and clay products, basic metals, fabricated metals, electrical machinery, and 
various others.   
 
As regards capital investment in manufacturing, electronic and electrical products received 
the highest amounts of capital investment: RM38.5 million between 1998 and 2002. 
Petroleum products, including petrochemicals, followed this with RM12.5 million.  For 
chemicals and chemical products, the equivalent figure was RM8.6 million, and for paper, 
printing and publishing it was RM8.2 million, for transport equipment RM7.2 million, for 
natural gas RM7.3 million, and for food manufacturing RM4.2 million (MIDA, 2004).   
  
The numbers of industrial establishments in the manufacturing sector grouping in the five 
years from 1998 to 2002 are interesting. The electronic and electric products establishment 
total had 1,087 from a total of 4,191 units. Machinery manufacturing had 428 units, 
fabricated metals products 253 units, food manufacturing 285, chemical and chemical 
products 256, and transport equipment 269 units.  Petroleum processing establishment has 
high level of capital investment, because of its capital-intensiveness and the high cost of 
equipment, the number of establishments was only 56.  The numbers of jobs created in the 
same years were highest for electronic and electric products, amounting to 170,320 of a total 
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403,299.  In other sectors, job creation figures were: food manufacturing 20,674 jobs, 
furniture and fixtures 20,881 jobs, rubber products 21,485 jobs, machinery 22,911 jobs, 
transport equipment 22,936 jobs, textiles and textiles products 19,961 jobs, wood and wood 
products 18,821 jobs and fabricated metals products 16,158 jobs (MIDA, 2004). 
 
Construction includes new construction, alterations, repairs and demolition work. 
Construction’s contribution of GDP for 1997 was 4.8%, and it employed about 9.2% 
Malaysian workforce (MTEN, 1998).  In 1997, the share of GDP had only been 1.0% but it 
increased to 4.9% by 2000.  This was due to the expansion of fiscal spending by the 
government and by banks.   
 
According to the principal statistics on construction (Department of Statistics, 2001) the 
gross value of its output in 1964, 1970, 1979, 1990 and 1998 was RM364,167 million, 
RM487,278 million, RM3,367,436 million, RM11,938,881 million and RM40,270,328 
million respectively.  Figures for value added by constructions in the same years were 
RM188,755 million, RM207,775 million, RM 1,313,975 million, RM4,387,652 million and 
RM15,549,376 million.  Civil engineering output was increased by the privatization of large 
infrastructural and civil engineering projects, such as roads, highways, airports, power 
transmission networks, telecommunications, rail transport and ports.  Increases in activity in 
the residential sub-sector and in tourism helped.  Other than this, the industry has strong links 
with others such as sawmills, distributive trades, and construction-related manufacturing.  
However, construction faced problems with supply space, lack of financing facilities and 
rising costs of imported construction materials (MTEN, 2000).  Further to this, the 
construction industry also had low levels of productivity, with contributing factors including 
heavy reliance on large numbers of unskilled foreign staff, multi-layered subcontracting 
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involving many small firms, and other sectoral forms of segregation of the activities of the 
industry (Wong, 2004).   
 
The third main sector group is private services.  These include professional services such as 
accountancy, architecture, engineering, law, surveying, veterinary surgery, private schools 
and private health care.  Other commercially-oriented private sectors include shipping, 
property, bus transport, road haulage, entertainment, tourism and travel, and banking, finance 
and insurance.  Such services contributed 55.1% to GDP in 2000 and in 2004 (EPU, 2001).  
The main contributors to this were transport and finance. In 2002, services contributed 45.9% 
to GDP.  Manufacturing and construction contributed 30.7% in the same year. Services used 
50.2% of the workforce in 2002 compared to 27.1% in manufacturing.  In 2002, Malaysia 
was the world’s 27th largest exporter and the 26th largest importer of commercial services 
compared to its position as the world’s 18th largest of exporter of goods.  Malaysia’s exports 
of commercial services were worth RM14.06 billion in 2002 compared to the world’s total 
for exports of RM2,972.36 billion.  The share is 0.48%.  A fast and significant increase 
occurred in 2002, when the exports were RM53.58 billion compared to total world exports of 
RM5, 853.9 billion with the share 0.92% (EPU, 2003).   
 
In the public services sector grouping, the government’s work has economic, social, security 
and general administrative aspects.  This so-called economic sector of the public services 
grouping includes agricultural development, mineral resources development, commercial and 
industrial development, other communications, energy, water and research and development 
which all involve employment of government staff, and government spending. The social 
services budget and employment sector includes education and training, health, information 
and broadcasting, housing, the ‘arts’, youth and sport, local authorities and welfare services, 
village and community development, and the purchase of land. There is also defence and 
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internal security, and finally, general administration, which means the employment and 
management of public sector staff, and the management, upgrading and renovation of 
government establishments and property. The government finances most new roads, bridges, 
airports, educational facilities and low-cost housing.  Other housing, and shops, offices, 
hotels, industrial plant and other non-housing properties are financed by the private sector.   
 
The expenditure data on this main sector grouping shows that it spends the most on its 
economic sector, on things such as transport and commerce and industry.  From 1996 and 
2000 (inclusive), the government spent RM4,166 million, compared to the social sector 
RM31,283 million, defence RM11,641, million and finally, general administration, spent 
RM8,923 million (EPU, 2001). RM20,825 million or 21%, was spent on transport and the 
cost of education was RM1,967 million or 19% from 1996 to 2000 from the total amount of 
expenditure on public services. Commerce and industry, with 11.4% defence with 9.6%, 
general services with 8.8% and agricultural development with 8.2% followed it.  In 2001, a 
social service spending was RM3,108 million, defence and security RM8,309 million, 
general administration RM8,631 million and economic services RM5,145 million.  
Expenditure in education has been growing more and more over the years.  In 2002, it was 
RM16,982 million and in 2003 and 2004, it was RM19,432 million and RM20,884 million 
respectively.   In various Malaysia Plans, public services expenditure from 1971 to 1975 
under the Second Malaysia Plan was RM27.804 million, and from 1976 to 1980, for the 
Third Malaysia Plan, it was RM78,799 million. For the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985), it 
was RM99,897 million and almost the same amount for the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990).  
For the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) it rose significantly for RM117,656 million (EPU, 
1998).  Public sector development expenditure, in 1995 it was RM29,799 million and in 2000 
it was RM58,975 million.  Such a significant increase was due to the government supporting 
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and facilitating the private sector especially trade, industry and transport, and on education as 
a form of human resource developments.  
 
The rate of growth of imports was 14.7% per annum for the 10 years (1990-2000), compared 
to 16.7% for exports.  Capital goods imports included transport equipment, and intermediate 
goods which included industrial supplies, parts and accessories for capital goods, and 
transport equipment and fuel and lubricants, consumption goods, that included durable and 
non-durable food and beverages for industry, food and others, and re-exports.  Between 1990 
and 2000, imports of capital goods were 18.9% and 15.0% respectively.  A significant 
change was in imports of intermediate goods which rose from 65.1% to 73.8%.  The highest 
composition was imports of parts and other accessories for capital goods and transport 
equipment.   
 
Data on employment by major occupational groups showed that, of the total 7,999.2 million 
employees in 1995, professional, technical and related staff held 791.9 jobs, service staff 
887.9 thousands, production and related staff, 2,711.8 thousands and farming, forestry, and 
fisherman 1,607 thousands.  Between 1995 and 2000, professional technical and related staff 
increased to 1,019.8 thousands, services staff to 1,094.0 thousands or 11.8%, production and 
related ones staff to 3.355.4 thousands in 2000.  Together the main occupational groupings 
grew by more than 4%, but growth of employment in farming, forestry and fishing was only 
0.9% between 1995 and 2000 (EPU, 2001).   Proportions of all employment in 1990 were, 
farming 26%, mining 0.5%, manufacturing 19.9%, construction 6.3%, and services 47.3%. 
The corresponding figures for 2000 were 15.2%, 0.4%, 27.6%, 8.1% and 48.7% (EPU, 
2001).  These figures show the most significant increase to have been of jobs in the 
manufacturing sector grouping.  Principal manufacturing products include semiconductors, 
consumer electronic and electrical products 
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Growth of employment of professional and technical category was 5.2% per annum from 
1990 to 2000.  More than a quarter of the employment generated in this category was in 
technical occupations due to the greater capital intensity and expansion in the use of ICT in 
most sectors.  The requirement for people with IT skills such as systems, engineering, 
software analysis and design ones totalled 108,000 in 2000.  Demand for engineers was 
mainly in the fields of electrical and electronics, mechanical, civil and chemical engineering.  
The employment figures of engineers increased to 61,030 and 143,320 respectively in 2000 
(EPU, 2001). 
 
 
A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION 
 
PEST analysis 
 
In this PEST analysis, it includes political, economics, social and technology scenarios in 
Malaysia. Malaysia is a multiracial constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of 
government.  It is recognised as an active and a leading member of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  The formation the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) is a 
form of ASEAN efforts to meets threats and challenges, not only from China and Malaysia 
but also from non-ASEAN competitors.  It has played an important role in Asia-Pacific 
economic cooperation, which includes most Pacific Rim countries.  Its member countries 
trade with neighbouring countries like Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Brunei.  The 
highest amount of FDI comes from Japan, followed by the USA, Taiwan and Korea.  
Malaysia has supported the formation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which is an 
ambitious attempt by ASEAN to integrate a market of 500 million people in South-East Asia, 
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to promote intra-ASEAN industrial links, and develop South-East Asia as an international 
production centre.   
 
Malaysia has maintained high growth rates.  A low and stable inflation rates has generally 
existed since 1960s.  Inflation in Malaysia was higher in 1973 and 1974, in 1980 and 1981, 
and low between 1985 and 1987, and stable between 1988 and 1996.  FDI has played a major 
role in the development of the economy.  Malaysia’s success in attracting FDI was due such 
factors as favourable business environment, good infrastructure and an educated workforce 
(Rasiah, 1995). The main exports destinations of manufactured goods from Malaysia include 
are ASEAN, the USA, the EU and Japan.  Among the ASEAN countries, Singapore is the 
main importer of Malaysian products.   
 
The proportion of people living in urban areas has risen as the relative importance of 
agriculture has waned.  Even among households remaining in the rural areas there is 
evidence of diversification of income sources away from reliance on agriculture, and 
especially so amongst the wealthier rural families.   Nonetheless, poorer rural families still 
derive significant fractions of their incomes from it. Unfortunately some policies designed to 
address rural poverty may have served to tie poorer households to other economic activities.  
A number of policies have been explored in an attempt to alter the distribution of assets and 
incomes derived from them.  A New Lands Programme has been a component of this, yet it 
is very expensive per family reached, and was never intended give direct help to the poorest 
households.  Significant progress has been made in the proportions of public company equity 
owned by Bumiputera people; yet the proportions of manufacturing assets in public 
companies have declined, perhaps partly as a result of ethnic equity distributional 
requirements under the NEP.  As elsewhere in the world, identifying and promoting small 
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firms, in this case of Bumiputera entrepreneurs, has proved difficult to implement (Lucas and 
Verry, 1999).   
 
Technically, this country has supported the development of engineering and science through 
technical, business and management education.  Malaysia’s Silicon, Valley’ its Multimedia 
Super Corridor (MSC) was designed in 1990s to help create a so-called knowledge-based 
economy (Malairaja, 2003).  However, although the numbers of companies registered with 
MSC status have exceeded targets, the quality of the growth can be questioned.   
 
A SWOT analysis 
 
Strengths  
 
Malaysia’s strengths are ones that it has as a relatively small, middle-income open economy, 
relatively rich in natural resources, and industrializing rapidly.  Factors encouraging foreign 
investors to locate in Malaysia include politically stability, labour availability, quality of 
infrastructure and exemptions from export and import duties (Lim and Ong 2002).   Other 
strengths may concern policies and programmes.  In various ways, these are designed link 
exports, employment, training, joint ventures, domestic equity levels and R and D. FDI has 
been and is strong in Malaysia, because most of it has come to take advantage of lower costs 
of labour to help sustain exports to markets in the USA, Japan and Europe (Lim and Ong, 
2002).   
 
The Malaysian economy has been acknowledged for some years for its emphasis on 
manufacturing in electrical and electronic engineering.  In 1991, the Office of Prime Minister 
initiated the Vision 2020 to accelerate Malaysia’s progress into a developed nation status in 
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20 years.  Its economic stability, openness to foreign trade and investment and rapid 
accumulation  of assets  have played very useful roles in promoting Malaysia’s 
transformation  from the relatively poor, predominantly agrarian, developing country of 1970 
to a middle-income, industrial country by the mid-1990s.  FDI has played a key role in this.  
Malaysia has been one of the most important hosts among developing countries to FDI.  
However, the contribution of FDI to accumulation has varied, declining in the early 1980s 
when public sector investment predominated, and then reaching much higher levels in the 
early 1990s.   
 
Weaknesses 
 
Proprietary weaknesses in Malaysian state dependence on information appear to be due to 
traditional ethnic divisions on and uncertain levels of trust between the public and private 
sectors.  Other weakness includes Malaysia’s vulnerability to short-term capital movements, 
in a very open economy with exports accounting for 103 percent of GDP (Choo, 2002).  As 
part of an often inadequate regulatory infrastructure, the related unprepared of industries and 
enterprises is another definite weakness.   
 
On the regulatory environment, the development of small to medium-sized industries (SMIs) 
in manufacturing was initially constrained by weaknesses of government support instruments 
(Rasiah 2001).  During the colonial era, the British introduced financial support for craft and 
other small industries under a Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA), largely to 
reduce discontent among the Malays.  Such initiatives were continued with greater financial 
support after independence under the Rural Development Ministry.   It was not until the late 
1970s that official policies attempted to earmark SMIs for support, but their development 
remained uncoordinated and cumbersome until SMI activities were given direct prominence 
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by the Ministry of Industrial Development, following the launching of the Industrial Master 
Plan in 1986.   
 
Opportunities 
 
Malaysia has been one of the second-tier NIEs, classified as economically and politically 
liberal, and with its export-oriented industries governed by markets.  Liberalisation of 
government policies of industrialization in the mid-1980s apparently helped to increase 
growth and to enhance the international competitiveness of Malaysia (Salleh and 
Meyanathan 1993; World Bank, 1993).  Other examples of successful liberalisation 
involving selective government intervention to overcome market failure and enhance 
economic performance have been South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (Lall 1996; Amsden 
1990; 1991).  Rasiah (2001) argued that political and economic factors skewed government 
policies towards medium-sized and large firms and away from micro and small firms.  
Incentives had shown bias towards large firms. Despite micro and small firms dominating in 
terms of numbers of establishments, medium-sized and large firms continued to lead in terms 
of employment, investment and value-added.   
 
Other opportunities include demand from export-oriented industries, such as those making 
electrical, electronic and wood products. More specific examples are air-conditioner, home 
machineries, as well as radios and television sets.   These are exported to the USA, 
Singapore, Japan and Taiwan.  Ariff and Ahmad (2000) have pointed out that the persistence 
of capital flows into the country through the 1998 financial crisis was due to low inflation, a 
large interest rate differential between Malaysia and the rest of the world, and the very open 
nature of relevant financial markets.  The money flows into Malaysia took the forms of FDI, 
bank lending, and especially portfolio capital. 
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Threats 
 
Malaysia has ample and cheap labour.  According to Foong (1999, p. 81) ‘The relatively low 
contribution of Malaysian SMEs to the total value added of the manufacturing sector is seen 
as a bottleneck in achieving the rapid industrialization of the nation’.  This bottleneck could 
be addressed through an increase in SME exports and imports.  The share of SMEs in 
Malaysia’s total exports is only 15 per cent, well below the 26.1 per cent average for a 
sample of OECD countries (Hall 1995). More could probably be achieved by increasing the 
involvement of SMEs in international trade in such APEC countries as Malaysia.   
 
Surveys of Japanese investors’ intentions (see Tejima 1992, for example) have suggested that 
the large-scale assembly of electronic products by Malaysian subsidiaries for export 
declining in favour of locations in China, where assembly production is aimed at Asian 
markets, and in Mexico, which produces for NAFTA markets.  However Edgington and 
Hayter (2001) argued that there remained a substantial opportunity for Malaysia to shift away 
from assembly production per se, to a new role, that of an international procurement centre 
for Japanese electronic firms, supplying parts and components to a wide overseas network of 
assembly factories.  Survey data collected by Ling and Yong (1997) has shown that East 
Asian NIEs such as Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, in that order, were already developing as 
electronics suppliers for Japanese assembly companies in Malaysia. 
 
Before the Technology Transfer Unit in various universities in Malaysia was established in 
the late 1990s, Malaysia licensees generally had to pay high costs for technology.  This was 
because foreign licensors generally insisted on higher rates of technology transfer.    The 
weakness of many technology buyers in developing countries, including Malaysia, was that 
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they lacked the technical, financial, legal and commercial expertise needed for the acquisition 
of more technical information and for the evaluation of relevant alternatives (Lim 2004).   
 
The Boston Consultancy Group (BCG) Matrix 
 
 The Boston growth share matrix assumes that there are two main factors that influence the 
strength of a company’s or a country’s market position. One is the growth rate of the 
segments that it serves, and the other is the relative market share that the company’s business 
enjoys.  Splitting each of these two factors into high and low produces the matrix.  Four types 
of business are identified.  It based on the manufactured goods in the country, there are 
divided into two; the non-resource-based industries (includes electrical and electronics, 
transport equipment, machinery and engineering products) and the resource-based industries 
(includes food processing, rubber, palm-oil, wood-based, chemical and petrochemicals).  The 
importance of manufacturing in Malaysia has been noted above. Its annual growth rate in the 
early 2000s was above average 10%, with its share GDP 32% and 30% in 2000 and 2003 
respectively. Its share to GDP was above 85%, and its share to total employment was 27% 
(EPU 2003). 
 
Dynamic Capabilities 
 
The resource-based view of the firm, initially developed by Penrose (1959), proposes that a 
firm’s competitive advantage is constituted in large part by its unique resources and 
capabilities.  A central premise of this theory in that those firm capabilities which are rare, 
inimitable, and difficult to trade tend to the basis for sustainable competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991).  Subsequent researchers have emphasized the importance of intangible 
resources for competitive advantage (Henderson and Cockburn 1994; Kogurt and Zander 
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1992; Petraff, 1993). The word dynamic is used because the capabilities that on emphasized 
tend to be human and active, rather than more passive, like capital and land. These tend to be 
tacit, complex, and firm-specific, rendering them inimitable by rivals (Reed and DeFillipi, 
1990).   One of the main arguments in favour of the Dynamic Capabilities approach to 
business builds on the assumptions of resource-based theory through its assertion that unique 
firm capabilities develop over time.  This accumulation of capabilities is driven by 
organizational learning and moulded by path dependencies, complementary assets, and 
industry opportunities (Teece, Pisano and Schuen, 1992).   This approach emphasizes that it 
is not only the bundle of resources which matters but also the mechanisms through which 
firms accumulate these skills and the contingencies which constrain their direction. 
 
Therefore, according to Dynamic Capabilities theory, firms accumulate knowledge, 
expertise, and skills through organizational learning.  Learning enables firms to perform their 
activities in improved ways.  Organizational learning occurs as individuals interact with each 
other and develop common codes of communication and co-ordinated search procedures.  
Moreover, organizational learning is not limited to internal activity but also results from 
assimilating and using of knowledge from outside the firm.  The accumulated knowledge 
generated by organizational learning is, of course, not static but dynamic as organizations 
continue to learn.  This firm knowledge is not boundless, however, as each firm is 
constrained in its knowledge development by path dependencies.  Thus each firm learns in 
areas which are related to previous activities (Hill and Deeds 1997; Teece, Pisano and 
Schuen, 1992). 
 
It is said that the path of firm knowledge is also constrained by a firm’s complementary 
assets.  Firms establish assets bases before starting their activities.  Any new product or 
process can require radically different complementary assets, particularly in terms of 
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manufacturing and downstream activities, which can enhance or destroy the value of 
previously established assets (Leonard-Barton, 1992).  Consequently, because of path 
dependencies and complementary assets, organizational capabilities, although dynamic, are 
constrained in their directions.  Pringle and Kroll (1997) used the Battle of Trafalgar of 1805 
and the relation with resource-based theory.  Napoleon Bonaparte has ordered a French-
Spanish fleet from the West Indies to the English Channel, either to defeat the Royal Navy or 
to divert the British fleet away from the Channel.  However, by using the Royal Navy’s 
intangible and partly inimitable human and organizational resources, Lord Nelson, destroyed 
or captured 18 out of 33 French and Spanish ships and seized thousands of prisoners without 
losing a single vessel, while only having 27 ships himself, which were older and generally 
somewhat smaller and less heavily armed than their opponents’. But the British were very 
experienced sailors with about 1,000 years of naval history and pride behind them, whereas 
the French and Spanish, although brave, were mainly soldiers having to fight a major sea 
battle.  
 
Thus the story of Nelson and Trafalgar was one of a Royal Navy with very high levels of 
eagerness and aggressiveness, ready to decide the issue of the ‘world naval supremacy once 
and for all’ (p. 8).  From Nelson down to the ordinary seaman, the British sailors craved a 
decisive battle that would put an end of their years of chasing French and Spanish ships 
across the Atlantic, and in the Mediterranean, and Caribbean.  Pringle and Kroll argued that 
firms can learn lessons from the Battle of Trafalgar such as the one that while all firms 
usually have equal access to environmental information, they can usually duplicate it, and 
that such information loses value as environments become increasingly dynamic, and that the 
information becomes less subject to imitation over time, and that in time it cannot usually be 
purchased on open markets.  Also, firms had to understand their own and rival organization’s 
heritages.  This should instil a sense of pride and thus help to motivate their members.  Firms 
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developed Dynamic Capabilities whenever they chose to implement innovative strategies, 
where creative strategists can take competitors by surprise. This could lead to sustained 
advantage.  For this, the leaders of firms should serve as role models.  Training could be 
important for building skills, conveying senses of permanence to employees, enhancing 
individual self-efficacy, and opening the door to greater participation and decentralization. 
Firms should usually empower their staff and let them set their own targets as far as possible 
(Jenkins, 1997, 2005).  This would enhance creativity, motivation, satisfaction, commitment, 
skill levels and decision quality.   
 
Dynamic Capability is a function of a firm’s ‘scientific, technological and managerial skills’ 
(Deeds, DeCarolis and Coombs, 1999).  Firms should manage the balance between building 
and exploiting capabilities in response to technical change (Hamilton and Singh 1992). 
Established firms might under-emphasize the importance of building capabilities because 
they tended to base their work on their existing products and markets.  By emphasizing 
building capabilities early in the evolution of its industry and the exploitation of those 
capabilities after technical uncertainty is largely resolved, a firm could have sound long-term 
approaches to competing in the face of new technical changes.   
 
Such views can be extended by using arguments offered by Bowman and Ambrosini (2203). 
They felt that using a Dynamic Capabilities perspective, resource-based views could be 
extended to be applied to corporate-level strategies.  They suggested that where a multi-
business corporation has a distinct centre, separated from SBU-level processes, the centre can 
only be justified on one of three grounds. Either the centre provides resources, or it uses 
processes that create resources, or the centre has Dynamic Capabilities itself.  
These Dynamic Capabilities can be used in Malaysia’s economy, depending on the extent to 
which Malaysian companies have their own capabilities.  Hashim and Mahajar (2001) 
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studied manufacturing firms in Malaysia that had problems with exporting.  They argued, 
from their findings,  that relevant SMEs lacked capital for financing expansion into foreign 
markets; that there were differences in product use in foreign marketplaces; lack of foreign 
distribution channels; differences in relevant product specifications; difficulties in collecting 
payment from foreign customers;  foreign business practices that were hard to understand; 
risks involved in selling abroad; difficulties with providing after-sales service; high cost of 
abroad; managerial hesitation about exporting; difficulties with quoting prices in foreign 
currency; and a lack of capacity for exporting.  Such difficulties are experienced by SMEs 
everywhere, but Malaysia’s are relatively inexperienced by many international standards. 
They also operators in markets in which the growing presence of competition from China is 
not likely to make life easier for them (Yusuf, 2003).   
 
Yusuf suggested that Malaysia should co-operate with counterparts in other East Asian 
countries so as to gain experience and capabilities. In manufacturing especially, they should 
try to invest and grow, with government help if necessary. He also argued that there should 
be promotion of new sources of growth and exports, particularly in services, including 
tourism, education and health.  Also because certain companies in Malaysia had relocated 
their operations to China to take advantage of lower labour costs there, with examples 
including Motorola, Sony, Acer, Philips, Seagate Storage Products and Astee, Malaysia 
should upgrade its manufacturing industries and value chains (Yusuf, 2003).  To encourage 
higher value-added industries, more skilled labour would be needed, and through redesign of 
education and training (Lucas and Verry 1999; Yusuf, 2003), human capital capabilities 
could be developed. With more emphasis on technical development, scientific understanding 
and research, technology transfer and the supply and use of venture capital, the resources and 
capabilities of industries and firms could be enhanced considerably (Power and McDougall, 
2004)  
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Wafa, Hashim and Mohamad (2000) argued that export-oriented SMEs have higher levels of 
capability than to domestic firms.  More significantly, such SMEs had higher capabilities in 
marketing, finance, operations, product development and human resource management.   
 
COMMERCIALIZATION:  SECTORAL AND GENERAL RELEVANCE 
 
This chapter has described and discussed the background of Malaysian industrialization.  The 
idea of comparative institutional advantage is useful in this context. Hall and Soskice (2001) 
suggested that effective specialisation in international trade depended not only on the relative 
factor costs of classical trade theory, but on the national institutions that support relevant 
industries.  Institutions may be able to create nation and sector-specific sources of 
comparative advantage (Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004), that also affect such economic factors 
as cost, the flow of ideas, and incentives to innovate (Zysman, 1983; Ziegler, 1997).  
Malaysia has advantages in mostly resource-based industries (such as food processing, 
rubber, palm-oil, wood based, chemical and petrochemical) but institutional changes have 
more effects on more than company-led factors such as  product design, distribution, 
logistics, marketing and technical advancement.    
 
Some university research is very relevant to companies and some is of little relevance.  
Klevorick, Levin, Nelson and Winter (1993) argued that food processing and 
pharmaceuticals relied quite directly on university research.  Yet while research in subjects 
like industrial science and computer science was often highly relevant to many industrial 
sectors geology, for example, did not have high relevance to any but a very few. Schibany 
and Schartinger (2001) argued that most spin-off companies were found in producer-related 
services, such as economic, technical and legal consultancies. According to Wah and 
Narayanan, commercialization of research findings in Malaysia was mostly done in 
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improvement of machinery and equipment sectors, chemicals, electrical and electronic 
engineering and the resource-based industry group.  One of the arguments about the technical 
competence of MNCs in electrical and electronics engineering in Malaysia was that high and 
medium levels of technical change were dominant (Wah and Narayanan 1997).   
 
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Further consideration should be given to manufacturing as it accounted for 84% of the 
exports from Malaysia and in 2003 it is a significant contributor to employment and has great 
potential for innovation, growth and change. Manufacturing and services sectors are 
increasingly interdependent in increasingly complex ways.  Therefore studies of innovation 
concern manufacturing and services.  Complex manufacturing tends to use more complex 
services than simpler kinds of manufacturing.  The former tend to be foreign-owned than the 
latter, and also to be undertaken by larger firms.   
 
Industries develop in different ways and FDI entering Malaysia tends to be in highly skilled 
sectors. At the same time, technical diffusion mainly involved acquiring techniques by 
importing goods particularly equipments and machineries (passive technical spill-over) 
instead of learning directly from the people who created foreign technical change (active 
technical spill over).  It is also necessary to increase employees’ skills and knowledge.  This 
is particularly so in such newer areas as biotechnology, aerospace, advanced materials, and 
nanotechnology.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Industrialization and manufacturing have emerged as the main contributors to the economic 
growth of Malaysia.  From the 1960s Malaysia has become one of the newly emerging 
economies in the Asia Pacific region.  It was an agricultural economy with manufacturing 
limited to primary industrial activities, and then after independence, its industrialization 
became the core of its strategy for its economic development.  
 
Malaysia is now a middle income developing country.  From being mainly a producer of 
food and raw materials such natural rubber and palm oil, its economy has become a diverse 
one with strong tertiary as well as primary and secondary sectors.  Its manufacturing exports 
have been traded with its three largest importers, the USA, Japan, and the other ASEAN 
countries, especially Singapore.  There is however growing emphasis on trade with such 
other countries as China, India and several Middle Eastern ones. Natural gas and oil are also 
currently major exports. The factual parts of the Chapter have described these and related 
economic developments in some detail. 
 
The arguments of the chapter have emphasised the ongoing power of industrialisation as the 
main change of recent world history and among current and future events. They stressed the 
need to regard services and manufacturing as interdependent and mutually supportive 
activities. They queried the widespread belief in education and human resource development 
and management as the main keys to economic development.  
 
The evaluative elements of the Chapter overlap with parts of the factual ones, but they also 
include a discussion of some future possibilities for Malaysia’s economy, and such general 
perspectives as those provided through use of SWOT and PEST, BCG Matrix and Resource 
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Based/Dynamic Capabilities analyses.  They contain, too, discussions and evaluations of the 
relevance of commercialization in Malaysia, both generally and for particular sectors. 
Commercialization and technology transfer are increasingly regarded as relevant in a wide 
range of mainly more advanced sectors, not only including those in which ICT is important, 
but also, for example, aerospace, biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter discusses concepts, assumptions and questions that concern apparently 
problematic rates of commercialization in Malaysia.  It seeks to alert readers to such possible 
sources of confusion as lack of knowledge, wishful thinking and self-interest.  The chapter 
first focuses on conceptual and definitional matters and on how thinking about the practical 
use of scientific and other knowledge tends to fall into two main camps. Two master theories 
of technical change are presented, compared and contrasted, next, and located geographically 
and historically.  Finally, in the more theoretical part of the chapter, 25 relevant concepts and 
phenomena are discussed [with more details in Appendix 2], and with the seven most 
relevant ones to the thesis considered at more length in Appendix 3. Understanding the 
relevant concepts is vital for discussing the demands, needs and expectations of companies in 
using discoveries and inventions from universities and GRIs.   
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The two master theories of technical change were compared and contrasted by Sorge and 
Hartmann (1980).  So-called ‘Western’ or ‘developed’ countries which dominate influential 
international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank have been accused 
of imposing ‘one size fits all’ thinking about economic development, innovation and so on, 
on Less Developed Countries (LDCs).  However the ‘Western’ or ‘developed’ countries are 
not homogeneous.  The contrasts apparent in these two master theories of technical change 
help demonstrate this.      
 
Following its more theoretical discussions, the chapter moves on to more practical, 
ontological, concerns.  It discusses the practice, theory, and institutions of commercialization 
in Malaysia, along with government, university and other efforts to support it as in Appendix 
4.  There is also discussion of relevant recent thinking about technology transfer.  Then, eight 
models of commercialization and technology transfer (CTT), those regarded as the most 
relevant, are described and evaluated.  Next, the researcher’s main preconceptions, her ideas 
about the findings of her research, before she undertook it, described.  The research 
questions, concerning apparently low uptake and how and why it exists - or seems to - are 
presented and justified.   
 
 
RESEARCHER AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS   
 
The comparisons between the two master theories of technical change draw on historical 
understanding and international comparisons.  The theories are quite opposed, being based on 
contrasting views of human nature, attitudes, knowledge, skill and work, and of the use of 
knowledge for practical ends. Before they are considered, the qualities of the two main, and 
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significantly different, kinds of academic who have concerned themselves with technical 
change are discussed.  The purpose of this is not to undertake an exercise in the sociology of 
knowledge.  Rather it is a simply to suggest that the theory which tends to be preferred in this 
thesis is based on broader and deeper factual and intellectual foundations than the other.  
 
The theory preferred here, the Technik one, draws partly on critiques made in the 1970s and 
1980s of British and North American industrial management and higher technical and other 
vocational education.  These critiques had taken cognisance of studies of invention and 
innovation conducted in the 1950s and 1960s (Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman, 1969; 
Langrish, Gibbons, Evans and Jevons, 1972), and also of studies of industrial organization 
and the use of microprocessors in manufacturing in France, Germany and the UK in the 
1970s and 1980s (Sorge, Hartmann, Nicholas and Warner 1983 and Sorge and Warner 1986).  
The researchers were experienced, with access to a wide range of intellectual resources.    On 
the European continent, and in the context of industrial employment, there were, it made 
sense to argue, no professions, and a clear and real tendency to reject the development and 
use of American, later Anglo-American, managers, management and management 
qualifications (Sorge 1978; Glover 1980; Locke 1996).  Nor were engineering and 
manufacturing sensibly understood as the application of science, or as being part of and 
dependent upon science. In Continental industry, production was the central, sector-defining, 
function in industrial companies around which lesser stars, like finance, marketing and 
personnel management revolved, and which contained almost all of the technical functions 
like design, maintenance, engineering, and what English speakers called R and D.  Not only 
was engineering not regarded as part of science or as its ‘mere’ ‘application’; its successes 
had made the funding of modern science possible, and although science now played vital 
parts in engineering education and in contributing ideas and knowledge to industry, it would 
always be fundamentally different to and separate from engineering.   
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It is sometimes said that most academics can be grouped into one, two, or all of three types.  
The first are technical college teachers. They mainly teach, and do very little or no research.  
They may be intellectuals, but as academics, are rarely public ones.  Many tend, in the UK, to 
be employed in newer and less prestigious universities.  The second are provincial 
academics.  They do do research, much of it very good, as well as teaching.  The third 
consists of cosmopolitan intellectuals.  They also do research and teach, but they tend to 
teach less than provincial academics, who in turn teach less than technical college teachers.  
The main differences between cosmopolitan intellectuals and provincial academics concern 
the nature of their research, writing and scholarship.  Cosmopolitan intellectuals often, some 
cases always, operate outside the parameters of established thinking and of single 
disciplinary concerns, and ‘normal science’ (Kuhn, 1962).  They are both convergent and 
divergent thinkers (cf. Hudson 1966) and are likely to be more confident, experienced, 
mature and successful than the average researcher, scholar and intellectual.  Provincial 
academics on the other hand, tend to be more focused, conventional, convergent, less 
confident, experienced, successful and sophisticated. They tend to think ‘within’ the boxes, 
of their topics and disciplines, whereas cosmopolitan intellectuals can seem unaware that 
boxes exist.    
 
When considering technical change, invention, discovery, commercialization, innovation, 
entrepreneurship, technology and so on, cosmopolitan intellectuals are more likely to 
question the meaning and relevance of such terms, whereas provincial academics are readier 
to follow lay, patrician, and sometimes confused usage.  Since the early 1990s, for example, 
a notion of researchers into the use and management of ICT in business and other 
organizations has been that of the ‘hybrid manager’, who is meant to combine technical and 
business knowledge and expertise.  The problem that the hybrid manager was intended to 
solve was that of lack of understanding, empathy and shared bodies of knowledge and 
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expertise between technical (ICT) professionals and managers with qualifications like arts, 
science and social science and business-related degrees.  Research into the perceived lack of 
hybrid mangers and its effects, into their formation and employment, was normally the 
product of provincial academics interested in technology management.  Such research and 
writing was concerned, although most of the business and management graduates conducting 
it seemed unaware of the fact, with a problem debated since the 1920s and 1930s, largely by 
American and British sociologists, namely the employment of technical and other 
professionals in large-scale formal bureaucratic business and other organizations, and the 
associated problems of supposedly ‘narrow’ professionals and more gentlemanly liberal arts 
and pure science graduates coming from different social and educational backgrounds and 
often having opposed assumptions about which types of professional and manager should be 
‘on tap’ or ‘on top’ in organizational hierarchies (Currie and Glover, 1999).   Here, there was 
an important sense of researchers reinventing the wheel, badly.  It was an example of  ‘crass 
empiricism’, of ignoring highly relevant work, concepts and theories because of the narrow 
and time-limited, culture-bound and ahistorical, nature of researchers’  educational 
backgrounds.   
 
The notion of commercialization was criticised along similar lines by Hughes (1985).  For 
Hughes, commercialization was a word used to replace and reframe innovation by politicians 
and others and in and around government who wanted to channel, control, structure and 
monitor relevant processes, and perhaps subconsciously to stifle them.  Their mentality could 
be convergent, inward-looking and small-minded.  Successful innovation needed confidence, 
energy, imagination and relatively uninhibited effort.  The state should be supportive and 
permissive, within reason, although even if entrepreneurs and innovators received excellent 
help and advice from state agencies, they could still fail if their own efforts as regards cost, 
quality and marketing were inadequate.  There is always tension between innovation and 
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control in organizational life, and those who seek to narrow the notion and practice of 
innovation down by renaming it commercialization are perhaps revealing their own 
prejudices and other inadequacies (cf. Child, 1981).  
 
For innovation and/or commercialization to succeed, it seems that the business people, 
entrepreneurs, managers and professionals responsible must be competent and motivated 
enough, with any external support helping to clarify and energise their efforts, and not 
confuses and dissipates them.  Confusion may arise because some of those involved 
misunderstand about the nature of technical change and business management.  Graduates in 
industrially non-relevant subjects or in relevant subjects who may encourage over-confidence 
in technical, professional, managerial and business contexts, may also be sources of 
confusion in similar ways, so that when employed in government or powerful positions in 
universities or industry, they also may make poor decisions about innovation. Some of the 
reasons for such problems may be inferred by comparing the following two major theories of 
technical change.     
 
 
THE TECHNIK VERSUS THE SCIENCE LEADS TO TECHNOLOGY LEADS TO 
HARDWARE MODELS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE 
 
When considering these theories and their implications, historical understanding and an 
ability to make international comparisons are needed.  The theories embody opposed views 
of human nature, knowledge use, skill and work.  Their concerns involve the main influences 
on, and effects of, technical change.   
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According to Sorge and Hartmann (1980), who spelt the theories out, the first was prevalent 
on the European continent and in Japan and other countries whose systems of education, 
training and dividing labour had not been designed largely along British and North American 
lines.  In their Technik theory, technical work consists mainly of art and skill.  Technical 
change was created in response to socio-economic and technical problems, consisting of 
gradual improvements to processes and products.  It largely involved learning by doing, 
‘unpredictable ingenuity’.  Scientific knowledge was useful to it but it was insufficient to 
guide design, which relied primarily on technical knowledge or ‘know-how’.  Technical 
work was an autonomous or separate cultural area, technik or engineering.  It was not 
dependent on scientific discoveries, not ‘mere’ applied science.  Innovation was continuous:  
technical changes were spread by industrial absorption plus modification. People slowly 
conquered nature by ever more sophisticated ‘tooling up’.  The effect of technical change on 
employment was to relocate work towards new targets. The total amount of work done was 
unlikely to be reduced.  Man or humankind was described and thought of as homo faber, 
namely the relatively intuitive ‘maker and doer’, who produced constant interaction of socio-
economic and technical problems.  The Technik theory tended to emphasise action, more 
than structure, in interpreting human events and relationships. 
 
The second theory was prevalent in the UK, the USA, and other former British Empire 
countries.  Sorge and Hartmann called it the Science leads to Technology leads to Hardware 
(STH) theory.  This had a slightly more dramatic emphasis than the Technik one, in spite of 
its greater emphasis on structure, over action, in its interpretations of events and social 
relationships.  New scientific knowledge was increasingly seen as the major source of 
technical change.  Technical change was ‘revolutionary’, involving ‘basic’ innovations.  It 
involved learning from academic knowledge, which was seen as the key to innovation, and 
was increasingly important with modernization.  Technical work was seen as a dependent 
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cultural area or as applied science, the industrial use of science.  Innovation was seen as 
discontinuous, involving revolutionary and other dramatic changes.  Technical changes were 
thought to be spread by technology transfer, by self-conscious decisions by managers to use 
new knowledge, techniques and processes. Rationally-guided search behaviour thus 
prevailed, rather than the unpredictable and less articulate ingenuity of the Technik theory.  
People were felt to be increasingly separated from nature or the environment as it increased.  
Technical change - often called technological change by its proponents - saved labour by 
displacing it into leisure or unemployment.  People were was defined using the term homo 
sapiens, literally man the thinker, the creature with the large and capable brain, increasingly 
concerned with socio-economic issues and less and less concerned with mere technical 
matters and detail. 
 
What are the origins of these theories?  Their links with Continental European countries (the 
Technik theory) and the UK, USA and other former British empire countries (the STH one) 
have been noted.  Why do Technik countries value engineering and production in particular, 
and manufacturing in general, more?  Why do they value science and R and D less, 
preferring the words engineering and engineer to technology and technologist? Also why 
have they had relatively little time, at least until recent years, when the following have been 
more useful to them in any case, for American and Anglo-American notions, institutions and 
practices of management? 
 
The theories differ because they have different historical and national roots.  From the 1560s 
France, later followed by other Continental countries, began to develop very high-status 
university-level schools of engineering and mining, and later, government and higher 
commercial studies.  On the other hand, ‘Anglo’ nations became more consistently and 
strongly interested in imperial expansion and international trade.  The Continental countries 
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focused more, from the nineteenth century onwards, on manufacturing and on state-
dominated systems of education and training for all almost levels of industrial and business 
employment.  The British focused more on such traditional professions as law and medicine, 
and especially on government and imperial administration, and high finance orientated 
towards international business.  Continental countries were focused more on manufacturing, 
engineering and production.   
 
British, Anglo-American, and other former British Empire thinking tended to be more arms’-
length towards these.  Such thinking influenced language.   For example, they increasingly 
tended to prefer the words technology and technologist to engineering and engineer, although 
nearly all ‘technologists’ are engineers by job title and qualification.  They tended to call 
technical development work ‘R and D’ although very few industrial companies employ 
scientists to conduct research.  Modern, say about 100 years’-old, American and Anglo-
American management thinking and practice was long resisted, at least until recently, in 
Continental Europe.  This has been because broadly educated and sector-specifically 
specialised Continental engineers have regarded management as part of particular kinds of 
engineering, and inferior to them, rather than the other way round, as in Anglo-American 
countries.  In the latter, management thinking and education were developed to compensate 
for apparent lack of practical knowledge of executive and senior managers with, for example, 
liberal arts and pure science degrees, and for presumed narrowness of their professional 
specialists in, for example, accountancy and engineering.   
 
Sorge and Hartmann (1980) described the Technik and the STH theories in some depth.  
Their thinking about them informed two books reporting large research program findings, to 
which Sorge made major contributions (Sorge, Nicholas, Hartmann and Warner, 1983; Sorge 
and Warner 1986; and articles by Sorge (1989, 1995).  The wider relevance of the work of 
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Sorge and various colleagues and its contexts were discussed by Glover and Kelly (1987, 
1993) and influenced by numerous papers by Fores (for example, Fores, 1977, 1979, 1979b, 
1979c, 1981, 1982a; also see Fores and Sorge, 1981).  Fores was an influential adviser to the 
UK government on industrial, engineering and vocational higher education policy in the 
1970s, and published with Sorge at various times.  Sorge’s thinking led him to write highly 
theoretically sophisticated and internationally informed, accounts of relationships between 
technical change and work organization, and between the latter and long-term political and 
socioeconomic change (see especially Sorge 1982-83).  The Technik theory to be supported 
by two major studies of over 130 important innovations conducted from the UK in the 1950s 
and 1960s (Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman, 1969; Langrish, Gibbons, Evans and Jevons, 
1972).  More recent research, including that by Sorge and his colleagues, has produced 
similar conclusions (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Schrer, 1982). 
 
There is a widespread tendency to assume that technical work becomes ‘more scientific’ over 
time. Clearly, as technical work grows in complexity it generally relies on more, and more 
complex and sophisticated, scientific information and thought.  However, as Fores (1977, 
1981, 1992) argued in different contexts, its essence is unchanging. It does not produce the 
outputs of science, namely academic journal articles and other accounts of empirical studies 
inscribed two-dimensionally on paper, free for anyone to read, and to be judged primarily by 
the criteria of truth or rightness against some scale.  Instead, the outputs of technical work or 
engineering consist of three-dimensional objects for practical use, which are made available 
for sale in commercial market places, and which are judged by criteria of usefulness, cost and 
profit.  Whereas science analyses existing phenomena to study them, technical work 
synthesizes material resources and human expertise to make new and improved physical 
artefacts and processes.   
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This means that engineering and science are different activities with different aims and 
outputs, although they do indeed usually inform each other.  Science informs engineering 
through its knowledge of such things as energy and force, number, and the properties of raw 
materials, through the education of engineers and through the ways in which engineers draw 
on its banks of knowledge for all kinds of purpose, in design, development, maintenance, 
production, testing and so on.  Engineering informs science in the design of the experiments, 
and the design and constructions of apparatus, and in all kinds of research in which practical 
knowledge or ’know-how’ is relevant.  The German word for the practical arts and 
techniques of research is forschungstechnik.  Forschung means research.  The main point is 
that for all their overlaps and similarities, engineering and science are genuinely different 
activities, one belonging mainly in business, the other mainly in universities.  Each builds on 
its own achievements in the course of its development, and neither is at all sensibly 
conceived as a part, or the ‘application’ of the other.   
 
The arguments suggest that commercialization of new scientific knowledge will not always 
be the main form that technical change and development, and innovation, take.  It also means 
that commercial and political expectations about the industrial fruits of new scientific 
knowledge may be too high, especially in national and other contexts in which the STH 
theory is ideologically, managerially and politically dominant.  Malaysia was influenced by 
its former status as a British colony, and it appears to be one such context in several respects.   
 
 
 RHETORIC, ASPIRATION AND HOPE   
  
Attempts to stimulate change by policy makers in government, business and industry are 
accompanied by rhetoric (Legge, 1995). This involves claiming that desired changes are 
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more feasible than rational appraisals suggest, or as if they had already occurred, with little 
or no real evidence available to support relevant claims.  Such ‘talking-up’ or ‘boosting’ can 
indeed make people think that something is real, so that it becomes so in some respects.  This 
initiates reification, a process whereby social relationships that are firmly established seem to 
be beyond human control, apparently fixed and unmanageable, and features of the natural, 
rather than of the social, world (Lukacs, 1923; Merton, 1968).  In some cases the rhetoric has 
a post hoc quality, when theories and concepts are used to described and dignify events 
according to the relevant management consultancy’s or fad’s gospel, when they already 
existed or would have taken place irrespective of whether or not the theory, concept or fad 
existed or not. 
  
In the 1970s, for example British industrial management was criticized for being turned in on 
itself, with its constituent professional occupations and functions like accounting and finance, 
marketing/sales, personnel/HRM, engineering/operations and design/technical development 
competing with each other for managerial power at the expense of co-operation, performance 
and output (Child, Fores, Glover and Lawrence, 1983).  However market and other forces 
and the need to survive in the 1980s forced management teams to co-operate and unify to the 
mutual benefit of most of those involved (Owen, 1999; Glover, Tracey and Currie, 1998).   
Similar behaviour was observed in the motor industry in the USA (Abernathy, Clark and 
Kantrow, 1983).  In both countries, business processes were clearly, and according to most 
definitions of business process re-engineering (BPR), being re-engineered in a variety of 
ways, and before, during, and after BPR began to be publicized and advocated, and however 
the relevant activities are or were conceived and described.  Thus the rhetoric of BPR and the 
reality of management were mutually supportive but not always linked or interdependent.   
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In theory, commercialization is likely to exhibit similar patterns.  Academics and industry 
seek mutual support, and wide ranges of mutual benefits follow.  Scientists show engineers in 
industry how products and processes can be improved or reinvented, or engineered for the 
first time.  Companies sometimes fund, inform and otherwise stimulate scientific research.  
Ideas and mixtures of technical and scientific knowledge flow in all directions, and the 
politest, because the most economical and accurate, way of describing the often very 
complex process, is to call it the commercialization of new scientific discoveries and 
engineering inventions.  The process actually consists, like all engineering, of far more than 
the application of new scientific knowledge, although it does often include it, and it is often a 
vital input.  There is a sense in which commercialization might be usefully renamed as 
knowledge engineering, remembering that if engineering is not commercially effective, it is 
usually pointless.  The old American saying that an engineer who is ‘someone can make for 
one dollar what any bloody fool can make for two’, is not irrelevant.  Yet the knowledge 
involved here is variously commercial, scientific, social and technical.   
 
The main points to be made, first, to repeat the one made above, after describing the two 
major theories of technical change, that the focus of many researchers into technical or 
‘technological’ change, or technology management, on the commercialization of science may 
be a product of bias towards the STH theory on their part.  Second, elements of rhetoric 
clearly surround and permeate such research and thinking, which ‘talk up’ its concerns by 
associating them more with universities and science and less with industry and engineering 
than the facts merit.  Much of the confusion is fed by state funding of scientific research, and 
of management and social scientific research into the effectiveness of the former.  Societies 
in which the STH theory is implemented, in which the rhetoric of ‘R and D’ and ‘science and 
technology’ are prominent, and in which much management and social scientific research 
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draws expectations of R and D and science, will tend to be those in which commercialization 
is talked up.     
 
Many researchers have noted how complex, varied and confusing relationships between 
states, academic science and industries can be.  Senker (1996), for example, discussed 
patterns of biotechnology-based industrial development in the USA and the UK.  There had 
been significant differences between the two in the early years in the 1970s.  The UK 
government began to intervene in the 1980s, two to three decades after the USA’s 
government.  There were also changes in financial environments.  In both cases, the 
governments played important but different roles in helping to develop emerging 
technologies. The rhetoric of commercialization embodies expectations about the funding of 
the research institutions by governments.  Some evidence on the aspirations and abilities of 
scientists and policy makers has suggested that such expectations are hard to satisfy. For 
example Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al (2003 p. 665) noted that scientists, while they may 
master technical details of their discoveries, lack the vision to appreciate their potential 
economic benefits.  
 
According to Inkster (1998, p. 54) early British industrialization was a product of individual 
inventors and commercial visionaries.   Technical education, professional associations and 
government R and D funding came later.  But in newer industrial countries the processes 
tended to take place the other way round, with governments, politicians, powerful firms and 
so on creating public institutions of industrial societies as well as industries themselves, at 
the same time or even earlier. 
 
These arguments simply indicate the considerable real-world variety of relevant phenomena.  
Yet, as noted, nothing can alter the difference between engineering and science, and that 
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between tacit technical and explicit scientific and other knowledge.  However complex, 
varied and indeed confusing technical and industrial phenomena become, air is still air, 
engineering is still engineering, food is still food, science is still science, and water is still 
water.  Engineers design and make things. Scientists study, describe and explain them. 
 
 
EVIDENCE: ENGINEERING ACHIEVEMENT VERSUS SCIENTIFIC 
ASPIRATION    
 
According to Hawthorne (1978), humankind developed industries and technical knowledge 
as a result of a series of innovations in three main fields of activity:    the use of materials, the 
exploitation and transformation of energy, and understanding and use of scientific principles 
and facts.  The development of technology could be characterised by evidence of engineering 
achievement through different technological routes, each of which constituted a particular 
combination of materials, energy, and development and application of knowledge and 
principles to result in generic and/or sector-specific bodies of technical knowledge and new 
manufacturing processes and products.  Examples of such routes might focus on the blast 
furnace, the internal combustion engine, the electric motor, and the steam engine, each of 
which offered separate routes to the technical satisfaction of material, transport, power and 
other needs. Mathias (1991, p. 35) argued that until the nineteenth century ‘great areas of 
advanced technology’ remained relatively untouched by formal scientific knowledge. They 
included agriculture, canals, machine-making, iron and steel making, and the mechanization 
of cloth making. A very small proportion of the UK’s labour force was engaged in activities 
where the links were even superficially high, as in chemicals and steam power.  It was 
questions of ‘great determination, intense curiosity, quick wits and clever fingers, getting a 
backer to survive relatively expensive periods of experimenting, testing and improving’, 
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which of were more important than scientific education.  Most innovations were the product 
of ‘inspired amateurs or brilliant artisans trained as clockmakers, millwrights, blacksmiths, 
carpenters, or in the Birmingham trades (Mathias, 1991, p. 38).  
 
Through the nineteenth century, in Britain and elsewhere on either side of the Atlantic, 
mechanical and civil engineering developed in sophistication, and chemical and electrical 
industries were developed. Somewhat later, engineering education included more science and 
became more theoretical in emphasis.  At the same time, and not only in the UK (cf. Wiener, 
1981), but also in Germany, the USA and elsewhere (Gispen 1989, Lee and Smith, 1992 and 
Smith, 1987), educational provision in the natural, physical and social sciences and the 
humanities expanded the numbers of those who often felt intellectually and/or morally and 
socially superior to  most engineers.  During the twentieth century, in the UK and to a 
smaller extent the USA, engineering found it increasingly difficult to recruit its share of the 
most able members of each generation (Glover, 1985).  It was regarded in many quarters as 
‘the dirty end of applied physics’ and, as noted earlier, as generally failing to offer 
employment fit for a gentleman or intellectual (Coleman, 1973; Glover, 1980).   
 
The other industries referred to above, chemicals and electricity, were regarded differently by 
economic historians from those established in the century or so up to 1850.  Their 
introduction constituted a ‘second industrial revolution’, which unlike the first, was called 
‘science-based’ by economists and economic historians (Cardwell 1957, p. 7).  They used 
cleaner sources of power than coal and steam, and in due course proportionately more white-
collar professional and managerial employees, than mechanical engineering, mining and 
construction.  In a society in which much energy and social aspiration were focused on 
administration, government, imperial and foreign affairs, universities and the professions, 
and more recently high finance and the media, compared with manufacturing, construction 
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and mining, and in which the former had generally adopted arms’-length attitudes towards 
the latter, science took much credit for engineering achievements, and allowed it to shelter 
under its wing, and engineering and production were often  regarded merely as effects, and 
even parts, of scientific endeavour.   
 
THE DECLINE OF THE STH OR LINEAR THEORY?  
 
The STH theory (Sorge and Hartmann, 1980) depicts the so-called linear theory of technical 
change comprehensively.  Research on many specific inventions and innovations built up 
from at least the 1950s onwards has cast increasing doubt on it.  In the 1970s and 1980s 
examples involving international comparisons emerged increasingly from more economically 
successful competitor nations that had espoused the Technik theory. The weaknesses of the 
STH theory became even more apparent, even those who believed strongly in the cause of 
helping industry to use the fruits of science more quickly and profitably.  Even so, advocates 
of linear approaches, who regarded research as the key to much or even most technical 
development and industrial innovation, continued to defend modified versions of it, which 
tend to differentiate between innovation that was technology-driven (technology push), and 
relatively linear, and that which is pulled through or out of companies by market forces 
(market pull), and with more of a holistic quality, neither version is particularly strong in 
defence of the role of scientific discoveries.  The enterprise tends to be regarded as the main 
source of innovation, with university science playing mainly background roles.     
  
The linear model has always seen innovation as happening by a sequence of separable stages 
such as discovery, design, production and marketing.  There are two main variants of this 
model, which usually concern design for product innovation.  First, there is the much more 
assertively linear technology-driven version where new ideas are developed by R and D staff, 
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then sent to engineering and manufacturing to design, tool up and produce, and then sent on 
to marketing for advertising, selling and distribution to customers.  The second is the much 
more holistic need-driven model with some linear elements: marketing comes up with ideas 
that drew on interaction with customers, which in turn are sent to R and D for prototype 
development, and then to design, engineering and manufacturing for design, tooling up and 
production (Galbraith, 1982).  Galbraith also suggested that innovation is more efficient 
when the relevant ‘stages’, or parts, of it are undertaken as simultaneously as possible, with 
continuous knowledge-sharing and other forms of communication between departments 
(Galbraith, 1982, p. 16-17). 
 
Verhaeghe and Kfir (2002) argued that, in so-called knowledge-intensive organizations, a 
linear view of innovation was more relevant than a holistic view.  A process classified as 
linear is where there is a little indication of feedback.   However, in the holistic view, the 
results are continually fed back into new cycles.  Newer models of innovation based on the 
idea of a knowledge-based economy go beyond the linear or chain linkage notion that has 
been used in innovation theory and in regional economics to explain processes in high-
technology industries (Strambach, 2002).  
 
The idea of a knowledge-based economy is dubious because many of the most directly useful 
elements of the so-called knowledge that is involved consist of situation-specific pieces of 
information about particular artefacts, processes and people, rather than scientific facts, laws 
or principles (Ackroyd, Glover, Currie and Bull, 2000); and because the idea that the 
knowledgeable are taking over the reins of power from the wealthy is a politically naïve and 
regularly discredited old one (Nicholls, 1969; Enteman, 1993; Glover and Tracey, 1997). 
Even so, the view of Verhaeghe and Kfir (2003), that in so-called knowledge-intensive 
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organizations a linear view of innovation can be more relevant than a holistic one, does have 
some relevance for the present study.   
 
Science or technology-push models are clearly linear ones.  Market-pull models are much 
more holistic. Linear models give indications of feedback between stages or parts of 
innovation processes, but market-pull ones suggest that feedback occurs between all stages 
and parts, especially when lessons of a given ‘cycle’ of innovation, are fed back into the start 
of a new cycle.  This approach treats innovations like biological evolutionary processes. 
From a distance, they probably are.  However, for present purposes, the arguments of 
Verhaeghe and Kfir (2003) are particularly relevant in two ways.  First, their point that the 
linear model continues to be useful for understanding innovation in knowledge-intensive 
technology organizations may be valid because such organizations tend to be small and 
responsible for relatively few discrete projects, with relatively clear beginnings, stages and 
ends.  Yet, and second, and more importantly, almost all kinds of linear or ‘chain linkage’ 
models may simply be largely out of date for explaining the general character of innovation 
in an ever more complex and sophisticated world in which engineers, scientists, marketing 
professionals, financial professionals, customers, policy-makers, policy advisers, policy 
implementers, staff of research grant awarding bodies, and firms, universities, research 
institutes and government agencies and departments co-operate, compete and otherwise 
interact and spawn innovation continually (Strambach, 2002).   
 
Newer models of innovation from regional economics, used to explain processes in advanced 
sectors that are also used more generally in innovation theory go, according to Strambach, far 
beyond the simplicities of the linear model (Clark and Tracey, 2004).  They fit well with the 
view of Crook, Pakulski and Waters (1992; 32) that differentiation, commodification and 
rationalization ‘define the transformation of premodern into modern systems as well as being 
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the central processes of modern societies’. Modernization produces highly differentiated 
societies, with high levels of specialization and complexity, and highly organized with high 
levels of rationalization and commodification.  Moreover, ‘postmodernization may be 
analysed as the consequence of the extensions of modernization processes to extreme levels’.  
Hence they focus on hyper-differentiation, hyper-rationalization and hyper-commodification.  
It is not necessary to be a postmodernist to see the strengths of this line of thinking.  The 
superficially chaotic character of contemporary innovation and the now limited, albeit still 
sometimes very significant, relevance of linear models has also been spelt out by Tirole 
(1989, p. 389).  Verhaege and Kfir (2003) were thus right to emphasize the continuing and 
often considerable importance of science-push and the linear model in many specific 
situations, but for general explanations and most specific situations, the Technik model 
remains superior.      
 
 
 
TWENTY-FIVE CONCEPTS AND THE SEVEN MOST SALIENT ONES 
These concepts are grouped under five main headings: subject classifications; socioeconomic 
development; academic; industrial; and ones linking universities and industries.  The reasons 
for choosing them are explained under each heading.  After each is discussed briefly (see 
Appendix 2 for more details of each) the seven most salient are discussed at more length in 
Appendix 3 with particular regard to the relevance of specific aspects of them to this study.   
 
1. Subject Classifications:  
 
1.  a.    Kunst, Technik and Wissenschaft  
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These Continental European definitions, in German, are included because they separate 
engineering and science, unlike such English language terms as applied science and 
technology.  They make a clear distinction between those who make things, Techniker or 
engineers, and those who study them, scientists or Wissenschaftler. 
 
 
1.  a. i  Kunst 
 
Kunst means the fine and performing arts, which are meant to be beautiful and inspiring.  
They are taught in German and other Continental art colleges.  
 
1.  a. ii  Technik 
 
This means engineering and technical excellence, and it includes many practical subjects.  It 
is concerned with usefulness and cost.  It uses unpredictable ingenuity far more than 
‘application’ of scientific principles.  On the Continent, university-level Technik subjects 
have long been taught in institutions with high or very high social status.  
 
1.  a. iii Wissenschaft 
 
Wissenschaft means science and scholarship, and includes all subjects concerned with 
discovering and recording the truth, for example history, economics, sociology and political 
science, as well as mathematics and physical sciences.  These are taught in traditional 
universities.  Their outputs are judged in terms of truth or rightness against some scale and 
consist of public and verifiable knowledge of phenomena (Ziman, 1968; Fores and Rey, 
1979). 
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1.  b.    The ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ sciences and the arts and humanities 
 
These are included because they appear less than logical compared with the previous 
classification, and because in the cases of the ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ sciences their character 
informs much conventional and/or English language research, thought and rhetoric about 
technical change and commercialization.   
 
1.  b. i   Science 
 
Science has two-dimensional paper outputs and the best short definition of scientific activity 
is the production of verifiable knowledge of phenomena.  The scientist aims to get as close as 
to truth as possible, and is not primarily interested in usefulness or profit.  
 
Scientists use research to study things. Scientific knowledge is a public good like air, always 
free for anyone to use.  Since it is impossible to predict whether new scientific knowledge 
will be used or not, the idea of ‘pure’ science is very questionable.  
 
1. b.ii   Engineering 
 
Engineering is not applied science, and not a part of science either, because it does not 
produce knowledge as its primary output.  Its outputs consist of hardware and supporting 
software.  Most working engineers will agree that engineering is sensibly called the 
‘industrial arts’ because it is much more art than science (Fores, 1978b).  
The root of the word engineering is ingenuity. Engineering is a, in fact the, useful art. It is 
intuitive, unpredictable, and private to its creators in many respects. Engineers make things, 
and their work includes the design and technical development of processes and products, and 
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the production of three-dimensional artefacts of all kinds. Although engineers use technical, 
scientific and other knowledge in their work, but their work is not part of science. Whereas 
the output of science is verifiable and published knowledge of phenomena in the form of 
scientific papers, books, and so on, that of engineering consists of commercially viable 
products. Engineering is ahead of the frontiers of scientific knowledge, with there being no 
science to apply, as when drugs are marketed without full knowledge of why they are 
successful, or when bridges are built without complete certainty about their long-term future 
and safety.    Engineering has existed since prehistoric humans began to make and use tools. 
The most comprehensive definition of our species is homo faber, the maker and doer (Glover 
and Kelly 1987).  Engineering also uses all kinds of accounting, financial, marketing, and 
people management expertise.  It has many branches, for example aeronautical, biological, 
chemical, civil, electronic and electrical, mechanical, mining and software.  
 
1. b.iii Technology 
 
This word currently appears to be identified mainly with information and communication 
technology (ICT). It is often used to differentiate ICT from apparently older and ‘cruder’ 
technologies, like those of electrical, mechanical, mining or civil engineering. It is more 
complex word, and the gently implied criticism of it being a status-concerned substitute for 
engineering has more than a grain of truth in it.   
 
Dictionary definitions of technology tend to note and stress the relevance of the literal 
translation from the Latin: knowledge or study or the science of technique and/or techniques.  
In both everyday and academic usage, however, and as just suggested, the word generally has 
more practical connotations, ones ‘traditionally’ and more accurately identifiable with 
engineering.   Most practising ‘technologists’ are engineers by qualification, function and 
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title, so this is unsurprising.  Fores and Sorge (1978) asked how engineering, which 
principally aims to produce three-dimensional objects for sale, could sensibly be described as 
‘-ology’.  They also wondered whether technology means ‘ideas, hardware, or something that 
arts graduates love to hate’.  Such implicit criticisms do provide support for the suggestion 
that technology is a rather vague notion.  Because it quite literally means so much, it is easy 
to use it in several different ways, usually without straying too obviously from the truth.  
 
In management and organization studies, the term technology has different levels of meaning 
(Loveridge, 2001).  At the highest level of abstraction, technology means, ‘all modes of 
organizing people for the purposes of controlling or co-ordinating their activities’ (p. 6375).  
At a lower level (p. 6376) it means ‘bodies of disciplined knowledge [that] have emerged in 
which causal and systematic relations between material and/or social elements in specified 
situations are postulated and related to empirical observations’.  This means, the bodies of 
knowledge and skill, of virtually all kinds, that enable particular ways of producing and 
doing things to be repeated more or less predictably and reliably.  Examples could include 
assembly line technology, biotechnology, and the technologies of chemical processing, 
information processing, guided missiles and waste disposal.  For Loveridge, the ways in 
which those relations and processes are categorised and explained ‘can be seen as 
constituting more or less scientific knowledge in terms of its reproducibility and 
generalizability’ (p. 6376).  However the knowledge used within each type of technology is, 
of course, mainly technical knowledge.   
 
A third, ‘lower level’, and more practical kind of definition focuses on the ‘techniques or 
procedures adopted in processing information [about] data on social or material operations’ 
(p. 6376). Loveridge regards techniques that are incorporated in the mechanical, material or 
electronic design and programming of hardware and software, in other words in machines 
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and capital equipment, as ‘the most articulated forms of technology’ (p. 6376).  This is his 
fourth way of defining technology.   
 
From all of his definitions, we can see how the word rivals and indeed potentially surpasses 
culture (qv) in terms of complexity.  Clearly it is partly synonymous with technical 
knowledge or know-how, but it is self-consciously upmarket and ‘modern’ in the way in 
which, in use, as well as etymologically and in theory, it makes rather biased claims about 
the science upon which practical procedures are, or should be, ‘based’.  Loveridge also 
discusses ‘technological innovation’ or change and the distinctions between product and 
process or production technology (p. 6376).  
 
Perhaps the best (short) working definition of (a) technology that emerges from this 
discussion is that it constitutes a generic, cross-sector and/or sector-specific bundle of 
information, knowledge and skill.   
 
 
1.b.iv The arts and humanities 
 
Arts subjects in the UK and other former British Empire countries are normally of three 
kinds:  the humanities, languages, and the fine and performing arts.  The humanities are often 
thought of as including languages, but they are principally those subjects which study 
humankind and its experience, such as geography, history and study of literature and various 
other manifestations of human artifice.  Partly because the social sciences, like anthropology, 
economics, political science, psychology and sociology, study human artifacts like tools, 
products, services, thoughts, motives, attitudes, and social institutions, processes and actions, 
they have often been classified as arts rather than as sciences, rather, that is, as part of what 
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would be Wissenschaft in German.  Language subjects often cover the study of the histories, 
economies and institutions of the societies whose languages are being learnt, and can 
therefore be regarded both/either as humanities and/or social scientific subjects.  The fine and 
performing arts subjects are more or less the same as the Kunst ones in German and on 
elsewhere the European Continent.  They are directly vocational than the other arts and 
humanities subjects.  Those who qualify in them are proportionately less likely to teach them 
than those with other arts and humanities qualifications, or not to use what they have learnt at 
all in subsequent employment, or more likely to make careers out of them outside teaching.   
 
What is of specific interest here is the tendency of many arts and humanities teachers, 
researchers and practitioners to distance themselves from the useful industrial arts of design, 
engineering, extraction, manufacturing and construction.  In the UK, design is taught for 
industrial and related purposes to engineers and architects. It is also taught, separately, in art 
college or university arts faculties, with a generally and significantly less practical and more 
aesthetic (and at times anarchic or frivolous) emphasis (Hudson, 1978).   
 
2. Socioeconomic development: culture; development; and sustainable 
development 
 
These are included to help clarify some of the major background assumptions used in this 
thesis.  The specific relevance of each is made apparent in each case. 
 
Culture 
According to Williams (1976), culture was the most complex English word. Traditionally it 
has been associated with intellectually and socially prestigious elite leisure pursuits, 
including the often expensive fine and performing arts, and their conspicuous consumption 
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for predatory purposes, in the pursuit of status and [by men] women (Veblen, 1921). Since 
the 1960s, one interpretation of it has increasingly been employed as a category in the study 
of management, and management has increasingly been thought of and discussed in cross-
cultural terms. Unfortunately many early comparisons of managers and management in 
different countries tended to be rather shallow and concerned with superficial attitudes and 
behaviour, and researchers often made things worse by inferring values from them (cf. 
Hofstede, 1980).  
 
However Sorge (1982-83, 1985) explored the history of the term to help arrive at a 
comprehensive definition. He discussed the roots of the word in the Latin verb colere, which 
means to grow, in the context of living organisms. He argued that the culture of a human 
group or social institution is made up of everything that it consisted of, everything that 
characterised it, everything that the people involved were and are, and that the culture of any 
human group, social institutions or society had three equally important components: 
ideational, material and social. Culture was so all-embracing and its roots were so deep that 
appearance was often taken for substance, with attitudes and ways of behaving, only parts of 
culture, being thought of as all of it.  
 
What Sorge implied was, as many others have stated since, was that countries do not ‘have’ 
cultures. They are them. The same point is often made about organizations.  This all meant 
that, for Sorge (1982-83), the more one writes or talks about the culture of something, the 
more one glosses over its essence.  It also means that it is unacceptable to ‘explain’ aspects of 
events that cannot be explained using familiar influences and logical reasoning by attributing 
them to ‘culture’.  So it is nonsensical to argue that while 80% of a society’s economic 
difficulties can be explained in economic terms, the other 20% are ‘rooted in its culture’, 
because the economic features of societies are themselves components of their culture.   
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Further, human characteristics develop over many generations, subject to many influences. 
Most of this is of course unknown to the individuals concerned, and we only ever really 
understand our own culture to a limited extent, and the understanding of it that we do have is 
naturally and highly subjective. 
 
What is the present relevance of these points?  The main point is that Malaysia is unique, like 
all nations, and to try to convert the Malaysian economy to something like that of Germany 
or the USA, or another more ‘advanced’ one, is like trying to turn a Toyota Yaris into large 
Mercedes car by putting a Mercedes engine in it, or vice-versa.  
 
Development  
 
Development has traditionally meant increasing the capacity, potential and output of a 
national economy. It tends to concern the capacity of a nation to generate annual increases in 
its gross national product (GNP).  
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, much thinking about economic development was focused on less 
developed countries (LDCs) and advocated rapid industrialization at the expense of rural 
development (Todaro, 1988).  Yet living standards of most LDCs remained unchanged in the 
1970s, and development came to be thought of more in terms of general economic growth 
and reduction of poverty, inequality, and unemployment.  Newer definitions treat 
development as a multidimensional process involving changes in attitudes, institutions and 
structures, as well as economic growth, reduction of inequality and eradication of absolute 
poverty. 
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Apart from its uses covering general socioeconomic change and that of LDCs, the term is 
also used in sustainable development (qv) and research and development (qv). The word also 
has another meaning, which includes the second part of R and D, in within-firm technical 
development activities (also see below). Parker (1978) saw the development of innovative 
processes as lengthy sequences of focused technical activities through which original 
concepts are modified until ready for production and sale.  Such concepts, and improved or 
new processes and products, could come from inventions or scientific discoveries (Cory, 
1996).  
 
Sustainable development 
 
Sustainable development, as described by the Brundtland Report of 1987, meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs 
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). According to Kuhlman and 
Edler (2003), national systems of innovation, and by implication, environmental protection, 
tend to reflect national political histories, structures and traditions. In France the innovation 
system is more centralized than in Germany and the USA.  Developing countries can seem to 
be careless with their natural environments.  Their politicians can have relatively more power 
and more ambition in their own countries than those in older, wealthier societies.  Such 
points may have some relevance for Malaysia. 
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3. Academic:  research and development; and discovery  
 
Research and development      
 
This rather vague notion is used to include many types of technical work, often of a quite 
routine nature, like maintenance.  It assumes, against most research evidence, that technical 
change needs to be preceded by scientific research.  Most industrial R and D appears to 
consist of development work.  However university and directly government organized and 
funded R and D has grown and apparently become more important in developed and some 
developing countries in the last 50 years. 
 
Discovery 
 
Discoveries, meaning new knowledge about the natural world, are often ineptly confused 
with inventions, and vice-versa. Industries tend to be concerned only with design, production 
and development problems, ones of practice, and not ones of fact or principle.  Technical 
knowledge, built up from experience, is usually sufficient.  This is not scientific knowledge. 
Industry is far normally more involved with inventions than discoveries. But many 
discoveries are relevant, with some very important or vital.      
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4.   Industrial:  production; design; entrepreneurship; innovation; invention; 
management of change; performance; success 
 
Production 
 
Production includes all the activities involved in the physical transformation of artefacts. 
Lawrence (1980) emphasized how production is what defines manufacturing in general, so 
that the type of product and production involved in each manufacturing sector defines it.  He 
emphasized how production is the most central function of any manufacturing organization, 
preceded by design, development, marketing and finance and followed by accounting and 
sales. In West Germany, production generally meant ‘the whole company minus sales and 
finance’, thus including design, technical development, purchasing and maintenance, unlike 
the situation in the UK a generation ago. 
 
Design 
 
Design is a private act, intuitive and specific to the individuals who undertake it, unlike the 
public nature of scientific work. Design is the main activity of many engineers, and more 
central to engineering than even production, but academics concerned with 
commercialization, technical change, and R and D, have tended to neglect it compared with 
them. It is the core activity of engineering (Fores, 1978b).  
 
Entrepreneurship 
 
Entrepreneurial action is needed for new knowledge and techniques to be made productive 
and commercially viable.  According to Kuratko (2001), an ‘entrepreneur undertakes to 
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organise, manage and assume the risks of business’. Entrepreneurial activity inside 
established businesses has been called intrapreneurship.   
 
For present purposes, entrepreneurship is relevant in the research, design, engineering, 
management, finance and marketing that result in the commercialization of discoveries and 
inventions. Enterprise can be social as well as economic, and in political terminology, left-
wing as well as right-wing (Keat and Abercombie, 1994).  However research has indicated 
that governments cannot build geographical or other clusters of innovative firms, and that 
such clusters are generally products of ‘systems of innovation’ in which companies, 
universities, banks, and other sources of venture capital and other finance, and government 
agencies, facilitate, support and stimulate each other to generate innovation, rather than to 
locate, channel or control it (Saxenian, 1996; Feldman and Audretsch, 1998; Feldman 2003; 
Clark and Tracey, 2004). While these factors can all be present in LDCs, their roots tend to 
be shallower than in established industrial countries.  
 
Innovation 
 
Innovation consists of inventions first being used to commercial effect. Marquis (1982) 
argued that about a quarter of innovations required virtually no adaptation of readily 
obtainable relevant information, and that another third were modifications of existing 
products or processes.  As just noted above, innovations tend to be more successful when 
they occur in contexts of systems of innovation.   
 
Invention 
 
 
This notion is discussed at more length in Appendix 3, but a few points must be made here.  
First, inventions are created by new syntheses of existing techniques and knowledge.  They 
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consist of new products or processes or component parts of them.  Invention is not the aim of 
science.  It is art, although science often contributes.  Inventions occur through both 
scarcities and surpluses of resources, or without resource considerations being much 
significance.  Inventors can tend to be more technically focused than innovators.   
 
The management of change 
 
Commercialization is a kind of organizational change.  To be successful, any changes must 
be managed suitably.   Such management needs, above all, to be holistic, with all necessary 
actions being taken, neither more nor fewer.  More details of the management literature on 
organizational change and of how it relates to commercialization are to be found in Appendix 
3.  
 
Performance 
 
Performance criteria are of several kinds, and operate at several interdependent levels: 
international, societal, sectoral, organizational, group and individual. Well-known 
performance criteria include product and service quality, process quality, quality and/or 
volume of employment and sales, return on investment, profit, ecological friendliness, 
market share, and corporate social responsibility (cf. Child, 1984). All relate to different 
interests in the survival and performance of organizations. The issue of the short versus long 
term for performance is also important, as are historical and societal contexts. It is reasonable 
to suggest that Anglo-American short-termism is, in at least one fundamental respect, as 
‘long-termist’ as it is possible to be.  By eschewing the collectivism of Continental European 
and Far Eastern societies, and in trusting individuals and individual firms to perform, Anglo-
Americans assume that the pursuit of individual self-interest and the creative destruction of 
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market forces will, in the long run, optimise societal outcomes (cf. Elias, 1978).  To coin a 
phrase, short-termism is only short-term in the short run.   
 
Success 
 
Success is more than performance.  It can be impossible to measure. Also, even when all 
possible contingencies are understood and catered and accounted for, achievement may still 
be impossible. According to Landes (1998), business or economic success is normally a 
product of two phenomena.  These are hard and focussed effort, and eschewing vanity, 
meaning refusing to believe one’s own propaganda.  As regards technical change, successful 
inventions are generally those which increase or maintain profits and market share.  
 
5. Linking universities and industries: commercialization; technical change; 
technological change; technology transfer 
 
Commercialization 
 
Commercialization seeks to make new scientific and technical knowledge and capabilities 
profitable. Government aims for commercialization in Malaysia are generally the same as 
those of other governments.  Hughes (1985) suggested that commercialization may be a 
synonym for government over-control of innovation.   
 
Technical change  
 
Technical change affects products and processes (Bell and Hill, 1978, p. 226)., and consist of 
innovation and diffusion.  Most technical change is piecemeal and small-scale, and hardly 
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merits the use of the word innovation.  Most changes use technical knowledge far more than 
scientific knowledge. Some does originate in scientific research, and some of this is of 
considerable use to industry and this is the kind that most discussions of commercialization 
are concerned with.  
 
Technological change 
 
The successes of organizations depend on the effective use of technology (Joynt, 2001).  
Unfortunately however, technological change is rarely distinguished clearly or openly from 
technical change.  It is useful to distinguish it in a relatively open and formal way by 
regarding it as a special case of technical change, in which, unlike the case with the latter, 
new scientific knowledge may combine with new and old techniques to help generate, not 
only improved or new processes and products, but new and often generic technologies with 
systemic implications.    
 
Technology transfer  
 
According to Brooks (1966), technology transfer occurs whenever scientific or other useful 
knowledge developed by one person, group or institution is used by another person, group or 
other institution to do whatever it wants it for. In practice, technology transfer means the 
transfer of technical knowledge, practical know-how, and not just scientific knowledge, but 
the relative importance of the latter is often exaggerated in the relevant literature. 
 
The seven most salient concepts, regarded as those most relevant to the concerns of the 
thesis, are discussed further in Appendix 3.   
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SOME RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER  
  
The literature on technology transfer concerns collaboration between universities and 
industry.   A general discussion of university-industry collaboration is in the report of the 
American Council on Education (American Council of Education 2001).  This suggested that 
indirect costs, conflicts of interest and disputes about intellectual property and findings could 
threaten the practical use of research.   
 
Bottom-up and top-down approaches to university-industry-government relations have been 
compared. On the former, the ‘micro strength’ of university-industry relations was described 
by Sutz (2000).  However the institutional design of university-industry–government 
relations used the latter, being centred on the roles of institutions.  Examples of the bottom-
up approach included a successful enterprise that had established a ‘knowledge relationship’ 
with a ‘technological tailor’. One university research unit was a set-up agency designed to 
ensure that university researchers met company needs as effectively as possible. A criticism 
of the bottom-up approach concerned its need for careful management to keep collaboration 
focused and effective (Sutz, p. 283).  The top-down approach often failed to involve firms in 
relevant decision-making, especially that concerned with  in their dealings with universities.  
Relationships between firms and universities were generally weak and often unbalanced. 
 
A seemingly better approach to planning stages of innovation from discovery/invention to 
commercialization was used by Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al (2003). Their case study of 
the technology portfolio of a European public research organization suggested that its type of 
technology-push was very successful for commercialising its technologies.  The main success 
factor was the balancing of the power and interests of the participants, who included 
university scientists and commercial company managers.  The authors stressed the 
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importance of research administrators establishing early links with industry to prevent 
technology suppliers developing unrealistic technical and commercial expectations. 
 
Foreign multinationals operating in Malaysia has rarely engaged in R and D there.  Most R 
and D in newer and emerging technologies such as advanced materials, ICT and 
biotechnology in Malaysia is done by Malaysian university and other researchers (Azmi and 
Alavi, 2001).    Working with university researchers can be difficult for Malaysian 
companies and venture capitalists. Universities too often expect to apply unsuitable one-size 
fits-all concepts. University expectations are generally different from other organizations’.  
Academics believe in and practise open publication of results, and oppose commercial 
secrecy.  Universities publish their discoveries for all to see and use, unlike the position in 
companies where individuals register their patents for their own use.  Universities need to 
accommodate businesses’ and venture capitalists’ needs without sacrificing their principles 
and long-term scientific objectives. Joint ventures and spin-off companies are effective by 
creating wealth for the universities and providing opportunities for venture capital companies 
and the businesses that they support by commercialising R and D and its funding.  Scientists 
can publish their research as usual while spin-off companies use their findings in business, 
separately from universities.  Scientists can be rewarded financially for working for spin-off 
companies if they do so separately from their university research.  Goto (2000) argued that 
closer, more transparent, university-industry links and approaches to university patenting 
were needed. 
 
The bottom-up approach of Sutz (2000) generally seems more likely to be suited to Malaysia 
than his top-down one.  The former should better encourage creative relationships between 
researchers and companies by emphasizing enabling and supportive roles for institutions 
rather than more directive, controlling and rigid ones. It tends to favour rather than stifle the 
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diversity and flexibility that economic and intellectual life thrive on. It encourages innovation 
without trying to plan and control it. It seems more likely to favour development of ‘Triple 
Helix’ relationships between governments, industries and university and other researchers 
that value sectoral, organizational, national and local kinds of embedded specificity 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000).  Industrial policies for LDCs have often ignored their 
needs for such kinds of tailor-made, apolitical, rooted and grounded industrial nurturing 
(Stiglitz, 2002). Yet while accepting that all such policies should be country-specific, and 
sector-specific and company-specific, it also seems sensible to agree with Mathias (1991, p. 
28-29) that putting discoveries and inventions to use usually involves similar kinds of costs 
and problems of translation from laboratory and engineering techniques to factory 
production, from largely or partly non-commercial contexts and the motive of the pursuit of 
knowledge or technical excellence to profitability as a condition of existence, and to growth 
of market share as an aid to longer-term survival.   
 
EIGHT MODELS OF COMMERCIALIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER  
 
Some of the most relevant theories or models of commercialization and technology transfer 
are introduced below.  These were produced by Cornwell (1998), Hindle and Yecken (2003), 
Jolly (1997), Lee and Gaertner (1994), Rothwell (1992), Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000), 
Lowe (1993), and Siegel, Waldman, Atwater and Link (2004).   From these eight, Lee and 
Gaertner’s University Model appears to be the most thorough and realistic for present 
purposes, because it includes the actions of all those directly involved in technology transfer 
and commercialization, while also being world-open by taking most relevant external 
influences well into account. However all have something to offer the present study. 
Rothwell’s is, however, more an account of the development of theories over time than a 
single theory. All eight are discussed again in chapters 6 and 8.    
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1. The University Model  
 
This model (Lee and Gaertner 1994: 384) assumes that innovation moves in an iterative or 
repetitive, more than in a sequential way, under the influence of competitive market forces. 
Four stages in the model are assumed, nevertheless.  They are basic research, technology 
development, technology commercialization, and marketing by industry.  The stages are 
connected through a continuous feedback loop.  The model assumes that some new scientific 
advances can be used to stimulate invention and technology creation and to lead to 
commercialization.  The first step in innovation involves scientists with the help of 
commercial and financial, and especially technical, experts, considering their findings to 
decide whether they are commercially promising.  If so, the next task is to consider more 
specific potential development and market needs.  Commercial, that is economic and 
technical, feasibility, needs to be taken into account before decisions about initiating design, 
development and focused market research are made.   
 
In this model, technical change uses scientific discoveries, which are engineered into 
processes and products.   If a problem arises the search may go back as far as the original 
scientific research and be solved through references to relevant knowledge.  The process is 
also evaluated and re-evaluated for possible demand shifts, other relevant discoveries and 
inventions, and unexpected setbacks. Commercialization consists of design and construction 
of processes and plant for market-oriented production.   It involves start-up, evaluation and 
technical problem-solving.  It identifies businesses potentially interested in adopting and 
adapting the new technology.  It tests relevant markets, and works towards market entry.  
Universities have several alternatives if they have something to sell.  One is to find an 
entrepreneur with a small or medium-sized firm that is interested in commercialising their 
new discoveries and/or technologies, and in using and licensing them and in paying royalties.  
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Another is to encourage researchers who have developed new technologies to start their own 
firms.  Commercialization is seen as always including the finishing, ‘business’ phases of the 
university technology transfer process.  This model is quite comprehensive and simple. It is 
also focused on actual people and events. While it tends to be compatible with the Technik 
model of technical change, it nonetheless allows use of relevant elements of the STH one.  
 
 
2. The Integrative Model 
 
 
Hindle and Yencken (2004) developed a model that described the various inputs to the 
spinning-off and development of new technology-based firms (NTBFs).  They took into 
account the processes, events and resource inputs that could be expected to be involved in the 
construction of NTBFs. Researchers generated new knowledge. This led to ideas being 
converted into opportunities using technology development, moving on to proof of concept 
and to the first ‘exit point’, when, typically, venture capitalists or other investors might be 
interested.  This model is more or less a simple linear one, but with various knowledge, 
information and expertise inputs reinforced and influenced by border scanning.  Border 
scanning included company awareness of external economic and regulatory factors and being 
commercially informed about sources of new ideas and opportunities.  The importance of 
access to entrepreneurial capacity at various phases of business development is emphasized. 
This model is simpler than the already quite simple University one. Its greater emphasis on 
external inputs is very helpful. 
 
3.   The Commercialization Map 
 
Jolly (1997) posited five stages of commercializing technologies.  These were imaging, 
incubating, demonstrating, promoting and sustaining.  Imaging consisted of reviewing 
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competing discoveries in the field, including patenting by others and the readiness of peers to 
endorse one’s own discovery.  Incubating involved using application-specific time windows 
for testing the technology, accepting the time scales of the firms expected to use the 
technology, selection of firms by universities as the resource providers and filing patents to 
consolidate positions.  Demonstrating included assessment of competing products or 
processes for the function-targeted availability of complementary technology.  Promoting 
involved assessing and encouraging the readiness of other market constituents to support 
commercialization and that of end users to adopt products or processes.  The last stage was 
sustaining, which involved responding to or otherwise coping with launches of more cost-
effective products or processes by competitors.  
Each stage, except the last, had a definable ‘transfer gap’.  The transfer gaps were interest, 
technology transfer, market transfer and diffusion.  The time windows of commercialization 
included all those typically seen as leading up to the acceptance of products in relevant 
markets. These are the stages through which the technology must pass if it is to be 
commercialised. The stages involve finding solutions to a variety of technical, production, 
and marketing problems and the bridges between the stages involve the mobilizing of 
resources to deal with them.  Jolly called this process ‘closing the circle of 
commercialization’.  Closing the circle was about effective management of each stage (p. 
329).   
 
The last of the four gaps was diffusion. If the research had originated in a public sector 
institution, then this usually represented the end of its involvement.  Dodgson (2000) argued 
that this model demonstrated a few important principles. Commercialization could fail at any 
one of the stages or gaps in the process. Effective commercialization processes tended to be 
continuous. They did not end when products reached the markets.  Products could be 
improved, and markets could change.  Long-term income streams depended not only on 
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careful market entry strategies, but also on continuing market development activities.  For 
Jolly (1997), the greater the value demonstrated in one stage of the commercialization 
process, the easier it was to build a bridge to one next to it.  But because the intermediate 
values were mainly based on expectations, they tended to be subjective.  This ultimately 
made bridging gaps a partly political act.  This model is similar to the University one.  
Although more complicated, and also distinctly ‘linear’, it nonetheless adds several 
interesting detailed insights to the University and other models.   
 
4. Quick Look 
 
This model focused on the first stage of ‘imagining’ new products (Cornwell, 1998).  It has 
been used at the National Mid-Continent Technology Transfer Centre (NMCTTC) of the 
USA’s National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to provide a preliminary 
assessment of the commercial potential of new technologies.  A Quick Look investigation 
provides a snapshot of the market’s receptiveness towards an invention or discovery. Quick 
Look is an example of a structured preliminary examination of the potential of a new 
technology.  It has three advantages.  It is quick, relative to other approaches, and does not 
involve detailed market surveys, but collects information about the potential of the market 
systematically. Second, it focuses on the inventors of the technology and people who use 
similar technologies in potential markets.  Third, it is used for comparisons, so that funding 
decisions can be made between competing projects (Cornwell, 1998).   
 
Why do some technologies fail to meet their markets?  Some are incorporated in products for 
which the anticipated demand does not materialise, some are never incorporated into any 
product; some products do not live up to their promised capabilities; and others simply do not 
attract enough interest (Jolly, 1997).  
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5. Rothwell’s Five Generations of Models of Innovation  
 
Rothwell (1992) described how five models of innovation processes were developed after the 
1940s. The first, prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, was the Science-Push Approach.  
Innovation was a linear process, beginning with scientific discoveries, passing through 
invention, engineering, and manufacturing activities, and ending with the marketing of a new 
process or product. At this time, university and government laboratories in the USA were 
being supported largely through supply-side policies for new product development 
(Rothwell, 1994, Strambach, 2002). It stressed the apparent relevance of R and D but, 
simplistically, there was little or no interaction or feedback between or among the stages, and 
no overlapping processes.  The model was rapidly shown to apply only to relatively simple 
kinds of process and product.   
 
From the early to mid-1960s, a second linear model of innovation, emphasizing demand-side 
factors, the Demand-Pull (or need-pull) Model, was more popular. Innovations resulted from 
perceived demand, which influenced directions and rate of innovation.  Markets were major 
sources of ideas.   
 
The third, the Coupling Model, integrated both supply-push and demand-pull, centring on an 
interaction process where innovation was regarded as a logical and sequential, although not 
necessarily a continuous, process.  The series of stages and functions were ideas generation, 
research, design and development, prototype production, manufacturing, marketing and sales, 
with marketplaces the ultimate destinations. There were feedback loops between new ideas 
and new technology, needs of society and of markets, and states of the arts of technology and 
production.  Technological capabilities and market needs are the main frameworks of this 
model.  Communication was emphasized, be it intra-or extra-organizational, for linking the 
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stages together (Rothwell, 1994, p. 10).  This is more Technik-like and less linear or STH-
like than the first two models. 
 
The fourth was the Integrated Model.  Japan, successful as a powerful source of innovation 
since the 1970s, was a major consideration in the development of the fourth-generation 
innovation model of the early 1980s and to the early 1990s.  The high performance of 
Japanese companies had been based on more than a combination of technology imitation, 
just-in-time relationships with suppliers and efficient and quality-oriented production. The 
ability of Japanese companies to innovate was also caused by their superior within-sector and 
cross-sector integration and the parallel development of technologies. Design to manufacture 
helped innovative Japanese firms and sectors to succeed. It emphasized, above all, parallel 
development of technologies with integrated development teams.  It has strong upstream 
links with suppliers and strong coupling with main customers with powerful effects on the 
integration with R and D and manufacturing. This is not the same as the Integrative Model of 
Hindle and Yencken (2004: see above). It is probably too complex an approach to be used in 
this study for Malaysian industry, with its shorter history and smaller scale than Japanese 
industry.  
 
Rothwell’s fifth generation and final model was the System Integration and Networking 
(SIN) one.  It had fully integrated parallel development with the use of expert systems and 
simulation modelling in R and D.  It had strong links with main customers.  It featured 
strategic integration with primary suppliers, including co-development of new products and 
linked CAD systems.  It had horizontal links including joint ventures, collaborative research 
groupings, and collaborative marketing management.  It also emphasised corporate flexibility 
and speed of development.  The model also had a very strong focus on quality and other non-
price factors. Like the fourth of Rothwell’s models, it is useful for thinking about some of the 
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directions that Malaysia and other countries and their governments and companies may wish 
to take.  
 
6. The Triple Helix model 
 
This, produced by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000), seeks to account for and explore new 
configurations of institutional forces emerging from national innovation systems, especially 
from relationships between governments, industries and universities. It seeks to transcend 
previous models of institutional relationships, whether laissez-faire or socialist, in which 
either the economic or the political predominated, with the so-called knowledge sector, 
meaning universities and university and other researchers, playing a subsidiary role.  The 
model is a generally bottom-up one that emphasizes the value of nurturing industries and 
involving university and other researchers and government departments and public officials 
and agencies in ways suited to the particular characteristics and creative satisfaction of 
embedded firm-specific, sector-specific and country-specific needs (cf.  Stiglitz 2002). This 
broad model with its long-term concerns, has great relevance for Malaysia, although of a 
more general and background kind than the University Model.  
 
7.  The Industry and Technology Life Cycle Model 
 
Lowe (1993) compared industry life cycles with technology life cycles to help search for 
optimal routes to success in the development, commercialization and exploitation of 
technology.  He also compared relationships between the two types of life cycle in mature 
and emerging industries. In emerging industries, where technological trajectories were still 
evolving and where innovation was radical, use of spin-off companies was the most likely 
option.  In mature industries, and when innovations tended to be less radical, licensing and/or 
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self–start consultancy firms might be the only options. Thus Lowe pointed to the maturity of 
industries and the progressiveness of technology as being important factors in decisions 
about the nature of commercialization. Clearly, this strong focus on two particularly 
important influences on commercialization processes is very relevant for the present study, if 
only part of the story. 
 
8.   The General Linear Flow Model of University-Industry-Technology Transfer 
(UITT) 
 
Siegel, Waldman, Atwater and Link (2004), had argued that the key UITT stakeholders are 
university scientists, who discover new technologies, university technology managers and 
administrators, who liaise between academic scientists and manage their universities’ 
intellectual property, and companies, who commercialised university-based technologies, and 
the government, which funds research projects.   
 
The general linear flow model of UITT reflects the conventional wisdom among academic 
administrators regarding how technologies are transferred.  The process is presumed to begin 
with a discovery by a state-funded scientist in a university laboratory.   In the USA such an 
academic is required by law to file an invention disclosure with the USA’s Federal 
Government’s Technology Transfer Office (TTO).  Their university must then decide 
whether it has to patent the innovation, which was one of the mechanisms for protecting 
intellectual property.  Any interest by industry partner could provide enough justification for 
a filing a patent.  The next stage involved companies negotiating licensing agreements.  The 
agreement could include benefits to universities such as royalties or an equity stake in a start-
up.  In the final stage, the technology is converted into a commercialised product.  
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In Chapter 2 relevant features of the Malaysian economy are discussed in detail and in 
Chapter 4 the above models are discussed in a little more depth, with their specific relevance 
for this study explored in more detail. A brief overview of their relevance follows.   
 
The University Model appears to be the most helpful because of its simplicity, breadth, 
relative lack of emphasis on linear assumptions, and for its stress on entrepreneurs as the key 
agents in the diffusion of new technology. The entrepreneur is normally the key figure in 
capitalist economies for bringing innovations to market. The Integrative Model is not as 
detailed but it has a useful emphasis on external inputs to commercialization.  The 
Commercialization Map is rather linear in emphasis, and is perhaps unnecessarily 
complicated, but it does offer a number of useful principles and specific inputs in the present 
context.  Its perhaps inappropriate neatness is compensated for partly by its 
comprehensiveness. Quick Look is useful for thinking about the main reasons for success and 
failure of attempts at commercialization. Rothwell’s five generations of models cover almost 
all relevant eventualities and show how thinking about innovation and commercialisation has 
evolved since the 1950s. His third model, the coupling one, is probably the most directly 
relevant to the position of Malaysia, but his fourth and fifth are also useful aids to thinking 
about how Malaysia’s national innovation system should and should not develop. The Triple 
Helix Model also has clear kinds of implication for Malaysia, especially for the development 
of deeply embedded creative networks between companies, researchers and governments. 
Finally, the Industry and Technology Life Cycle Model is helpful for comparing the different 
market situations and technology levels of different sectors and companies with their needs 
for less or more adventurous modes of commercialization. 
 
The least relevant elements of some of the above theories in the present context include over-
emphasis on the new technology-based firm (NTBF) for the commercialisation of 
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technology, on the various gaps in the technology transfer process, and undue concentration 
at times on specific processes and products. All these are relevant to the present study and are 
taken into account as necessary, but the interests, values, attitudes, roles, actions and 
behaviour of the main actors comprise, together, its central focus. 
    
 
SOME PRECONCEPTIONS OF THE RESEARCHER  
 
After speaking to a small number of entrepreneurs and university researchers in Malaysia, 
before conducting the main interview program, it seemed that the country has faced several 
problems with attempts to achieve effective commercialization.   These included culture 
clashes between the worlds of science, business, administration and government, 
administrative and managerial inflexibility of several kinds, poorly designed reward systems 
for researchers and other relevant parties, and in particular, ineffective management of 
university technology transfer offices.  As there appeared  to be little systematic and widely 
appreciated understanding of organizational practices in the management of university 
intellectual property, the study sought answers to questions about various straightforward 
points including ones concerning definitions of technology transfer, measurement of 
performance in technology transfer, impediments to successful technology transfer, how to 
improve the process, and the characteristics of relationships with university 
commercialization, technology transfer and/or industrial liaison offices. 
 
The answers to such questions might concern lack of mutual understanding of administrative, 
corporate, scientific and university norms as pervasive barriers to effective technology 
transfer to entrepreneurs and firms.  Others answers may be about lack of marketing 
expertise, social skills and industrial awareness on the part of research administrators and 
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other technology transfer-related staff, inadequate recognition of and rewards for university 
researchers, and managerialism and general inflexibility on the part of university 
administrators.  Most of these weaknesses were themes of respondents’ answers when the 
main interview program was conducted.   
 
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
There are main two research questions. One concerns the problem of low uptake of 
potentially profitable discoveries and inventions, of low rates of commercialisation or 
innovation. This is addressed through asking questions of the above kinds about the attitudes 
and behaviour of the responsible parties. 
 
The other concerns the underlying and often far from conscious reasons for the relevant 
attitudes and behaviour. They concern questions about values, interests and control. The four 
main parties, namely scientific researchers and engineers, business managers and 
entrepreneurs, research administrators and civil servants, and politicians, bring different 
backgrounds, experiences, attitudes and values to discussion and decision-making about 
commercialisation. In some respects, they are programmed to misunderstand and mistrust 
each other.  
 
An extensive Anglo-American literature on such matters that dates back to the 1920s (see for 
example Currie and Glover 1999; Cotgrove and Box, 1970). Many writers on professionals 
and management are thus concerned with the different interests of the parties, be they 
scientific publication and reputation, professional achievement, prestige and status, financial 
reward, profit, market share, administrative resources and authority and managerial power 
and influence, political power, reputation and achievement, and so on (Child 1981; Glover 
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and Hughes 2000). In some respects, control is a larger concern in the present context than 
values or interests, insofar as assumptions underpinning and directing commercialisation 
efforts in Malaysia may be unduly concerned with it. Such assumptions may be 
paternalistically culture-bound insofar as they embody rather arms’-length ‘one size fits all’ 
assumptions of policies designed by products of Anglo-American and in many respects neo-
colonial and patrician educational and scientific traditions, employed by major international 
economic, financial and political institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (cf. Stiglitz 2002). 
 
Much thinking about strategic management, about technical change and innovation and about 
national and organizational culture and management has become more reflexively self-
critical since the 1960s. Regarding the last of these, we have seen in the discussion of culture, 
above, the naïveté of attempts to impose ‘solutions’ from one society or economic activity 
sector as remedies for the problems of others. This fact, and that of the limitations of the STH 
model of technical change, are accepted widely amongst the more sophisticated, 
interdisciplinary and critical students of strategic management and technical change and 
innovation.  
 
One factor that does appear to remain fairly constant throughout sectors, across the world and 
over time, is the combination of integrity and ability characteristic of able innovators. 
Sometimes the integrity is very focused and limited to the tasks in hand or thereabouts and it 
is at times unaccompanied by management of others with an eye to the long term. However, 
technical and scientific and other sustained creative achievements do require strong concern 
for facts and truth, as well as considerable persistence, and these are all admirable human 
characteristics (Groen and Hampden-Turner, 2005).  Florida (2003) reinforced this view in 
his study of innovative regions of the USA, in which diversity of all kinds, social, political, 
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and ethnic, as well as economic and technical, appears to be the fertile soil in which skills, 
knowledge and incomes have grown faster than in virtually all other regions of that country.  
 
Saxenian (1994) compared sources of regional advantage in two such regions in the USA, 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 in Massachusetts. The former had prospered while the latter 
declined, because the former’s industrial system was decentralized and co-operative, whereas 
the latter was dominated by self-sufficient independent corporations. Teece (2000) 
emphasised ‘dynamic capabilities’ of firms in the strategic management of technology, 
suggesting among other things how SMEs in LDCs could profit from innovations that had 
originated elsewhere.  Because manufacturing competitiveness in advanced industrial 
countries had declined, with vertical integration often breaking up, firms in LDCs were able 
to rely less on imitating the products of the former than in the past, and more able to 
complement the efforts, often in sophisticated ways, of newer companies in the advanced 
industrial countries, which were filling important market niches. Such efforts to take 
advantage of spillover effects were often very profitable for the LDC’s SMEs.   
 
Teece’s (2003) emphasis on the internally-generated activities of firms has acted as a critique 
of the more external, market-focused strategic theses and recipes of Michael Porter (1990). 
However Teece (2005), like Porter, does also take context into account, seeing it as 
constituting some of the resources available to SMEs and other firms, along with their own 
abilities, dynamism and other resources.  Teece’s thinking sits well with both the bottom-up 
emphasis for innovation management and strategy of Sutz (2000) and the demotic and 
creative emphasis of the Technik model of technical change. 
 
All of this also relates well to the thesis of Stiglitz (2002) about ‘Western’, very often USA 
Ivy League university-educated, economists at the World Bank and in other major 
 139
international institutions like the OECD, seeking to impose ‘one best way’ to organize 
economic activity across the world. Like Porter (1990), they sought to persuade 
governments, including those of LDCs, to build clusters of innovation from the bottom up, 
but with top-down government direction, through programmatic devices like Malaysia’s 
Intensification of Research in Priority Areas, but without enough of the conditions in which 
they could develop, such as relevant markets, industries, qualified people, venture capital, 
contacts and so on, being in place beforehand.  Stiglitz and Teece were both keen to 
emphasize the importance of social institutions and conditions for effective innovation. If 
trust levels between individuals and institutions were low, for example, innovation was 
inhibited. Organic organization structures were of course preferable in many sectors to 
mechanistic ones, but it was also helpful for modes of interorganizational governance to be 
clearly structured as well as co-operative, as they often are in the USA. In editing a special 
issue of Industrial and Corporate Change, Breschi and Malerba (2001) criticised, after 
reviewing considerable evidence, the ‘ineffectiveness of public policies attempting to direct 
the formation of new clusters through top-down interventions, such as technopoles, science 
parks and firm incubators’. Instead they argued that governments should help clusters to 
develop by ‘accommodating new firms, investment in education and the provision of support 
infrastructures’. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter some of the issues regarding the perceived low uptake by Malaysian firms of 
commercialisation initiatives have been considered. The problems of learning from a ‘West’ 
that is not homogeneous were discussed by comparing and accounting for and exploring 
some ramifications of two master, contrasting and competing, sets of assumptions about the 
nature of technical change that have long been influential in Europe, North America and 
 140
elsewhere. A number of concepts used to discuss technical change, innovation and 
commercialization were examined to illustrate the complexity and variety of interpretations 
and assumptions used in writings on the subject of this thesis. From these a smaller number 
of the most central concepts have been selected and these were explored at greater length as 
in Appendix 3.     
 
Eight theories of commercialization and technology transfer were outlined and their different 
kinds of present relevance explained. Next, some preconceptions of the researcher about the 
perceived low rates of commercialisation of discoveries and inventions in Malaysia were 
outlined, as were the two research questions: the need for a rigorous explanation of this 
supposedly low uptake, and the need to explain the assumptions, interests and values and so 
on that helped to create the problem or problems in the first place, and which sustain its 
existence. 
 
These preconceptions and the research questions are discussed at much greater length in 
Chapter 4.  Chapter 4 also concerned with the kinds of issue discussed above, with Malaysian 
industrial and technology policy and strategies, but in more depth. Chapter 5 is the 
methodology one: It reminds the reader of the main hypotheses and research questions of this 
study, which were first spelt out in Chapter I.  Even so, it is worth spelling them out here 
also, to end this chapter neatly and to help keep the thesis focused.    
 
The main hypotheses deal with the two research questions, identified in Chapter I and the 
previous section, which are as follows. The first question concerned the reasons for the 
perceived low uptake of commercialisation efforts in Malaysia. The hypotheses for this are 
primarily concerned with apparent mutual misunderstanding between, and apparent 
resistance to change from, the main parties concerned. The second question concerns the 
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broader and deeper reasons for the low uptake, for the misunderstanding, and for the 
resistance to change. The hypotheses in this context will concern Malaysia’s industrial and 
technology policies and practices in relation to its political and economic historical 
experience.  
 
  
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
COMMERCIALIZATION AND TECHNICAL CHANGE IN MALAYSIA 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter describes and discusses commercialization and technical change in Malaysia.  In 
the first section, the contributions of commercialisation and innovation to economic 
development are briefly described and explored.  Relevant comparisons of commercialization 
in developing and developed countries are made.  The institutions and people involved, that 
is companies, government departments, universities, government research institutes, banks 
and their staff, and venture capitalists are also identified. In the second section, inputs to 
commercialization in the form of discoveries and inventions from universities and 
government research institutes (GRIs) are described.  In the third, the roles of the institutions, 
firms and people identified in the first section are discussed.  
 
In the fourth, attention turns to the processes and results of commercialization in Malaysia, to 
try to develop an overview of achievement and lack of it in the commercialization of 
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university and GRI discoveries and inventions in Malaysia.  The fifth section turns to the two 
master models of technical change discussed in Chapter 3 and considers their relevance to the 
evidence discussed in the present chapter and vice-versa. The main point addressed here is 
the extent to which scientific discoveries do, and can, influence manufacturing and other 
relevant commercial and organizational processes.  The sixth section turns to my own Model 
of Commercialization for Malaysia, with regards to the most appropriate flow of 
commercialization or The Commercialization Loop (Abu Talib, 2007).  The final section 
considers the kinds of question that each type of respondent should be asked in the light of all 
of the foregoing and the contents of Chapters 1 to 3, meaning in the light of the research 
questions and existing evidence and information. The conclusion summarizes the chapter.  
 
 
DEVELOPMENT, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION 
 
Commercialization of new knowledge is widely felt to be essential to economic growth. In 
Malaysia, in other developing countries, the problems of commercialization are felt to be 
inadequate infrastructure, lack of market research, and inexperience on the part of venture 
capitalists (Utusan Malaysia, 2003).  Also, there are poor links between universities and 
firms, there is little market awareness and commercial motivation on the part of staff R and 
D.  Further, seed-level development funding and business angel investments are two gaps 
faced by local entrepreneurs, and there are fewer than 150 business angel investors in 
Malaysia.  Gan (2003) argued that working with university researchers can be challenging for 
firms and venture capitalists, as one should understand those universities’ policies and or 
expectations are different from theirs insofar as most universities in Malaysia practise open 
publication of their research results, as opposed to firms’ practices of keeping results and 
findings of their investigations commercially secret. Also, universities themselves hold 
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patents of all their inventions, unlike firms, whereas individuals and companies usually 
register their patents.   
 
University-industry knowledge transfer is a significant research subject in economics and 
management studies, as well a major feature of science and technology policy agendas in 
many countries (Balconi, Breschi and Lissoni, 2004).  Using evidence from Latin American 
countries, Arocena and Sutz (2001) argued that it is harder for developing countries to 
innovate and commercialise are because of the low importance given to endogenous 
knowledge production and the low involvement of industry with R and D. Some Latin 
American universities were elitist and focused on self-defined research agendas, and 
international in outlook rather than focused on their intended roles of commercially-useful 
knowledge production and promoting of innovation.     
 
In Japan, it has long been recognised that although expectations are placed on the potential of 
universities, Japanese universities are not making contributions to Japan’s economy and 
society that match their potential.   For example about 36% of research in Japan was in 
universities, but patents originating in universities at that time represented only 0.04% of 
total patents (Fujisue, 1998).  Archibald and Finifter (2003) argued that in an era of 
reinventing government and performance measurement, if research centres started to shift 
resources towards specific projects to try to maximise commercial success, they might 
sensibly reduce the proportion of basic research.  Muent (1999) studied the problems of 
commercialization for SMEs in Poland.  He found that networks of relations between 
companies and technical universities and research institutes were often deficient.   
 
Some American and Far Eastern researchers have recognised that about half of all university 
patents are never licensed, and that licensing activity is not randomly distributed across 
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patents (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Hsu and Bernstein, 1997).  Shane (2002) argued that 
when patents are not an effective mechanism for appropriating the returns to innovation, 
university technology is likely to be licensed  back to inventors, because commercialization 
by inventors mitigated the adverse solutions, moral hazards, and hold-up problems that 
plagued markets for knowledge.   Jensen, Thursby and Thursby (2003) showed that 
university technology in the USA was more likely to be licensed if it was at relatively late 
stages of development. 
 
Other examples include India. Sikka (1997) argued that the reasons why many technologies 
developed in Indian laboratories have remained unexploited were that they were not proven 
on adequate prototype or pilot plant scales.  Kumar and Jain (2003), also in India, identified 
influences on decisions to commercialize new technologies.  The more important ones  
included the status of technologies, sources of technology, market potential for end products, 
company business philosophies, financial statuses of  industrial firms, tie-ups or technical 
back-up support, and patentability.  Other influences included entrepreneurial experience of 
proposal, educational backgrounds of entrepreneurs, import-export policies, fiscal policies, 
the capacities of companies to expand, the geographical locations of companies, and the sizes 
of industrial firms.  Some factors likely to enhance the chances of success of new technology 
firms were timely availability of required funds, no-repayment during gestation periods, nil 
or low interest rates during such periods, optimisation of technology at pilot plants and in-
advance completion of plant engineering and design, including instrumentation.   
 
One problem with universities in the USA as regards commercialization was that faculty 
members had little incentive to become involved with firms located in universities’ 
incubators (Mian, 1994).  It appeared that technology incubators in the USA university have 
not focused on technology transfer and commercialization of university research. Among the 
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reasons for this is were legal impediments to licensing university research for 
commercialization.  A few managers reported that existing legal structures at their 
universities impeded the ability to transfer or commercialize university-based research. 
Another reason was conflicts of interest which prohibited faculty members from having more 
than minority interests in companies located in incubators.  Another reason was the 
proportion of royalty payments retained by universities.  If such percentages were high, 
negotiations for technology transfer with firms could stall or be cancelled altogether 
(Phillips, 2002).  Kumar and Jain (2003) argued that, in India, the parameters that influenced 
decisions about commercialization of new technology and the success of new technology 
ventures, included the efficacy of existing financing/support mechanism required by 
stakeholder agencies, that is those in industry, technology institutions, financial institutions 
and government for further development of commercialization of new technologies for India.   
 
Most scholars have argued that economic development is mainly about two things: increases 
in efficiency, meaning achieving more output with the same levels of input, usually through 
technical change; or increases in the levels of inputs, that is by accumulating more and more 
capital.  However, one of the major arguments about what is driving growth, centred on 
differences between countries in terms of initial conditions, for example in wealth 
distribution and education; in macroeconomic environments, for example inflation or savings 
rates; and in industrial policies, for examples inwards versus outwards orientation (von 
Tunzelman, 1995).  Veloso and Soto (2001) argued that incentives, infrastructure, and 
institutions are relevant for  understanding differences in technical development and 
industrial trajectories between countries, because they shape government policies and firm 
strategies in terms of exports, subcontracting, and technology acquisition, among others.   
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Commercialization can clearly enhance the abilities of local industries in Malaysia and 
elsewhere to gain competitive advantages for their product lines and to advance processes. 
Beyond engineering achievements and abilities in manufacturing and production, industries 
of all kinds should have scientific capabilities.  In Malaysia, and based on government 
reports, about 300 R and D projects had been commercialised by the government research 
institutes and universities.  These achievements includes ones in food production, wildlife 
conservation, diagnostic kit, environmental protection, smart cards, disease control, industrial 
products, biotechnology, engineering equipment, construction materials, waste treatment, 
information technology, multimedia, and e-business.  As universities are seen as sources of 
technology development that may be useful to entrepreneurial activities, the government has 
emphasised increasing the flow of scientific knowledge to the industry.  Successful 
commercialization of discoveries, it felt could bring many direct and indirect benefits to 
Malaysia.  The formation of spin–off companies, starts ups, new enterprises, and 
entrepreneurship in technology development and technology licensing were among the 
benefits of successful commercialization.  Ownership of intellectual property rights can 
support, the government thinks, an innovative culture, R and D excellence, and economic 
spill-over.  
 
INPUTS TO COMMERCIALIZATION 
 
Inputs to commercialization concern discoveries and inventions from the universities and 
GRIs in Malaysia.  Under the IRPA many successful projects have been recognized as 
award-winning innovations. Examples include the production of high quality oysters of the 
species crassostrea iredalei by Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM); Malaysia tea tree oil, a 
joint project between Perlis Essentials Oil Sdn Bhd and the Malaysian Agricultural Research 
and Development Institutes (MARDI); the development of MARDI of a new variety of padi 
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MR220 capable of producing more than 10.5 tonnes per hectare;  the development of the 
stone matrix Asphalt (SMA) with Cellulose Oil Palm Fibre for road surfacing by Universiti 
Putra Malaysia (UPM); and the development of by SIRIM of the e-Jari Access Control 
System, an intelligent  Biometric (finger-print) access control system. 
 
Others includes, by SIRIM, the Solar Powered Auto-Ventilator System (SPAVS) for cars.  
This was a joint project undertaken by SIRIM with Agreevest Sdn Bhd.  There have also 
been pitcher plants by the Forest Research Institute of Malaysia (FRIM); the production of 
Oriented Strand Boards and Panels using rubber wood waste under the collaborative between 
FRIM and the Hevea Wood Industry Sdn Bhd.  These collaborative projects were funded by 
the Industry R and D Grants Scheme (IGS).   Another grant scheme under the government is 
Multimedia Super Corridor R and D Grant Scheme (MGS).  This successful collaboration 
includes the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia and Airstar (M) Sdn. Bhd in producing wireless 
point-to-point link of high efficiency; lighter and smaller transceivers for easy installation; a 
new antenna design; the design and development of high-end artificial intelligent Made-in-
Malaysia printing technology resulting in enhanced machine capabilities that  matching those 
of imported models; development of Malaysian-made SF6 GIS incorporating vacuum 
interruption technology; design and development of specialised mobile oil palm tree shredder 
and cutter machine capable of disintegrating whole oil palm fronds and branches; 
development of low voltage and high voltage HRC fuse; and finally the development of 
mechanised equipment to harvest water weed (water hyacinth) in Malaysian lakes and ponds. 
 
In the field of environmental technologies, the universities and GRIs have also developed a 
solid gasification/thermal oxidation plant for the treatment of unsorted municipal solid waste; 
designed and developed a zone outdoor air purifier that can provide filtered and cleaner air 
for outdoor structures; designed and developed a mobile modular incinerator system for the 
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mass destruction of animal carcasses; and designed and developed a remediation process for 
closed and existing landfills using an advanced waste compositing technology.   
 
There are also resourced-based technologies that include the development of machinery to 
produce empty fruit bunch fibres for the manufacture of medium density fibre board; and 
production of oil palm fibre/thermoplastic composite pellets for extrusion and moulding and 
development of Natural Oil Polyol (NOP), a low cost and environmentally friendly Polyol 
and polyuthane system manufactured from Malaysian oils.  In advanced materials there is the 
development of RAM battery with a new mechanical sealing system; in aquaculture/marine 
culture technology, there are new automated high density poly culture systems for the 
production of freshwater fish and propagation and commercialization of corals.  
 
Under the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the programme of the 
Commercialization of R and D Fund (CRDF) offers examples of the inputs to 
commercialization from its machinery and equipment group.  They include 
commercialization of a hydrogen generator based on electrolysis.  This joint collaboration is 
between the Universiti Malaya and the Gas Generator (M) Sdn Bhd.  It produced a dryer 
system for use in the animal feed industry by FRIM and KD Technology Sdn Bhd.  This 
dryer is called the Radiant Modular Kin Drying (KD) system.  It is an efficient industrial 
dryer for many products from timber to spices, from composite boards to fertilizer and from 
animal feed and to seafood.  MARDI and UPM have developed a lever-operated Knapsack 
Sprayer. This product was being developed further by Metraplas Industries Sdn Bhd.  It 
product is a lightweight plastic dispenser for applying chemical, fertilizer and pesticide in 
farms and plantations.  Harta Semarak Sdn Bhd has taken the commercialization of a new 
process for waste water and drinking water from the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 
(UKM).  The company has modelled a prototype water and waste water treatment facility, 
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which is able to treat water more efficiently.   The Zeo-Tech has also been introduced to 
prawn farming, both as an odour absorption agent and growth stimulator. The introduction of 
Zeo-Tech to aquaculture ponds has been found to stimulate the growth of phytoplankton as a 
natural food for prawn.   
 
Under the Chemical Industry Group, inputs to commercialization include the 
commercialization of a process to produce larvicide from Bacillus thuringgiensis.  This is a 
joint collaboration between Inbiotech Sdn Bhd and the Institute of Medical Research (IMR).  
The bacterium is a Malaysian isolate of the Bacillus thuringgiensis that was first discovered 
in Europe.  It was isolated by researchers at the Entomology Department of the IMR during 
studies to find a local species of the bacterium.  The bacterium was recommended highly by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) for the control of disease-carrying mosquitoes.  
Another CRDF project is the commercialization of Mychorriza as a crop enhancer. This 
project involves joint collaboration between Malaysian Agri-Tech Sdn Bhd and UPM.  This 
company has developed, for commercial application, a group of special underground agents 
called the Arbuscular mycorrhiza fungi (AMF).  They can strengthen tree roots and provide a 
defence against pathogens.  Malaysian Vaccines and Pharmaceuticals Sdn Bhd is company 
that has undertaken the production of animal vaccines formulated during R and D work at the 
Veterinary Research Institute (VRI) of the Department of Veterinary Service.  Then the 
company was approved CRDF to conduct research into commercialization of animal 
vaccines with University of Putra Malaysia (UPM).  The design of an advanced thymidine 
kinase gene-deletion process is different from that developed in some Western countries.  
The technique enables the microbiologist to develop a ‘designer’ virus unique in 
characteristics and for processing limited capabilities for causing damage to animal cells.   
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As mentioned above, the Malaysia tea tree oil project, a joint one between Perlis Essentials 
Oil (PEO) Sdn Bhd and the Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development Institutes 
(MARDI), is also funded under the CRDF.  The grant was allocated for the setting up of a 
pilot plant at the MARDI Bukit Tinggi research station.  The tea tree oil had been 
commercialized since early 1999, albeit on a smaller scale compared to when it was given 
MITI’s funds for further R and D work.   
 
In the electrical and electronic group, another form of commercialization is a portable card 
acceptance device with a biometric capability.  It is a joint collaboration between SIRIM, 
MIMOS and EPNCR (M) Sdn Bhd. This device is consists of several key components, 
namely a microprocessor, a smart card interface module, a cryptographic module, a memory 
chip and a liquid crystal display panel.  The product incorporates a large database 
management capability to handle the large amount of information that will be stored in its 
memory.   
 
INSTITUTIONS AND FIRMS  
 
The University-Industry Commercialization Collaboration Forum (UICCF), hosted bi-
monthly, tries to encourage universities to transform their research into business ventures and 
to facilitate links between universities, industry and venture capitalists.  UICCF acts as 
platform to allow researchers to showcase their projects to funding bodies, and at the same 
time, to ensure that their research projects meet industry/market needs.      
 
The main source of research funding in Malaysia is the Intensification of Research in Priority 
Areas (IRPA) program.  The IRPA is there to support R and D in the public sector in areas 
which address the need of Malaysian industry so as to enhance the national economy.  The 
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main purpose of the IRPA program is to focus on R and D activities which are in line with 
the national R and D Priority Areas. 
 
Government support for university research comes from the Malaysian Technology 
Development Corporation (MTDC) which has links with companies, engineers, researchers 
and financial institutions, and which provides venture capital for commercialization of 
university research projects.  Several high technology parks have been purpose-built close to 
key universities to enable both academia and industry to optimise available resources and 
capabilities. The MTDC is offering CRDF to SMEs to encourage firms to commercialize 
indigenous technologies developed by local universities and research institutions.  In 2001, 
RM3millions was approved compared to RM9 million in 2002 under the CRDF fund by 
MTDC. Technology research funding which has a connection to public research is the 
CRDF.  This fund provides partial grants, ranging from 50% to 70%, to most Malaysian-
owned companies incorporated under the Companies Act 1965, to help them to 
commercialize research results.  Approved activities for funding include market surveys and 
research, product/process design and development, standards and regulations compliance, 
intellectual property protection, and demonstrations of technology.  Examples of smart 
partnerships between universities and industry include the University-Industry Technology 
Advancement Programme (UNITAP) of Universiti Teknologi Malaysia.   
 
The IRPA Management Information Systems (IRPA-MIS) program has a design prescription 
system for the automation of the processes by which the general and financial management 
of the IRPA’s R and D are controlled and monitored. It functions to provide financial 
administration for budgeting, for commitment from researchers and disbursement of IRPA 
funds, for monitoring and an assessment of R and D, for its database research-related policy, 
and for management support information.  One of the venture capitalists in Malaysia is 
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Malaysia Venture Capital management Bhd, which work as the manager of the Cradle 
Investment Programme.  The programme helps to promote early stages of commercialization, 
for example by producing market surveys and business plans.     
 
The Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM) has established the University Business Centre (UBC) 
as its investment arm.  It introduces activities for commercialising technology and helping its 
academics in moving technology, capabilities and expertise into industry.  It is also forming 
R and D partnerships designed to accelerate the introduction of discoveries and inventions 
into commercial use. It offers help to firms, entrepreneurs, educators, economic development 
officers and counsellors.  UBC also offers services for the commercialization of research, 
contract research, consultancy services, training and venture partner in multimedia.  UPM 
also offers industry-responsive R and D Centres such as those for Advanced Materials 
(CAM), Animal Production, and its Centre for Biological Control of Tropical Pests. The 
UPM also offers incubation centres and a Technology Park.  
 
PROCESSES AND RESULTS OF COMMERCIALIZATION 
 
Out of 3,707 research projects conducted under the Seventh Malaysia Plans, only 527 or 5 
percent have been commercialized.   Synergies between government, universities and 
industries are very relevant for shaping technical development in Malaysia.  Thus, a study by 
Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) under Research, Development and commercialization 
nexus has analysed the critical factors for successful commercialization.  Problems includes 
the largely ‘pure’ research culture of doing research among academic staff.  Thus an 
acculturation process has been introduced to educate researchers about the need to undertake 
research that ‘eventually’ leads commercialization (Mohd. Sadullah, 2005).   
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Most universities and GRIs have their own Business Units and Research Management Center 
(RMCs).  An example of processes of commercialization in USM, is the way in which 
researchers get the support systems and acculturation based on their industrial inputs, under 
the supervision of the Research and Creative Management Division.  After research findings 
are reported, the challenge is to create effective partnerships with industry.  Three important 
steps are taken for this in USM.  First, there is the pre-evaluation form, assessing the utility 
of technologies and focusing areas for funding.  Second there is the patenting strategy, where 
the researchers get advice on strategies for protecting their intellectual property.   Third, there 
is the first right of refusal, where USAINS Private Limited, the USM holding company set up 
to expedite the negotiation process with potential commercial partners.  Their problems of 
commercialization include the gap between producing research findings and getting 
commercial partners.  Others include the lack of pre-seed finance beyond the ‘proof of 
concept’ stage that precludes smooth translation of potential research findings into tangible 
commercial outputs (BDU, 2003).  
 
Commercialization processes in Malaysia take place in many ways.  Many benefits can be 
obtained from the spinning out R and D results.  They include returns on R and D investment 
in bad and good times; greater satisfaction for and the retention of good researchers; 
economic gains for the outside community/world; and at universities, spin-off can sharpen a 
professor’s perspective and create jobs for graduates.  In the survey done MOSTE, in 2003, 
four different stages of commercialization were examined in terms of their intensity.  The 
stages were filing patents, purchasing of technologies, company formation and licensing of 
patents.  Based on their findings, licensing of patent is not very prominent, as the quality of 
the research is not amenable to licensing and licensing strategies are not well understood.    
As R and D expenditure increases, the government is concerned about the research results 
that are untapped by the industry.   
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Reasons for this include the fact that laboratory priorities shift by the time technology is 
developed, the laboratory’s parent has left a sector or market by the time technology is 
developed, researchers focus on research and not on technology commercialization, and 
researchers who discover something that they were not looking for are likely to focus back 
on their original goals at the expense of the new technology (MOSTE, 2003).  In terms of 
spinning-off, the problems, from the survey, were that most researchers do not have the 
entrepreneurial drive to make a spin-off work, too few researchers tested their products 
among potential customers during the technology development phase, and many universities 
lacked the capabilities of technology transfer offices.   However, the research done under the 
existing set-up is not effective, and the awareness and outreach programmes are poorly 
executed, resulting in lack of knowledge of their services.      
 
In Universiti Malaya (UM) the problems of commercialization go beyond staffing and 
headcounts to start-up the needs and skill sets required to take the start-ups to the next stage 
of development.  In Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM), their process of commercializing 
research results is started by their researchers, using their findings and the university’s 
Commercialization Business Units.   UPM Holdings gives UPM’s researchers consultancy, 
training and commercialization advisory services. In spite of no less than 20 successful 
technologies, UPM lacks the services of patent lawyer.  The Standard Institutions and 
Research Innovation Malaysia (SIRIM), which does industrial research development faces 
problems of shortages of funds for ‘up-scaling activities’.  Then are also problems of fair 
values on technologies at hand, and in valuing those to be commercialised.   
 
On behalf of venture capitalists, Malaysian Venture Capitalist (MAVCAP), in the Business 
Development Unit (BDU) of MOSTE report of their study, found that Malaysia was lacking 
in business-building competence.  Yet this was very important to every start-up company as a 
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necessary complement to the technical knowledge of researchers.  Researchers were not 
willing to move to employment with commercialized ventures, as they did not want to risk 
their academic careers for risky ventures.  Researchers were also so engrossed in their 
research that they ignored the commercial potential of their findings (MOSTE, 2003).  
 
It is helpful to discuss the practices of the Malaysian Palm Oil Board as an example of a 
publicly funded government research institution, where five of the interviews for this study 
took place.  Its institutional processes had recently been changed for it to help companies 
better in their implementation of commercialization processes and stages.  The Malaysian 
Palm Oil Board was established in May 2000 as part of the restructuring of Palm Oil 
Research Institutes Malaysia (PORIM) and the Palm Oil Registration and Licensing 
Authority (PORLA).  Commercialization processes start from and end in markets (Basiron 
and Soon, 2004).  They cover research project formulation and evaluation, and project 
implementation and completion as well as commercialization itself.  At the evaluation stage, 
there is Intra-Institutional or internal committee on research evaluation and also includes the 
presentation of new proposal to a Programme Advisory Committee (PAC) which 
recommends the MPOB Board to the acceptance or rejection of new projects and proposals.  
This committee comprises experts in their respective fields from universities and industries.  
A pre-screening procedure is used where the management of MPOB has an opportunity to 
question the usefulness, and the potential economic and potential technical viability of a 
proposal, and to make suggestions to strengthen it.  An extra-institutional mechanism is used 
to help to determine the market-relevance and technical soundness of new proposals.  This 
mechanism consists of the MPOB-Industry Committees.  On the first implementation of 
research projects, MPOB introduced the PORIM Research Notebook in 1999.  This recording 
system ensures that there are official records of research work being carried out, in particular 
of those lead seen as likely to lead to inventions.  
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MPOB also has an IPR policy, which is accordance with Civil Service Department of 
Malaysia’s circular about such policies.  The MPOB policy lays down the processes for 
identifying the owners and the creators of inventions, determining the scope and types of 
intellectual property protection to be effected, and the rewards to be given to the inventors in 
the event of successful commercialization.  The researcher has his or her completed research 
projects vetted by the Viva Committee of the MPOB.  Only projects accepted by the 
committee can be considered as completed.  The committee then recommend or endorse 
follow-up actions for obtaining partners for commercialization, and to obtain funding for 
pilot or semi-industrial plants.  Documentation of technology is part of the follow-up 
processes of firming-up the technology and the know-how in-house before offering it to third 
parties for commercialization.   All future retirees of MPOB have to document their 
technologies before they are allowed to retire.  On publicity and promotion, the MPOB 
organised a Transfer of Technology Seminars and Exhibitions annually since 2000.  They 
allow interested parties to have a closer look at the technologies and to discuss them with 
potential investors.  MPOB also holds an annual Technology Demonstration Month after the 
Technology Transfer Seminar.  This month-long events enable interested investors to explore 
the nature and the potential of inventions in detail.   
 
Based on MPOB’s experience in commercialization of its technologies, the problems usually 
encountered stem from lack of expertise in the organizations that might be capable of 
managing intellectual property and of formulating deals with outside parties.  Since 1995, 
253 technologies have been launched and up to 2004 about 30 percent of them have been 
commercialized.  MPOB has been involved in contract research and negotiations, technology 
licensing, consultancy, collaborative research, confidential disclosure, secrecy, and materials 
transfer.  Other problems that it has experienced include making approval processes clear as 
this bureaucratic process takes time.  To get funding for pilot plants and semi-industrial area 
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facilities is also often a problem.  Regarding selection of commercialization parties, the 
MPOB has only o little chances of few companies to choose from.  Licensing is the best 
mode of commercialization used so far by the MPOB, as it does not involve its direct 
involvement in business ventures through equity investment. Such direct involvement can 
involve problems with key contract terms, technical support, consultancy, royalties, and 
rewarding research scientists.  Three success factors for commercialization in MPOB are the 
quality of the technology, that of the entrepreneur and that of the R and D support from the 
research institutions (Basiron and Soon, 2004).  In the face of such problems the MPOB has 
achieved 253 technologies, with about 30 percent of them being commercialized.  Among the 
technologies and products are the continuous sterilisation milling technology, the Smart 
Balance edible oil formulation, red palm oil, palm vitamin E, a mechanical grabber for 
loading fresh fruit bunches, an aluminium harvesting pole, a palm-based cosmetic and 
personal care formulations, oil palm fibre, a thermoformable plastic composite for car 
components, oil palm plywood and many others. 
 
As scientific knowledge and technical innovation are repeatedly advocated as very relevant 
for the economic growth, Malaysians should expect that practically useful research can come 
from many disciplines, including biology, chemistry, computer science, engineering of many 
kinds, mathematics and physics. In Malaysia, as is also true in many other countries, as 
discussed above, the commercialization of science and technical engineering work remains 
very difficult.  Despite considerable investment in R and D, turning research findings into 
money-making business processes or products is still often very difficult.  There was a 
definite significant increase in the number of researchers and R and D personnel in the period 
1998 to 2000, greater than that for compared to 1996 to 1998, and an increase of R and D 
expenditure from 0.39% of GDP in 1998 to 0.5% in 2000.  Expenditure (include salary and 
emolument) per researcher personal increased from £3300 in 1998 to £10250.     
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In 2003 the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), reported a study of government agencies, 
universities, GRIs, financial companies and other private institutions that were involved in 
research and commercialization, in which it listed various problems.    These included lack of 
critical mass and quality of R and D outputs of researchers; lack of knowledge in evaluating 
potential intellectual property assets and of how to protect them; lack of expertise in 
developing viable commercialization strategies; lack of IP awareness and support service for 
IPR protection; lack of private sector participation in R and D activities; and lack of an 
effective frameworks, and mechanism for successful commercialization of good quality and 
marketable R and D.  There was also a need to make technology commercialization offices in 
universities and research institutions more effective; a need to establish a permanent and 
flexible networks for R and D commercialization; a need for greater incentives for owners of 
IPRs; a need to improves the funding mechanisms and for increased financial support for R 
and D commercialization in universities and research institutions; a need for policies to 
address any problems R and D commercialization investment versus financial return; a need 
to provide greater rewards and incentives for researchers who perform well; a need for 
human resource development in specific R and D areas, particularly in IPR management and 
in entrepreneurship; a need to enhance the competence of Technology Commercialization 
Offices (TCOs), and a need for more international networking, affiliations, and technology 
commercialization expertise.     
 
The detailed of commercialization in Malaysia is further discussed in Appendix 4.  
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THE TWO MODELS OF TECHNICAL CHANGE 
 
In Chapter 3, the two models of technical change used in this study were described quite 
thoroughly, from their origins to the differences in using both in industry.  The Technik 
model was thought of mainly in terms of art and skill; and it mainly emphasised the technical 
aspects of technical change which was seen as spreading into and across industries through 
absorption plus modification.  However, the STH model put its emphasis on the use of 
scientific discoveries leading, in industry to ‘revolutionary’ development which consisted 
mainly of ‘basic’ innovations.  The two models link to this research, in that Malaysia failed 
to realize the possible importance of technical change and/or ‘R and D’ in the 1950s and 60s  
For example, South Korea and Taiwan were sending students in large numbers to universities 
in the USA especially to tap their scientific and technical resources and expertise.   These 
students returned to their home countries and began developing indigenous products and 
other innovations.  But in Malaysia, the master plan for technological development was only 
influential after the late 1980s and early 1990s as Malaysia started the creation of local 
technologies such as those needed to make its indigenous car, the Proton.  Skills and 
knowledge remain the most important aspect of Malaysian industrialization process.  The 
development of human resources requires substantial investment and inputs from various 
sectors.  As in Europe and in Japan and some other countries, relevant systems of education 
and training were not always perfectly conceived well organized. As noted in Chapter 2, 
Malaysia followed the British system of education in the early part of its educational 
development and planning, so that technical change in Malaysia tends to be discussed using 
the STH model. However, the question has arisen as how far the discoveries, inventions and 
innovation produced in Malaysia have supported the development of manufacturing and 
industries?   In the 1970s, Malaysia was largely only involved with assembly production and 
with manufacturing lower technology goods, such as the most basic wires and cables.  
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Nevertheless, the three decades after, the manufacturing of advanced chips and electronic 
products has been achieved.   
 
The development of indigenous processes and products has been emphasised as benefiting 
greatly from having the natural resources in the country. Funk (2004) found that 
technological change was a major driver for the formulations of new industries. The 
development of a new industry did not drive growth nearly as much as advances in existing 
industries. A classic example of this was the technology trajectory for vacuum tubes, which 
was initially developed for radios but then helped to spawn television and mainframe 
computers. From the point of view of economic history, however, as reported by Bauer 
(1995), such a decentralized market outcome seems to be a poor descriptor of many 
technological breakthroughs. This is not to say that economic convenience is irrelevant, but 
rather, as argued by Mokyr (1998) that ‘there usually is, at some level, a non-market 
institution that has to approve, license or provide some other imprimatur without which firms 
cannot change their production methods’.  
 
The market test by itself is not always enough. The reason is the very nature of technological 
change that leads almost invariably to an improvement in the welfare of some and to 
deterioration in that of others. Thus, as envisaged by Olson (1982), the decision whether to 
adopt a new technology is likely to be resisted by losers through some kind of activism aimed 
at influencing the decision by the relevant institutions. Malaysian companies have been 
referred to as consumer products exporters, as this is would refer only as a downstream 
segment of the industry.  Thus the decisions in influencing Malaysian industry not only 
depend on its markets, but also on recognizing the fundamental institutional arrangements in 
the country.    
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Following the above discussion, of development, innovation and commercialization, and of 
inputs to, processes and results of commercialization, we can conclude that technical change 
in Malaysia is more based on the technical ingenuity of people then on new scientific 
knowledge.  The preferred theory of technical change is the Technik rather than the STH one.  
This conclusion follows study of the types of discovery and invention made in Malaysia, 
especially of those from the universities and the GRIs.  The researchers both from 
universities and GRIs mostly made discoveries and innovations by using their experience, 
skills and scientific and technical knowledge, together known as expertise or ‘know-how’. 
Their ability to work out problems and having sometimes improved on processes and 
products was more like that of engineers than that of scientists.     
 
THE COMMERCIALIZATION LOOP MODEL  
 
In Chapter 3, eight models of Commercialization and Technology Transfer (CTT) were been 
presented.  From the eight, Lee and Gartner’s University Model appeared to be the most 
relevant to the Malaysian approaches to commercialization of university and government 
research findings.  It assumes that basic research, technology development, technology 
commercialization and marketing by industry are linked by a feedback loop.  The loop plays 
an important bridging communication and motivational role for the parties involved. The 
model identified entrepreneurs as agents of change, for diffusion of new technologies.  A 
prominent feature of capitalist economies is that entrepreneurs have played and continue to 
play catalytic roles in bringing technical innovations to markets. However, the Triple Helix 
Model by Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) supported institutions such as government, 
industries and universities in a bottom-up model.  They focus on the specific tasks of those 
institutions.   
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Using the above two models, and thoughts stimulated by other six and the data from the 
present study, a new model is presented here.  The Commercialization Loop Model (Abu 
Talib, 2007) is intended to be quite broadly applicable and indicates who contributes to 
commercialization of university and GRIs research findings.  As noted earlier, Malaysia has 
provided various funds to develop systematic process of CTT of research findings.  In this 
new model, we identify who contributes to CTT.  There is the government as a major 
stakeholder, and also scientists from universities and GRIs, senior research administrators 
from both universities and GRIs, the technology transfer officers from universities and GRIs, 
owner-managers, directors and managers and professionals from companies and managers 
and professionals from companies and banks and ventures capitalists.  There are also the 
citizens and taxpayers whose work funds much university and GRI research and other 
activities, and related government work, but they are very relevant in an independent way in 
the present context.  Analyzing the functioning of various parties involves examining the 
ways in which they parties interact in given national entities. Successful CTT can be said to 
happen when each party is co-operating and working productively.      
 
With this new model, scientists are thought of the main contributors towards discoveries of 
new scientific knowledge and/or inventions done in universities and GRI laboratories. New 
scientific knowledge and/or inventions are made available to companies through academic 
papers, seminars, conferences, and exhibitions.  Interested companies buy the discoveries 
through licensing, buy-outs, patents and consultancy.  Financing the explorations of the new 
scientific knowledge is either through their own resources or through funding by investors or 
venture capitalists.  Government acting partly as regulators, then create subsidies and taxes to 
help the match the needs of companies and to facilitate the movement of relevant scientific 
knowledge from universities and GRIs to them. These are the main elements of the processes 
of CTT.  Networks or other forms of interaction between scientists, technology transfer 
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offices, senior research administrators of universities, company managers and professionals, 
and banks and venture capitalists should be conceived as bargaining arenas in which the 
parties operate in hierarchies of interdependence.  There may be gaps between them, which 
may create more complex outcomes.  The gaps between the parties may be kinds of serious 
hindrances or impediments to potential technical developments from new scientific 
discoveries from scientists.  For example, scientists can help in early identification of new 
technologies, increasing awareness, providing testing facilities and training programs, 
thereby significantly speeding up CTT.  Varying degrees of integration between the parties is 
required in the processes of CTT.   
 
Numerous factors can improve or damage the processes of CTT.  One important critical 
factor in Malaysia appears to be too much top-down and arm’s lengths management of and 
structures for the industrial use of discoveries and inventions from scientists from universities 
and GRIs.  Factors that can improve the processes of CTT, based on thinking about this new 
model and the findings of the study, include better understanding of business by universities, 
wider and greater financial resources for both scientists and companies, better 
communication between the parties, better rewards for scientists and their discoveries, better 
government funding and more investment in near-to-market research findings, and more 
suitably educated and skilled and more TTO officers. Other factors that damage the processes 
include the slow speed, and expensive of negotiation of technology transfer between 
universities and companies.  Financing technology transfer deals between companies and 
venture capitalists is often unsatisfactory.  Each party seeks to satisfy its stakeholders, which 
can include governments. Scientists and universities also have often found it hard to  identify 
companies wishing to acquire research findings, which have relevant interests and which 
willing to invest in to take up for commercialization.  There are also often, specifically social 
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attitudinal and control issues that affect the processes of CTT.  Finally, the parties can lack 
the established contacts that they need to pursue CTT effectively.   
 
This study of the commercialization of discoveries and inventions from Malaysian 
universities and GRIs by Malaysian manufacturing companies needs to be mainly qualitative, 
with the use of questions must be selective, partly subjective and historically grounded rather 
than too overly scientific or quantitative.  It is, after the perceptions of respondents that 
suggest what their behaviour will be.  As the aim of this thesis is to try to investigate, 
describe and explore from a standpoint that considers the historical, political, economic and 
social influences, it seemed sensible to ask respondents what appear at first to be some 
simple and direct questions about the roles of engineering and of science in technical change, 
and the relevance of research findings to companies and the approaches to CTT involved.   
 
It may, at first sight, seem strange that this study should have been undertaken by an 
investigator without training in science or engineering and thereby largely dependent upon 
second-hand knowledge in fields intricate enough to deter the novice.  So the fundamental 
question concerns the roles of engineering and of science in technical change.  The study 
seeks to help get closer to the truth about the models of technical change used here taking 
into account the backgrounds and potential biases of the respondents in the process.   The 
researcher has asked more detailed questions for example, on the value of the efforts of the 
government to increase the flow of new scientific knowledge to industry; on how the 
processes of CTT have changed over time at relevant universities and GRIs, on the 
importance of the commercial use, actual and potential, of the research findings compared 
with its other efficiency-seeking inputs.  Finally, it is important to analyse relevant problems, 
strength and weaknesses of CTT processes.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, the importance of CTT to the economy of Malaysia been discussed.  Malaysia 
has already put much effort into stimulating potentially productive interaction between 
universities, GRIs, companies and relevant financial players.  Policy makers such as 
politicians see university-industry links as a major feature of Malaysia’s science and 
technology policy agenda.   The nature and the roles of the parties involved in CTT in 
Malaysia have also been discussed.  Various inputs to commercialization in the form of 
discoveries and inventions have been identified.  We have focused on the roles, problems and 
issues of success and other factors in commercialization.  The two master models of technical 
change discussed in Chapter 3 and elsewhere previously have been linked to the nature of 
technology development in Malaysia to help consider how technical change can contribute to 
its economic development.  A new model of CTT was presented.  
 
In the next chapter, the focus is on the qualitative research methods used to gather data 
involving 60 interviews conducted over three months in Malaysian companies, universities, 
GRIs and other institutions.  The chapter has briefly explained the epistemological and 
ontological positions adopted by the researcher.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter described and attempts to justify the research methods used this study.   They 
were qualitative ones, namely semi-structured interviews and to a much smaller extent, 
documentary analysis.  It does the same for the sampling and for the methods chosen for the 
analysis of the data.  
 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
A discussion of the philosophy behind the approach to research design can help clarify the 
choices and uses of research methods used in any research projects.  Explaining choices of 
research design can often show us why an understanding of relevant philosophical issues is 
very useful in research (Esterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2005).  Philosophical orientation, 
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research methods, experience and established knowledge and researcher competence 
ultimately determine the quality of research.  What constitutes legitimate and accepted 
knowledge is greatly influenced by philosophical attitudes from time to time by communities 
of scholars (Chia, 2002). 
 
Positivism (quantitative methods) and social constructionism (qualitative methods) are two 
contrasting traditional view of views of how social science research should be conducted.  
The social constructionist approach focuses how people make sense of the world, especially 
by language (Esterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2005).  In this study, the epistemological 
position adopted serves as an initial basis the conscious and unconscious questions, 
assumptions and beliefs that the researcher brings to her research endeavour.  It informs all 
aspects of the research process.  Thus research methodology is informed by what we know 
philosophically and its use affects what we come to know by doing research.  However, if the 
epistemological basis of a study is weak, then progress in developing a specialised 
knowledge base for a study and for the practiced use of its findings also will be weak (Smyth 
and Morris, 2007).  On the importance of epistemology in management research, it has been 
argued that ‘how we come to ask particular questions, how we assesses the relevance and 
value of different research methodologies so that we can investigate those questions, how we 
evaluate the research findings, all… vary according to our underlying epistemological 
commitments’ (Johnson and Duberly, 2000, p.61).   
 
When comparing positivism and social constructionism, it can be seen than the latter, unlike 
the former includes the observer as part of what is being observed, regards human interests as 
among the main drivers of science, uses explanations to increase general understanding of 
phenomena, argues that research progresses through gathering rich data from which ideas are 
induced, under that concepts should incorporate stakeholder perspectives, and that units of 
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analysis may include the complexity of ‘whole’ situations, that generalization comes through 
theoretical abstraction, that sampling may only  requires small numbers of cases chosen for 
specific reasons.  From a positivism standpoint, on the other hand, the observer must be 
independent, human interests should be irrelevant, explanations must demonstrate causality, 
research progresses through hypotheses and deductions, concepts need to be operationalized 
so that they can be measured, units of analysis should be reduced to simplest terms, and that 
generalization through statistical probability and sampling requires large numbers selected 
randomly These features constitute the differences between the qualitative and quantitative 
research methods (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2005).   
 
On the links between epistemological and ontological positions that Easterby-Smith, Thorpe 
and Lowe (2005, p. 30) discuss, they summarize the links in ways that are useful for this 
study.  As regards ontology in social science, truths depend on who ‘establish’ them, and 
facts are all best understood as fallible human creations. Here, the epistemological position is 
that of social constructionism.  The acceptance of any particular epistemology usually leads a 
researcher to adopt methods that are characteristic of their position.  Thus in this study, 
which generally relies on social constructionism, the methods used include having an aim of 
invention of theory or explanation, the starting points are with meanings and concepts, 
research design embodies reflexivity, the main techniques is conversation, the 
analysis/interpretation sense-making and the outcomes consists of enhanced or changed 
understanding.    
 
Ontology concerns assumptions that we make about the nature of reality, while epistemology 
is about general sets of assumptions about different ways of inquiring into the nature of the 
world. Whenever a piece of research is carried out, researchers make assumptions about how 
the world is (ontology) and how we can come to know it (epistemology).  While philosophy 
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may never provide definitive answers about existence, it can ask relevant questions and 
provides some guidance and justification for certain courses of investigation and action.  
Hence the philosophy of critical realism used in this study asserts a view that the most 
affective kind of analysis is looking at ‘reality with reality eyes’.  Discussions should focus 
on reality with the hope that the world can be changed and improved.  Critical realism has 
influenced the concerns and methods of management research.  It takes the view that science 
is not mainly about discovering universal laws; rather, it is concerned with explanation, 
understanding and interpretation (Fleetwood and Ackroyd, 2004).  It wants science, 
especially social science, to be transformative.   
 
Given the fact that this study focuses on the perspectives of scientists, companies, 
universities, government research institutes and other parties about perceived low industrial 
uptake of researchers’ discoveries and inventions of Malaysia universities and GRIs, may 
often subjective, and usually untidy and varied views competing for attention and support, a 
social constructivist epistemology and an approach to ontology that uses largely qualitative 
methods seems appropriate.  The reasons for using qualitative methods are discussed in a 
little detail below.    
 
 
METHODS 
 
Methods include strategies and techniques employed to acquire knowledge and categorise to 
study, and manipulate data (Jary and Jary, 2000).  Qualitative methods have been used for 
this study.  According to Bryman and Burgess (1999), a qualitative method displays a 
preference for the interpretation of social phenomena from the point of view of the meanings 
employed by the people being studied; for the use of natural rather than artificial settings for 
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the collection of data; and for generating data and theories rather than for simply testing the 
latter.  Qualitative approaches generally provide a means for wider and more subjective 
views of the respondents towards the subject being studied than qualitative ones do.  Weber’s 
notion of verstehen (understanding) implies that it is necessary to take people’s subjective 
interpretations of phenomena into account to develop empathetic understanding of their 
social behaviour (Bryman and Burgess, 1999).  Schultz (Bryman and Burgess, 1999) 
similarly emphasised the importance of developing an ‘interpretative’ understanding of the 
social world. Qualitative research methods provide means for people to express their views 
in wider ways rather than those allowed by confining them to rigid answers to closed 
questions of the kinds used with quantitative methods.   
 
Many writers since the 1950s have stressed the value in social science of using qualitative 
methods (Denzin and Lincoln, 2002; Denzin, Norman, and Lincoln, 2000; Baker, 1986).  
Morse (1995) summarized such views by arguing that those qualitative methods are typically 
used to explore new or little known, and previously unconceptualized or inadequately 
understood, phenomena, or when an investigator suspects bias in existing interpretations.  
Qualitative methods were especially appropriate for looking at phenomena from everyday 
but also unbiased perspectives of non-experimenters or non-observers.  As a result 
qualitative research was usually conducted in natural settings rather than in controlled 
laboratory ones.  In the course of qualitative research, hypotheses and theories emerge from 
data, either while data collection is in process or in the course of data analysis.   
 
The study of innovation has been considerable and varied.  Many actors and institutions are 
involved in innovation, often over long periods.  Its study often demands a flexible and 
processical orientation; an adaptive and developing methodological framework which can 
also change with the demands of the research over time; and an action research orientation, 
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in which feedback and modification of information and interpretations are very important 
(Lyall, Bruce, Firn, Firn and Tait, 2004).  Many innovations and commercialization 
processes are unique in themselves, and in their institutional, sectoral, market and national 
contexts, and it is easy to generalise too much about them.   
 
Measuring the effects of research is difficult and can demand shifts in organizational 
mindsets and performance indicators (Lyall, Bruce, Firn, Firn and Tait 2004).  Therefore 
commercialization can need to be set in wider contextual frameworks which consider the 
business environment, the dynamics of relevant processes, the different factors and elements 
involved and so on.  However, it is clear that approaching the phenomenon from such angles 
is not easy.  As Nasbeth and Ray (1974, p. 20) commented, ‘…the difficulty is that these 
micro level studies have to based on company data, which are always difficult to come by, 
with the further impediment that any result must usually be published in such a way that 
information about individual companies is not disclosed.  Indeed, this dual difficulty with the 
data is probably the main reason why such reports and monographs are scarce compared with 
the more theoretical macro studies’. 
 
In 1988 the UK’s Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) commissioned a report 
on how to improve and assess the use and dissemination of research that it funded 
(Richardson, Jackson and Sykes, 1990).  The study used for the report adopted a largely 
exploratory qualitative approach and sought to collect ideas about problems and possible 
solutions rather than to collect more quantitative and factual data about research use and 
dissemination.  Lyall, Bruce, Firn, Firn and Tait (2004), discussed research methods used in 
government to assess the end-users relevance of public sector research.  They argued that the 
needs of end-user were diverse and often hard to quantify, and that there was often much 
ambiguity and many new things to learn from each process of evaluation.  Their own 
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methods reflected their respect for diversity, ambiguity and the idea of ongoing development 
process of evaluation.  Thus in their own study they used desk and on-line research, personal 
and telephone interviews with senior managers and researchers, a series of focus groups 
conducted with selected end-users, a large postal survey of end-users, and telephone calls to 
a sample of respondents who had completed questionnaires.  Jensen, Thursby and Thursby 
(2003), who investigated the disclosure and licensing of university inventions, used 
questionnaires that they sent to 62 research universities in the USA.  They examined the 
interplay of the three major types of university actor in technology transfer from universities 
to industry:  faculties, technology transfer offices (TTOs) and university central 
administrators.  They found that TTOs reported that licensing objectives were influenced by 
the views of academics and administrators, supporting the assumptions that TTOs are dual 
agents who try, and sometimes fail, to agree with academics and central administrations as 
well as private sector companies.      
 
 
SOURCES OF DATA  
 
Research designs vary, depending on the needs of multi-focus or single-focus cases and 
process inquiries.  Different sampling issues arise in each situation.  These needs and issues 
also vary according to the paradigms that are being employed.  Every instance of a case or 
process bears the stamp of the general class of phenomena to which it belongs.  However, 
any given instance is likely to be particular and unique.  Thus, for example, any given 
classroom is like all classrooms, but no two classrooms are the same (Mason, 2002). 
 
For these reasons, many post-positivists, constructionists, and critical theory-centred   
qualitative researchers employ theoretical and purposive, and not random, sampling models.  
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They seek out groups, settings, and individuals where and with whom the processes being 
studied are most likely to occur.  At the same time, a process of constant comparison of 
groups, concepts, and observations is necessary, as the researcher seeks to develop an 
understanding that encompasses all instances of processes or cases under investigation.  A 
focus on negative cases is a key feature of this process (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). 
 
In designing this study I obviously to ask what I needed to know.   In part, my study 
concerns an assumption that it is worth looking for immediate and practical and 
organizational reasons for the low uptake of researchers’ discoveries and inventions in 
Malaysia universities and GRIs.   I am therefore interested in a suspicion that the parties in 
government and administration, universities and research institutes, and manufacturing 
companies, lack experience of commercialization and technology transfer, and of knowledge 
of each others’ aims and ways of working, and that the parties mistrust each other.  The 
second hypothesis concerns the underlying and long-term reasons why there is apparently 
low uptake, and why there may be lack of relevant knowledge and experience, 
misunderstanding and mistrust.  Malaysia was a British colony, and there exists a suspicion 
that it is operating with a partly post-colonial mentality in a partly neo-colonial socio-
political and economic context.  Malaysia is also still a developing country in some 
significant respects, and its political leaders, civil servants, academics and industrial 
companies lack experience of indigenous industrial innovation, with many of the resources 
needed to develop clusters of dynamic industrial capabilities only beginning to germinate.  
When reading relevant literature about all these issues, and through discussions with my 
supervisors and others, I have come to believe that better understanding of the strengths and 
potential of its economy and society, and of the opportunities available to it could eventually 
help Malaysia to develop its industries faster and more effectively than it has been, and with 
greater self-confidence and confidence in the future.     
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I chose interviews and used relevant university, government and company documents as the 
most appropriate methods for my research.  I was very aware of how I needed to establish 
trust, rapport and authentic communication patterns with the interviewees.  As my primary 
data were from the interviews, I sought as much direct evidence as possible about the 
supposed low uptake of researchers’ discoveries and inventions in Malaysian universities and 
GRIs.  Interviewing is the most commonly recognised kind of qualitative research method.  
Interviewing was chosen because this study aims to identify the respondents’ knowledge, 
values, attitudes, interests, understanding, behaviour and experiences that are relevant to the 
commercialization and transfer of technology.  Second, interviews are legitimate and 
meaningful ways of generating data by talking with respondents.  Third, qualitative research 
perspectives assume that knowledge is situational, and because the interview is just as much 
as a social situation as any other interaction, interviewing is a natural and ‘honest’ way of 
gathering data.  Also processes of commercialization and technology transfer deal with 
institutional knowledge.     
 
 Further, I wanted to develop social explanations and arguments from interview data rather 
than to produce a shallower analysis of surface comparability between relatively simple 
responses taken from larger numbers of people.  I wanted to understand the variety, 
complexity and depth of the low uptake of scientific research findings by companies in 
Malaysia, rather than to draft a broad ‘understanding’ from surface patterns.  I sought to use 
a distinctive approach to comparisons, to analysing data and to the construction of 
arguments, and maybe to the generation of detailed cross-contextual interpretations of the 
data and the problem studied.   To do this, the semi-structured interview schedule was 
constructed so as to make it heavily dependent on the respondents’ abilities and efforts to 
verbalise, interact, conceptualise and remember.  The seven interview schedules do not all 
ask the same questions, because the respondents perform different roles, and I assumed that 
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different questions were needed to generate data which were comparable across key areas.   I 
also assumed that all my interviewees would be given more freedom in and control of the 
interview situation than is usually permitted (Mason, 2002) with the structured approach of 
mail survey questions, partly because they were generally very creative and highly qualified, 
intelligent and mature people.   
 
Studies do try to get close to the internal complexities of commercialization processes can 
throw up the problem of making generalizations about commercialization. This is not to say 
that it is impossible to draw out some useful general lessons and guidelines from 
commercialization research, but the research should reflect some idea of the variety, of 
relevant problems in the real world, of its content and its contexts.  This is an old problem 
associated with the study of management and organization.  There are the approaches which 
seek to develop and extend theoretical knowledge and conceptual frameworks, but they may 
not be easily related to the everyday and broader concerns and experiences of the research 
subjects.   If some of the underlying theory and its assumptions are mistaken, the research 
subjects’ interest may be harmed.   
 
GENERATING PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA 
 
The evidence comes from 60 interviews and the study of a disappointingly limited number of 
organizational documents.  The interview findings were meant to be supported or challenged 
by an examination of documentary secondary data. The documents sought included 
government, university and company reports, working papers, books, manuals, and 
newspapers, magazines and websites.  Such documents can be very meaningful for research 
by constituting a form of expression or representation of relevant elements of situations or 
process that we can read or trace (Mason, 2002).  In practice the documents that I was able to 
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obtain were not of great use.    This is obviously that some company document were typically 
bland company documents and have few grieves specific facts.  The documents were only 
used for marketing information and its contents were not relevance to this study.   
 
I chose to interview seven groups of respondents, because they were the main parties 
involved in commercialization and technology transfer (Kumar and Jain, 2003).  Technical 
change and the idea of commercialization have attracted policy makers, who have been 
persuaded them to get involved with decisions-making about new technology and 
collaborative ventures (Walsh and Le Roux, 2004; Kumar and Jain, 2003).   
 
The 60 interviews took a total of 55 days and involved nearly 4,000 miles of travelling in 
West Malaysia.  Only one interview was conducted by telephone.  All the others were 
conducted face-to-face.  To gain access to interviewees, I first chose four universities and 
three GRIs.  Malaysia has 68 public and private universities and colleges.  The four 
universities chosen were the University Technology Malaysia (UTM), University Putra 
Malaysia (UPM), the National University of Malaysia (UKM) and the Science University of 
Malaysia (USM).  The three GRIs are the Malaysian Agriculture Research and Development 
Institute (MARDI), the Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology Research (MINT), and 
the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB). I chose these universities and GRIs for being among 
the most active universities and institutes in developing technologies and in trying to 
commercialise them.  The interviewees were the top research administrators, for example 
Deputy Vice-Chancellors (Research) of universities or Directors of GRIs and in companies, 
entrepreneurs and directors, managers and professionals.  They also included researchers in 
the universities and GRIs and Technology Transfer Officers TTOs) venture capitalists, two 
journalists, a politician.     
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Those people are chosen as examples of real-life participants in technical change.  They 
represent, or speak for, many other such people and they have access to the appropriate 
contextual and situated knowledge for the purpose of the research.  The choice of the group 
and of the numbers and types of respondent is based on a classification of real-life or 
common-sense categories.  As the researcher is using a purposive sampling strategy, it is not 
a major concern if the sample is big enough to be statistically representative of a total 
population.  This small, but hardly absurdly small, qualitative sample is practical considering 
the time and money available for generating and analyzing qualitative data. The researcher 
has hopefully chosen respondents who provided access to enough data, with the right kinds 
of focus on the research questions.  
 
 
The final sample size was 60, as noted earlier.  It was made up of  eight university 
researchers, nine GRI researchers, eight administrators in university technology transfer 
offices and GRIs, six top university research administrators (Deputy Vice Chancellors 
(Research) of their universities and the GRI’s administrators (Directors’ General), three 
venture capitalists, one politician, two journalists and 23 managers or entrepreneurs.  The 
actual numbers in each category being interviewed were affected by the limitations of cost 
and time of the research.  What was most important was to get enough in each category to 
gather enough data on what people of each type tended to think.  Thus precisely correct 
numbers of respondents were not vital for this research, as the researcher is mainly interested 
in getting a reasonably varied and representative range of views and a number of interesting 
and possibly individual ‘angles’.  Interestingly ‘wrong’ answers may be much more 
illuminating and productive than typical ones, although, ultimately, both kinds are vital for 
research to be effective.   Therefore the researcher did not make many very definite sampling 
decisions in advance.  She was influenced by four factors in this.  One was the uncertainty 
just discussed.  The second was the need to get a reasonable number of respondents of each 
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type.  The third were her own cost and time restrictions.  The fourth was the willingness of 
people to grant interviews.   
 
By using the distinction between actors and the rules that are most related to the system 
failures, a systems failure framework can be used that reorganised the classifications and 
definitions of failures exclude one another (Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, and Gilsing, 2004). This 
categorization process is intended to be a practical tool for both researchers and policy 
makers.  Thus when a system failure occurs, they ask, for example, what kinds of failure 
have occurred, and what actions or interaction between them are hindered?  So, system 
innovation-based policy choices focus on the evaluations of government policies and their 
failures.  It is important to ask whether they address the right failures/actors or whether there 
are other or more important ones that may stem from bottlenecks in the system or even the 
system having the wrong aims before it was designed.  Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, and Gilsing 
(2004) categorise the actors, such as customers, firms, policy departments, research 
institutes, consultants and so on that act and thereby co-create not only products and 
technologies but also the institutional frameworks in which they functions.  Rules/system 
failures that is the conditions that are either specifically created by the actors, or have 
evolved spontaneously, not only influence the functioning of individual actors, but also 
systems as wholes.  
 
The evidence of this research is based on the interview findings and the few useful 
documents presented. Errors might have arisen in the interviews because the researcher and 
the questions had been misunderstood.  Thus a concern with reliability of data stresses a 
concern with variance of interviews to the researcher and the data to the respondents’ 
perceptions and interpretations of the interviewer and the questions asked (Cicourel, 1964).  
In this case the researcher added some questions to give more freedom to interviewees to 
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release insights and further information. The question-wording and research design were 
intended to anticipate situations of ‘deeper meaning’ and ‘difficult rapport’ (Cicourel, 1964).  
The researcher also made on the spot decisions about the content, style, scope and 
sequencing of questions whenever it seemed appropriate to pursuing the research aims.  She 
tried to make decisions and to act quickly in pursuing the research strategy, rather than in an 
ad hoc and idiosyncratic fashion (Mason, 2003).  Even so, the journalist respondent, and 
several company and researcher respondents, about nine in total, did not answer several 
questions because they focused, instead, on other questions that interested them more.   
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Because of the nature of the study and the data gathering, it was clear that content analysis 
was the appropriate method for data analysis.  Content analysis is the method accepted to 
investigate texts such as interviews and discussion (Silverman, 2001).  It is a research tool 
used to detect the presence of certain words or concepts in texts or sets of texts (Writing @ 
CSU: Writing Guide, 2004).  This method allowed the researcher to classify and analyse the 
presence, meanings and relationships of significant words and concepts, and then to make 
inferences about the messages in the texts.  There are two general categories of content 
analysis: conceptual and relational.  Conceptual analysis can be thought of as establishing the 
existence and frequency of concepts most often represented by words of phrases in a text. 
Relational analysis on the other hand, goes one step further by examining the relationships 
among concepts in a text (Writing @ CSU: Writing Guide, 2004).  Since the emphasis of my 
research was towards both interrelatedness establishing the existence and frequency of 
concepts and examining their interrelationships, it was appropriate for the researcher to use 
both categories.   
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However, the problem for users of content analysis is to employ the theory which is precise 
enough to enable the researcher to specify in advance what she should look for in some 
datasets, how she is to identify and extract the material, how she must code it, and finally, 
how its significance is to be decided (Cicourel, 1968).  Therefore, the researcher must relate 
the categories to theories of technical change and commercialization (among others), and 
show how she came to develop the categories and the rules whereby material was coded into 
the categories.   
 
Compared to the users of quantitative methods, who are more comfortable with conventional 
measures of reliability where standard instruments of measurement are used, the users of 
qualitative methods are unable to perform simple reliability tests (Mason, 2002).  The 
reliability of this study is based on the precision of discussion and rigorousness of 
explanation in the next Chapters.  Validity of data generated in the interviews reflected not 
only on how effective interviewing or documentary analysis were as strategies in this 
research, but also on how illuminating interviews were for the study of technical change, 
commercialization and transfer of technology.  So the interview schedule was designed for 
semi-structured interviews, which as explained in the sections too had the capacity to 
perform these tasks.   Cicourel (1964, p. 79) suggested that a well-conceived interview, 
complex as it may be, must have its roots in the categories of common-sense thinking, for 
without a knowledge of such roots the interviewer could not establish the necessary 
community for conducting the research.  While that is also any view, Miller and Fredericks 
(2003) argued that the process by which data become evidence can be dubious because the 
relative significance of different kinds of data is hard to calculate.     
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, the researcher has described and explained her reasons for choosing a 
qualitative approach to the topic, and semi-structured interviews and documentary materials 
as her main form of data.  The philosophical bases of research design were discussed and the 
adoptions of the specific epistemological and ontological positions used in the study were 
explained.  The sampling and the sampling process have also been described and discussed, 
as has the use of content analysis to classify the data.     Finally, it should be noted that the 
data are analysed in a discursive and historical fashion in the following chapters, relating 
them to relevant economic, social and political developments and issues, rather than by 
employing statistical techniques and prescribing results in detail.  Some quotations are used 
but they are kept deliberately short and focussed, so that what is written is a mixture of more 
or less factual description and the author’s interpretations of the phenomena described and 
the views expressed by the respondents.    
 
In the next chapters, the findings are presented and the interpretations of the data are made 
using conceptual and relational analysis.  This analysis is used to help establish the context of 
commercialization and technology transfer in Malaysia and their problems.      
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
COMPANY PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is concerned with the perspectives of the respondents who worked in industry.  
We have seen, in Appendix 1 how their companies were often trying to develop their own 
ways of producing or adopting technical change.  In the latter case this was generally through 
either risk-averse use of partners, or by adopting foreign technology.  Some companies had 
sub-units concerned with technical improvement.  In general, there was a feeling amongst 
these respondents that university and GRI research findings were not relevant enough to the 
worth of their companies, nor even, sometimes, genuinely new.  This chapter discusses the 
main assumptions of the respondents about technical change, commercialization and so on, 
their views about processes of commercialization and technology transfer in Malaysia, and 
those on the role of Malaysia’s government in helping to effect them. 
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The values and interests of respondents, and their abilities to control events are important 
factors to bear in mind in considering such data (Child, 1981).  The term value covers the 
major assumptions, emotions and goals of the respondents.  Their interests are related to their 
material, psychological and social concerns, and they need an ability to control events to 
achieve things in accordance with their values and interests.   For example, an engineer 
trying to improve a product is likely to consider his or her beliefs about the wider purposes 
and the possible results of his or her work, in philosophical, political or social terms, as well 
as in technical, economic and scientific ones.  They will also be concerned with their 
continuing employment, their career prospects, and with how others, especially significant 
ones like their bosses, regard their contributions in the short and long term.  They will also 
consider the motives and behaviour of colleagues and subordinates in their own workgroups, 
and those of bosses and colleagues outside them, and about the resources of all kinds 
available to them, so that they control events as far as possible, rather than being controlled 
by them.   
 
The two main research questions of this study concern the apparent failure of Malaysian 
companies to use discoveries, ideas, inventions and knowledge produced by their country’s 
universities and GRIs, and the apparent failure of the latter two kinds of institution to 
persuade companies to use their findings.  Company respondents suggested that most 
scientific research was too academic or sometimes too expensive for them to use.  They were 
mainly interested in whether existing things and limited improvements to them worked and 
whether they were profitable.   Different values, philosophies, interests and structures of 
power were involved.     
 
In Appendix 1 we saw that the company respondents often felt that government and 
university procedures to be too complicated and time-consuming.  They also found that many 
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researchers did not seem able to be to understand their needs or to be persuasive 
communicators.  In theory, companies wanted to benefit from new discoveries and 
knowledge, and to work with scientists who genuinely wanted to help them, but in practice it 
was very often unnecessary or very hard to do so.   
 
As noted previously, the company interviewees came from various sectors.  They were most 
often engineers by profession, who had degrees in civil, chemical, electrical, electronic and 
mechanical engineering.  The rest were degree holders in such subjects as business, 
computing, marketing, medicine and pharmacology.  They were either owners, partners or 
managers in their companies.  They worked for companies in construction, mechanical 
engineering, chemical engineering and pharmaceuticals, electronic and information 
technology, biomedical engineering, biotechnology and food technology, and in a technology 
transfer one.    
 
The next section of this chapter discusses the respondents’ assumptions about technical 
change, and commercialization and technology transfer (CTT).  It draws on the relevant 
literature and on their answers to interview schedule questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 13.  In the 
third section, their perspectives on the processes of CTT in Malaysia are considered.  The 
models of CTT discussed in chapter 4 and the findings from the interview questions 2, 3, 4, 5 
again, and 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, are used here.  
 
The respondents’ views on the role of government in CTT are discussed in the fourth section.  
This uses the findings from questions 6, 7 and 12.  It also considers respondents’ views on 
the nature of relevant supranational, national and company policies concerned with 
commercialization, doing so in relation to the ideas of such critical writers as Stiglitz (2002, 
2006).  The fifth and last main section, before the Conclusion discusses how far the company 
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respondents’ views help to answer the research questions.  This discussion includes the 
practical relevance of the models of CTT that were described in chapter 4.     
 
 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT TECHNICAL CHANGE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
In chapter 2 we saw that the government of Malaysia has been trying to upgrade Malaysian 
industry since the 1980s.  It had followed a philosophy of economic and industrial 
development taken from some of the world’s most powerful nations and from institutions 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
The backgrounds of the 23 company respondents were those of engineers, business people 
and scientists and they tended to be in their early forties, with their ages ranging from 35 to 
45 and to be employed in senior management and professional roles.  They tended to focus 
on their companies staying profitable and not to be very critical of conventional ways of 
thinking about technical change and authority structures.   
 
In chapter 3 some problems about how university scientists and other researchers in the 
English-speaking world and/or former British Empire countries perceive industry and 
technical change are discussed.  They tended to exaggerate the practical role of science, in 
spite of considerable evidence over many years, at least since 1950s, that most technical 
change builds on previous technical change, and that it usually originates from companies 
and engineers rather than from universities and scientists.  Some recent research had 
suggested, also, that companies saw possible development costs as likely to be too high, 
partly because relevant findings were often too new or novel to be commercialised 
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(Markman, Gianiodis, Phan and Balkin, 2005; Schilling, 1998), and that company managers 
and professionals found university and government researchers hard to communicate with 
(Siegel, Waldman, Atwater and Link, 2004; Thursby, Jensen and Thursby, 2001).     
 
Technical change, as noted earlier, involves the creation, design, production, use, and 
diffusion of new products, processes or systems.  The outcomes of technical change are 
unpredictable in that no one can predict results of decisions to innovate.  However, in 
Malaysia, the government encourages ‘scientific and technological’ advances without, often, 
any real interest on the parts of individual companies.    
 
Several studies have been conducted, in different parts of the world, on synergies between 
industries, government and universities.  Vuola and Hameri (2006) found that research 
organizations, states and industries had different expectations of collaboration.   They saw it 
as potentially beneficial to all concerned, but most companies were not often interested in 
scientific discoveries, as they did not lead directly to new processes and products.    ‘Big 
science’ and industry cooperation did, however, generate social interaction and inputs into 
industrial innovation and new business creation (Vuola and Hameri, 2006).  However, they 
argued that some companies were not much interested in the big science-related as their own 
markets were small, often specific and narrow, and lacked potential economies of scale. 
Langrish, Gibbons, Evans and Jevons (1972), all very experienced researchers into and 
writers on such issue, argued that a new branch of science tended only to be useful to 
industry in its early days.  For example, the early days of astronomy were linked with 
economically important attempts at improving navigation, but it had rarely been useful since 
then. (Since the 1970s it has become useful navigation again).  According to Fores (1974), 
once a new area or industrial sector has been established, the aim of science is to understand 
it and the aim of technology is to make it work, and industry had been successful at making 
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things work without too much reliance on understanding.  Scientific knowledge and scientific 
methods were used at times in executive work in industry and business, but this type of work 
was inevitably much more often concerned with practical, much of it about people, detail 
than with general principles.    
  
It was a challenge for government to stimulate new industries out of new technologies (Hung 
and Chu, 2006).  They argued that there must be mechanisms to encourage partnerships for 
commercialization, entrepreneurship and venture initiatives.  There needed to be 
encouragement of partnerships, a speeding up transition processes and the promotion of 
entrepreneurship, and ways of sustaining commercialization processes and new companies 
creation.  Hung and Chu also advocated fostering R and D ventures and entrepreneurial 
capacities, establishing public support mechanisms targeted at sources of innovation and 
market failure, mobilizing public support, and policies for stimulating technology transfer.  
Most of the tasks discussed by them do need performing by someone, but their approach is a 
rather top-down, government-oriented one.   
 
It has been argued that, companies with high sales performance have a strong emphasis on 
strategic orientation, operating environments and the use of e-commerce (O’regan, 
Ghobadian and Gallear, 2006).  Many small companies experienced difficulties converting R 
and D outputs into profitable innovation.  However, O’regan, Ghobadian and Gallear (2006) 
suggested that innovation did always not high growth performance of manufacturing 
companies.  A sales orientation tended to be more profitable than innovation one.  In 
developing countries, most SME performance is associated with appropriate learning 
capabilities, levels of technology, knowledge, skills ands experience.  Informal learning was 
most effective and dominant way form of mastering new technologies (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 
and Lal, 2006).  Lack of understanding of their own needs was the reason why many SMEs 
 189
failed to convert R and D into innovation (Kim and Mauborgne, 2000).  Storey (1998) argued 
that most SME research focused on factors, such as financing that contributed to their 
survival, rather than to growth and the achievement of sustainable competitive advantage 
(Storey, 1994).   
 
Technical change 
 
The 23 respondents were asked (question 13) about ‘the roles of engineering, and of science, 
in technical change’.  Five of them chose not to answer the question, in one way or another.  
One (7) dominated the interview almost completely (he was very informative) and then 
needed to return to his work before the question could be asked.  Two others (23 and 1) were 
also knowledgeable but seemed to feel that it was insulting to them to ask the question, 
although they clearly regarded both engineering and science as vital for industry, and seemed 
slightly more sympathetic to the Technik model than the STH one.  A fourth (14) was simply 
too busy to conduct a full interview with, and the researcher chose to focus on other points.  
The fifth, a researcher in a pharmaceuticals company (16), felt unable, for reasons not fully 
stated to consider the question.   
  
Respondent 7 was a senior manager in his company.  He did not answer the question as he 
felt that there was not much research done in universities that was relevant to his industrial 
sector.  Although he was a production engineer, the company that he worked for was a multi-
national, and a local company.  The company used imported machines, and so no technical 
changes occurred in production.  Respondents 23 and 1 were both senior partners of their 
companies.  Respondent 23 was a chemical engineer and his company a consultant company 
in patent registration, technology licensing and market research and had experience of 
working with a Malaysian venture capitalist company.  His attitude to the development of 
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research findings from universities and GRIs was fairly positive.  He did not answer the 
question directly, but he had an interest in the commercialization of scientific discoveries.  
Respondent 1 had been a scientific researcher before joining his construction company.  He 
also did not answer the question, but he was more in favour of the STH model.  He had been 
involved in research in natural rubber.  He claimed that this had led to technical change in the 
natural rubber industry.  Respondent 14 was a veterinary surgeon had experience of working 
with scientists from universities.  He believed, like Fores (1976), that in the world of the 
scientist, the main aim is to test and put forward and test ideas.  Respondent 16 held a 
doctorate in pharmaceutical technology.  She was a senior researcher in her company. 
Although she had worked as a scientist, her views on technical change did not show 
understanding of how technical development might be related to engineering work.  
Therefore she did not answer question 13.    
 
Of the remaining 18, six favoured the Technik model, four the STH one, with six feeling that 
they were both commercially relevant.  The final two respondents out of the 23 gave other 
answers.  The variety of the kinds of answer given to this question suggests that much 
confusion exists, even among people with relevant experience, about the relevant facts and 
issues.  The arguments used by the seven favouring the Technik model tended to focus on the 
creativity and practicality of engineering and the way in which science was more distant from 
the actions of companies, although sometimes very directly, and usually potentially  relevant, 
if only slightly so.  They also tended to stress the great responsibilities borne by many 
professional engineers.   
 
Of the six respondents who preferred the Technik model, three of them were engineers (3, 6 
and 8).  Respondents 12, 10, and 19 had degrees or certificates in human resources, auditing 
and computing.  The engineers tend to have more understanding of the role of engineering 
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work and of how it produces technical change.  They undiscovered technological 
development and often did not depend university or government research, and of how their 
on ways of working led to it.  Respondent 6, who was a scientist himself, and in his 40s, felt 
that the role of engineers was ‘to look at the problem; if he cannot solve it and then he has to 
go to the science people who maybe can solve it’.  Therefore engineers and scientists had to 
talk to each other in order for technical change to succeed.  Respondent 3, who ran an 
engineering company, emphasized how engineers affected everyday lives.   
 
Respondent 8, who was in her 40s, argued that scientific knowledge was very general, and 
that it was engineers who worked the technical know-why of industrial processes and 
products.  Respondents 12 who had degree in human resources management believed in 
communicating with university scientists and government researchers.  He also believed that 
engineering was important for technical change, and that engineers were there ‘to solve 
technological problems in production’.  Engineers were more concerned with improving 
processes than with knowledge.  Respondent 12 said that ‘we ask engineers, to keep and 
improving things …we always ask them to be more creative’.  According to the Technik 
model of technical change technical work is autonomous or separate cultural area, Technik or 
engineering and not part of, or dependent on science (Sorge and Hartman, 1980).   
Respondent 12 felt that ‘… science can be made useful along with engineering innovation in 
general, science can be an element of achievement connected with engineering 
contributions’.  Respondents 10 and 19 who were senior managers said that their company 
appreciated engineers who work on improving process.  Respondent 19 argued that scientific 
knowledge was about ideas mainly and hard to make useful in industry and difficult to drive 
into it.  However engineers, with science-based engineering degrees, did work on solving 
engineering problems.     
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The four favouring the STH model argued that scientific knowledge was crucial to technical 
change.  The four respondents were 9, 17, 18 and 21.    Respondent 9 who had a degree in 
marketing, argued that as scientists create more knowledge, in form of scientific publications 
and sometimes patents, either in life and non-life sciences, it is the role of engineers form the 
knowledge into products.  Obviously, the adoption of scientific knowledge or the applied of 
scientific knowledge is said to seeks to ascertain the possibility of practical use of knowledge 
discovered through basic research.   
 
Respondents 17 argued that scientists had originated knowledge from the Stone Age.  
Engineers were applied scientific knowledge in industry.    He suggested that 
‘…theoretically, science creates impetus, you have a new invention, and engineering takes 
over, to make into products’.   Respondent 21 regarded science as turning revolutionary 
inventions into products.  Scientists were more concerned developing knowledge, and 
engineers were more interested in producing things.    
 
Respondents 4, 5, 13, 15, 20 and 22 believed that both engineering and science were 
important in technical change.  They spoke of an ‘opportunistic’ approach, using arguments 
that engineering and science were both important if needed by their companies.  Respondents 
4, 5, 15 and 22 felt that both the practical knowledge of engineering and the ideas of science 
could and did benefit industry.  Respondent 13 said that both engineering and science should 
work together for the success of any technical change.  Respondent 13 went on to argue that 
‘…if you want to develop an engineering product alone, you cannot develop it on its own.  It 
needs scientific support, actually.  If you need detail facts from science, you still need 
engineering support’. Respondent 5 felt that engineering and science could not be separated.  
To him, a scientist with core scientific knowledge also needed to appreciate the engineering 
or technical parts of technical change.  An engineer must also do the same.   
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Although respondent 20 argued that both engineering and science were important to industry, 
technical change in Malaysia had yet to come out with a ‘platform technology’ or something 
totally new, or novel, to progress faster.  We can argue that experimental development in this 
context is the use of such knowledge to develop new materials, equipment, systems or 
processes. Unfortunately, however, much lay and public use of the term then tends to regard 
science as the source of all or almost all technical change, such as when politicians speak 
about ‘getting ideas out of laboratories and into production’ (Rosenberg, 1990).  This in itself 
may be seen as evidence that most companies prefer re-engineering to make scientific 
research, or to create relatively simple improvements to their products or processes either 
through their partner or parent companies.  Scientific knowledge might not really help them 
dramatically in their manufacturing or in most technical improvements that they make.   
 
The last two respondents, 2 and 11 offered other answers about the roles of engineering and 
science in technical change.  Respondent 2, who was a senior manager in his company, said 
that he was quite a pessimistic because his company did not have much interest in thinking 
about the roles in engineering and science as contributors to technical change.  Although his 
company might have an option to improve its manufacturing methods, for example, by using 
welding robots or CNC machines, it was not relevant to it as he said, ‘we don’t go for [the] 
latest development, it’s not so relevant for us to fabricate and to put all fashion systems on 
the welding’.  This was because the company was a small one, and unwilling to risk major 
investment in new technology.  The respondent preferred its established hardware and 
technical knowledge.  Respondent 11, who held more critical views, said that Germany had 
more advanced knowledge of engineering and science and that Malaysians should learn from 
it.  This respondent preferred German machines for their its company’s production lines, as 
they were more reliable, even though more costly, compared with Japan ones.   
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Commercialization and Technology Transfer (CTT) 
 
Many universities and GRIs have developed expertise in patenting the findings and 
inventions of their scientists, with the hope that the patents will yield products and return 
capital to them.  Commercialization means the commercial use of such findings and 
inventions.   Technology transfer means the dissemination of knowledge and techniques 
across universities, GRIs and industrial companies and sectors (industry links).  The links 
involve the commercial uses of research finding, through the adaptation and adoption of new 
scientific knowledge, products and processes. Commercialization and technology transfer 
(CTT) thus create relationships between all or most of the parties involved.   
 
Eleven of the 23 respondents said that discoveries made in universities and GRIs were not 
relevant to their companies’ work or to the sectors that their companies worked in.  The 
sectors thus referred to included chemicals, construction, food technology, mechanical 
engineering and pharmaceuticals. This is rather surprising list of sectors since, apart perhaps 
from constructions, they usually stand to benefit significantly from scientific research.  
However, the relevant scientific findings need not come from, or from collaborations with, 
university or GRIs located in Malaysia.  The respondents who made this claim were 1, 2, 4, 
5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 22.  All respondents spoke quite reluctantly on questions 2 and 3 
which were about the relevance of discoveries made in universities and GRIs to their 
companies’ work.   They argued that they did not have any relationship with universities or 
GRIs about the discoveries made by these institutions.  Their technology was either from 
their own parent companies or their partners.  Therefore, there was no engagement either 
through consultation, licensing, patenting, external investment, prototype development, 
incubator, spin-off and even dissemination through scientific journals and books.  Where 
respondents gave examples of real concern with the relevance of research findings, they 
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generally related them to information about research findings or communication between 
scientists and companies.  Companies were generally devoted to the needs of customers and 
their markets, in seeking for more profits.   
 
Generally, these companies had no interest in scientific discoveries and CTT.  They argued 
that they never been approach by any of these institutions, they had not been invited to 
promotions by universities or GRIs, and/or their research findings were not suitable to their 
needs.  However, these reasons also had much to do with managerial decisions about 
processes of taking up any research findings from universities and GRIs.  Respondents 
stressed the lengthy nature of processes of technology transfer from universities and GRIs.  
They felt that universities and GRIs took too long to make decisions about technology 
transfer.   
 
The study found that generally companies agreed with the principle of adoption of new 
scientific discoveries made in universities and GRIs, but that it did not, take place.  The 
engineer and manager respondents argued that most of the research findings were not very 
new, and some managers were keen to seek other sources of new technology.  They found 
that some research institutes were quite discouraging.   Scientists’ understanding was most 
focused on knowledge.  One respondent said that ‘they carry out research, and they get good 
findings, they prepare papers and they prepare for conferences and seminars’.  These 
activities gave scientists more satisfaction than trying to commercialize their findings into 
processes or products.   
 
It seemed that nearly half of the total respondents supported and took part in the use of 
research findings from universities and GRIs.  These companies had generally worked well 
with universities and GRIs.  They were respondents 6, 9, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 23. 
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They were from the sectors of electrical engineering (energy), chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
electronic and information technology, biomedical science, biotechnology, food technology 
and technology transfer, all ones which benefit greatly from scientific knowledge.  They 
appreciated research findings made at universities and GRIs and one of them said that, ‘it is 
quite relevant, because not many people exploit the resources within the universities’.  Other 
respondent said that, ‘my company’s product actually is from the university.  We are working 
closely together with scientists, since they didn’t have any knowledge about market needs 
and they are not business people’.  Moreover, there were companies from pharmaceuticals 
that employed university scientists as consultants.  These scientists experienced their research 
findings being commercialized by the companies. One respondent said that, ‘… because he is 
the consultant to the company, we found it was a very productive relationship, and we were 
able to come out of it with a lot of products’.  However, one respondent said another reason 
‘Just to commercialize without technology transfer, is not possible, right now.  Therefore, 
what you have to do is you have to get all the agreements (?) right’.  The respondent argued 
that transferor and transferee ‘must be able to work hand in hand in order to make 
commercialization a success’.   
 
Where difficulties were reported, the respondents, 7 and 14, from two companies did not 
answer either question 2 or 3.  These companies tended to focus on the availabilities of their 
own technology to make profit.  The respondents said that their companies lacked the money 
to take any relevant research findings.  They argued that they could rely on their existing 
technology and their own resources of other kinds.     
 
On the relationship between the findings and its CTT [questions 1 and 4] it was thought by 
most respondents that CTT did not really take place much in Malaysia.  Companies were 
reluctant to work with scientists from universities and GRIs.  A respondent said that ‘any 
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research involves a lot of money, time and all that, so right now, no company is ready to 
waste their time and money taking something that they are going to get within 5 or 10 years.  
Everyone wants to get profit immediately … it is easy to buy or do re-engineering products 
or processes’.  The study tended to confirm the idea that some universities’ research findings 
were regarded as too academic and unsuited to companies’ needs, and in some ways, the 
Technik model of technical change.  Another respondent said that ‘if the product is 
functional, it is OK for me.  There must be nice packaging and good display’.  Difficulties in 
CTT also involved the nature of the invention of new processes or products.  A respondent 
said that ‘most university and GRI research findings are duplications of research findings 
from the West and made applicable to Malaysian environment’.  Another respondent who 
was asked said ‘… yes, but not new processes but new products using existing technology.  
Malaysians did not have what we called “platform technology”.  They were all from the 
West’.  
 
However, and along lines like those discussed by Okubo and Sjöberg (2000) regarding 
Sweden, private companies in Malaysia are increasingly being integrated into national and 
international academic networks and collaborate with many more players than in the past.  
Swedish university researchers were being motivated to be more socially-oriented and to 
seek more collaboration with industry.  In Malaysia, even though some scientists produce 
some useful research findings, a respondent said that ‘I think the market perspective is wide 
enough.  If the market is saturated, and everybody is doing it, and yours is not any better than 
anybody in the world, and therefore, Malaysian scientists lack suitable resources, they are 
probably are still playing catch up with those in other countries’.  Respondents reported that 
most of the prototypes might be good in laboratories and might look good.  However, 
without necessary improvements in design and availability, the research findings may not be 
useful or commercial, and therefore technology transfer will not happen’.   
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THE PROCESSES OF COMMERCIALIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
(CTT) 
 
In chapter 4, some sources of inputs to CTT in Malaysia were discussed.  They included 
Ministries, universities, industries, and financial institutions such as banks and venture 
capitalists.  The IRPA, as the main source of financial help for R and D in universities and 
GRIs, has been linked to their efforts in CTT.  Uddin (2006) argued that entrepreneurs were 
the main parties who transformed indigenous innovations into products.  In a study of rural 
industries in Bangladesh, it was found that innovation and diffusion should not be considered 
as different aspects of technical development process.  Rather they were interlinked, since the 
technologies are adapted, meaning modified, adjusted and improved in the processes of their 
diffusion.  However, company performance was highly associated with learning capabilities, 
levels of technology, and levels of knowledge, skills and experience (Oyeralan-Oyeyinka and 
Lal, 2006).  Many SMEs had difficulties in achieving successful commercialization, despite 
having significant investments in R and D.  Factors that affected this lay within the contexts 
of strategy, organizational culture and leadership style (O’regan, Ghobadian and Sims, 2006).  
According to those latter authors managers and professionals were agreed that, in general, 
investment in R and D, the numbers of new products introduced, needs to met technical 
changes in both processes and products, and the importance of prototype development, were 
the most important attributes of innovation in manufacturing SMEs (O’regan, Ghobadian and 
Gallear, 2006).   
 
Regarding CTT, evidence of the 11 company respondents claimed that there no CTT had 
taken place in or around their companies.  They were respondents 1, 2, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 
18, 21 and 22.  There was much evidence to suggest that most companies simply did not 
know about the possibilities of CTT from universities and GRIs.  Respondent 12 said that, 
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‘we never know about their inventions or … their knowledge.  Actually, we don’t know what 
happen in the universities’.  Respondent 2 argued that his company was a low profile one.  It 
had tried to collaborate with a GRI, but had failed.  The failure affected perceptions of the 
company so that people believed that it was not impressed with research findings from 
universities and GRIs.  Therefore some companies preferred their own projects and 
developments rather than taking up CTT from scientists.  Respondents 17 and 13 said that 
financial capabilities were their own problems with CTT.  Respondent 13 preferred re-
engineering products to using CTT from universities and GRIs.  The company worked with a 
university for its testing requirements under the government rules.  Thus they only used the 
university’s testing facilities.     
 
Therefore most of these manager and professional respondents felt that ideas from 
universities and GRIs lacked real potential for technical development through from research 
findings processes and products.  Respondent 1 said that the research findings were often not 
good and attractive enough and therefore discouraged companies.   Respondent 18 had 
discussed the possibilities of CTT with parties involved such as scientists, TTO officers and 
venture capitalists. He spoke of his frustration with his experience of the slow speed of CTT.  
Venture capitalists, in particular lacked confidence in CTT.  The slow speed of CTT did not 
stimulate interest in it in his company.   The data discussed so far suggest that there is a wide 
gap in understanding between the pursuit of knowledge by scientists and that of profit by 
companies and venture capitalists.  Respondent 6 felt that although research by scientists 
could be critical to manufacturing, CTT was not easy.  Most scientists were rarely often 
heard to disseminate knowledge to wider audiences or to inform companies directly about it 
as they did not have ‘the business skills and capabilities, and therefore they need to be 
trained’.   
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The respondents who were usefully involved with CTT were 4, 9, 14, 16, 19, 20 and 23.  
Two were from bio-medical companies that engaged university scientists as consultants.  
CTT in these companies meant using the scientists’ research findings and their downstream 
products. They spoke of working ‘hand in hand’ with them.  Apart from of understanding the 
processes of CTT better, companies found that more interactive relationships with scientists 
often led to the development of new techniques and technologies. Sometimes companies 
focused on quality and other problems posed in production and design or customer feedback.  
Respondent 19, from the ICT sector, argued that sometimes scientists did not have any 
knowledge of the specific need of industries, and that, therefore, companies studied them and 
got feedback from customers and which they discussed with scientists.  The CTT often 
emerged from flows of thinking between managers and scientists.   Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 
(2002) suggested that technology transfer for innovation emerged from complicated 
processes where ‘fundamental research need not play an initiating role, or at times, any 
roles’.  
  
On the related question of companies’ contacts with various parties about CTT, most 
companies seemed to have negative perceptions of those involved.  The parties concerned 
were the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI), the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), venture capitalists, universities, GRIs, and banks.  
Companies which had positive views MOSTI or MITI and vice- versa were recipients of 
grants and funds for CTT.   
 
The only politician in this study said that ‘research findings from universities and GRIs were 
often not likely to be taken up by companies’.  Government policies were merely ‘top-down 
management and arms’-length’ structures. Many research grants did not actually reach the 
companies that needed them.  Respondent 9 argued that ‘they give funds to people who do 
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not justify their requirement but, [instead give funding] based on politically- related criteria’.  
Respondent 2 added that funds and grants for CTT all tended to involve IT and other 
complicated technology.  He claimed that his company’s technology was very basic, and that 
it was foreign-controlled as well.  However, the company did contribute to technical 
development in the national context.  The respondent argued that the Malaysian government 
should offer broader financial help for CTT.  Respondent 3 argued that although his company 
had made many efforts to commercialise GRI research findings in mechanical engineering, 
the MITI, had ignored them and had taken more interest in IT companies for CTT.  This 
suggest that the government may not understand how mechanical engineering deepening, 
although one of the longest-established kinds of engineering, is often just as any other kind.   
 
MITI, on the other hand, was regarded as the main Ministry for helping companies with their 
trade promotions for international markets.  Most of the present respondents said that MITI 
was good at assisting and consulting companies in international markets, especially with their 
trade missions and exhibitions.  MOSTI had facilitated CTT with the Industrial Research and 
Development Grants Scheme (IGS), and in other similar ways.  However, about small 
companies, respondent 14 said that ‘A company has to top up a grant with matching funds 
and they cannot afford them.  The cost of development of research findings includes testing 
equipment and analytical equipment which can be very costly to a company’.   Respondent 
17 argued that, with some grants, companies had to have the financial capabilities to take up 
any grants given to them.  He said that a ‘company has to produce necessary invoices.  It 
means that they have to incur the financial cost and then get reimbursed by the grant 
provider.  So, a company with financial constraints would not be able to apply for any grant’.  
Respondent 17 also said that ‘to come out with the money first, and to claim it later, is not 
easy.  They always put a damper in our activities.  When we have to claim, the process is 
worst’.  So, he preferred to go to a bank for financial assistance with his CTT.   
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Venture capitalists (VCs) were seen as risk-averse in Malaysia.  Most respondents had 
negative perceptions of ways in which VCs assess companies for CTT and help them with it. 
Respondent 6 argued that Malaysian venture capitalists were very negative.  They did not 
work as they should.  In his experience, scientists and company managers and professionals 
all had negative thoughts about venture capitalists.  The companies claimed that VCs sought 
an 80 percent level of confidence for profit, but that it was about 50 percent in the USA.  
Respondent 19 said that ‘normally the whole process of CTT is taken over by them, and your 
company is controlled by them.  So this is something that we don’t like’.  Respondent 23 said 
that a VC was someone who had funds, and ‘he might have a deep knowledge of how to 
make money out of a project that is presented to him’.  However, he argued that in Malaysia, 
there rarely were successful venturing models that had both incentives and rewards for both 
VCs and companies.  These differences in perspective thus showed how wide some of the 
gaps between the various parties can be.    
 
Despite the apparent problem, some respondents argued that their companies had strong 
financial capabilities and did not need assistance from VCs and banks. Respondent 12 
claimed that his company had strong financial capabilities, as they were under foreign- 
control and that states were among their stakeholders.  However, respondent 9 argued that 
that VC functions should act more like banks.  They should have enough funds to support 
CTT.  Respondent 8’s company did not engage with banks, as it was small company and did 
not have any collateral to offer against loans for CTT.    
 
Banks were regarded as normal profit-seeking organizations.  Respondent 18 said that ‘I 
think the bank’s understanding of commercialization process is [that it is] very slow and they 
[feel that they] cannot wait afford to wait for five years for any product [to go] from 
scientists out to market’.  Banks were seen as normal financial service providers, as in other 
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countries.  It seemed that most companies’ contacts with banks were at a minimal level.  
Respondent 6 said that ‘Malaysian banks have a certain image. They do not practice 
“performance loan” as some other developed countries.   That facility could certainly help 
most companies.  So the companies have to accept the banks’ role and cannot argue much 
[about it]’.  Generally, the company respondents in this study claimed that most banks 
preferred any research findings to have yielded market share.  They were not really interested 
in new research findings, as they wanted to see the ‘track record of the product’.  However 
respondent 14 praised the role of the Malaysian Development Bank.  It had assisted his 
company to build plants and to develop its operations under CTT.  As the Bank was 
government-funded, these roles were normal for it.    
 
The company respondents gave mixed answers to questions 9 and 10 about their contacts 
with universities and GRIs for CTT.  These two questions were regarded as fundamental by 
them, and related to the research question 1, about why companies were reluctant to take up 
research findings from universities and GRIs.  The answers to questions 9 and 10 were 
related to the new model of CTT where, this was the point of contact and informed between 
the various parties at the first level loop.  Scientists were expected to support companies in 
their technical development when using their new scientific knowledge.  But most of 
company respondents felt that universities and GRIs did not have any significant 
contributions to offer to their technical development, of processes or of products.       
 
There was much evidence from this study that companies had minimal or no contacts with 
universities and GRIs.  Respondents 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 21 and 22 all 
made points along these lines.  However respondents 3, 6, 9, 14, 17, 18, 19 and 23 had good 
contacts with universities and GRIs.   We look first at the first group of these respondents.  
Obviously, most respondents have neutral perspectives on universities and GRIs.  Most have 
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had minimal contacts with universities as most of their companies provide and/or support 
industrial training for students and graduates at their plants or other premises. In Malaysia, 
industrial training is part and parcel of the qualifying requirements for universities graduates 
of many kinds and it is a form of almost unpaid labour for companies.  For most companies, 
the industrial training is the only service that most universities can offer.     
 
Respondent 12 said that his company did not have contacts with universities, as it was felt 
that university research findings did not meet its requirements.  The company relied on its 
own chemists or production engineers to improve its processes and products.  He said that 
most universities did not produce graduates with any detailed knowledge of what his 
company did.  Respondents 13 and 10 had contacts with universities, but only to use their 
testing facilities. Respondent 21 said that ‘We don’t really encounter with any real attractive 
research findings for us to look at’.  Respondent 1 claimed that his company did not have 
contacts with universities and GRIs because the technology in building houses were already 
available in national and international markets and it did  not need to spend anything for any 
research.  Furthermore, university scientists or their administrators had never approached it.  
The company also did not want to take any risk of taking research findings into the 
construction sector, or of acting as a testing bed for new scientific knowledge from 
universities or GRIs.  Respondent 14 said that any contacts with university and GRI people, 
especially their scientists were based on friendship connections only.  He could communicate 
well with scientists, or administrators because he knew them and they were among his 
friends, and any relevant research findings might be useful for CTT in such circumstance.   
Respondent 22 claimed that his company’s contacts with one GRI were ‘not on a formal 
basis and it did not have any memorandum of understanding to work with it’.  The 
company’s contact with the GRI was based on its common interest in technical development 
in mechanical engineering, but it remained informal.    This does not, of course, that the 
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contact was not useful to the company, and if informal contacts between companies and 
researchers are growing in Malaysia that is probably a good sign for the future.    
 
When contracts existed between companies and universities or GRIs they seem to have 
worked well.  Respondent 9 claimed that it was in his company’s interest to work with 
universities and GRIs.  This chemical engineering company had found that universities and 
GRIs had many research findings that were potentially practicable and commercially viable.  
Since his academic background was in marketing, he argued that he had the capabilities to 
develop and use strategic business and marketing plans for CTT.  Respondent 19 said that his 
company had close contacts and collaboration with one of the universities the northern part 
of West Malaysia.  The company premises were located at the university’s incubator plant.  
Company staff met scientists regularly to implement CTT.  Company managers felt that the 
location factor did speed up and help successful CTT.  He claimed that his company had the 
business skills and knowledge for CTT that scientists often lacked.  The company fully 
accepted that scientists can produce new knowledge and discoveries and it was the role of 
any interested company to pursue this with CTT.  Respondent 23, who managed a technology 
transfer consultancy, commented on the role of university scientists based on his various 
close contacts.  He said that ‘University scientists themselves are responsible and they have 
to drive it.  There is nothing else.  If a scientist is passionate about his project, he has to push 
people around’.  In short, respondent felt that scientists and university research administrators 
had to search the business community actively for financial resources as government funds 
for exploration and development of research findings were often non-existent or very limited.    
 
We have noted and discussed the perspectives of company managers and professionals on the 
contributions of new scientific knowledge to technical development in companies through 
CTT.  Past evidence and thinking about CTT had suggested that managers and professionals 
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perceived CTT to be quite a fragmented set of processes.  The present data show that 
company managers and professionals in Malaysia felt that universities and GRIs lack 
technology inputs to cater for industrial needs.  Better mechanisms for information flows 
between industry and universities and GRIs may need to be developed by all parties.  
Companies may have failed to make use of relevant discoveries, inventions and knowledge 
produced by universities and GRIs because they are often very dependent on imported 
technologies through licensing or joint-venture agreements, and concentrate mainly on low to 
medium value-added operations.  Companies also argued that the speed of negotiation of 
technology transfer between universities and GRIs and companies was too slow.  This was 
expensive in terms of companies’ money and time.   
 
Only a few companies seem to need make contacts with universities and GRIs or want to 
enhance their strategy and technical capabilities.  Therefore, CTT of research findings 
contributes only marginally to the development of the overall technical capability of 
Malaysian industry.  This creates a circle in which some national companies try to overcome 
the technology dependency syndrome by developing their capabilities to select, acquire, 
assimilate and adapt imported technologies and thereafter innovate themselves.  Although 
investment in any technical change is generally risky, long-term, and costly, the average 
returns on such investment can be substantial for companies, and even for the economy as a 
whole.  Managers and professionals and scientists can seem to have different values, interests 
and ways of controlling their activities, although, as Tagiuri (1965) suggested these are easily 
exaggerated.  Even so, they often did not seem to trust each other fully.   
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THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
The flow of scientific knowledge to at least some industrial sectors is clearly a problem for 
Malaysia’s government.  Changes of policies and roles of different institutions for supporting 
commercialization have had varied outcomes.  The formation of spin–off and start up 
companies, entrepreneurship in technology development, and technology licensing are all 
more likely to produce useful technical change because they are active processes that commit 
and involve top managers and professionals directly.  Yet as R and D expenditure apparently 
increases, the government is increasingly concerned about research results that are untapped 
by companies.  Company respondents were asked detailed questions about, for example, the 
effectiveness of specific efforts of the government to increase the flow of new scientific 
knowledge to industry.  The factors that support or retard processes of CTT and how they 
have changed over time have been described.  In the context of the new model of CTT 
proposed (Abu Talib, 2007), companies were often unaware of CTT processes  and when 
they were or became aware, of them, thought of them as costly in terms of development and 
new investment.  Respondents also argued that conflicts of interests were experienced during 
CTT.  For example, universities often had protective mechanisms that did not allowed 
scientists to get such rewards from successful CTT as cash royalties. In France, government –
employed scientific researchers have expressed anger at reductions in research funds. The 
government felt unable to support some laboratories.  Although it tried to strengthen the 
innovative capacities of firms, the researcher were very discontent (Vavakova, 2006). 
 
Despite the variety and subtlety of much of the data drawn from the company respondents, as 
discussed in Appendix 1 and this one, it is clear that a gap exists between the expectations of 
the Malaysian government about the commercial potential of scientific research conducted in 
Malaysia and those of companies, some of which are non-existent.   
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The nature of this gap suggests that some politicians, civil servants and academics, while 
wanting to help industry to become more innovative and profitable, lack experience and 
understanding of it.  At the same time, many of them want to be seen to be doing something, 
partly to maintain their own positions, or to strengthen them.  This may make them too active 
and too keen to impose ‘solutions’ from above.  So instead of simply ensuring that relevant 
knowledge and expertise are available to companies, along with competent sources of 
finance, they may create structures, institutions and procedures for stimulating, channelling, 
managing and controlling innovation, and starts to discourage, and even to stifle, it (Webb, 
1992).   
 
Therefore the freedom and ability of firms to invest and adapt new products or processes can 
be reduced.  Such tendencies would disappoint.  Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000) whose 
Triple Helix Model favoured the creative potential of institutions such as government, 
companies and universities in their bottom-up model.  Marques, Caraça and Diz (2006) 
supported the Triple Helix Model, arguing that it has been effective promoting regional 
innovation and entrepreneurship.  They argued that the creation and development of 
technology-based firms have helped CTT given the least governments’ role.  It has been 
argued, too that in most cases the most sensible path towards solutions to lack of innovation 
in industry is to ensure that the relevant professionals, managers, technicians, skilled 
operatives and so on, are innovative people who are able to use their own colleagues, 
relevant sources of finance and universities and scientific researchers, as and when necessary.  
Wheelon (2004) argued that a combination of technical information collection systems and 
scientific analysis contributed decisively to the solution of three important Cold War 
problems.  This was done through the collaboration of engineers and scientists with the 
intelligence community.   
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The Evidence 
 
Having given some attention to company respondents’ view on the flow of new scientific 
knowledge to industry and the processes of CTT, and on the various ways in which 
government might attempt to influence it, we now consider the respondents’ answers on their 
government’s role in such events.  Respondents 16, 18 and 21 did not answer the question:  
they focused or in details of CTT processes and on the work of their own companies.  
Respondents 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13 and 21 and were worried about the weaknesses of the 
efforts of the government to increase the flow of new scientific knowledge from universities 
and GRIs.  One would expect that, it appeared that some of the governments’ effort only 
benefited few sectors of industries.  Respondent 2, whose company made agriculture 
equipment argued that companies did not expect any new scientific knowledge from 
universities and GRIs.  Further researches in companies had been simplified and the role of 
marketing people had become more important.  He claimed that any product might often 
have ‘zero value, zero efficiency’ but marketing effect made them become saleable and 
become profited.  He suggested that instead of product research, market research have been 
helping a lot for any successful companies.  Some of the efforts were not relevant to the 
company, as some companies found that government tended to focus on more advanced 
technologies.   
 
Similar controversies have marked the efforts of the government, with most universities’ 
business centres being managed by scientists.  Respondent 5 argued that ‘Scientists are not 
good in managing business, especially when they are negotiating on their research findings. 
It is the government’s weakness that some scientists being given research funds to prolong 
their research.   Government often seemed unaware that some research is not relevant to 
companies.  It’s the government view that some “real research is being stifled” when some 
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scientists are not given opportunities and funds.  Respondent 5 said that some politicians did 
‘not have any real interest or knowledge in the technical development of industry.  They 
should encourage scientists to do research in areas that “tries to go beyond what other people 
use or have”’.  The main complaints of most companies centred around their efforts to get 
freedom of necessary new scientific knowledge or discoveries as there were information 
about it.  Respondent 6 had been shocked knowing that under Sixth Malaysia Plan, covering 
2001 to 2005, most industrially-relevant research findings had been left idle in the form of 
reports sent to MOSTI.  Yet the government had allocated more IRPA funds under the next 
Plan, the situation might be happened will be ‘nobody will read the report, and the research 
findings were ignored by the government itself’.   
 
Respondent 17 said that although the government had made some effort, ‘industry is rather 
reluctant to really pursue serious R and D… because they would like to see ready-made 
products, ready to be sold immediately, without them [needing] to do any more work on it’. 
Often scientists thought, wrongly, that their raw research findings are ready to be used and 
marketed by companies.   There were gaps in understanding and ability between companies 
and scientists.  Numerous obstacles to the development of research findings could be 
identified.  Most concerned funding, incentives, rewards, incubation, patenting, and 
licensing, and a fear that government did not appreciate the practical details of CTT.   
Respondent 17 felt that most start-ups that were meant commercialise new scientific findings 
were doomed from the outset. Respondent 3 argued that most universities and GRIs had 
many problems with their applied research.    Co-ordination between scientists and their 
administrators was poor, and both parties lacked power.  In universities and GRIs there was 
some complacency and lack of real commitment to contributing to technical innovation.  
There was a widespread lack of links between researchers in different groups and institutions. 
Respondent 3 said that ‘the research organizations need to get their house in order.  If they 
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cannot get their house in order, how can the government promote CTT?’  Most government 
research premises were equipped well and indeed they had excess facilities, which were often 
seen as left idling.   
 
Nevertheless, respondents were not generally against a role for government in trying to 
increase the flow of new scientific knowledge to industry.  They tended to regard it as a 
catalyst for technical development and as consisting of a more committed and systematic 
approach than Malaysia had used previously.  Respondents 1, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22 
and 23 spoke along these lines.  Most agreed that the government’s approaches had real 
potential but they often feared undesirable consequences.  Different respondents said that 
university research findings were not often applicable to companies, were not marketable, 
were technically not practical, not acceptable for up-scaling, and too academic in terms of 
their purposes.  However, respondents 1 and 11 both argued that ‘companies have the role of 
pursuing the development phase of research findings, as the government has given some 
funding’.  Respondents 1 and 8 felt that the government ought to take a new approach to 
CTT.  Respondent 8 argued that the ‘government should encourage more inventors to come 
to market, and graduates from overseas should be brought back to Malaysia’.    
 
Respondent 22 said that although the government’s role should be broader and directed at 
more companies, the government should also improve specific ways of managing research 
funds.   Respondent 19 argued that ‘earlier on, some research funding was focused on ICT, 
but the focus has now changed to biotechnology and agriculture.  Thus it affects the 
capability of the “ICT industry”’.  This was because at the national level companies would 
not support any research in ICT and relevant Malaysian markets are so small.  Other 
respondents argued that more recognition should be given to scientists.  Respondents 1 and 5 
felt that if more recognition and rewards were given to scientists, they would contribute 
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strongly to a new surge of CTT.  It was thought widely in Malaysia that scientists in the West 
produced good research findings as they ‘loved their jobs, were highly capable and dedicated 
to their research’ (respondent 23).  In Malaysia ‘differences in the strategic management of 
research funding … [were experienced] there were often inefficiencies in policy and 
bureaucracy’.  Respondent 18 argued that ‘the government was good at publicity, but 
actually getting companies involved is not easy.  What the government says they want to do 
is another part of story’.  He said that companies had different interests and resources from 
those of researchers and the government.  Their bottom line concerns were financial capital 
and time, and speed of achieving CTT in terms of the processes and management of it were 
sometimes ‘non-existent’.     
 
The general perceptions of flows of scientific knowledge and their effects on companies was 
that they were or at least could be beneficial to them.  However, most company respondents 
thought that there were seldom signs of positive incremental change in the technical 
development of companies.  Companies’ perceptions the roles of government in the attempts 
to increase the flow of scientific knowledge to industry included some very varied views.  
Some company respondents said that the role of government could be improved and that its 
approaches could be developed over time. Many respondents expected or wanted to see the 
freedom of companies to invest in and adopt new processes or products become an essential 
feature of the competitive manufacturing processes in Malaysia.  Arms’-length and ‘one size 
fits all’ approaches by the government were not likely to increase, or even to help start, flows 
of new scientific knowledge from universities and GRIs to industry.   Some companies were 
worried by proliferation of government controls and regulations, which could take up 
management time and effort.  Such control and regulations, could, some felt, divert 
managements from pursuit of more urgent and fundamental company goals and lead to more 
defensive actions on their part.   
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DISCUSSION  
 
In this section the research questions spelt out in Chapters I and Appendix 1 are restated 
briefly and readers are reminded of the main elements of the models of commercialization 
that were described in Chapter 3.  The contents of the three previous sections are then related 
to each research question and to each more relevant model of commercialization, to help try 
to explain what the latter tell us about the former.   
 
The apparent failure of Malaysian companies to use discoveries, ideas, inventions and 
knowledge produced by their country’s universities and GRIs, and the apparent failure of the 
latter two kinds of institution to persuade companies to use their findings are the foci of the 
two main research questions.  The questions suggest to, and remind, us that the respondents 
did not anticipate any impressive change of attitude, control and power for CTT to become 
more effective.  It was widely thought that technical change and CTT would be advantageous 
to them, but there was little widespread evidence of a move towards any significant 
acceleration in technical development from a mixture of research findings and efforts from 
the government.  Scientists were seen as the main factor in the development of intellectual 
property and in the encouragement and/or the establishment of companies to exploit research 
findings were seen as part of a natural process of university and GRI functions.  However, 
companies were discouraged and marginalised by the drawbacks of time compression for 
cost, product quality, licensed technology, patent policies, property rights of inventors, and 
their collaboration with universities and GRIs.  These activities need trust, support, and 
adaptation to increase the main philosophical of the models of commercialization of 
innovation between of the all parties involved.   
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The main elements in the various models of commercialization were engineering and 
scientific work.  Relevant advanced engineering that was stimulated by the discoveries, 
inventions and creativity of engineers and scientists became diffused towards the 
construction of new processes and products, with economic and technical feasibility in terms 
of design and development generally regarded as important.  The others were the universities 
and government laboratories and serious and constructive and feedback with administrators, 
and suppliers of finance from the government and the private sector, and managers and 
professionals in companies. Companies’ capabilities were often influenced by the degree of 
their mature and radical perspectives on technical change.    Their values were associated 
with types and sources of technical change.  Companies’ ‘failure’ to put profitable use 
discoveries, ideas, inventions and knowledge produced by their country’s universities and 
GRIs were often related to the significance and interest or lack of them, of the research 
findings.   Companies in the pharmaceuticals and biomedical science sectors often gained 
more benefits of technical change and from CTT compared to companies in other sectors.   
 
In Chapter 3, eight models of commercialization, and [in Chapter 4] a new one of the 
author’s (Abu Talib 2007), were described and discussed.  The University Model had four 
stages of CTT, including basic research, technology development, technology 
commercialization and marketing (Lee and Gaertner, 1994).  CTT started with the selection 
of scientific knowledge for the design and construction of processes or products.  The 
Integrative Model regarded the formation of new technology-based firms, where scientists 
discovered new knowledge and proofs of concept were taken up by new firms and venture 
capitalists, was more of a linear model of CTT, where knowledge, information and expertise 
inputs were very important (Hindle and Yencken, 2004).  Five stages of CTT constituted the 
Commercialization Map (Jolly, 1997).  The stages were imaging, incubating, demonstrating, 
promoting and sustaining.   The stages were linked by interest, technology transfer, market 
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transfer and diffusion.  It could be a ‘failure model’ due to a variety of technical, production 
and marketing problems.  The Quick Look Model only emphasised short term actions 
associated with the market receptiveness of processes and products.  Information on potential 
market was an important element in this model (Cornwell, 1998).    
The Five Generation Models was really a conceptualisation of five different types of model 
(Rothwell, 1992).  They were said to have started with the Science-Push Approach where 
CTT and innovation were linear processes.  Scientific discoveries passed through inventors, 
engineering and manufacturing and ended with marketing.  The market was the major 
element of source of ideas for R and D in the Demand-Pull Approach, the ‘Second 
Generation Model’.  The Coupling Model, the third one, combined the two previous 
generation models with a supply approach to innovation and it’s CTT.  The main elements in 
this model were ideas generation, research, design and development, prototype production, 
manufacturing, marketing and sales.  Technology capabilities and market needs were often 
supported.  The fourth and fifth generation models were the Integrated Model and the System 
Integration and Networking (SIN) ones.  The former had elements of integration within its 
sector, across sectors and could take the form of parallel development.  The important 
success factor with this model was ‘design to manufacture’.  The latter is seen as a successful 
tool for Japan’s innovations in the 1990s and later.  This model had full integration with 
parallel development, with the use of expert systems, where primary suppliers link with joint 
ventures, and collaborative research and marketing groups.   
 
The Triple Helix Model’s main element was companies (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000).  
Universities and scientists were subsidiary elements.  This model configured institutional 
forces from government, companies and universities. It depicted a generally bottom-up 
approach, emphasising the nurturing of companies.  The seventh model, the Industry and 
Technology Life Cycle one, has as its main elements the maturity of industries and the 
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progressiveness of technology (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000).  These factors contributed 
to decision making about the nature of commercialization.  The eighth model was the 
General Linear Flow Model where the main elements were universities, industries and 
technology transfer (UITT) (Siegel, Waldman, Atwater and Link (2004).  Scientists often 
began with new discoveries from their research. The role of universities was to make 
decisions on patenting and licensing to interested companies.   
 
Abu Talib’s Commercialization Loop Model, the new model proposed in conjunction with 
this study, prefers to stress the elements of loops and communication in and between 
governments, scientists, senior research administrators, technology transfer officers, 
managers and professionals from companies, banks and ventures capitalists.  The use of 
loops between the actors or parties involved was perceived as a bargaining arena needed for 
successful CTT.  Benefits of this model included greater understanding of business by 
universities and GRIs, greater financial capabilities, and better relationships and 
communications.  However, the elements of the model also act to control them.  Thus any 
defensive move by any of the actors involved can damage the process of CTT.  The activities 
of CTT must be devised, evaluated and created to forestall this.  Uncoordinated loops can 
have serious implications and effects such as loss of intellectual property, problems with 
licensing, and reduced independence and autonomy of one or more actors or parties.   
 
Generally, companies did not use new discoveries and other kinds of new knowledge from 
universities because it was assumed that most universities do research that are not relevant to 
their own approaches to CTT. Universities seem to be beginning to learn about their mistakes 
and to recognise the importance of developing policies and practices to protect themselves 
during CTT.  In this study, the companies tended to prefer a separate form or s structure or a 
not-for-profit organization to administer some or all aspects of CTT.  This might usefully be 
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a bank or a venture capitalist company.  Further, some university research findings had not 
resulted in companies gaining financially from them.   If universities and GRIs made more 
efforts to help companies to get more out of CTT by focusing more, with companies, on 
company financial objectivities, and adjust their own priorities accordingly, CTT could be 
more effective.   
 
From the first section of this Chapter, we can conclude that companies generally favour the 
Technik model.   Their managers and professionals tended to believe that the creativity and 
practicality of engineering were central to technical change.  They argued that scientists 
aimed to discover and test new knowledge as their major contribution.  Scientific knowledge 
was relevant and useful but usually either in very broad, general, background ways, or in 
very specialised and specific ones that tended to be unique.  Companies preferred that their 
engineers try to solve technical problems.  They did not normally expect to use scientists 
from universities or GRIs to do so.  They argued that their engineers mainly improved 
processes or products, rather than dealing with scientific theories of facts.  Engineers did 
sometimes use new and other knowledge to improve processes and products, of course.  
Universities and GRIs often failed to persuade companies to use their research findings, 
because the findings were presented in the form of scientific knowledge, and not in ways 
designed to show how the knowledge could be used.   
 
However, a minority of managers and professionals did prefer the STH model.    Most of 
them had worked or were working with scientists from universities and GRIs because their 
research was relevant to their companies.  These respondents argued that scientists could use 
the impetus from new knowledge to help invent, design and develop new processes or 
products.  Their companies had been working well with scientists as they had the same drive 
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and interest in technical development.  Some of them preferred working closely with 
scientists rather than with their administrators.   
A third group of respondents thought that scientific knowledge and engineering were both 
important in technical change.  They argued that both the practical knowledge of engineering 
and the ideas of science were of benefit to companies.  However, not all of their companies 
worked well with universities and GRIs as they preferred to do re-engineering in their 
production, either through collaborations or with more established partners.  Yet they did 
understand how some scientists understood, appreciated and could contribute to the work of 
engineers and vice-versa.   
 
On the process of CTT, some company respondents argued that their companies did not use 
any research findings from universities and GRIs.  They preferred to generate their own 
improvements.  They had their own financial capabilities and used them to re-engineer 
processes and products.  They used and regarded university and GRI laboratories simply as 
testing-hubs. Companies did not use their research findings because they were not good 
enough for or attractive enough to them.  Such respondents also argued that argued that 
venture capitalists did not seem serious in investing in new ventures, as they seemed to lack 
confidence both in managers and professionals in companies and in scientists themselves, 
and they had accused all parties as not having the capabilities to manage spin-offs or new 
ventures.  The company respondents also argued that universities and GRIs had failed to 
persuade them to their use research findings because CTT took too long.  Government 
research laboratories, in particulars had to obey the rules and regulations of bureaucracy.  
Companies found that there were gaps in terms of interests, support, trust and confidence.  
Scientists were said to have more interest in pursuing knowledge and companies were profit-
led.   
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Some of the more negative company respondents also felt that scientists and their 
administrators did not have the business knowledge and abilities to work them.  Yet more 
positive ones favoured the work of scientists and enjoyed working with them.  The 
companies concerned in such instances were located either in university or GRI incubator 
plants or a university business premises.  However, most companies did focus their technical 
development either through opportunities created by prior development or through buyers 
and feedback from them.  The complicated processes of CTT could, respondents claimed, 
become a hindrance to companies wanting to use research findings from universities and 
GRIs.  A respondent employed by a foreign-controlled company argued that the company did 
nevertheless contribute to the development of Malaysia by producing and generating sales.  
Some company respondents argued that the failure of its GRIs and their research 
administrators to get companies involved in CTT happened because they were focusing too 
much on biotechnology and ICT sectors.   
 
Regarding companies’ contacts with universities, GRIs, MITI, MOSTI, banks and venture 
capitalists, there was more evidence on the apparent failure of companies to use knowledge.   
Most companies did not have contacts with most of these in connection with CTT. However, 
they did have contacts with some of them on the basis of the requirements of government 
agencies. These relationships were quite formal basis and did not affect any initiatives of 
companies to do with technical change and CTT.  Some companies did receive R and D 
funds from the government, but some respondents argued that the recipients did not use the 
funding fully, that they abused it, or used political connection to get funds, and that there 
were elements of bribery on top of that.  More often, politicians’ decisions on innovation 
seemed to be evidence that research findings were ‘left on the shelves’ without further 
design, development or marketing.  The negative perspective towards the parties also 
included the process of applying for grants involving disbursement of money from the MITI 
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or the MOSTI.   Small companies with limited financial capital found that the process was a 
hindrance for them in their pursuit of and attempts to use research findings from universities 
and GRIs, as they had to design, develop and market them as profitable products or 
processes, while continuing to be profitable and while also trying to innovate and be 
diplomatic with those whose help they were seeking.   
 
The company respondents were generally quite critical about venture capitalists and banks.  
They regarded the former as risk-averse about investing new ventures designed to exploit 
research findings.  Knowledge about venture capitalists among companies was quite new to 
them, and successful models of venturing were rare in Malaysia.  Most banks and venture 
capitalists in Malaysia were not interested in research findings that companies have taken, or 
might take, into the product market.  Since universities and GRIs were unable to collaborate 
with banks or venture capitalists, companies were inhibited from getting into venturing.  
Banks and venture capitalists appeared to be much less active in supporting research-based 
development of companies than they are in some developed countries.  When Malaysian 
venture capitalists did take any interest in companies that wanted to commercialise research 
findings they were very emphatic about the need for business plans to be prepared.   
 
When universities and GRIs did not have significant and relevant research findings that 
interested companies, the relevant companies had minimal or no contacts with them.     They 
argued that their in-house engineers or scientists were capable of improving products or 
processes based on demand or prior customer contact.  The central point in this argument was 
that university research administrators and their technology transfer officers had no business 
skills and seldom learnt about them from companies.  New scientific knowledge from 
universities and GRIs was biased towards presentations in seminars and conferences, and in 
academic papers.  Yet the government complained about companies not using knowledge 
 221
from universities and GRIs, MITI or MOSTI and its agencies did not ensure that research 
findings were presented attractively or early.  Technology transfer offices and university and 
GRI administrators often took too long to negotiate with companies and to make decision 
about CTT.   There were increasingly negative perceptions of companies towards some 
scientists and university administrators about negotiations on the ownership of intellectual 
property.  Universities and technology transfer offices often showed little trust in transferring 
knowledge and ideas to companies.  Yet there were companies that were actively involved 
with scientific research and the uses of its findings.  They were often located near or in 
universities.  Companies located close to universities tend to be those that collaborated with 
them the most, commercially and in publishing joint academic papers (Mueller, 2006). 
 
A major conclusion of this study that companies failed to use discoveries, ideas and 
inventions produced by universities and GRIs, and that these institutions fail to persuade 
companies to use their findings mainly because of gaps in interaction between relevant 
companies, scientists, universities, GRIs, and Ministries.  The interview data suggest that the 
government wanted to control the freedom of scientists, its administrators in research offices, 
of technology transfer officers, other senior research or university administrators, and 
company managers and professionals.  The problem appears to start whenever the 
government wants to exploit research findings commercially.  The ability or inability of 
scientists and administrators to produce, identify and exploit commercially relevant 
knowledge depends partly on the state of existing research knowledge and also on the 
absorptive capacity of managers and professionals.  Generally companies did not expect 
much from university and GRI research findings, as they claimed that they had own 
technological capabilities, either through partners, research alliances with other firms, 
contracted out research, or by recruiting researchers and scientists for their firms.  However, 
some companies focused on improving existing processes and products and did not do 
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research, using their own engineers and technicians.  Obviously, companies do not want to 
take risks in adopting new processes or products.  They might as well focus on exploiting the 
profit possibilities of their given product programs, rather than in searching for new 
opportunities and realizing the potential of new discoveries, ideas, inventions and knowledge 
produced by universities and GRIs, which could divert them away from their main area of 
strength.   
 
The Malaysian government’s apparent failure to persuade companies to use research findings 
was based partly, according to some respondents, on the funding of most scientific research 
in universities and GRIs.  Companies were angered that some scientists were given 
responsibilities for managing university business units or their technology transfer offices.  
They argued that the government should understand that most scientists did not have 
business skills.  The government seemed to ignore the facts that these scientists and 
companies need further financial assistance because the practical use of some research 
findings might have been substantially delayed.  Companies were often reluctant to pursue 
research findings, because they ‘would like to see ready-made products’.  Not surprisingly, 
public research only very rarely results in ready-to-produce innovation (Arundel and Geuna, 
2004).   However Mueller (2006) has found that ‘firms are most likely to draw from 
university research if they follow specific innovation strategies’.  In very successful once-
developing countries in Far East, such as Japan in the 1960s and the Republic of Korea in the 
1980s, industrial firms, especially, large conglomerates, had stronger research capacities than 
their national universities.  However, universities in developing countries often devote their 
resources to undergraduate education that mostly use the knowledge imported from 
developed countries, or to applied research that can adopted easily by national industrial 
firms (Eun, Keun and Guisheng, 2006).   
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Further to this argument, the fact that most of respondents agreed that although the 
government had a great deal in the form of resources and funds, the problem arises, as one of 
the respondents said, ‘How cheap is that technology and how good is it?’  He meant that any 
research finding could have industrial potential but it is can be costly to small companies.  
Small companies usually have very limited financial resources.  For the purposes of 
managing the research funds, some respondents argued the responsibility of the people who 
were involved in managing the government funds and projects.  They clearly agreed that 
some IRPA projects failed and some succeeded.  It was difficult to facilitate them. One of the 
respondents said, ‘getting things done is another part of the story’.  The expected rate of 
return may exceed what the government wanted it to be, in time of 2, 3 or 10 years.  
However, they found that some universities’ scientists were preferred consultancy work 
rather than presenting research findings to be transferred to companies.  Companies, as 
business entities, often ‘look at the bottom line, at how much money they can get and 
everything’.  Therefore, to facilitate more, the government should produce a manual 
outlining its steps towards communications and publication for CTT.   
 
As noted above, the role of government varies in the eight models of commercialization.  
There were insignificant roles for the government in the University Model, the Integrated 
Model, the Quick Look Model and the Industry and Technology Life Cycle Model.  For 
example, the University Model emphasizes the influence of market forces.  As the stages of 
commercialization were linked and connected through feedback loops, scientists often get 
creative freedom and with the help of commercial and financial people.  The Integrated 
Model stresses the formation of new technology-based firms.  Even though the model is a 
rather linear one, external economic and regulatory factors were taken into consideration as 
the capacities and achievement of entrepreneurs.  The Quick Look Model was a simple one 
that emphasised the potential commercial uses of new processes or products.   
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On the other hand, the Commercialization Map, Rothwell’s Five Generations of Models of 
Innovation Model, the Triple Helix, the General Linear Flow of University-Industry-
Technology Transfer Model and The Commercialization Loop Models (Abu Talib, 2007) all 
have significant roles for government.  The most significant of them is the Triple Helix 
Model.  A triple helix of relations between university-industry-government transcends the 
earlier models of institutional relations, both the more liberal (laissez-faire) and the socialist 
ones (Marques, Caraça and Diz, 2006).  In the former, the economy and markets’ 
predominated, while in the second, interest was focused primarily on politics and the actions 
of government.  While in the Commercialization Map Model, the ultimate expectations came 
from government.  The Commercialization Loop Model has the same feature, where the 
intervention of government was one of the main influences.  In most countries scientific 
research is government-funded, and most governments have some interest in 
commercialization, so it would be surprising if models of commercialization did not include 
some role for government action.      
 
In the above discussion, two assumptions about creativity and resources have been relied 
upon.  On creativity, the respondents felt that the role of government was to provide controls 
and to act as a sort of ‘gate-keeper’.  The choices and independence of companies to use 
discoveries, ideas, inventions and knowledge produced by their countries’ universities and 
GRIs seemed to be weak.  The company respondents generally felt that universities and GRIs 
seemed to keep a distance from business people or to become entrepreneurial to take part in 
the functions of business. There was also a problem with the absorptive capacities of 
business people, and with the existence of intermediary institutions like politicians, 
ministries, media, banks and venture capitalists.  Although some respondents argued that 
some universities and GRIs do have the propensity to persuade companies to use their 
findings, but these institutions had problems of inadequate human and financial resources.   
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Technology transfer offices and the actions of senior research administrators in both 
universities and GRIs often failed because of inexperienced or having the wrong kinds of 
experience.   However, when we realise the likely problems faced by companies trying to use 
discoveries, inventions and knowledge produced by their country’s universities and GRIs, 
none of the relevant difficulties and failures seem surprising.  Innovation and other ways of 
improving competitiveness amongst companies are seen as economic multipliers in both 
industrial and developing countries.  The innovative capabilities of companies depend on 
their organizational and institutional arrangements, entrepreneurial behaviour, economic 
opportunities, organizational learning and technical capabilities, and all of these are complex 
and varied in themselves as well as being parts of very complicated and ever-changing 
systems.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has described and evaluated the data gathered from the interviews with the 
company respondents.  The data largely concerned the failure of Malaysian companies to use 
discoveries, inventions and knowledge produced by their country’s universities and GRIs, 
and the apparent failure of the latter two kinds of institution to persuade companies to use 
their findings.  It has been suggested that major assumptions about technical change and CTT 
form profound parts of the context of relevant processes.  Most respondents felt that 
engineering was more important than science in technical change.  They tended to favour the 
Technik model and to regard scientists’ research findings as being mainly irrelevant to their 
companies’ needs and demands.  Another important perspective was the processes of CTT.  
The respondents often suspected that CTT was favoured by the government as an idea that 
could be used to help it to control what companies did, especially as regards innovation and 
development.  The creativity and technological capabilities of companies largely depended, 
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however on their engineers who preferred to adapt technology to develop their processes and 
products, rather than to apply university and GRI research findings.   
 
The data suggested those important aspects of eight existing models of commercialization 
and one new one have genuine and varied and relevance to many different individual sectors.  
However, universities and GRIs with limited financial and human resources and poor 
business skills had weakened the propensity of companies to pursue CTT.  The relatively 
poor response from banks and venture capitalists to CTT has trapped companies in situations 
in which companies generally did not want to contact and work with them as sources of 
finances.  The role of government in developing CTT had not usually had significant effects.  
The respondents argued that many research findings only seemed suitable in laboratory 
environments and that developing them into commercial processes and products was often 
far too expensive in terms of time and money.   Of course, government should be able to help 
companies to enhance their absorptive capacities in their respective sectors. The data 
gathered from scientists, research administrators and other representatives of government and 
public interests are discussed in the next chapter.  The discussion and the evaluations of them 
are presented in an equivalent manner to that of this chapter.   
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
SCIENTISTS’ AND PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is concerned with the views of 17 practising scientists and 14 technology 
transfer officers and senior research administrators from universities and GRIs and also with 
those of three venture capitalists, two journalists and a politician.  Various details and 
interpretations of the interview data taken from these people are drawn together to explore 
the relations between them and the research questions.     
 
The most interesting facet of this chapter concerns the flaws in the system or the 
management of innovation by and with the Malaysian government.  The data from the 
scientists and the other university and GRI staff seem to suggest that government and the 
GRIs tend to be too controlling and demanding in their management of relevant research.  
Low rates of use in business, of discoveries and inventions made in universities and GRIs, 
are responsibility of politicians and government and university research administrators, as 
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well as of business people.  All of these parties tend to blame each other for low uptake, and 
each does appear to be partly responsible, at least to some degree.   
 
The first section summarises the ideas and literature from chapters 2, 3 and 4, with other 
recent literature related to the study.  It addresses the main arguments of the thesis.  Data on 
the assumptions about technical change, commercialization and technology transfer (CTT) 
from 37 respondents, number 24 to 60, are described in detail in this section.  Chapter 6 has 
described 23 company managers’ and professionals’ assumptions of these kinds.  In this 
chapter, the data considered are from 17 scientists (respondents 24 to 40), 8 technology 
transfer officers (respondents 41 to 48), and 6 senior research staff (respondents 49 to 54) 
from universities and GRIs respectively.  Three venture capitalists (respondents 55 to 57), 
two journalists (respondents 58 and 59) and a politician (respondent 60).  The relevant 
answers were questions 11, 1, 2, 3 and 6 for the scientists, questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 for the 
technology transfer staff; questions 4, 1, 2, 4, and 12 for the senior research staff; questions 
1, 3 and 4 for the venture capitalists; questions 5, 1, 2, and 3 for the journalists, and questions 
5, 2 and 3 for the politician.   
 
The next section discusses the respondents’ views about and experiences of processes of 
commercialization and technology transfer (CTT).  It draws on relevant literature and on 
their answers to the related interview schedule questions, which are numbers 4 to 10 for the 
scientists; questions 2 to 7 for the technology transfer staff; questions 3 to 12 for senior 
research administrators; question 2 for the venture capitalists and journalists; questions 2, 3, 
4 and 6 for the politician.  In this section, the eight models of commercialization and the new 
model will be discussed in relation to the data from the interviews.   
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The third section, apart from this Introduction, concerns the role of the government in trying 
to increase the flow of new scientific knowledge to industries, which are discussed in the 
fourth section.  The involvement of government in industry, previously discussed in Chapter 
4, has been increasing because much new scientific knowledge is potentially usable by 
companies.  However, the involvement of scientists in policy formulation and 
implementation can be problematic because scientists vary in their understanding and 
companies vary in their understanding of science.   This section uses the answers to question 
10 for the scientists; 3 and 4 for the technology transfer staff; 2, 6, 7, and 13 for the senior 
research staff, 2d and 2e for the venture capitalists; 1, 2 and 3 for the journalist; and 2f and 2 
g for the politician.  The fifth and the last main section before the brief summarizing 
Conclusion discuss how and why the respondents’ answer the research questions.  This 
discussion includes some understanding the practical relevance of the models of CTT that 
were presented and described in Chapter 3.   
 
 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT TECHNICAL CHANGE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
In chapter 2, the launching of the Industrial Master Plan (IMP) in 1986 was noted.   It 
reflected the Malaysian government’s concern at that time with the state of industrial 
development, and more importantly, the future role of manufacturing.  The latter was 
expected to become a major catalyst towards Malaysia becoming a fully industrial country.  
However, with both then and now, Malaysia’s domestic industries tend to lack sophisticated 
technical and commercial expertise.   Although Malaysian companies have experiences of 
technology transfer, continuing the development of indigenous technology remain an issue.  
Not only in Malaysia, and rightly or wrongly, this is often felt to be the one of the critical 
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issues in science and technology policy formulation and implementation, which relates to the 
depth of technical knowledge required in a country’s various manufacturing activities at any 
stage of industrialization.  Data from manufacturing firms in Argentina, suggested that in 
spite of low R and D expenditures in Argentina’s manufacturing industries, managers 
considered R and D activities as part of their routines (Chudnovsky, Lopez and Pupato, 
2006).  Generally, Malaysian public R and D expenditure is largely generated through 
government budgetary allocations.  Most of Malaysia’s R and D budget was spent on 
engineering sciences, information and communication technology and agricultural science 
(Stads, Tawang and Beintema, 2005).    
 
In chapter 3, we considered the idea of that manufacturing consists the application of science, 
or is part of science.  The argument that this is not the case was supported by the Byatt and 
Cohen approach (Jevons, 1976).  Jevons argued that there had been virtually no identifiable 
curiosity-oriented research inputs that led into industrial innovation.  There were only two 
genuine examples that satisfied the idea that curiosity-oriented research leads to major 
industrial innovation: nuclear power and silicon.  Jevons argued that, normally innovations 
proceeds continuously in firms and those inventions are made as technical problems arise 
that need solutions.  Mayr (1976) suggested that there were various dimensions of science 
and technology; as different bodies of knowledge, or different types of work, or according to 
motives of the people who do the work.  Therefore, engineering was shown not generally to 
be thought of as part of, nor as the ‘mere’ application of science.  This was discussed in 
Chapter 3.  The Technik model of technical change sometimes considered most useful for 
describing  situations in which engineering successes consists solely of, and are solely 
informed by improvements to products or processes.  However, education and perhaps 
research in science seems an important precondition for the economic advancement of less 
developed countries (Bernardes and Albuquerque, 2003).  These authors argued that the 
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presence of science and scientists helps to initiate and sustain positive interaction with 
technical development.  This seems arguments relevant to any country’s absorptive 
capability, whether the country be less developed or developed.   
 
Ali (1992) argued that developing countries like Malaysia offer little evidence to show that 
technology transfer regulations have been used nationally to screen processes for more 
‘appropriate technologies’, partly because technology transfer is evaluated by administrators 
lacking the necessary educational and industrial backgrounds.  Malaysia’s technological 
‘base’ has been relatively underdeveloped.  Therefore it needs to be less dependent on upon 
imported technologies, while ways and means ought to be found to improve the capabilities 
of domestic industries. The role of technology transfer offices in universities and GRIs 
appears to be important in such a context.  Lee and Win (2004) conducted a study of 
Singaporean research centres and industries, and argued that the ideal technology transfer 
mode seemed to be joint projects among research centres and companies in which relevant 
facilities and expertise complemented each other.  The research centres in Singapore helped 
domestic companies through licensing and contract research programs.  Reducing risk 
through such collaboration encouraged use of technology transfer as a motivational 
mechanism for industries and universities. Financial risk was the critical factor to be 
considered in technology transfer and it could be decreased by sharing R and D costs and 
facilities.   
 
Technical change 
 
In the interviews, scientists and others except technology transfer officers were asked about 
their perspectives on the roles of engineering and science in technical change.   Out of 29 
respondents, seven preferred Technik model, six preferred the STH one, 10 had sympathies 
 232
with elements of both, and six others did not answer the question.  The six respondents who 
did not answer the question were respondents 27, 33, 40, 53, 55 and 58. Respondents 27, 33 
and 40 were scientists.  Respondent 53 was a senior research administrator, 55 was a venture 
capitalist and 58 was the journalist.  The scientists from the universities and GRIs had at least 
masters’ degrees in their fields. Generally, the scientists from universities had PhD degrees.  
The scientists who preferred the Technik model were respondents 24, 25, 29 and 32.  Others 
were respondents 49, 51 and 54.  Respondent 24 was a university lecturer and a consultant to 
a company, and he argued that scientific knowledge in chemistry did help him to produce 
producing fertilizer-relevant research outputs that had helped agriculture in Malaysia.  But 
engineering knowledge was the basis for the production and improvement of fertilizers.  
Respondent 25, who had wide experience of the commercialization of research findings in 
telecommunications, argued that Malaysia ‘cannot focus on science’.   He said that Korea 
and Taiwan had emerged as newly industrial countries in the 1990s by focusing on 
engineering. He preferred to help companies to solve their engineering problems and he 
supported the Technik model.  Respondent 29 also supported the Technik model.  He found 
that many of his students did not have strong knowledge of sciences.  They excelled in their 
engineering classes.   However he believed that wide scientific knowledge was the 
foundation of good engineering and that its availability helped companies.  Respondent 32 
said that engineers worked on problem solving and that they needed basic scientific 
knowledge to do so.  However, most companies that were interested in quality products were 
not interested in university and GRI new scientific knowledge for its own sake.   
 
Respondents 49, 51 and 54 who were senior university and GRI research administrators also 
supported the Technik model.  Respondent 49 said that ‘physics is the father of knowledge, 
and chemistry is the mother of science.  Therefore engineers rely on scientific knowledge for 
the underlying principles to help them understand their work’.  He gave an example of 
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Korean engineers who had been involved in construction of the Penang Bridge.  They sought 
help from the University of Science Malaysia’s scientists in their attempt to get cement to set 
fast in water. Scientists did the necessary work ‘backward’ as relevant theories had been 
developed previously.  The engineers needed to build pillars to the bridge and they also 
needed support from scientists in this work.    Respondent 51 argued that the roles of 
engineering and science in technical change should be separated.  He said that ‘both have 
different functions, depending on the nature of the problem’.  Therefore, in his university, 
there were separate faculties for engineering and science.  Respondent 54 argued that 
engineering helped to ensure precision in any particular technical change.  Even though 
engineers might have done good research to help to create something new, they still needed 
scientists’ knowledge to enhance the quality of their work.  His institute had built a 
successful prototype machine for food mechanization.  However, the products did not gain 
any market advantages.   Companies did not seem have any interest in them, as the market 
was not big enough.     
 
Respondents 30, 31, 36, 50, 59 and 60 were the six who supported the STH model. 
Respondent 30 said that ‘scientists who are the ones who develop research findings or a 
small scale and then the scientists will pass the technical part to engineers for the engineering 
work.  Engineers will use the larger part of the research findings.  However, engineers can 
also help industry to solve their technical problems, and work together with scientists’.  
Respondent 31 argued the same, as she felt that research findings starts with science.  
Engineering was then applied to it.  Respondent 36 argued that engineering cannot exist 
without science and that engineering was a part of science.  His research work involved a lot 
of scientific knowledge and had a wider scope than engineering.  He said that ‘science covers 
all and engineering originates from science’.  Respondents 50 and 59, who did not have 
either science or engineering degree backgrounds, argued that engineering can be considered 
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as the application of science or that it is applied science.  Scientific knowledge was the basic 
knowledge for engineering work.    However, although respondent 60 was a scientist, he 
argued that ‘there are differences between science and engineering.  Engineering is more 
practical and science is more academic’.  Yet he went on to say: ‘Science is still basic to 
engineering’.     
 
The largest group of respondents discussed in this chapter tended to support the idea that 
both engineering and science had important roles in technical change.  They gave varied 
perceptions of this.  Respondents 31, 34 and 35 who were scientists, said that for their 
research findings to be relevant to industry, it needed to use both engineering and science.  
They had been involved in commercializing their research findings and found that without 
the help of engineers and engineering knowledge, their scientific discoveries could not be 
turned into products or processes.  For example, respondent 35 said that ‘when I want to 
scale up my process, I leave it to the engineers to design the whole thing.  I called relevant 
engineers to get involved in my project’.  Respondent 34 said that ‘engineers must work 
together with the science people, because people…lack knowledge about machinery and 
design, so they have to work [together] to get better products’.  Interestingly, respondent 38 
noted that the roles of engineering and science need to be interrelated for technical change to 
occur.  He gave an example of the use of his research findings with one of the national car 
production companies.  He said, ‘we started with science, analysing concepts by formulating 
the right method, analysing raw materials and so on, and then followed up by using 
engineering principles in developing actual processes’.  As a senior research administrator, 
respondent 55 noted that ‘I think science cannot stand alone, and engineering cannot stand 
alone.  They have to be combined to solve problems for technical change [to happen]’.   
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Commercialization and Technology Transfer (CTT) 
 
Debackere and Veugelers (2005) studied the context, structure and the processes that 
universities can use to become active in the scientific knowledge market, managing and 
applying academic science, technology and innovation.  They described about the advantages 
of decentralized organization and incentives that helped active involvement of scientists with 
commercialization with support from technology transfer offices (TTOs).  TTOs became 
mediating institutions for improving links between scientists and industry.  Lee and Win 
(2004), argued that ‘the higher the commitment in motivating industry to participate in 
technology transfer projects, the more successful the technology transfer practices become’. 
Reasons for why industrial collaboration with university research centres experienced 
problems were included lack of in-house R and D, companies shortening product life cycles, 
cutbacks in R and D budgets, and the changing nature of research priorities.   
 
In this study, there is evidence that all scientists, both from universities and GRIs, are likely 
to perceive that their research findings are industrially relevant, and that many expect that 
they will be used in the future.   However, scientists were nevertheless not always satisfied 
about the way of their research findings are commercialized and transferred to industry.  
Respondent 24 said that ‘it was very relevant, as we work directly with the farmers.  I got the 
research problem from the farmers’.  He also trusted the company that took up his research 
findings.  He claimed that the company had profited well from them.  Respondent 25 said 
that ‘our research was…problem- oriented.  We identified the problem first, and then we 
solved it.  Since this was an engineering problem, not a scientific one, we could do it fast.  
Therefore we set a target of less than four months’.  He also said that his findings would be 
used widely as the work was an application, one that could solve problems in 
telecommunication.     
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Respondent 28 said that, ‘this finding [is] very relevant to the industry in the sense that latex 
waste that they produce, they do not have to throw it away any more, as it can be converted 
into something useful’.  He admitted that his research has taken a long period to perfect.  He 
took eight years to come to the stage of commercialization.  Respondent 30 said that ‘my 
product is 100 percent relevant to industry.  Some scientists do fundamental research.  Mine 
was not fundamental research, although it was applied research.  I think applied research is 
more relevant to industry than fundamental research’.  Respondent 33 said that his research 
findings were always tailor-made towards industry’s needs.  Respondent 34 was very 
committed with her research findings in such a way, and said that ‘my product was relevant 
because at the moment all artificial dressings are imported.  So we started using starch, the 
indigenous material.  Then we were trying to convert cytosine derivatives that will be 
produced by local manufacturers into dressing.  I believe that our dressings will latter replace 
those imported ones’.   Respondent 35 said that his research findings in rubber vulcanisation 
were relevant to users, as they suitable to their requirements, and were user-friendly products, 
especially to the environment.  It took him five years to complete his research findings and 
start to commercialize and become involved with technology transfer.  Respondent 39 said 
that his research findings were relevant to traditional food processing, as no other machine 
was being used.  The machine had helped to improve traditional food-making.     
 
Most, about 13 or 14, of the scientists were not satisfied with the ways in which their 
research findings were being commercialised.  Respondent 26 said that his research findings 
did not attract any business people.  He said ‘there is no taker for the time being.  That’s why 
to make sure that the thing is not wasted, I sell it myself, and so people can still benefit from 
my invention’.  Respondent 25 was quite upset on some about some companies’ resistance 
towards university research findings.  He said, ‘they don’t care about how big scientists you 
are, they don’t care about your findings’.  He gave his opinion that ‘scientists in Malaysia 
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themselves have to go out and do necessary things in order to commercialise their products.  
That [is] the existing way, which nobody likes to do … because it interferes with other job 
functions. It is very hectic thing to do, but there is no better way out at this time.’  He 
suggested that university administrators need other people to do marketing, to identify 
potential industry partners, to make contact, and to do product demonstrations or 
presentations.  He then implied that university administrators should understand how to do 
business with industry people.  Respondent 27 spoke about her frustration of the way in 
which her research findings were being commercialised.  She was upset about from the poor 
responses from various government people especially policy makers.  She noted that some of 
them did not appreciate scientists’ work.  Although she had made every effort to present and 
demonstrate her research and to train people using her accounting software, it had not helped 
her.  Respondent 28 spoke about problems with giving his research findings a ‘price’.  He 
said ‘well, we can transfer the findings.  We can sell the findings but … we need to put the 
price on the findings.  That is the hardest part, you know’.   
 
Another point noted in this study was the weakness of university technology transfer offices 
(TTOs).  Respondent 29 spoke about scientists’ efforts to get research findings 
commercialised.  He said ‘It’s [because of] the effort of the lecturers.  They have to do the 
research, and then when they found something, the TTO in the University will take a certain 
portion of their profit.  On top of that, they will take from our personal income another 10% 
above ten thousand.  But they don’t really bother whether the lecturer can sell or not.  
Because although there were some programs being organized by them from time from time, 
but they have got limited resources, and they may get very good research findings  about 20 
to 30 in numbers, but they can not really market them all.  It’s just like trying to be Jack of all 
trades, and master of none.  I cannot blame them’.  
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There was a range of perspective from the 20 respondents who were not scientists.  The eight 
TTO officers often suggested that licensing was the best method for commercialization of 
research findings.  Respondent 41 said ‘Commercialization can be successful in more 
developed countries because universities are getting funding from industries for them to 
solve specific problems.  In Malaysia, 90 to 95 percent of the research funds for universities 
come from the government. Therefore there is another hurdle for universities.  They have to 
find a business entity that have confidence in their findings and commercialise them, which it 
is not an easy one to overcome’.   His university had failed once with a joint venture project, 
because the university took more time to find a reliable business partner than it had.  
Respondent 42 spoke about the function of TTOs.  He stressed that university scientists 
should focus on and continue their research.  There should be a mechanism established to 
commercialize research findings, to transfer them to business people.  It would benefit all the 
parties involved.  However, he noted that with commercialization, 90 percent of the work 
consisted of upscaling, prototyping, market survey work, assessing cost effectiveness, 
packaging and so on.  He commented on some scientists’ attitudes and beliefs regarding 
commercialization. He felt that scientists were very proud people and not very open to 
suggestions.  He felt that scientists should have open minds, a will to listen and more 
openness to and less contempt for comment and advice.  Some scientists put a high tag value 
on their research findings even though they still needed further improvements.  He also found 
that generally scientists refused to give out everything they know to business people, as they 
were very afraid to be cheated or ‘taken for ride by the business people’.   
 
Respondent 43 said that commercialization and technology transfer were two different 
things.  Technology transfer ‘is transporting the technology’.  It transfers knowledge and 
know-how to the third parties. University research findings and technology are transferred to 
business people through licensing, patenting or outright sale.   Technology transfer also 
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involved training.    Commercialisation was more focused on money matters.  He said that ‘If 
the findings do not generate profit there is no commercialisation … You can see or not?  
There are many research products that will not be able to be commercialised because they 
doesn’t have any value to industry.  However, university research findings do not create 
interest [in] industry.  Maybe one of the examples, is that the product is good and innovative 
but they are [industry is] not ready.  Or the product is good and innovative, but it is too 
costly’.  Respondent 44 made the same point.  CTT is ‘ideally translating the R and D results 
into a business model, and that model is has some market orientation or market relevance so 
that people will want to buy the idea, formula, products or services.  This is strictly dollar and 
cents’.  Respondent 46, who consists of two persons, argued that there was not any official 
approval proper to commercialized government activities in the government system.  They 
described commercialization and technology transfer differently.  Technology transfer was 
transferring research findings to business people, which they ‘use or apply’.  They considered 
that with commercialization ‘you [have] got to get [the] money that you invest’.   
 
Respondent 49, from the senior research administrators’ group of six respondents, argued 
that commercialization activities were important to his university, apart from the basic 
research and teaching that were its main function.  Respondent 50 described research 
findings are very significant as they reflect a university’s own achievements. Their 
production was in line with one of a university’s two core functions.  He spoke of the 
importance of research findings in terms of the budget allocated to his university by the 
government.  His university received a level among the highest funding for university R and 
D.  However, the respondent gave a different perception of CTT.  He said that 
‘Commercialization is a bonus.  This is because commercialization is not the main aim of R 
and D for a university lecturer’.   He argued that any scientist who reached the stage of 
commercializing his research findings successfully, could be treated having reached the full 
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cycle from idea conceptualization to product commercialization.  His university’s scientists 
had three main functions.  One was to teach, another is to do research and the third is 
professional extension either through training and in other ways.   He argued that the three 
functions support each other.  He said ‘To be a good teacher, he or she must be a good 
researcher, and they should go hand in hand’.    Respondent 53 and 54 came from different 
GRIs.  Since the main function of a GRI is to support public people as a social obligation, 
respondent 53 said that ‘Since the palm oil industries are paying us money, we must be able 
to turn all research findings into commercial use so that the industry gets benefits.  To get 
funding for research, every scientist in his office has to apply and pass its assessment.  
Respondent 60 noted that his office had only started to commercialize research findings in 
the past ten years.  His office had taken every measure to make sure that its scientists’ 
research findings had commercial value right from the beginning of the early stage of 
conducting research or even at the proposal level.   
 
Comparisons between points made in previous literature discussed in this study and the 
evidence have suggested that scientists claim that they have made contributions towards 
Malaysian economic development.  They spoke of their contribution towards patenting, 
consultancy, licensing, training, spin-off companies and other methods of commercializing 
their findings.   However, it can be seen from the study that even though scientists argued 
that they had research findings relevant for business people, they were not satisfied with the 
ways in which their findings were being (were not) commercialized.  About two thirds of the 
17 scientists interviewed preferred doing research that had helped solving industrial 
problems.  Lee and Win (2004) noted that research centres in Singapore mainly conducted 
applied research, not basic research, as their main objectives include helping local industry.  
This was in line with the claim of Charlton (2007), that although people often suggested that 
a scientist should have a specific personality, usually conscientious and self-critical, it was 
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not always necessary for this to be followed.  He argued that past scientists usually worked 
alone and depended on conscientiousness and self-criticism for the validity of their research.   
He also argued that generally scientists tended to be shy, introverted and highly-focused.  In 
this study, respondent 42 (a TTO officer) and respondent 6 (a company interviewee) claimed 
the same.  However, scientists should have three different stances towards their research 
(Drenth, 2001).  First, they emphasize the search for truth, which requires an attitude of 
openness and collaboration; second, they can provide evidence and information that can 
settle differences of opinion or reduce intellectual tensions, and third, they can offer 
independent and unbiased advice on policy matters that involve scientific information or 
requires a scientific foundation.  Commercialization efforts are made to facilitate the work of 
scientists with adequate links and openness and trust between the various parties.    
 
 
THE PROCESSES OF COMMERCIALIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
(CTT) 
 
Ali (1992: 110-111) argued that there was a problem of perceptions on all sides about the 
ability of each to create permanent links with the other.  The GRIs are perceived by industry 
to be lacking in market orientation.  The industrial sectors are perceived by GRIs to be in 
forging necessary links.  In Malaysia the tendency for larger companies to undertake their 
own research, while small companies are unlikely to do any research (Lee, 2004), is similar 
to that in more developed economies, but probably more pronounced.  Closer links between 
universities, GRIs and companies that encourage CTT would very probably be useful.  
Universities are regarded as major, insufficiently exploited, repositories of knowledge 
(Langford, Hall, Josty, Matos and Jacobson, 2006). There are major differences between 
industrial and academic incentives.  Industry seeks competitive advantage, which generally 
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accepted being derived from unique, valuable and difficult to imitate assets and capabilities 
(Barney, 1991).  Heterogeneity and appropriability are important with the goal of increasing 
shareholder value (Teece, 1997). On the other hand, academics seek peer recognition, and 
thus may lack interest in appropriability.  This claim is in line with at least some of the 
evidence from this study.  
 
Mostly scientists spoke about their involvement with CTT, their relationships other in 
organizing commercialization and various their further points about commercialization.  
Most of the involvement was based on individual effort.  Scientists with relevant research 
findings found that training was the best way of transferring knowledge to business people.  
All the training was done either by themselves as consultants or through their universities or 
departments.  Respondent 25 argued that some national companies were reluctant to use 
university or GRIs research findings that supported their production or processing lines.  
Therefore he claimed that he should be involved in the commercialization process.  
Respondent 28 argued that the government had funded research through the IRPA, and that it 
did not support companies with its development fund.  He said that ‘we don’t have time to go 
around and do the promotion.  So that’s the problem.  The government gave us the money to 
do the research.  We came out with a product and we need mechanism actually to transfer our 
findings to the private sector.  That kind of link is missing’.   
 
Respondent 29 felt that he had the responsibility to train the buyers of research finding, so as 
to help to disseminate the knowledge to them.  Respondent 30 felt that he had to get totally 
involved in CTT as to assist technology transfer officers.  He claimed that through 
exhibitions and competitions, he got chances to meet business people and to know their 
demands for technical development.  Respondent 33 said ‘Training is a continuous process, it 
is not just one off one’.  He felt that through training, seminars, discussions and workshops 
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he had helped companies to fabricate machines that business people needed.  His task was 
technical specification and to design.  Respondent 31 saw licensing as the best method for 
commercializing research findings.  She said ‘I think a more pragmatic approach is licensing.  
That’s why I said, if you have the IP, it is a ticket for you to negotiate on the licensing’.  She 
added that in developed countries ‘The private sector participates in research and then they 
get the first right of refusal to commercialize.  That’s more efficient, rather than through 
IRPA.  We have very broad-based research and you know you have to focus back and tailor 
to the market.  So that’s what we are trying to do now, we have to tailor back to the market’.  
Respondent 32 pointed out those senior managers of any company are important in making 
commercialization decisions. Eventually they made decisions on technical development that 
could be good for them to become more competitive compared with their competitors. So it 
[commercialization] is to help them and it is better for them’. 
The group respondents of eight technology transfer officers (TTO) mostly spoke about three 
main subjects.  They were first, about scientists’ attitudes towards CTT, second about TTOs’ 
role in transferring research findings to business people, and finally, how the processes of 
technology transfer and commercialization changed over time.   Markman, Gianiodis, Phan 
and Balkin (2005) evaluated university technology transfer in the USA as ‘innovation speed 
related to time’.  They claimed that accelerating the use of any research findings by business 
people is subjected to various problems, such as confusion due to knowledge spillover, 
competitors’ replication of processes, and operational and technical obsolescence.  Hence the 
TTO’s role has affected the universities’ aim to maximize the return to Intellectual Property 
(IP) through licensing, joint ventures or spin-off companies.  Locket and Wright (2005) 
stressed their view that TT officers should be equipped with business skills as one of the 
universities’ resources and capabilities for CTT.   
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Respondent 41 argued that scientists should be allowed to continue their research and not be 
made responsible for asking any company to take theirs up.  However, respondent 42 said 
that ‘Scientists should not only pursue their knowledge through publishing in scientific 
journals.  They should also have an interest in starting to commercialize their research 
findings’.  Respondent 43 argued that in the past, before 1995, scientists never made any 
activities of CTT known.  Therefore, scientists more often said ‘I like to do my research 
because it is my interest and my research domain’, since then they did not have direct 
contacts with business people or work experience in the commercial world.  However, 
although his university had made many research findings, few had been commercialized 
successfully and few had generated returns to his university.  Respondent 44 noted that some 
scientists had higher chances of helping business people if their research findings had 
novelty, and were demonstrable, and technically and economically viable.  However, he was 
upset that there were scientists who had negative attitudes, what he called ‘What Is In It For 
Me? (WIIIFM). He meant that some scientists were more focused on to the return of money 
from their research findings that been commercialized by business people.  Respondent 48 
argued that although the government preferred scientists to tailor their research findings to 
helping companies, scientists should be given the freedom to remain scientists and discover 
things.    
 
About their roles of transferring research findings to companies, respondents 44 and 46 spoke 
of details of the most important characteristics of successful CTT, the most and least 
effective aspects of relationship with companies, and the most and least satisfying aspects 
GRI’s interaction with companies.  However, the other TTO officers also managed to 
respond well to related questions.  Respondent 44 stressed that scientists at his institution did 
research that had helped companies and that they had gained experienced in CTT.  The main 
factor leading to lag in Malaysian CTT of research findings was market size. He argued that 
 245
although government had its five-year development planning, its implementation had 
suffered.  He commented that there had been series of meetings, discussions and committees 
on many issues, especially on education, but that their value had been questionable. The 
IRPA funds that did not support development funding were another issue.   He said that 
‘Companies won’t want to go and jump into the puddle just like that.  Therefore development 
funds that go beyond IRPA should be managed’.  He felt that scientists did not understand 
how businesses were run and how companies made complicated decision over the IP 
ownership and licensing.  Often, and often irrelevantly, some scientists wanted to get 
involved directly in the management of companies or to become CEOs.  He also quoted the 
problem of control by fund management of the IRPA.  Because of the inadequate funds from 
IRPA, he argued that the IRPA food and agriculture research area should be treated fairly 
although the research area was quite saturated.  Some scientists’ proposals for research were 
neglected or not given enough funds to be completes within a particular period of time.  The 
management also often said that ‘You cannot do this, you cannot do that, after that you have 
to follow the national code of sharing this and that, and share skill, expertise and so on’.  This 
statement then will hamper scientists’ enthusiasm to do research and to innovate.  Thus the 
situation had made scientists’ attitudes towards compete each other for funds and research 
areas, and for recognition that based on individual achievement, more strongly than they 
ideally should.  Scientists in Malaysia seldom wanted to share funds and interests, although 
the government wanted them to.  This problem made collaboration in research between 
universities and GRIs difficult.  The respondent argued that from his experience, several 
types commercialization were regarded as being at high and low satisfactory levels in his 
institution.  The types of commercialization of research findings were joint ventures, 
licensing, consultancy and client-specified problems. From these types of commercialization, 
joint ventures and consultancy bore the highest risks, while licensing and client-specified 
problems had the lowest risks.  In terms of success rates, consultancy and client-specified 
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projects had highest rates, and the other two had lower rates.  Client-specified projects had 
the highest rates among the four types of commercialization.   
 
Apart from the types of commercialization and their levels of risk, success and satisfaction 
with results, he spoke of companies’ attitudes, interest and enthusiasm.   He said that some 
companies were not serious about CTT and had no relevant knowledge at all.  These people 
he called ‘opportunists’.  They were business people who always wanted quick money.  He 
also gave an example of people who acted as ‘introducers’ or ‘brokers’ who took on other 
person’s advantages.  He felt that these people were not real professionals and therefore, that 
their involvement in commercialization of research findings was a problem.   
 
Respondent 45 also spoke about his problems with commercialization of research findings.  
He asked whether commercialization of research findings started from scientists or business 
people.  It could be from either.  He felt that, generally scientists’ findings did not have 
‘commercial interfaces’.  If they had the commercial interfaces, the processes of 
commercialization could be easily done.  He also spoke about companies that took up 
research findings.  Their main targets and purposes were always to get higher growth rates.  
As stated before, companies would always want profits from their businesses.      
 
Respondent 46, who, as noted before consisted of two interviewees, argued that at present, 
Malaysian SMEs did not understand the importance of research findings.  So often, such 
companies did not have funds for their R and D.  Therefore, some companies would request 
help from their institution, asking about any research findings that could help them to remain 
competitive.  However, they said that ‘Their scientists often did not seem to know what 
products do they have to produce, because they don’t understand the market.  So a gap 
existed’.  Therefore, the best thing they could do was to work together with companies in 
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order for the two sides to understand each other.  The institution had a program of gathering 
companies and venture capitalists either from the private or the public sector, to come 
together to discuss their interests in research findings and their commercialization.  Again, 
they spoke about the different cultures of business and government people.  With the 
pressure to have lower costs and higher profits, some companies impatient with the 
bureaucratic system of government.  The working system of the government was not 
integrated well with how companies worked.  The government wanted efficiency in 
management.  The government regarded ‘one way communication’ as normal and held its 
own strong views on companies wanting work done quickly.  Generally companies saw 
‘time’ as their main priority because if innovation was slow, profits tended to be less.   
Scientists tended to seek long-term and permanent answers to problems, but companies 
sought improvements that worked quickly and were profitable.  If CTT made a company 
slow to innovate, it could lose market share.  Therefore their roles as TTOs were to make 
firm decisions as soon as possible on whether research findings were commercially viable.  
They said that ‘our role in [the] TTO is to pick things up and match [ourselves] with business 
people, and the research still goes on’.   
 
How the processes of CTT change over time in universities and GRIs depends on 
government requirements for research and its findings.  For example, in one of the GRIs, the 
institution had changed its technique of finding a good research area.   Initially, choices were 
based on ‘market push’. It meant that, the researchers developed processes or products and 
then looked at their features.  If the features solved relevant problems, they pushed the 
processes or products or replaced others.  Previously, they were trying to make processes or 
products using a ‘market pull’ approach.     
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Generally, senior research administrators focused on four subject areas in their interviews 
responses.  First, they discussed their university’s/institute’s strategy for CTT.  Second, they 
discussed critical factors and weaknesses in commercialization.  Third, they considered their 
contacts with various parties involved in commercialization, such as the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation (MOSTI), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), venture capitalists, banks, universities and GRIs.  Finally, they explained how the 
processes of CTT changed over time.    
 
Respondent 49 spoke about his university’s strategy of appointing a consultancy company to 
draw their ‘Innovation System’ up for them.  The system meant that the university helped to 
find business partners for viable research findings of their scientists to be commercialized, 
chosen, first, through investing in pilot plants and production plants. The system also 
proposed research parks or incubator parks that eventually helped scientists to pursue their 
findings and improve them.  He also argued that some scientists might be interested in being 
entrepreneurs and in getting involved in commercialization of their own findings.  However, 
the present procedures did not give any help to or have any flexibility for scientists.  He said 
that ‘If a scientist is able to go outside to do his production and join a company, we should 
not ask him to resign.  At least if he has some fall-back station, when he doesn’t make it or 
even if he does make it, after the product has been fully developed, he sometimes wants to go 
back to the lab.  So we let him come back to the lab as a professor but the company 
flourishes’.  On their weaknesses, this respondent argued that from hundreds of research 
findings that his university had produced, there were none that had made significant 
contributions towards his university.  The Nokia mobile telephone from Sweden had been 
good bench mark of innovation.  He then suggested a reward system for scientists that might 
motivate them to stay in universities and continue to contribute to their work.  On their 
relationship with various parties, respondent 49 argued that generally the relationship was as 
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well maintained as it was supposed to be.  However, his role was more about getting funds 
for research at his university.   He had made close contacts with business people to gain 
funds for research collaboration.   Respondents in this group often argued that they had 
minimal relationships with venture capitalists.  Companies were responsible for getting 
involved with venture capitalists.  Generally, MOSTI and MITI supported universities and 
GRIs with research and CTT funds, respectively.   
 
Respondent 51 spoke about his university’s main strengths and weaknesses regarding the 
commercialization of its research findings.  Some scientists did not have much awareness of 
market needs.  He said that ‘Scientists conduct research in the university.  Their main aim is 
not to come out with a product.  Our main aim is to extend knowledge’.   He argued that 
MOSTI had recently stated in Eighth Malaysia Plan (for 2001 to 2005) that 
‘commercialization is the end thing’.  Therefore scientists could not stop their research in the 
middle of a planning period, but this new statement had attracted scientists to CTT through 
collaboration.  Respondent 54 spoke about how his institution’s strategy for CTT was 
restructuring his organization since 2000.  With its new structure, the institute had a special 
task unit for R and D and CTT.  The new unit’s aim was designed to have links with business 
people for CTT.  It also has units that support CTT, the TT and Promotion and Development 
Centre.  The others are the Centre for Economy and Technology Management and the 
Technical Services Centre.  However, only about 30 percent of his institute’s scientists are 
engaged in CTT activities at any time.  This figure had changed from previously only a few 
percent doing CTT.  A study of British industry-university collaboration (Laursen and Salter, 
2004) found that there was an over-estimation of universities as direct source of innovation.  
They claimed that the interaction between universities and industrial firms remained largely 
subtle and complex (p. 212).   
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The three venture capitalist respondents spoke about the abilities of various parties involved 
in commercialization and their relationships with them.  Respondent 55 argued that venture 
capitalists did not run any businesses, and that they depended on business people to do that.  
However, venture capitalists did not invest in research findings to be commercialized unless 
they were identified and taken up by business people.  Respondent 56 discussed the gaps 
between scientists and business people.  Generally universities in Malaysia had their own 
TTOs.  But their functions were harder to perform because they were headed by academics.  
Although the scientists’ ideas or concepts were good and special, they often took too long to 
commercialise, and venture capitalists often had to pull out as they became short of funds.   
He said that ‘some scientists may take 10 years and thus the venturing options [were] not 
good’.  Respondent 57 spoke about his experience of helping companies to fund 
commercialization.  He said that ‘some research is being done by lecturers and students, and 
so you can see that there is a lack of an entrepreneurial environment’.  He argued that 
university scientists’ research findings often only offered an improvement to or an 
enhancement of processes or products.  However, companies looked at the competitive 
advantage of any new processes or products.  He also spoke of the issue of the time taken for 
research findings to be commercialized.  Some universities’ administrations took more time 
to make decisions about doing so.  New software products could be outdated after six 
months.  Although research findings might have potential benefits, there could no be demand 
from users, or companies might not have a ‘track record’.  Business people often did not 
want to take any risk of losing capital on pilot plants that might need excessive investment.  
Most venture capitalists had minimal contacts and relationships with MOSTI and MITI as 
regards CTT of university and GRI research findings.   
 
Both of the journalist respondents spoke about there being different interests with regards to 
processes of CTT.  Respondent 58 argued that although Malaysia had many competent 
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scientists in agriculture, often they tended to have little knowledge about commercialization 
of their findings.  The low uptake by business people was because some of the findings were 
not very likely help them improve their businesses.  Since agriculture is a big sector, he 
suggested that scientists should do research to help increase food production. He also argued 
that some scientists had negative attitudes towards business people who might be interested 
in their findings, and might say to them, ‘Who are you to ask?’  He suggested the formation 
of a clearing house for research findings to act as coordinator and support for research and its 
commercialization.  As many companies seemed unable or unwilling to put new scientific 
knowledge to use, he suggested that the problem was that there was no comparability of 
research.  Companies had different interests and the government had others.  He said: ‘the 
industry is going one way, the government is going another way’.  Some politicians made 
reckless statements about a revolutionised agricultural sector.  He also argued that the 
education policy had a bad effect on the main purposes of education.  Education can stifle 
originality, and he suggested a revamping of educational policies.  He claimed that the best 
idea was to produce holistic students who excelled in academic work and who were also 
creative. He then discussed the American management ideas that he thought best to adapt to.  
However respondent 59 thought otherwise.  He argued that Malaysia had been influenced by 
American management rather than the Far East management.  The Americans often 
emphasised such concepts as the ‘short term’ and ‘quarterly horizons’ and the idea of the 
‘technopreneur’.  He argued that the word technopreneur did not exist as it is had two 
different and rather opposed meanings, for ‘technology’ and ‘entrepreneur’.   
 
The only politician in this study spoke mostly about his Ministry’s role in facilitating the 
process of CTT.  MOSTI had put a different emphasis on commercialization of scientific 
knowledge in two different Malaysian Plans.  He suggested that Seventh Malaysia Plan’s 
motives for R and D were about ‘capacity building’.  Later, at the end of the Eighth Malaysia 
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Plan and at the beginning of the Ninth Plan, commercialization had become the main focus of 
R and D in universities and GRIs.  He argued that both scientists and its administrators had 
less experience in business than they ought to have and said that ‘they did not have the [a] 
remote view of how to market the products … by university researchers and know how to file 
patents’.  He said that ‘University administrators must follow what the government wanted 
and was hoping for.  This also goes for GRIs’.  The respondent spoke about the idea of 
producing more and more ‘relevant’ graduates and other qualified people for industry and 
made the argument of basic education plus hard heads and crafty hands, producing industrial 
success.  He noted how the Malaysian education system had followed the British system for 
many years.  However, when compared to the German and French systems, they had 
Fachhochschule and Grandes Ecoles respectively, and these systems apparently emphasised 
competencies and skills.  However, the Malaysian education system has changed when more 
vocational and technical schools were given priority to give hands’-on skills for technical 
change.  
 
Based on the evidence above, the various parties tended to believe that the low uptake of 
research findings was to blame purely on the system or on the management of it, but most of 
them did not have very wide-ranging or long-term historical perspectives.   The views of 
scientists and its administrators have been described and discussed. Generally scientists 
claimed that the process of CTT was new to them.  Individual scientists tried to pursue CTT 
and their efforts were partly in their own interests and/or for patronage from their university’s 
or GRI TTOs or senior administrators.  They revealed that some policies were against their 
aspirations for commercialization, especially towards their incentives and rewards.  Only by 
looking to their companies’ intentions and objectives, scientists should strive to achieve, and 
by then they should be guided in setting priorities between research and development.  
Companies’ profit motives had to be understood by the others in this study.  In this sense, 
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technical change and CTT are best promoted in a system where all the parties involved trust 
each other.   Large companies were often first to adapt new inventions compared to small 
companies, as the former have substantial resources while the latter have much more limited 
ones.  The uptake of research findings of universities and GRIs should show the ability of 
both big and small companies to adapt.  TTOs and senior research administrators have shown 
that in this study that they have limited abilities.  Clearly the ability to cope with government 
regulations tends to deter the process of CTT.  Government regulations on budgeting 
processes and spending sometimes take much time that could be spent more usefully on 
technical development work.  There were a number of aspects to this: first, the mere 
existence of regulations is especially burdensome to scientists who are looking for research 
funds; second, the cost of compliance to can be prohibitively high to them; third, scientists 
and the administrators might not possess the technical or legal expertise to cope with legally 
and technically complex compliance problems in CTT.  Lockett and Wright (2005) suggested 
that university and other senior administrators needed to devote attention to the training and 
recruitment of officers with broad bases of business skills.  Markman, Gianiodis, Phan, and 
Balkin (2005) found that the ‘faster’ TTOs can commercialise research findings that are 
protected by patents, the greater the returns to the university and the higher the rate of start-
up formation.  These authors reported that there were three key influences on speed:  TTO 
resources, competency in identifying licensing processes, and participation of faculty 
inventors in the licensing process.  On the roles of venture capitalists in the process of CTT, 
they prefer to invest after the seed stage (Wright, Locket, Clarysse and Binks, 2006).   
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THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
A critical aspiration that governments of developing countries such as Malaysia should 
satisfy in managing technology development is fostering technology efforts that lead to the 
most efficient use of the available domestic resources (Ali, 1992).  The role of government in 
promoting and guiding the flow of scientific knowledge from universities and GRIs to 
industry is significant and was discussed in Chapter 6.  The government has created funds to 
foster the enabling research findings to be used to help create new processes and products.  
Wright, Locket, Clarysse and Binks (2006) studied the role of several governments, 
including Malaysia’s, in supporting CTT and found that TTOs have major problems in 
developing prototypes, conducting initial market research and developing business plans, 
because of shortages of proof of concept funding.  A lack of adequate staff is also indicated 
with respect to their availability to identify, assess and exploit intellectual property.  
Incentives and rewards for such staff also appear to pose problems.   
 
The Evidence 
 
The data suggest that most scientists were not satisfied with the process of CTT and its 
incentives and rewards.  Respondent 27 argued that the government should give more help to 
scientists who trying hard to get their research findings commercialised.  There should be one 
government coordinating agency to be a link between scientists, business people and 
government.  Various existing committees intended to act as links between them did not 
actually help.  She said that ‘if the research findings can be used by the government agencies, 
we do make sure that government agencies buy from them’.  Business people and venture 
capitalists should then come into action, after any improved development of those research 
findings.  However, she felt that her suggestions would most probably be difficult to 
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implement.  She said that sometimes the government gave the reason of there being a lack of 
enough finance to help scientists and business people.   
 
Respondent 28 reported on the attitudes of TTO officers, when he referred to his interest in 
CTT.  He said ‘because I thought I just gave them my idea, this is my product then they find 
the suitable partner for me.  No reply.  I mean they are there.  I’m not sure how many 
lecturers, how many university researchers actually benefited from the exercise. I don’t 
know.  They still want to see the business plan, the research feature or customers and all 
those things.  It is really ridiculous you know.  As a scientist you don’t have time actually to 
do the market survey.  I only can give my input from my knowledge or my experience in the 
laboratory.  This is my product and this is what my product can do.  So they should be the 
ones that try to match me with someone else’.  Respondent 29 argued that university research 
administrators did not have suitable knowledge about CTT and their functions. University 
administrators did help scientists to participate in conferences, but ‘after the exhibition, 
nothing happens and [there is] no help’.  Therefore, he suggested that if ‘any scientists go for 
promotion, they should published papers more.  Research findings did not contribute 
anything: they want to see how many papers you have written’.  Respondent 31 
recommended that ‘scientists should be allowed to be directors, but not managing directors 
until they ask the university for leave, temporarily leave of absence’. It would appear that 
scientists are helping companies to improve research findings and to develop them.  
Respondent 34 said that ‘scientists are just like water.  They can be coloured’.  She also said 
‘but we guide them.  If we want them to do things, we then assist them.  If not they will go 
wild’.  Therefore, without a proper guide in terms of the flow and process of commercially 
driven research, it could not succeed.      
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Respondent 40 said that the problem of the government in supporting CTT was that CTT was 
hindered by the non-understanding of many business people.  They regarded research 
findings as able to be commercialized and taken up without them paying any costs.  She 
argued that sometimes her Institute had to charge money to small companies.  Therefore, 
companies thought it better to buy from overseas, because they felt more confident doing so, 
and they did not believe in Malaysian technology.   She pointed out that ‘when [the] 
government wanted us to sort out and fund our own research, it’s difficult you know, because 
we cannot depend solely on commercialization.  We still need the government funding to 
some extent, like the IRPA’.   
 
From the TTO group, respondent 43 spoke about a significant share of IRPA funds and 
government infrastructure being ready for CTT.  He cited the case of Japan.  In Japan, 
research findings took about eight to thirteen years to be developed.  It then took about the 
same number of years to enter their market in the form of developed products.  Therefore, the 
Malaysian government should realise that ‘if you have got something today, don’t expect that 
tomorrow or within a year it will be in the market. It will not happen’.  Therefore, any 
research findings obtained during the period of the present Malaysian plan, will only be 
developed the product or processes in the period of the next Malaysian plan. He argued that 
his office should not be responsible for any incubating and nurturing product development, 
which is meant for business people.  His and other TTO offices should be supported with 
financial assistance to provide infrastructure for incubations and nurturing.  However, he 
found that some business people misused CTT funds from government.  Indeed, respondent 
46 argued that the government should contribute to the ‘push-type market research’.  They 
claimed that some companies needed to be ‘pushed’ to use relevant research findings from 
GRIs.  By having a government regulatory framework, it will create demand from business 
people.  They argued that being a government department, it has a different culture and can 
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act as a different source of pressure.  Many companies regarded time as their main constraint 
and some government departments ignored or forgot this.  Normal government rules and 
regulations wore down the motivation of business people.  However the respondent agreed 
that government regulations did help to increase efficiency, but not to increase profit.  He 
emphasised his view that the government was trying to be fair to all of the parties. But the 
barriers between government, scientists and industries were not being reduced.     
 
Respondent 49 argued that both MOSTI and the Ministry of Education (MOE) had good 
communication with his university regarding its scientists and their research.  Their contacts 
were mainly about research policy and management.  His university also obtained research 
funds from other Ministries with the help of MOSTI.  Therefore, his Office had helped 
scientists to get more research funding from the government.  However, respondent 51 said 
that ‘his university felt that commercialization is a new interest even in the case of MOSTI.  
MOSTI’s previous interest was to encourage R and D.  So our link with them is more about 
monitoring, ensuring that research gets its funding and that it gets implemented as per 
proposal’.  Therefore, his university had regular meetings with MOSTI about funds for R and 
D.  This respondent stressed his view that some companies preferred to engage scientists as 
consultants, rather than taking research findings and commercializing them.  The government 
had facilitated CTT with matching funds but some companies preferred the freedom of 
getting research findings ready or nearly ready to be used. He said ‘they engaged the 
researchers as consultants. That’s all.  Some researchers are happy with that. This is because 
as I said [the] university’s job is not to make money.  But the university’s job is to 
disseminate knowledge.  Some universities stress [this] at the early stage, sometimes maybe 
you want to allow some freedom for the researchers’.  He gave praise to the government 
initiatives of the IRPA.  Through the IRPA, his institutes got extra funds and collaborated 
with universities.  He argued that CTT initiatives were new to SMEs in Malaysia.  He said, 
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‘their modus operandi is maybe a little bit too early for [the] majority of our SMEs’.  He 
suggested that the government should give direct support in terms of soft loans or direct 
subsidies.   
 
Venture capitalists (VC) gave different perspectives on the role of the government.   
Respondent 55 argued that his company did not have much contact with the Ministry 
involved in CTT, as they only focused on the ‘findings due not only from national companies 
but also other countries, like India, Singapore and Thailand’.  Respondent 56 held similar 
views.  He argued that his company did not work with government departments or 
government servants.  They worked well with companies.  Although his companies were 
involved in CTT, he found that it was a high risk thing.  One of companies that he been 
investing in failed in an attempt at commercialization.  The failure happened because 
companies that he been investing were still on a scale.  Since the findings took longer to be 
developed, his company stopped the investment, although they thought that the product 
might be excellent and extraordinary.  He also argued that most research findings remained 
on shelves as the government was not benefiting obviously from innovations and inventions 
from universities and GRIs.  He suggested that the government should give more incentives 
to scientists and change its policy on the investments of venture capitalists.  The government 
should support industry as a whole.   
 
Only respondent 58, one of the journalist respondents, offered his particular argument about 
the role of the government.  He suggested that the government should play an active role and 
take more initiative for example, by setting up research universities and commercialization 
centres.  His suggestion came about as there seemed to be no proper links between the 
demands of the industry and the supply of scientific knowledge from universities and GRIs.  
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As a politician, and member of the government, respondent 60 argued that the government 
had made many changes to its policies for CTT.   
 
Clearly, most of the respondents frequently cited in this chapter argued that government, 
university and GRIs bureaucracy and inflexibility were barriers to the use of scientific 
knowledge in industry.   They believed that although the government was trying to fund 
industrially relevant research and to help companies to use it, there was evidence of inability 
on the government’s part to support the practical development of research findings, and of 
inability on the part of their staff to help university and other researchers and companies to 
deliver the process efficiently.  The respondents felt that there were some particularly rigid 
procedures in universities, GRIs and various government ministries and other agencies that 
very clearly did not fit some specific, and often important, situation.   
 
DISCUSSION  
 
The evidence in this chapter is well linked with that discussed in Chapter 6.  So far, in this 
Chapter and in the previous one, there is a considerable mix of more or less objectives, 
perspectives on technical change, CTT and its processes and the role of government in trying 
to increase the flow of new scientific knowledge to industry. We found that most of the 
respondents’ various kinds of interests, values, understandings, and skills influenced the 
apparent failure of Malaysian companies to use such knowledge, and the apparent failure of 
the latter two kinds of institution to persuade companies to use their findings.   
 
More specifically scientists wishing to pursue their research findings with companies found 
that they needed to be mindful of various organizational and managerial factors.  Most 
scientists argued that their research findings were relevant to their intended industries.   They 
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clearly wished to foster CTT and thus to help industry.  We also found that some other 
scientists would prefer to help companies to contribute to their technical development.  This 
study has also shown that most scientists’ had various, and varying, understandings of the 
role of engineering and of science in technical change.  This was because most of the 
scientist respondents applied research, conducted feasibility studies or undertook prototype 
development.  The Scientists who preferred Technik model of technical change tended to 
work in environments that helped companies with feasibility studies and prototype 
development.  The scientists who mainly did applied research argued that it started from 
scientific knowledge and they generally believed the STH model.   However, in Chapter 6 we 
found that the understandings of business people of the roles of engineering and science in 
technical change to be almost the same.  Most of the respondents from companies had quite 
liberal and flexible views about the nature and the processes of technical change.     
Beyond this, changes in the environment of technical change and how people respond to it 
depend on the ‘rules’ of the market place.  Both scientists and business people argued that the 
government should play a role in influencing relevant aspects of markets.  Scientists, 
especially, wanted the government to create regulations and procedures that might help 
scientists to participate more effectively in CTT.  For example, respondent 27 (a scientist) 
argued that the government does not have the political will to ensure that its scientists get 
proper incentives and assistance with research and CTT.  The delaying of decision making by 
the government, by both its administrators and politicians weakened the motivation of many 
scientists. Stiglitz (2006, 122-123) argued that, in spite of the rhetoric about intellectual 
property providing incentives, the incentives have not been translated into action.  
Respondent 31 claimed in line with Stiglitz, that she had involved in research and CTT for 10 
years and she realized that the lack of sufficient incentives had hampered most scientists.   
Generally scientists and business people who were involved in CTT wanted heavy 
involvement of the government to create demand, particularly in the market segments where 
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major customers belonged.  The government was not, apparently, capable of rational and 
even-handed decision making.   
 
There were also various uncertainties in government policies and procedures that affected 
scientists, university and GRI administrators that hampered the flow of scientific knowledge.  
In Chapter 6 we saw that most business respondents also blamed the system of government 
management and its bureaucracy that sometimes slowed CTT.  They also found that there 
was a lack of coordination between scientists, its administrators and business people that 
might have been designed to harmonise and bring together their motives for CTT.  Both 
administrators and scientists respondents indicated that they should be given incentives and 
rewards.  Most scientists and administrators argued that that although the IRPA was meant to 
help nurture R and D in universities and GRIs, the intentions of commercialization was only 
been realized to any degree in 2002 (during the mid-term review of the start of the Eighth 
Malaysia Plan).  Therefore, CTT had not been given strong support from the various parties.  
Most scientists and research administrators claimed that ‘having’ to pursue CTT was a sort of 
‘bonus’.  However, they were not only worried about companies’ systems for managing R 
and D, but also with responses of business people who largely had limited technical and 
financial capabilities.   
 
Most of the company-based respondents preferred scientists to become their companies’ 
consultants to give them advice for technical development. The government wants another 
mode of CTT, such as the use joint ventures, start-ups, licensing, patenting and spin-off.  
Respondents 46 and 52, who were a TTO and a senior research administrator from the same 
GRI, also mentioned their Institute’s success rate of CTT in terms of their establishment of a 
Trust Fund and their contributions towards CTT.  They argued that the government had put 
an emphasis on numbers of patents, licenses and of the formation of joint ventures as 
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indicators of the likely success of CTT.   However the company respondents had different 
grounds for their involvement.  These included, first, the idea that technical change is the best 
source of growth for a company, although small companies preferred adaptations of more 
radical innovations or to become imitators.  However, many SMEs in Malaysia tended to 
enjoy the comparative advantage of being near the end of relevant innovation cycles.  This 
evidence of variety of needs reinforces the idea that the role of the government should be to 
decide on the most appropriate measures in each case, and generally to act as a supporter and 
facilitator of companies.   
 
The study also shows that the role of TTOs and senior research administrators in CTT should 
come from a strategic perspective.  The data also suggest that there need for more flexible 
university and GRI management of commercialization, for improving business skills of TT 
Officers and for the more effective financial support from the government for design and 
prototyping.  The study shows, too, that any CTT mechanisms, such as licensing, start-up and 
sponsored research, should always be given adequate resources.    
 
Relationships between university and GRI scientist and administrators on the one hand and 
venture capitalists on the other need to be improved, with the culture gap between them being 
bridged through the processes of setting up and monitoring commercialization agreements.  
Venture capitalists need to prove to themselves that new scientific knowledge is 
commercially relevant.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, interview evidence on the apparent failures of companies to engage 
themselves in successful CTT, and of scientists, TTO staff and university and GRI senior 
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research administrators to persuade relevant companies to use research findings from their 
universities and GRIs has been reported and discussed. The main data considered here came 
from 17 scientists, eight TTO staff, six senior research officers from universities and GRIs, 
three venture capitalists, two journalists and a politician.  The data from the venture 
capitalists, the journalists, and a politician were sometimes about different things, but in 
general they supported the most significant views expressed by the other main groups of 
respondents in this study.   
 
It has been suggested in earlier Chapters that opposed and mixed assumptions about the roles 
of engineering and of science in technical change are widespread in Malaysia and elsewhere.  
Generally, the survey respondents with engineering academic backgrounds understood that 
engineering is not an application of science.  However, they appreciated the often vital role 
of science in engineering and its usefulness in explaining technical change.  Respondents 
who had scientific academic backgrounds tended to favour the STH model more, and to 
emphasise their view that their research findings were relevant to the need of relevant 
companies.  Their assumptions were based on their experience and their interest in research 
and its advancement of knowledge of their domain areas.  However, the TTOs and senior 
research administrators argued that while scientists did generally work well on and through 
their research, companies did not often like the long-term nature of scientific research, or the 
time taken in universities and GRIs to organize commercialization agreements.  The 
apparently very detailed control by the government in terms of IRPA and grants for CTT was 
not much liked by either the scientists or the company respondents.    
 
In the next Chapter, Chapter 8, the findings that have been described and discussed in this 
one are summarised briefly and discussed, before considering some more general ideas 
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relevant to the use of knowledge and innovation in industry, and the relevance of everything 
discussed up to that point to policies for CTT in Malaysia.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION:  A MALAYSIAN WAY? 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purposes of this chapter are to discuss the research questions and the findings together in 
the context of some broader considerations, and to consider the relevance of the study to 
policy makers in Malaysia.  The first section summarises and, in some respects, 
contextualises, the arguments and evidence of the study.  The second approaches the question 
of whether there can and should be a specifically Malaysian route to economic development, 
and if so, what it might be like.  The third section explores some issues related to this 
question, ones to do with namely industrialization and development.  The fourth performs a 
similar function, but focuses on innovation and CTT, and on features of management and 
organization, and also the role of government that affect them.  Finally, the fifth section 
draws the foregoing together to help produce an idea what a Malaysian route to economic 
development should be like.     
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THE STORY SO FAR 
 
The main research questions concern with apparent failure by Malaysia companies to use 
research findings from universities and GRIs through the processes of CTT, and with the 
apparent failure of the government and scientists and others in universities and GRIs to 
persuade companies to engage in CTT.  The two secondary research questions concern, 
together, the possibility of specifically a Malaysian approach to economic development and 
CTT, at all levels of policy-making.  It is a concern of the whole of this chapter.   
 
The first main research question, low up-take by companies, was attributed to several factors 
by respondents.  This included lack of finance from companies or the government; zero or 
poor communication of relevant research findings; companies preferring their own ideas and 
knowledge to those of external researchers; foreign-owned holding companies or partners 
supplying new technology or preferring reverse engineering; inflexible and time-consuming 
government, GRI and university regulations and procedures; the long-term and/or ‘blue sky’ 
nature of research; and lack of CTT-related knowledge and skills among administrators in 
GRIs and universities.    
 
The second main one, failure to persuade companies to commercialize new knowledge by the 
government, GRIs and universities, was attributed to scientists being largely concerned with 
advancing knowledge and with publications rather than with the profits of the companies that 
they may help; to the procedures and regulations referred to above; to CTT processes taking 
too long to satisfy market needs; to research administrators not understanding how CTT 
happens or how to make it happen; and to research administrators not knowing how to 
motivate and how to give time to researchers so that they involve themselves in CTT.   
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On the idea of a specifically Malaysian approach, a few respondents made comments about 
researchers and universities and GRI authorities needing clearer and stronger policies from 
the government on how to help companies with CTT.  But apart from that, the respondents 
tended to be rather passive in their thinking. This appears to be because their responsibilities 
and the structures and procedures that they operate with constrain their time and 
imaginations.   
 
Also relevant here is the fact that in Chapter 3, eight models of CTT were reviewed, and in 
general it was thought that they tended to be too complicated.  Before the data were obtained, 
a simple relatively Double Loop Model was proposed (Abu Talib 2007), in chapter 4.  This 
criticism and the act of replacing them were based on study of these other models and on 
their relevance and problems, and not on any empirical work. However the interview data did 
support the emphasis of the Double Loop Model on the overwhelming importance of 
communication between scientists, university or GRI technology transfer offices and 
companies, and also, in many cases, on funding from the government and companies. 
 
On relevant contextual factors, facts and issues that stand out as particularly important 
concern the general nature and background of Malaysia as an economy and society, the 
present social and political context of Malaysia’s economy, the beliefs about economic and 
social and social phenomena held by Malaysia’s elite and their relationship with Malaysia’s 
provision for CTT, and relevant educational and related matters.  
 
On Malaysia’s economic and social characteristics and as we have seen in Chapter 2, it is a 
middle-income developing country with a democratic, if in some less formal respects 
imperfect, system of government, with a mixed but mainly privately-owned economy, and 
effective public services of varying but improving effectiveness.  There was a colonial 
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presence in Malaya/Malaysia from the fifteen century to 1957, and during it the economy 
evolved from a simple agrarian one to one with a developing infrastructure and public 
services, extensive and often exploited commodity production and some basic 
manufacturing.  The ethnic composition of the society changed under British rule, which 
lasted from the early-to-mid nineteenth century to 1957.  By the end of this period, the result 
was that 30 percent of the population was (and is now) Chinese, about 10 percent Indian and 
about 60 percent Bumiputera. The Chinese tend to be more entrepreneurial than the 
Bumiputera or the Indians, and this has meant that there has been a need for the Bumiputera 
and the Indians to become more economically and politically dynamic in the last 50 years, to 
keep up with them.  
 
As a participant in the world’s economy Malaysia remains a large scale producer of natural 
rubber and oil and other commodities.  But now about a third of employment is in industry.  
Employment in services is increasing faster than in other sectors, but most such employment 
is in such goods-related jobs as those in retailing.  Manufacturing jobs are changing from 
assembly type branch factory ones under foreign control to more sophisticated ones in 
Malaysian or partly Malaysian-owned companies, especially in more advanced industrial 
sectors. Foreign direct investment and joint ventures with foreign companies are growing and 
more Malaysian companies are becoming more expert commercially, financially and 
technically.  Exports have been changing in kind as well as growing in number and value, 
and import substitution continues.  The economy is increasingly diverse, balanced and 
entrepreneurial.   More companies are specialised, especially in ICT and biotechnology, but 
also in many other sectors.  The balance of payments has generally been in surplus since the 
mid-1980s and the typical annual surplus has been growing.  In general terms Malaysia is 
quite a successful economy.  It is not a victim of the world economy in any sense.  It is not a 
poor developing country.  It is relatively industrial and it does not borrow from the 
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International Monetary Fund, for example the IMF-managed ‘bail-out’ in 1997 of Thailand, 
Indonesia and South Korea.   
 
However Malaysia’s leaders, while normally acting in quite dynamic and independent ways, 
are still to some extent influenced by Western managerial thinking.  The educational 
backgrounds of ministers, industrialists and professional specialists are still often North 
American and British and similar, and Western education remains prestigious and influential 
in elite circles.  The MBA, for example is very popular among senior managers of 
companies, and the concepts and the language of English-speaking business and management 
education, and also those of its higher scientific and technical education, pervade discussions 
of technical change and CTT.   
 
Malaysian provision for CTT is an important part of the work of the government.  For 
example, six out of 34 Ministers are responsible for Ministries which are involved with CTT 
either directly or indirectly:  MOSTI, MITI, the Ministry of Human Resources, the Ministry 
of Education, the Ministry of Entrepreneurial Development and the Ministry of Higher 
Education.  The IRPA has been operative for over 20 years and government discussions of 
the need for commercialization began around 30 years ago. IRPA started in the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan (1986 to 1990) and it has continued to expand since.  The government 
changed and gave large emphasis to such important areas of research as biotechnology, ICT, 
advanced manufacturing, advanced materials, aerospace-related technology, and 
nanotechnology, whereas previously agriculture and its related industries were emphasised 
more.  The number of IRPA grants that have been approved to areas of research has changed 
from time to time with agro-industry changing from 33.9% in 1996 to 2000, to 19.7% in 
2001 to 2005.  This is because the government reduced the priority and put emphasis 
research on engineering and science in universities, from 19.5% to 26.9% in the same period, 
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when the emphasis on manufacturing grew from 8.7% to 14.5%.  The amount spent on IRPA 
research grants in 1996 to 2000 was £102 million.  In 2001 to 2005 it was £132 million and 
the amount allocated for 2006 to 2010 is £225 million.  The amount spend on CTT was £29 
million in 1996 to 2000, £38 million between 2001 to 2005, and for 2006 to 2010 it will be 
£263 million.  The number of researchers was 15,022 in 2002, 17,790 in 2002 and 27,500 
people (estimated number) for 2005 (EPU, 2006).    
 
Finally on these contextual factors, there is an apparent tendency in Malaysia that is referred 
to in Chapter 3, for considerable faith to be put into vocational education as a source of 
wealth (Illich, 1971; Dore, 1976).  Such faith can be questioned for the kinds of reasons 
explored by Illich and Dore, insofar as modern schooling and the pursuit of credentials often 
seem to exist for the sake of social control and personal and institutional ambition rather than 
to give people genuinely useful knowledge and skills.   
 
Education that is very instrumental and focused can help to produce people with weak values 
and distorted priorities, whereas education that is genuinely independent and thoughtful can 
be the most effective basis for practical learning and action.  For example, the UK, before, 
during and after the Second World War, has been criticised strongly for being led by 
graduates in the classics and the humanities, whereas Germany tended to have a more 
technocratic elite (Barnett, 1972).  Surprisingly perhaps, the UK, with about two thirds of 
Germany’s population, and no slave labour to supplement it, produced significantly more 
military aircraft than Germany in the Second World War, many more naval ships, and more 
tanks and artillery pieces per head of population (Ellis, 1993).   
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TOWARDS A MALAYSIAN WAY  
 
According to Sorge (1985, p. 244) ‘the appropriate way of transferring experience and 
recipies from one culture to another… does not involve imitation but ingenious and judicious 
tinkering’.  This means that work and employment are always organized, and people 
experience them, in ways that are always full of conflict between extremes, with ambiguous 
processes and change and instability always present.  Similarly, choices can always be made, 
but they are always constrained.  Simply to imitate something attractive in another country, 
or industry or other social institutions can be unsubtle and even dangerous.  Different 
institutions and practices in different societies are, after all, different institutions to different 
societies.  The culture of a human society or social institution is everything that it consists of.  
It is the sum total of all of its material artefacts, all its the historical experience and all of its 
ways of life. It has three components:  the material ones include its climate and geography, 
the bodies of its people and or the artefacts that its people construct.  The social ones consist 
of all the institutions of a society, for example, families, friendships, companies, government 
departments, public associations and so on.  The ideational ones consist of its members’ 
beliefs, attitudes, opinions, values and ways of acting and behaving (Sorge, 1982; 1985).   
 
If a society tries to impose its institutions on another it is likely to experience serious 
difficulties (see for example, Sorge, 1985, and Locke, 1996).  After the Second World War 
the USA tried to impose some aspects of American management on Germany (Sorge) and 
Japan (Locke on both countries).  However, each country had its own strong and distinctive 
approach to management, which in both cases was engineering-based and specialised.  
Companies in both countries tended to copy superficial aspects of American management 
while, in general, carrying on as before.  Sorge (1978) reported how a firm of American 
management consultants produced a report in 1973 saying that Germany had a ‘management 
 272
gap’.  In other words, it did not have general managers with non-relevant or business 
administration first degrees and MBAs.  Sorge (1979) and Calori and de Woot (1994) both 
argued that any given independent country had developed its own way of organizing and 
managing work.  This was always a product of its history and was deeply embedded in the 
society along, for example, with its systems of education, kinship, production and 
consumption.   
 
Numerous writers including Locke (1996) and Locke and Schőne (2004) have argued that 
there is a fundamental difference between continental European and North American and 
other former British empire countries approaches to management (see also Glover and 
Hughes, 1996).  Glover and Hughes called them the Technik and (later, Business) 
Management approaches.    The former tends to emphasize the value of production, process, 
the long term, management in specialist activities, and more positive side of the state’s role 
in economic life.  The latter, the neo-American or the (Business) Management Model, 
stresses consumption, outcome, the short term, management of specialist activities, and the 
more negative side of the state’s role, Glover and Hughes (1996: 5).  Later, Locke and Shöne 
(2004) explained how use of the generally more effective Technik approach in the USA could 
be successful in a country widely regarded as the home of the opposed Business Management 
one. 
 
Different countries have different needs and priorities.  Often the priorities are flawed and 
sometimes even badly mistaken.  More generally, capitalist societies take many forms.  Some 
provide more social welfare than others, and some are run by technocrats whereas others are 
run more democratically.  There is great variation in levels and kinds of regulation by 
governments.  Some countries tend to ignore the rules and wishes of regional and global 
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supra-national organization like Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and others do not. 
 
There are also conflicts and trade-off between values and economic rationality.  When a 
country has a comparative advantage in the production and sale of some good or service, it 
may dominate markets at the expense of the values of those who buy the products.  In other 
cases, countries will spend more on things that they value than they actually need to.  The 
development of a given economy and society is not simply matter of economic growth.  
Growth can take many directions.  For example, the environment may be seen as something 
that deserves the utmost respect, or something that can be damaged but perhaps eventually 
repaired.  Similar arguments can be applied to people.  They may be employed like 
commodities simply to help an economy grow exist or they may be strongly valued and 
developed as individuals.  Cairncross (1995, p. 66) argued that growth of populations and 
incomes meant that the world’s resources are being used on a larger scale than ever.  There 
have been shortages of energy and food in individual countries and regions of the world since 
industrialization began.  But in the most recent decades they have contributed to pressures on 
population and on other resources.  Growth that does not respect the environment tends to 
reduce the quality of life and to affect poorer people more than richer ones, with the former 
being much more numerous.  As populations have become richer they tend to become more 
environmentally concerned, but possibly more because they have damaged the environment 
in the process, than because their wealth has enlightened them.    
 
According to Stiglitz (2006), much post-1945 economic decision making by the most 
powerful countries has damaged the weakest ones.  This has meant that processes of 
successful development have not always been well understood.  Today, according to Stiglitz, 
some of the factors that favour successful development are economic growth and stability, 
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lack of poverty and of severe income inequality, full employment, sound balances between 
governments and markets,  democracy, efficiency that is not completely due to self-interest 
and market forces, reasonable economic equity, and social consensus, at least some serious 
concern for the environment and at least some support for basic research, reasonable 
consumer protection, and the existence and tolerance of social and cultural diversity.  These 
things are, in fact, when taken together, successful development.   
 
Economic development also requires lack of serious vulnerability to damaging external 
forces and good internal financial management.   High levels of debt tend to handicap 
development.  Innovation should be facilitated by liberal and fair intellectual property laws, 
by government support that both rewards and punishes companies as appropriate, by 
understanding financial institutions, by investment in both engineering and scientific 
education and research, and by companies that value positive change.   
 
Barney (1991) argued that any firm had three kinds of resource or asset.  Physical resources 
meant hardware, plant and equipment, access to raw materials, and geographical location.  
Human resources consist of such things as experience, training, intelligence, judgment, 
relationships and individual insight. Organizational resources consist of such things as formal 
structure, formal and informal system of planning, controlling and coordinating; and informal 
relations inside and outside the firm.  Some resources made firms more viable and 
competitive than others.  Such resources needed to be valuable, rare and impossible to 
substitute and difficult to imitate.  Barney’s statement of the Resource Based Theory of Firm 
was used by Pringle and Kroll (1997), who argued, as we saw in Chapter 5, that the British 
had defeated large and stronger French and Spanish fleets at the Battle of Trafalgar (in 1805) 
because they had superior skills and seamanship and gunnery and a much longer seafaring 
and naval tradition.  According to Pringle and Kroll the biggest assets of the Royal Navy 
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were the human and organizational resources of its seafaring heritage, a winning tradition 
and the ‘superlative leadership of Horatio Nelson’.  The British naval tradition was arguably 
1000 years old.  At the time of Trafalgar it was highly innovative, co-operative, creative, 
confident, skilled, aggressive and motivated.  Its strongest traditions were arguably 
adaptability and innovativeness.   
 
If Malaysia is thought in terms of having physical human and organizational resources, some 
of which have the attributes of key ones (being valuable, rare, unsubstituable and very hard 
to imitate), they might be described as follows.  The physical resources include plentiful 
resources of energy and minerals, more than adequate housing, a modern transport and 
communications infrastructure, and a strong agricultural sector.  The human resources are 
increasingly well educated with expanding numbers of state and private schools and colleges, 
and 46 universities for a population of 23 million.  Literacy is quite high and total 
educational provision is expanding.  Technical education needs to expand, but it is doing so.  
On the organizational resources, there is a lively system of economic planning with state 
support for the expansion of firms, in the generally being economic integration.  Provision 
for health, education and welfare, both public and private, is generally sound and expanding.  
Much state-supported economic expansion since the 1980s has been concerned with ICT, but 
since the late 1990s the focus has been shifting to biotechnology, partly because this matches 
the country’s natural resource endowments. 
 
Some brief further indicators of what a Malaysian way might look like can be gleaned from 
the following arguments.  On economic development, Salih (2005) compared it in South East 
Asia (Malaysia, Taiwan and Singapore) and South West Asia (Iraq), against a background of 
the experiences of various other countries.  Salih argued that for a developing country to 
develop successfully it needed to invest in human resources, science, and technologies that 
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are aimed at the future; agri-industrial capacity and links; and the spirit of entrepreneurship.  
Ismail and Yussof (2003), on labour market competitiveness and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philiphines, found that varied labour market 
characteristics tended to affect FDI inflows differently.  For example, Malaysia had allowed 
many foreign workers to enter the country, and this had curbed wage increases. Also 
Malaysia encouraged foreign companies to export what they produced in Malaysia so that 
their product policies did not need to be strongly Malaysia-centred.  There was also evidence 
that the growing number of Malaysia’s professional employees tended to work for Malaysian 
and not foreign companies, probably strengthening the former at the expense of the latter. 
Further, when Malaysia spent more on R and D, FDI inflows tended to fall because Malaysia 
seemed to be getting less reliant on foreign technology.  The main conclusions were that 
Malaysia’s wage levels, interest rates and levels of employee qualification were low enough 
to keep the country attractive for FDI for some time to come, without FDI being a threat in 
any serious way to economic growth and development.  On environmental policy in 
Malaysia, Hezri and Hasan (2006) discussed what they saw as its four phases of development 
since 1971.  They did so in the contexts of changing environmental concerns and concepts, 
and of Malaysia’s changing, meaning largely expanding and improving, relationships with 
the rest of the world.   
 
On relevant educational and related economic issues, Lai and Yap (2004) argued that ‘the 
availability of skilled human capital in Malaysia is not sufficient for technological 
development to progress’.  They compared the availability of the ‘strategic resources of’ 
human capital, R and D, S and T [science and technology] parks, foreign technology transfer 
and GRIs’ in Malaysia with the same in the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.  The 
data in this article are significant for policy, and are discussed at greater length below, as are 
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the arguments of two other articles, by Neville (1998), and Sohail, Daud (2006), on 
managerial changes in Malaysian higher education.   
 
Public management reforms in Malaysia are dealt with by Siddique (2006).  This is discussed 
below.  It is relevant because CTT depends partly on competent public sector management.  
Finally, the concept of psychic distance, a mixture of geographical distance and culture, (see, 
for example Child, Ng and Wong, 2002; Hassel and Cunningham 2006), is also relevant and 
is also useful for thinking, for example, about whether Anglo-Saxon culture likely to 
influence that of Malaysia for much longer.   
 
 
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
So far in this and earlier Chapters we have been seen that the ‘failures’ of companies to 
commercialize scientific outputs and of scientists to persuade companies to use their work 
are attributable from such factor overly high expectations of the industrial potential of 
science through to practical problems of making it commercially useful to sometimes trivial 
organizational deficiencies and personal inadequacies.  We have seen how Malaysia has the 
resources to become a dynamic advanced industrial economy and that it is using them with 
ever greater confidence and ability.  We have, however, also expressed numerous doubts as 
to whether all aspects of modern thinking about industrial innovation and management are 
squally relevant to Malaysia’s needs, or indeed, to everyone’s. 
 
Some of the arguments of this section have already been made in some detail in Chapter 2 
and in some other chapters, and when this is the case they are generally spelt out quite briefly 
here. They concerned, in Chapter 2, with the continuing and indeed growing importance of 
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industrialization as the world’s major kind of and force for change, and the organizations of 
contemporary advanced or partly advanced industrial /industrializing economies under 
alliance capitalism.  They concerned the contemporary tendency to overrate globalization as 
a force and as a master trend, and the tendency to exaggerate the impossible of formal 
education as a provider of useful knowledge and skills.   
 
The industrialization that Malaysia, along with many other countries, past, present and no 
doubt, future, is pursuing is important as a force in the world for many reasons.  One of the 
most persuasive is the fact that in about 50 years after the Second World War, world 
industrial production grew sevenfold, when the world’s population ‘merely’ doubled 
(Cairncross, 1995).  Another concerns the way in which manufacturing, which so often 
replaces employees with machines, nevertheless generates many millions of goods-related 
job in services, upstream (for example in design, investment analysis, market research and 
extraction sectors) downstream of factories (for example in retailing and the maintenance and 
repair of goods).  Another example is that there has been a long-term tendency to replace 
personal services with various machines, as when computers and voice recognition software 
replace typists or audiovisual equipment replaces live entertainment.  Goods are thus used by 
us to provide services for ourselves, replacing services provided by others as our employees 
or as employees of others.   Further to, and also  suggested by all above three reasons, is the 
one that development of manufacturing, and of industry defined more broadly, to include 
energy and construction for example, tends to precede and underpin many other kinds of 
innovation, in services and manufacturing, and outside places of work as well (Tagiuri, 
1965).   
 
Finally, and all taken together, these forces and changes mean that we inhabit, in the 
developed world at least a very technically sophisticated highly goods-dependent economy 
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and society in which divisions of labour are unexpectedly complex and interdependent, with 
most employment in industry being services types and with most employment in services 
being viable only when reliant on the use of sophisticated and often expensive hardware.   
 
The process of industrialization arguably began in the late Middle Ages with the beginning of 
industrialized warfare headed by the widespread use of gunpowder, and with modern forms 
of communication facilitated by the invention and use of moveable type of printing and the 
magnetic compass for navigation (Glover and Walker, 2007).  However, mechanization, the 
first of four phases of industrialization proper, began with the invention of the steam engine, 
the archetypal machine of this phase, and loosely associated changes in energy supply, in 
large and small scale metalworking, and in mechanical engineering more generally.  The 
second phase, starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, had two major 
components and has thus been called electrochemicalisation.  The two components are the 
discovery and use of electrical power and the development of the chemicals industry, and 
later in many respects the pharmaceuticals one.  The archetypal machines of this phase were 
and are the electric motor and the chemical plant.  The third phase belongs to the second half 
of the twentieth century and to a lesser extent, the opening decade or two of the present one 
and it is infotechnologization, with its archetypal machine being the computer, or more 
precisely, the personal computer.  The fourth one, biotechnologization, is currently 
accelerating into major prominence and dominance, although its early origins go back 
thousands of years, to beer-brewing and viticulture for example.  The archetypal machine of 
biotechnologization is the android, combining use of mechanics, electricity, electronics and 
biology with important and major attributes of all preceding technologies. 
 
Many other technologies and machines have been invented those are as old as these just 
referred to, and nuclear and renewable sources of energy have not even been alluded to.  
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However, virtually all past, current or projected technologies and machines are related, or 
relatable, to at least one of the above.  Whether they are in a process of exhausting all 
possible technologies and machines is probably unknowable, but Leonardo da Vinci and H. 
G. Wells, among others have shown how it is possible to imagine future ones, including 
some that are invented several decades or even centuries after the idea of their existence was 
first spelt out for posterity.  Glover and Walker (2007) estimate that the pace of technical 
change will be very much slower than it is now by around 2300, but admit that this is a fairly 
wild guess.  However, it does still seem fair to agree with the stance taken by Ackroyd, 
Glover, Currie and Bull (2000) nearly ten years ago, that technical change is unlikely ever to 
be as significant, fast and dramatic as it was in the half century around 1900. 
 
The context of a developing economy like that of Malaysia is made up, therefore, in a large 
part by the industrialization that Malaysian government has embraced for over a generation.  
It is important, as claimed earlier in this thesis, that economic growth does not neglect the 
natural environment or treat it brutally (Cairncross, 1995).  Growth that takes more from the 
Earth than it returns to it, and which thus degrades it, has quantifiable economic costs.  
Permanent or long-lasting damage to soil, to forest, to sources of water and seafood may 
produce high short-term gains for the few and some benefits for the many, but they are 
normally outweight by the cost to all, even in the very short term.   Pollution and poverty 
have long gone hand-in hand, but serious and effective efforts to end them tend to do the 
same, so that a clean environment with high environmental standard and a wealthy and 
healthy society also tend to go together.  This lesson needs to be learnt or a  world level and 
applied using principles of equity and appropriate economic incentives, with poorer countries 
paid fair prices for their labour and natural resources, with much more serious attraction 
being given to overpopulation than has been apparent to date, and with international political 
and economic institutions, governments and large international companies encouraged or 
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forced to behave more co-operatively, democratically and responsibly (Stiglitz, 2006).  In 
Malaysia, public, government-ordained environmental controls have been opposed by 
industries, which have padoxically been encouraged to do so by the government policy of 
highly valuing rapid economic growth (Nor, 1991; also see Aiken and Leigh, 1988:; and 
Visvanathan and Tiong, 1999).   
 
In Chapter 2 attention was drawn to the highly and apparently ever-increasingly complex and 
interdependent nature of economic divisions of labour between and within firms and between 
and within countries (Ackroyd, 2002; Glover, 2003).  This direction of change is reflected 
well in international trade theories, which increasingly take  account, beyond different 
national resource endowments and the value of interdependence, the growing  tendency for 
multinational and transnational firms to  trade with themselves and the pursue competitive 
advantage by operating within complex networks of firms in and across relevant sectors 
(Daniels, Redebaugh and Sullivan, 2004).  The same theme is tackled from another angle in 
theories and accounts of the industrialization of firms, where the development and nature of 
theorising shows clearly that while big business remains big business, it is more complex and 
fragmented, but more interdependent and less monolithic than in the past.  
 
One of the most recent approaches, the network one, explains how the more intentionally 
experienced a firm gets the bolder it seems to become.  It becomes keener to get involved 
with other companies in various ways, often changing its own shape in processes like 
internationalization, alliance-building and off shoring.  It masters diverse location, no longer 
being overawed by them.  Its reputation and capabilities help it to increase the capital 
available to it, and to overcome deficiencies in its desired level and pattern of ownership.  In 
recent decades in the developed and developing worlds, whole national industrial sectors 
have internationalized.  This is because of intersectoral, interdependencies, between networks 
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of suppliers of capital, ideas, information, materials and parts, assemblers, producers, 
distributors, sellers, users, repairers and maintainers, hirers and so on.  Competition and 
technical change often disrupt such networks and often encourage involvement of foreign 
companies.  This all means that firms increasingly work in internationally integrated 
activities and networks.  The higher the degrees of industrialization become, the stronger the 
international networks become.  Such networks typically involve SMEs and/or 
subcontractors as well as larger and more dominant companies (Ghaury, 2000).  Malaysia’s 
economy contains a high proportion of SMEs, and levels of FDI are high at increasing and 
these characteristics are increasingly representative of it.    
 
ASEAN is important to Malaysia because its members receive a high proportion of 
Malaysian exports, because its members’ economies have grown and are growing fast, and 
because its roles, economic, environmental and political, are expanding, although there is 
some disagreement among its members about the directions that these roles have been taking 
and are to take in the future.  Malaysia is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and its economic policies are affected, as are those of most countries, between its loyalty to 
its fellow members of ASEAN, a free trade area, and its commitment to the wider aims of the 
WTO.   
 
In general communal and economic relationship between Malaysia’s Bumiputera, Chinese 
and Indian populations are good.  Bumiputera people do not identify with any other ethnic or 
national group apart from themselves.  Constituting some 60% of the population, they have 
considerable freedom to develop socially, economically, educationally and politically in 
several directions, or none apart from their own.  They also have no great need to pursue 
fashionably ‘high-tech’ routes industrially, at least not at the expense of other that could be 
more congenial and/or profitable.  But they do need education that will suit whatever return 
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of alliance, or possibly other, capitalism, they choose to develop.  At present the education 
system is inherited from the British with growing element of US-style management education 
for graduates.  Increasingly, however, vocational education for business and management is 
bearing more country-specific.   
 
The disadvantages and problems of industrialization have been, and are considerable.  Two 
World and numerous other Wars since the 1850s have arguably been encouraged and fed by 
the availability of ever-more destructive, novel and sophisticated forms of hardware.   Old 
ways of life have been disrupted and diseases spread by it and by preceding but related 
changes like ones in navigation, transport, warfare and agriculture since the fifteenth country.  
Last, but far from least, there is now accelerating environmental pollution and global 
warming. 
 
 
INNOVATION, MANAGEMENT AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
In Chapter 3 a fundamental issue concerning CTT was raised.  Industry is the main home of 
engineering, which uses, or ‘applies’ scientific knowledge, but this is a very different activity 
from scientific research.  This suggest’ that the commercialization of new scientific 
discoveries is not likely to be an easy task for industry, except perhaps when certain sectors, 
like chemical and pharmaceuticals,  constantly employ significant numbers of staff with 
scientific qualifications.  However very large segments of the education of engineers are in 
scientific subjects, and a scientific, meaning analytical and curious, cost of mind is an asset in 
most situations, not least those in which scientific knowledge is routinely used as a resource, 
for important or vital information.  Both engineering and science demand analytical, 
disciplined and linear thinking and more intuitive, unconventional and divergent types or 
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inputs.   There are, therefore, at least intuitive grounds for assuming that the presence of 
scientists and scientific thinking around engineers, often of people with diverse disciplinary 
backgrounds, will enhance the intellectual and creative work of the former.  Moreover, the 
evidence and arguments of Tagiuri (1965) reinforce this assumption about thinking styles 
with some points about educational and social backgrounds and individual values.  Tagiuri 
was interested in a tradition of social research into presumed contexts of values between 
engineers and/or scientists and managers working in industry.  Managers, many felt, would 
value commercial, financial and economic achievements, whereas engineers would value the 
capabilities, quality and at times the aesthetic features of the products that they designed and 
made, and whereas scientists would value the quality and beauty of their intellectual efforts 
and solutions.  In the past studies, researchers had asked members of each group what 
frustrated and pleased them in their dealings with the others.   
 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, each group had spoken of managers interfering with their desire to 
be creative, swamping them with ‘bureaucracy’ closing excellent projects down for short-
term financial reasons, and treating them like children in other ways, and so on (see for 
example, Cotgrove and Box, 1970).  Tagiuri felt that the researchers who had reported a 
number of American and British studies of scientists or engineers versus managers in 
industry had asked their respondents leading questions like ‘Do you feel that you lack 
autonomy in your job?, which had elicited spurious replies.  In other words the industrial 
engineers or scientist would say “yes”, the management never leave us alone’ or anything 
similar in order to get sympathy from the researcher and whoever would later read their 
report.  This was an example of ‘socially respectable’ responses or of the famous ‘Hawthorne 
Effect’ in industrial sociology, when the very act of doing research creates certain ‘results’ or 
‘thinking’ that would never have ‘existed’ otherwise. 
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The relevance of this to the presence study, in which managers and professionals on the one 
hand, and scientists on the other, gave answers of very much different kinds that might have 
been predicted from knowledge of their backgrounds, the questions asked, and their 
situations.  In my opinion, their answers seemed were perfectly valid on the whole, although 
they seemed to be a few examples of socially respectable and specious answers.  In 
particular, some of the senior research administrators seemed to be trying to gave me an 
impression of effort and ability on their part which the content of other interviews of various 
kinds seemed to cast doubt on.  However, Taguiri’s main point was based on his own 
research.  He got samples of managers, engineers and scientists to complete a questionnaire 
that asked them to supply information from which he could work out the degrees to which 
their personal values were aesthetic, economic, political, theoretical, religious or social.  
Engineers might tend to be aesthetic and economic, businessmen economic and political or 
social, scientists theoretical, and so on.  What Tagiuri actually found was that all three types 
similar values, ones typically of white Anglo-Saxon American managers and professionals, 
who had happened to have chosen one from three different occupations to belong to. 
 
The respondents tended on the whole to realise that industrial companies were mainly do 
engineering, and that science is only relevant occasionally and usually only shows itself 
when they think that scientific knowledge can be used to help increase profits.  However, 
they tended to believed that it could often do so, and they also felt that scientists could be 
very useful people to employ in engineering contexts.  They could often offer different and 
original perspectives and help to trigger off and to pursue view and profitable lines of 
thinking.   
 
The real danger to innovative work in Malaysian industry may not come from any of those 
employed in it, except perhaps from some of those employed it the highest levels.  
 286
Researchers and writers on management and management work like Geneen (1986), Jackal 
(1982) and Kolter (1982) have noted how egoism and selfishness can limit the potential and 
achievement of managers.  Geneen attributed failed careers to ‘egotism, not alcoholism’; 
Jackal explored managerial careerism, presentationism and politics in some depth; and Kolter 
described how most managers began new jobs with ‘an agenda’ a desire to ‘make a mark on 
the organization’ through a mixture of achievement and networking.  This kind of behaviour 
was linked to managerialism by Enteman (1993), who argued that efficiency was the main 
target of present-day managers, whose ambitious consisted of running organizations for 
themselves and themselves only, with other managers the only people whom they wished to 
please.   
 
According to Glover (2003) the values and beliefs of managers, especially young graduate 
ones, and of business and management education were as follows.  The pace of change in the 
world is accelerating, as competition and as a new phenomenon globalization.  Technologies 
and cultures are growing ever more able across the world.  Services are growing, and 
manufacturing declining, in influencing as sources of employment and wealth.  To get staff 
to work effectively, it is vital to manage culture, or ‘the way we do things round here’.  
Bureaucracy is bad and decreasing in importance and organic organization is the opposite.  
Service and technology are replacing engineering in the new knowledge and information and 
post-industrial-economy and society, in which more and more employees are knowledge 
workers.  Innovative methods and systems are increasingly effective, replacing older ones, in 
business and management.  They are best used by a new elite of dynamic young managers 
which is needed to engineer and manage the business processes, and the economies and 
societies of the globe.  With their help and under their management, the economies and the 
societies of the globe should eventually converge into one global economy and society.   
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This sub belief is embodied in many English-language management textbooks.  It is taught to 
many students from their mid-late teens onward.  The beliefs are largely mistaken: apart from 
points already made about globalization, competition, the pace of change, manufacturing and 
services, engineering and service and the uses of knowledge, human societies or cultures 
normally converge and diverge at the same time, and bureaucracy is about efficiency and 
fairness, whereas organic organization is often inefficient, stressful and political, and a 
nursery for bullies.  What most distinguishes Anglo-Saxon, or Anglo-American, 
managerialism is its selfish and aggressive ageism.  Its appeal is to be sweep whatever is 
older to one side (Glover and Branine, 1997).  There may be some in newly industrial 
countries like Malaysia who might usefully be aware of this, and who may have distanced 
themselves, them thinking and their policies, too high above the realities of technical work in 
industry. 
 
There may, in fact, be a deep problem with the whole idea of managing innovation.  Webb 
(1992) hinted at this in her report of her study of medium-size company in the UK 
components industry.  The management claimed to run the company as a permissive, high-
discretion, high-trust workplace but ‘innovative was undermined by fear of failure at the top 
management levels (p. 490), resulting in defensive management, lowered performance and 
job losses including one at professional and management levels.  In Malaysia the relevant 
contrast may not be anything like as stark as those depicted here, but the more government 
erects structures around those given creative tasks to perform and the longer it fails to get the 
balance between control and autonomy right in they day to day work, to greater the danger 
that long-term damage will institutionalised in relevant habits, expectations and structures.   
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DISCUSSION: A MALAYSIAN WAY 
 
Malaysia is a newly developed, newly industrial country, a little inexperienced in all of the 
complexities of international economies and politics.  On the other hand its leaders and its 
people are more likely than counterparts in more experienced but cynical settings to look on 
the outside world with clear, unjaundiced and unbiased eyes.  Malaysia also has the 
advantage of being an indigenously wealthy country with plentiful natural resources, some 
offshore, that include ones that can attract tourist in large numbers.  These points suggest that 
while Malaysia should not be slow to consider its national security, it can rationally afford to 
indulge in ‘satisfying’, less than fully economically rational, behaviour (March and Simon, 
1958).  This means that it does not need to strive to assert itself against or over others or to 
prove itself to itself in any way, so as to maximise all or most of its outcomes.  It means that 
it can opt for sustainable development rather than for development or any price.  
 
The above point also leads to the suggestion, about education, and along similar to those 
presented in the previous section, to be creative with education by indulging itself with a 
certain amount of experimentation.  It can afford liberal vocationalism, producing citizen 
with principles, open minds and useful knowledge and skills, people who combine the 
graduates of the philosopher-king and the true, meaning broadly educated, general as well as 
specialist, technocrat.  It can follow Illich (1971) by explicitly trying to avoid ‘schooling’ 
young people to conform and follow authoritarian principles, while actively helping them to 
obey those whom they respect and work with disciplined ways while starting to achieve self-
disciplined.   
 
Education should be valued to its own sake.  There should be no contempt-rather the reverse-
for the practical and for the intellectual.  An ideal of source should be uncalculated, but it 
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should stand in a mutual and synergistic scholarship with enlightened self-interest.  Pride in 
all of the positive features of Malaysia, its history and its people should be valued and when 
appropriate rewarded.  The notion of civil surely should be principally concerned with 
including habits and expectations of self-government, with the state explicitly in the service 
of the people.  Membership of supranatural organizations like the WTO and ASEAN should 
be assertive, benevolent and active.  Economic management has, however, already been 
discussed, as how relevant environmental points.   
 
Lai and Yap (2004) make a number of recommendations to technology development in 
Malaysia.  They emphasise on producing service as opposed to arts graduates, more 
education and training involving the private sector, more liberal immigration policies, more 
collaborative involving foreign companies in R and D, more active and efficient management 
of science and technology parks, more FDI abroad and more technically sophisticated SMEs 
and more and more sector-focused GRIs are all advocated.  These are logical 
recommendations on the basis of relevant evidence, but the mixture of top-down leadership 
and self-sustaining business activity is arguably slightly biased in favour of the former. 
To sum up, a truly Malaysian way would play more often to the existing strengths of 
Malaysia and its people, and be somewhat less tidy, structured and imposed from above.  It 
would accept the strong probability that most Malaysian want to be wealthier and to inhibit a 
technically sophisticated society, but it would also seek explicitly to build on the strength 
offered by Islam, Confusion and other religious and philosophical traditions; it would seek to 
define and pursue appropriate kinds of technology for the Malaysian contexts; and in line 
with pursuing sustainability, it would generally refrain from pursuing aggressively wasteful 
growth.  It would accept, further, the inexperience of the relevant parties with CTT and 
generally encourage those involved to develop their own forms of them and methods for 
pursuing them.  This would, at time, involve the government acting proactively, but the word 
 290
proactively should be accepted as one that can mean very different things in different sectoral 
and other context. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has emphasised a need for ‘softer’ aspects of CTT to be pursued in Malaysia, 
including an approach that understands and develops without its own limitations.  It has 
sought to think about CTT in a broader and more subtle and thoughtful way than has usually 
been the case in the past.  More specific ideas and recommendations follow in the last and 
final chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS   
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
First, in this final chapter, the aims, research questions and methods of the study are restated 
and followed by a summary of the thesis.  Then, the study’s main focus, the preconceptions, 
and some key findings and their implications are discussed briefly. The theoretical 
contributions of the thesis are considered next.  The limitations of the research and the thesis 
are then noted, partly to underpin the arguments of final three sections, which consist of 
some general policy implications of the study, some specific recommendations for policy, 
and recommendation for further research, which include methodological ones.   
 
SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH AND THE THESIS 
 
The aim of this study has been to describe, investigate and explain the perceived the low rate 
of adoption and commercialization of inventions and knowledge in Malaysian manufacturing 
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companies.  The topic was chosen partly because Malaysia is a developing country, with 
GDP per capita of about £2,970.00 in 2006 and a generally high rate of economic growth.  
Other reasons for interest in the topic included certain differences in management language 
and assumptions involving use of rhetoric about globalization, the presumption of 
accelerating economic and social change, an apparently growing belief in the notions that 
science is the main source of technical change, and that advanced economies are ‘knowledge’ 
ones.  The social and educational backgrounds of Malaysian leaders, professionals and 
managers, which have been influenced by Western, especially British, approaches to learning 
and human resource development, appeared to be potentially important influences on their 
actions and values.  Therefore the work  began in search of answers to the suggestion that 
Malaysia may have particular strengths and weaknesses in its attempts to commercialise 
scientific knowledge from universities and GRIs.  The respondents in the present study that 
used 60 semi-structured interviews of seven types of interested party were:  managers and 
professionals from companies; scientists, technology transfer staff (Technology Transfer 
Officers: TTOs), senior research administrators, all from universities and GRIs; venture 
capitalists, a journalist and a politician.   
 
The aim of this study was pursued by seeking answers to two main and two supporting 
research questions, by administering seven differently-worded interview schedules to the 
seven groups of respondents.  The main research questions were concerned with why many 
Malaysian firms do not appear to make use of scientific knowledge produced by Malaysian 
universities and government research institutes, and with why university and government 
research institute researchers, whose work is funded by the government and intended to be 
commercialised by Malaysian industry, apparently failed to persuade many companies to use 
their knowledge.  The supporting research questions concerned the notion of the possibility 
of a uniquely ‘Malaysian way’ to enhance the technical and scientific sophistication of 
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industry, and with the actual relevance to industry of the scientific knowledge aimed at it by 
Malaysia’s university and GRI scientists.    
 
Eight chapters follow this. Chapter 2 discusses the nature and the potential of Malaysia’s 
economy.  The main foci are economic policies and the development of manufacturing.  It 
also offers a discussion of the importance of understanding industrialization to the thesis.  
Industrialization, and not globalization, is thought of as the master change of the present era.  
The assumption that effective HRM, including formal vocational education, was vital to 
innovation was also, like that of globalisation, criticised.  There were also preliminary 
evaluations of the Malaysian economy based on PEST and SWOT analyses, the Boston 
Consultancy Group’s Matrix, and the Dynamic Capabilities version of Resource-Based 
Theory.  These evaluations suggested that there are several kinds of policy-maker with varied 
values and objectives influencing the Malaysian economy. Chapter 3 reviewed some of the 
main assumptions, concepts, and influences on them, that are used in studying problems of 
CTT in Malaysia.  Key foci included the backgrounds of researchers who have written 
influentially about technical change.  It presented two models of technical change based on 
different assumptions about human nature, knowledge, skills, and the use of knowledge for 
practical ends.  Key concepts were classified in ways that divided them into five main 
headings.  Another aim of Chapter 3 was to focus on the seven most salient concepts used 
from 25 concepts for this study that was discussed as Appendix 3.  The seven were 
commercialization, entrepreneurship, innovation, invention, the management of change, 
research and development and technology transfer.  It also goes on to discuss eight  extant 
models of CTT, which generally assumed that the main parties involved in it were scientists 
and entrepreneurs.  The author also offered her own Double Loop Commercialization Model, 
which stressed the importance of demand, supply and effective communication in CTT.  A 
 294
brief constructive critique of the values and interests of, and of the mental models of control 
of events used by, most of the various parties involved was also made.   
 
In Chapter 4, an overview of Malaysian commercialization and technical change policies and 
practices was presented.  It was seen that the contributions of CTT to Malaysian economic 
development tended to be lag behind politicians’ expectations.  However, it was noteworthy 
that the institutions and people involved proved to be important in the processes of CTT.  
This chapter also provided descriptions of the roles of the master models of technical change 
for understanding CTT in Malaysia.  It appeared that technical change in Malaysia was more 
based on the technical ingenuity of business people, so that the Technik model of technical 
change was more realistic than the STH one.  Various types of discovery and invention from 
Malaysian universities and GRIs were considered in the course of this discussion.  This 
chapter ended with the presentation of the author’s new model of commercialization, the 
Commercialization Loop Model, which appeared to be quite broadly applicable, and to help 
indicate which kinds of people contributes most to CTT in Malaysia (Abu Talib, 2007).   
 
Research methods were discussed in Chapter 5.  The method for gathering data for this 
qualitative study was interviewing.  The interviews were semi-structured and used relatively 
open-ended questions.  Each group of respondents had its own partly different interview 
schedule.  Appendix 1 (Research Participants) documented all the interview findings in some 
detail and reviews a little of documentary evidence taken from the companies and other 
organizations that supplied by the interviewees. Data from companies and scientists and 
other respondents were dealt with separately. The most powerful findings concerned many 
companies seeing CTT as not relevant to them, and making criticisms of the qualities and 
procedures of the administrators of CTT in universities and GRIs. Venture capitalists were 
also criticised, for lacking interest in working with scientists. 
 295
Chapters 6 and 7 discussed data from the company managers and professionals, and from the 
scientists and other public parties. These two chapters were mainly focused on the 
respondents’ assumptions about technical change and CTT; the processes of CTT; and the 
role of government in trying to foster it.  In Chapter 6 it was seen that some company 
managers and professionals regarded many research findings as irrelevant to them, but that 
others did find them to be relevant. The latter tended to work well with universities and 
GRIs, and tended to take up grants provided for CTT.  The main elements of successful CTT 
included scientists’ involvement in the process and the establishment of companies near 
universities’ and GRIs’ premises, including the use of incubators or technology parks. Most 
company respondents considered that any involvement in CTT could be expensive in terms 
of time and money.  Companies preferred relevant research findings that profited their 
companies.  Although some companies did try to meet the requirements of getting grants for 
CTT, the processes sometimes discouraged them.  Further, they believed the attitudes of 
some scientists who refused to share all their knowledge were blurring the missions of 
successful CTT.     
 
Some scientists felt that involvement with CTT tended to pressurise them. Scientists could 
and did work well with companies, sometimes as consultants. TTOs, however, often lacked 
necessary skills and resources. Venture capitalists argued that they would prefer to work with 
companies rather than with scientists.  Differences in culture and poor understanding of 
policies and practices sometimes did contribute to the failure of companies to take up 
research findings, and to the failures of scientists and their administrators to get them to do 
so.   
 
In Chapter 8, the author briefly discussed how a ‘Malaysian way’ towards successful 
economic development and CTT, might be found, in a theoretical and practical context in 
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which, as Sorge (1985) argued, choices can always be made, but always in ways constrained 
by resource and other limitations.  Different institutions and practices in different societies 
are different institutions to different societies, and, therefore, each country’s ambitions, ways 
of achieving them, and achievements, are always unique.  The culture of a human society or 
social institution is everything that it used to be and which it now consists of.  For Malaysia, 
in its present context, the higher the degree of industrialization becomes, the stronger the 
international networks become. Malaysia’s economy contains a high proportion of SMEs, 
and levels of FDI are high and increasing, and these characteristics are highly representative 
of it. .The other main focus of discussion was a specifically Malaysian route to economic 
development.  It was partly about education and inculcation of liberal thinking, producing 
citizens with principles, open-minds, and with useful knowledge and skills, people who 
combine the qualities of the philosopher-king and the true, meaning broadly educated, 
general as well as specialist, technocrat. 
 
In the contexts of respondents’ arguments on government policies, companies’ managers and 
professionals spoke of being concerned about a lack of readiness on the part of government 
venture capitalists to invest in companies. This was also referred as lack of commitment by 
government policy-makers to look on university research as being a fully respectable part of 
the government’s agenda.  They also felt that most government-funded inventions and 
discoveries were not publicised enough to companies and businesses.  Companies argued that 
they had advanced knowledge of technology and production but did not try hard enough to 
disseminate it widely..  Further, TTOs emphasised their view that their organizations did not 
have many CTT-expert staff. They felt that there should be a flexible process of CTT that 
could help it become more successful. Almost all of the respondents omitted to mention the 
importance of the role of regional economic differences in CTT.   Although the government 
had launched a new regional development policy, the role of management in CTT was not 
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regarded as an essential element of government policy.  Most of the scientist respondents 
made remarks about difficulties involved in working with companies.  They had experienced 
them in their roles in selling ideas, in design and in manufacturing.  Companies appreciated 
foreign technology more than domestic kinds.   However, university staff believed in the 
importance of using pilot plants to convince companies of the usefulness of their findings.  
Finally, they felt that elements of trust and commitment from the various parties involved, 
especially between scientists and companies, should be among the main features of CTT.   
 
 
THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE STUDY, THE PRECONCEPTIONS, AND SOME KEY 
FINDINGS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS  
 
The main focus of this study was the perceived failure of manufacturing companies in 
Malaysia to use university and GRI research findings, and the failure of scientists to persuade 
companies to use them. Many people in industry in Malaysia seemed to think that scientists, 
in their own country at least, did not always do industrially relevant research. This is the case 
in most countries, of course, but in Malaysia this commonplace fact  seemed to surprise 
industrial managers more than it might in countries with older traditions of modern 
manufacturing. Companies often used reverse engineering or help from foreign-owned 
parents instead of using research from Malaysian universities. In some sectors, of course, 
there was little research from anywhere for companies to use. This is also common across the 
industrial world, but in Malaysia the degrees to which university and GRI TTOs lacked 
relevant skills, experience and procedures needed to make CTT work seemed particularly 
noticeable. Some industry sectors did, however, enjoy experiential advantages in using 
research findings, and to be sophisticated by any standards, for example ones in chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and mechanical engineering.   
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Government industrial policies have focused on the government-business relationship, and 
this study suggests that business climate influences, sometimes dramatically, relationships 
between scientists, their administrators and companies.  A key element of the findings was 
the importance of effective communication between the various parties for success with 
CTT.  As university and GRI scientists become, rightly or wrongly, the main focus of models 
of CTT, it is relevant to focus on their business and technical knowledge and skills, or on 
their lack of them, and their need to become more involved with processes of invention and 
innovation in companies.  In future alliances between companies, scientists, TTOs and 
research administrators it seems that it will be helpful to develop the currently often very 
poor links and methods of communication between them.  Therefore the preconception of 
this study, those differences in values, attitudes and ways of initiating, prosecuting and 
controlling activities matter greatly as influences on actual low uptake by companies, has 
been validated.  Given the efforts to promote CTT and to supply funds for it by the 
government, the success rates of CTT are still questionable.  Some restructuring of funds and 
grants could also help to increase the volume of effective support for research and its 
successful development.   
 
 
THE THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 
 
This study makes some contributions to theory.   The idea of commercialization as a useful 
input to economic life is partly dubious, as explained and discussed in several ways in 
previous chapters, but sometimes it is very or partly relevant and useful.  The study offers 
some evidence for evaluating and considering further the two very wide-ranging and general 
models and theories of technical change, the Technik and the STH ones.  The practical 
problems of CTT can, as we have seen, be understood better by looking at them from these 
 299
two theoretical perspectives. This is because the hopes for CTT are expressed from the STH 
perspective and criticised from the Technik one.  Malaysia has its own specific industrial and 
other technical needs, priorities and resources, of course, and the models and the contrasts 
between them are also useful for helping us to understand what they are.   
 
This study has offered original data that demonstrate that there are genuine problems with 
CTT. We have seen how CTT are advocated for political and economic purposes by 
politicians and their allies and employees in business and government, apparently without 
achieving a great deal, although some scientists and companies, in some sectors, have built 
and used links successfully.  Some companies have pursued technical development largely 
by relying on their unique capabilities and resources.  
 
University and GRI scientists tended to be rather passive in their thinking and responses.  
Their backgrounds, responsibilities and the structures and procedures that they operate with 
constrain their time and imaginations.  D’Este and Patel (2007, p.1309) concluded that 
interaction between universities and industry in the UK was most effective when it used a 
variety of channels.  These included the creation of new physical processes, consultancy and 
contract research, joint research, training, and meetings and conferences.   The individual 
characteristics of the people involved had stronger effects on the variety and frequency of 
interaction between industry and academic researchers than the characteristics of the latter’s 
departments, disciplines or universities,.  D’Este and Patel (2007) also questioned two 
aspects of government policies directed at university-industry interaction, namely the 
concerns of governments with measurement of rates of patenting and of spin-off activities.  
For the present study, their findings suggest that the Malaysian government and universities 
may be putting too much pressure on academic researchers to interact formally with 
companies through existing university channels, and to do so with goals and targets that are 
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too highly specified and quantifiable. Researchers who interacted well with companies, 
according to them, and in several ways  suggested by the present findings, often did use the 
formal university channels but several others too, formal and informal, and in both their 
universities and in the companies that they helped. 
 
The results of this study are relevant in a more general sense, because it is widely accepted 
that CTT is a very, perhaps the single most, important tool of a so-called knowledge-based 
strategy for growth (Wong, Ho, and Singh, 2007; Etzkowitz, Webster, Gebhart and Terra, 
2000).  Wong, Ho and Singh (2007) built a model to help plan knowledge-based economic 
development for the National University of Singapore. However, the Commercialization 
Loop Model created by the present writer is not as ambitious because it was designed for a 
different, narrower or more focused, purpose, to respond to the perceived problem of low 
uptake of research from universities and GRIs.  Universities in Malaysia have succeeded in 
being granted funding from government initiatives for economic development in various 
years of Malaysian Development Plans, and Malaysian governments have now been looking 
to universities for knowledge and innovation to help stimulate economic growth for a number 
of decades. As the experience and the challenges facing scientists and companies in Malaysia 
continue to develop, and if as the most general conclusions of this study suggest they should, 
relevant government and related policies become more based on the Technik as opposed to 
the STH model of technical change, and therefore more focused and sector-specific and 
company-centred, they should become more practical and effective.     
 
The present study also presents some discussion of parts of the historical, political and 
intellectual background of CTT.  In chapter 3, comparisons were made between academics, 
who were grouped into cosmopolitan intellectuals, provincial academics and technical 
college teachers. The backgrounds of all those involved with CTT can be compared with 
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theirs, so as to suggest that certain types of experience and outlook, in industry, government 
and universities alike, will tend to be associated with specific kinds of attitude to CTT. Thus 
some academic researchers tend to have fairly narrow outlooks and tend not to understand 
the wider possibilities, and the relevance and the limitations of their own work: they tend to 
be provincial academics. Cosmopolitan intellectuals, on the other hand, who do tend to 
understand the wider issues, tend to be the more able and successful kinds of academic or 
government minister or official, or manager or professional in more technically sophisticated 
sectors like pharmaceuticals or aerospace.  
 
In the same context, university administrators and TTO officers have been criticised for 
lacking relevant, or for having inadequately sophisticated, experience and capabilities 
(Wong, Ho, and Singh, 2007; Debackere and Veugelers, 2005).  They have also been 
criticised for lack of subtlety, understanding and administrative and communicative ability 
when acting on behalf of university managers to encourage and support researchers 
(Debackere and Veugelers, 2005; Inzelt, 2004). On the other hand, they are likely to be 
criticised by researchers for whatever they do, because of the administrative and managerial 
nature of their roles, and many of them have distinguished backgrounds themselves, often as 
former researchers with genuine desires to support currently active ones. These are important 
practical as well as theoretically relevant findings of this study. 
 
Another interesting theoretical contribution of this thesis concerns how the terms engineering 
and science are understood by different kinds of people who are involved in or with them in 
Malaysia, The interview data and the present writer’s general experiences suggest that the 
English language meanings of these words are very influential, and that the STH model of 
technical change is widely assumed to be broadly correct in Malaysia. This, it is suggested, 
makes Malaysian governments and other Malaysian institutions expect too much, too soon, 
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from CTT, and to make them think of it as a much more rational and sequential or linear set 
of processes than it is in reality, or if the Technik model of technical change had been more 
influential in Malaysia. 
 
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The limitations of this study were discussed briefly in Chapter 5.  Cost and time 
considerations had limited the number of respondents.  Thus the findings cannot be 
generalised directly to the larger populations being considered.  Some respondents tended to 
express their answers and views in ‘socially respectable’ ways,  and seemed reluctant to 
present themselves did not present themselves and their universities, GRIs, and companies or 
other organizations negatively.  The group of respondents that appeared to do this most were 
the TTOs and senior research administrators.  This was perhaps not surprising as they usually 
held promoted positions in non-traditional, non-mainstream, in some respects marginal, units 
of their organizations, and it must also usually be tempting for them to paint the most 
favourable pictures possible of the science and scientists that they represent. Another reason 
was probably the ages of these respondents.  Generally they were in their late 40s and early 
50s, in a country in which people tend to retire at 55. They were senior managers, senior 
lecturers, senior officers and senior administrators who, being in mid-career, would be 
unlikely to feel very free to be critical of their own and related employing organizations.   
 
A further, partly separate, limitation lay in the use of the qualitative data-gathering method of 
interviewing. The quality of interview data is depends on the skills of the interviewer, how 
rigorously the data are understood and analyzed, and on the validity of the insights being 
discussed in the findings and interpretations of data that, in this case, are in Appendix 1, and 
in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.   
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SOME GENERAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
The discussion of the data from company and scientists’ and public sector perspectives 
presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 suggest some useful implications for policy.  Regarding 
CTT, we have seen how scientists were thought of as the main factors in the production of 
new intellectual property and the encouragement of companies to exploit research findings.  
However, companies’ thinking and efforts were often discouraged and marginalised by 
constraints of time, cost, product quality considerations, technology licensing, patenting 
processes, inventors’ intellectual property rights, and the organization and character of their 
collaboration with universities and GRIs.   Inzelt (2004) showed how, in Hungary, a very 
different country from Malaysia in many ways but one at a not dissimilar stage of economic 
development, the proportion of industrial companies involved with public scientific 
researchers and government agencies concerned with CTT and supporting it with incentives 
and encouragement is low, as is also the case in Malaysia. Evidence from this study suggests 
that support for the R and D objectives of universities and GRIs is different from that given 
or not given in companies for innovation.  The former consists of dissemination of research 
through journals and publication.  The latter is sensitive to a large degree to companies’ 
technical, financial and commercial disciplines and their direct encouragement or otherwise 
of CTT and innovation.  Therefore, government policies during the Eighth Plan period 
(2001-2005) that have made companies contribute towards the expansion of their own 
research and development activities can be questioned.   
 
Effective CTT needs mutual trust and support and adaptability from all the parties.  Building 
up business partnerships between universities and companies in the long term is more than a 
question of providing financial resources. In any case the financial resources and capabilities 
of the Malaysian government have definite limits. On the other hand, Malaysia has plenty of 
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natural resources.  The politician interviewee admitted that the initial motives of the 
government as regards CTT were focused on building human capabilities.  Interaction and 
links between universities and companies were, he accurately pointed out, becoming more 
regular. Relevant government policies for higher education, research and CTT were 
becoming more ambitious and strategic in practice, whereas in the past they only tended to be 
so in theory. Policies and incentives were now more focused on supporting strategic links 
between scientists and companies.  Thinking about regional economic development and 
science-industry collaboration has become both more practical, and also more theoretically 
developed in Malaysia, as elsewhere, drawing on new growth theory, transaction cost and 
resource-based value theory, and evolutionary economics (Juniper, 2002).   
 
The data contain many potentially useful points, general and specific, about how the 
companies’ capabilities were very often influenced by the sectors that they occupied and 
their familiarity with technical change and scientific knowledge. The government is 
concerned with indigenous capacity building particularly in such areas as ICT, 
biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, advanced materials, and aerospace-related 
technologies.  Companies involved in and with these technologies are very prominent among 
those for whom CTT are relevant and likely to be useful. Yet the data suggest that, even for 
them, CTT are rarely simple and straightforward. For other companies, their relevance can 
range from minimal to surprisingly important. In most cases, uncertainty about research and 
development is normal.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY 
 
Evidence discussed above suggests that CTT can be burdens on pressurised scientists, TTOs 
and senior research officers who are expected to help companies to implement them. 
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Responsible company managers and professionals need to act in ways that satisfy their 
superiors. In making recommendation for policy, many influences and options need to be 
taken into account.  How universities are organized to contribute to CTT is one key 
influence. In principle, university administrators have to change their policies on intellectual 
property ownership to allow scientists to enjoy greater shares of royalty income than was 
usually the case before CTT became a priority.  They need to encourage their scientists to 
become directly involved with companies and to be more entrepreneurial and commercial..  
Therefore, scientists might increasingly be allowed to form and own or part-own engineering 
or so-called technology-based companies.  Universities might be encouraged to break some 
academic barriers and to get scientists to work more like engineers by aiming to conduct 
commercially relevant research from the outset.  However, senior university staff should not 
put too much pressure on scientists to be narrowly relevant, because the most relevant and 
profitable research of all, and not only in the long run, is often the most broad in approach 
and fundamental in its concerns.  
 
As noted before, the other main problem with CTT concerns financial capabilities of 
universities, GRIs and companies. The government might usefully give more substantial 
financial to help them to design, test and develop products and processes, using relevant 
research findings.  It is well to remember that inadequate communication is too often another 
source of barriers between various parties involved in CTT.  If communication and co-
operation are organized and managed more competently, the spread of CTT from universities 
and GRIs into companies should be faster, more successful, and better integrated.  Such 
improvements should start by developing common and clear overarching aims, and by 
emphasising the importance of experience and continuity in collaboration and 
communication. 
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It would also seem desirable for the Malaysian government to approach CTT and the 
development of Malaysia’s industry and economy in a broader way, one that is more 
historical and comparative and more detached from day to day policy and management 
considerations. The key issue for this study concerned the abilities of the various parties 
involved to take appropriate measures to help to strengthen the market orientation of 
research. The thesis has pointed to the factors that have allowed the relatively low uptake of 
research findings by many Malaysian companies to persist for over a decade after the IRPA 
policy was implemented. It would be wrong to rule out the strong possibility, indeed the 
probability, that many companies need to gain competitive advantages by taking up research 
findings, whether or not they are aware of their needs for technical change, and whether or 
not such change is obviously likely to be profitable. Also, it is clear from the interview data 
that many scientists prefer their established approaches to their academic jobs to trying to 
engage in CTT.  This tendency appears to include a defensive-minded preference on the part 
of some scientists to conceal their research findings from companies.  The more general 
question then arises as to how far different groups in the scientific community are willing, 
over time, to share their knowledge and findings with businesses.  Also how may the process 
of CTT help shape the directions of scientific research, the nature of relevant scientific 
knowledge, and co-operation between scientific and business communities?  Such broad and 
partly comparative and historical questions need to be asked and answered by researchers 
before policies can be shaped with any confidence, or modified suitably in action.  
 
Support for CTT can have different objectives and take a variety of forms.  Therefore, policy 
objectives recommended to be pursued by the Malaysian government should involve 
technology forecasting, technology acquisition, exploitation/licensing, lead users and the 
financial institutions that specialise in funding technical change.  Although such institutions 
and practices exist, their contributions are questionable, as they seem often seem to focus on 
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profiting from the financing of politically fashionable or popular innovations. Continuous 
dialogue and regular discussion between the main parties, meaning scientists, companies, 
engineers, university administrators and TTOs is necessary for supporting CTT.   Legislation 
on financing and education policies should be developed to increase relevant kinds of support 
for CTT. 
 
The new regional development programmes in Malaysia such as those for the Northern 
Corridor Economic Region (NCER), the Iskandar Development Region (ISR) and East Coast 
Economic Region (ECER) mean that they are among the main new regional foci for CTT.  
Such ‘new’ areas and the Multimedia Super Corridor could complement each other and 
Malaysia’s other areas or regions with their efforts, and their success, measurable partly by 
such indicators as patents awarded, depends partly on closing relevant so-called technology 
gaps through industry-science co-operation.  
 
We have seen that since the Fifth Malaysian Plan, the government has increasingly promoted 
R and D and other kinds of innovation.  As well as support for CTT/innovation by 
universities and companies, and regional financing/support, other relevant programmes and 
initiatives include electronic government, ‘Smart Schools’, telemedicine and R and D 
clusters. These have been promoted as flagship ways of promoting the use of new 
technologies.  Tighter public budgets and growing interest in the natural environment seem 
likely to firm up evaluations of policies and their implementation.   
Important policies for regional development include regulatory intervention, such as 
regulatory policies, technical norms and protective regulations; financial incentives for 
promotion of R and D and innovative projects in companies and universities, using with 
direct support or tax measures, and promotion of co-operation of companies with public 
institutions; and promotion of public demand for innovative products, involving procurement 
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by the public sectors.  However, the last suggestion could fail if, in the public sectors, 
managers prefer imports and, in effect, imported techniques, to indigenous products and 
techniques from Malaysia’s universities and GRIs.  Therefore, it is the responsibility of the 
federal government to intervene accordingly to help ensure the greater success of CTT across 
Malaysia’s regions.   
 
Other policy recommendations could include upgrading of the International Divisions under 
MOSTI that now provide links and nurture scientific collaboration with other countries, and a 
re-evaluation of the role of GRIs. There is a need for GRIs to respond faster to changing 
competitive environments, which probably requires more flexible use as well as planning of 
their work.  Here, also, more interdisciplinarity is also needed, in both companies and 
amongst university and GRI scientists, to help cope with often large effects of complex 
systems of successful CTT, as well as use of more internal competition in GRIs, and possibly 
some restructuring of incentives for R and D and related staff. In the last of these cases it 
should be remembered that professionals like engineers and scientists and related GRI and 
university staff do not always react positively to incentives that are purely monetary, because 
many such people rightly regard themselves primarily as public servants with altruistic 
motives. 
 
The above proposals are geared towards enhancing technical change and the development 
and internationalisation of business. Better long-term use and development of limited 
resources is sought.  This means more selectivity as regards sectors, technology and location, 
although the government needs to be careful not to intervene too much in markets and in 
their self-regulating forces, or in the largely self-organized science system. Several of the 
interviewees made this point in different ways and from different standpoints.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
A more historical, comparative and long-term approach to research into CTT is needed, 
rather than one focused on their day-to-day management and specific policies, however 
important the latter may be. The key question in this study was the ability of various parties 
involved to take appropriate measures to strengthen the use by Malaysian companies of more 
market-oriented scientific research findings.  The factors that affect the low uptake of 
research findings by Malaysian companies, over two decades after IRPA was implemented 
(in 1986), have been noted. So too have the existence of positive attitudes and practices 
among many researchers and in some, mainly more advanced, industrial sectors, the lack of 
interest in science, some reasonable enough and some not, in many others; some rather 
defensive attitudes among some scientists; some rather inflexible approaches to the 
management of CTT in universities and GRIs; and the evolving nature of the relationships 
between government, researchers and companies and the relationships of all three major 
parties, individually and combined, with the outside world.  
 
One methodological limitation of the study is a lack of case study materials to complement 
the interview data.  The present study was, in some ways, a case study of some reasonably 
representative Malaysian universities and GRIs.  However, the use of only two research 
tools, the interview and - to a very minor degree - documentary analysis, was a genuine 
weakness.  To improve on this study, further research which uses other methods should be 
conducted.  A case study is not so much a single data-gathering technique as a 
methodological approach that incorporates a number of data-gathering techniques (Hamel, 
Dufour and Fortin, 1993; Merriam, 2001; Yin, 1998).  The case study approach can vary 
from an interview of a single individual or group to a general all-encompassing field study 
gathering and using many types and source of data. Thus a  case study may focus on an 
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individual, a group, or an entire organization or community, and may use a wide range of 
data-gathering tools such as life histories, documents, oral histories, interviews, postal 
surveys, and observation, direct and participant (Hagan, 2002: Yin, 1994).  Case studies can 
be rather pointed in their focus or take a very broad view of life and society.  For example, an 
investigator may confine his or her examination to a single aspect of an individual’s life such 
as studying a medical student’s action and behaviour in their medical school.  Or an 
investigator might try to assess the whole life of the individual and their entire background, 
experiences, roles, and all of the motives that affect his or her behaviour as a student and in 
society, past, present and future.  Very rich and detailed information can come from case 
studies. In contrast, often extensive large-scale survey research data may seem somewhat 
superficial in nature (Champion, 1993).                                                                                                          
 
In the case of CTT in Malaysia, additional research is needed to fill out and/or to contradict 
elements of the sketchy picture drawn on the basis of the present data.   More systematic 
coverage of more industries, sectors and/or companies is needed. An attempt is needed to use 
more detailed and comprehensive data to identify the features of the scientists who are 
engaged with companies in different sectors.  By concentrating on single universities, GRIs, 
and on different sectors or industries, we may uncover the interaction of the more significant 
factors characteristic of CTT in their and other cases and some if not all of the reasons for 
them.  We may be able to capture various nuances, patterns and thus some of the more latent 
elements that even the interview method might overlook (Gall, Borg and Gall, 1995; 1998).  
The case study has an ability to open the way for significant discoveries (Shaughnessy and 
Zeshmeister, 1999).  It can serve as a breeding ground for insights and hypothesis to be 
pursued in subsequent work.  For example, Wong, Ho and Singh (2007) conducted a case 
study of the National University of Singapore (NUS) as a kind of entrepreneurial university 
in the context of a Triple Helix kind of theoretical approach (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 
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2000). A case study of an organization involves systematic gathering of enough information 
about it to allow the investigator serious insights into its life (Berg, 2004).  The National 
University of Singapore was chosen because of its technology commercialization activities.  
Multi-case study work can include cross-case analysis. Thus Barnes, Pashby and Gibbons ( 
2002) evaluated six collaborative research projects undertaken partly for the purpose of 
effective university-industry interaction.   The collection of the data for this research was 
through interviews with participants in each of the projects, project documentation and direct 
observation of project meetings. The study could be regarded as broad and generic, but it has 
yielded findings useful for academic and industrial practitioners.  Therefore, in future 
research for evidence of successful CTT in clusters, industries, regions or areas, universities 
and GRIs case studies are needed in order to develop deeper and more comprehensive 
evaluations.   
 
Future research should also be longitudinal, also in the cause of better evaluation. Case 
studies tend to have longitudinal elements, often extensive ones, of course.  The present 
study tended only to gather deep data from the respondents who were experienced scientists 
and members of companies, and partly because purposive sampling was used to find 
respondents with relevant interesting backgrounds and experiences. Longitudinal studies 
have obvious advantages over cross-sectional ones by providing data about events that take 
place over time. They usually ask and answer more ‘why questions’ than cross-sectional 
studies do. However, this advantage often comes at a heavy cost of time and money.  
Observations may have to be made at the times when events are occurring, and the methods 
of observation may require many researchers (Babbie, 2002).   The present study was a 
sponsored one with time limits, although as a government-sponsored one by an academic 
from a very good Malaysian university with an obvious constructive interest in the work of 
the respondents, it was likely to be viewed favourably by them.  Kjaergaard and Kautz 
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(2008) conducted a very useful longitudinal study on how to manage knowledge in 
organizations in Denmark from February 1999 until June 2000 which focused on events, 
organizational members, their contexts and interaction between all three factors over this 
relatively short period.  The study nonetheless appears to make good sense of the 
perceptions, actions and behaviour of management, in clear and useful ways.  
 
Longitudinal studies have has been used for exploring relationships between external 
technology acquisitions and firm performance.   The method was used to control  industry 
effects, firm effects and time effects, with analysis using data sets on 341 electronics 
manufacturing firms over the years 1998 to 2002 (Tsai and Wang, 2008). Further study of the 
present subject could compare the data from the present sample with evidence from a region 
with high absorptive capacity, rather than taking selected universities, GRIs and industries 
through longitudinal studies. Arguments about analytical and methodological issues 
concerning innovation systems have been considered by Carlsson, Jacobsson, Holmén and 
Rickne (2002).  They argued that certain methodological aspects stood out as the most 
problematic ones.  There were: level of analysis; system boundaries; and system 
performance.  The phenomenon most in need of further research was performance 
measurement.  Measuring performance of a technological system is not a straightforward, but 
requires a careful consideration of level analysis factors and the degree of maturity of the 
technological system studied.   
 
Relevant future research in the Malaysian context needs, especially, to focus on regional 
innovation systems and clusters of industrial development.  Innovation system is a concept 
widely dealt with in the literature on technical change and regional economies. The concept 
relates to two main bodies of theory and research.  The first is innovation systems research; 
the second is regional economics, with its interest in explaining the locational distribution 
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and policy effects of regional high technology industry, technology parks, innovation 
networks and innovation programmes (Cooke, Uranga and Extebarria, 1997).  Here, these 
researchers considered the concepts of region, innovation and system and discussed the 
importance of financial capacity, institutionalised learning and productive culture to 
systematic innovation.  They argued that regions had evolved along different trajectories 
though varied combinations of political, social and economic forces.   
 
In Malaysia the Central Region includes Melaka, Negeri Sembilan, Selangor and Wilayah 
Persekutuan. It, and they, has enjoyed faster fastest growth of GDP compared to other 
regions which include the Northern, Southern and Eastern ones, and Sabah and Sarawak 
(EPU, 2006).  Selected examples of comparative studies of regional innovation systems have 
included Regional Innovation Systems: Designing for the Future; the European Regional 
Innovation Survey; SME Policy and the Regional Dimension of Innovation; Nordic SMEs 
and Regional Innovation Systems; Regional Cluster-driven Innovation in Canada; and 
Regional Innovative Clusters (Doloreux and Parto, 2005).  According to Doloreuex and 
Parto, the main objectives of these studies was to understand how regional innovation 
systems function, to specify factors and mechanisms that best promote competitiveness and 
innovation, and to assess relevant policy implications.  Doloreuex and Parto attempted a 
state-of-the-art review of such studies, with a focus on conceptual clarification and the 
usefulness of research findings vis-á-vis regional innovation systems, and stressing the roles 
of different types of regional innovation system in different countries.  They concluded that a 
regional innovation system is a normative and descriptive notion that tries to capture how 
technical development takes place in a country or other usefully identifiable territory.  They 
argued that regional institutional arrangements and institutions needed to be as appropriate as 
possible in their different geographical contexts as factors that could help optimise the 
achievement of regional development and innovation.  
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Research in China on regional innovation systems located between Beijing and Shenzhen 
suggested that local officials played important roles in developing the evolutionary 
trajectories of their regions. In particular, they discussed how and why Beijing and Shenzhen 
had used different methods for developing their technology clusters (Chen and Kenney, 
2007).  Beijing had developed University/Research Institute (URI) links through spin-off 
companies and university science parks.  Shenzhen had upgraded higher education 
institutions.   
 
Cooke (2005) argued that the ‘regional knowledge capabilities’ approach proved superior in 
explaining how research, innovation and production actually function. The case of Basel and 
its bioscience firms evaluated using this approach is the result of much recent thinking by 
users of the regional innovation model about the nature of innovation. From capabilities 
rooted initially in ‘open science’ and subsequently in ‘open innovation’, ‘spirals of growth 
nodes’, operating through international networks, were set in motion.  Conceição and Heitor 
(2007) suggested that many firms lacked even more incentives to perform their own R and D 
than was thought previously, and thus needed stronger interventions from the public sector.  
This might be particularly important for late industrializing countries, with relatively 
immature industries and education systems.  Often these countries showed low levels of 
private commitment to technical development or R and D, with disproportionately high 
government expenditure on it.   
Cabrer-Borrás and Serrano-Domingo (2007) analysed spatial patterns of innovation, their 
regional interdependencies and evolution, as well as its role in local innovation, in Spanish 
regions.  They argued that while local capacity was very relevant for domestic innovation, so 
too were spatial innovation spillovers, which came mainly from higher education and public 
administration.  A minimum level of regional development was required to improve the 
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effectiveness of R and D policies.  They indicated that it was necessary for R and D policies 
to be used in combination with others that were focused on improving socio-economic and 
structural influences on innovative performance.  They concluded that to combine such 
general policies with other industrial, technological and scientific policies, both general and 
regional in scope, was to focus constructively on the improvement of the educational levels 
of populations, on the technical intensity of relevant sectors, and on the links between 
scientific research and the technical requirements of such sectors.  These Such arguments 
were firmed up before by Rondé and Hussler (2005), who felt that the engine of regional 
innovativeness seemed to reside in the relationships developed between the actors in the 
given territory.  The present study shows the significance of the effects of relational 
competences and confirms the idea that networking capability is a major enhancer of 
innovation.   
 
Singh (2007) suggested, on the basis of his study, that innovative teams that achieve cross-
regional knowledge integration emerge with innovations of significantly greater value than 
those that do not.  Cross-regional knowledge integration did not only seem to have a direct 
effect on quality of innovation but it also appeared to have a moderating effect on the 
geographical distribution of R and D as an influence on innovation quality.  The addresses of 
firms seemed to be linked to limitations on their patent counts, and Singh argued that location 
in a region was generally a useful indicator of both knowledge availability and innovative 
capacity.  Mainwaring, Moore and Murphy’s (2007) study and arguments are consistent with 
the Schumpeterian view that innovation increases with firm size, contrary to much of the 
recent empirical literature.  The latter argued that firms outside their ‘region’ (Ireland) made 
little contributions to regional patent stocks and that patenting activity rose and increased 
with firm size.  Similarly, the main arguments of Rutten and Boekema (2007) on differences 
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in regional social capital also help to explain regional differences in economic development.  
They argued, as many other have since the 1990s, that regional social capital originates from 
the embeddedness of firms in regional webs of economic, political and social relations.  The 
norms, values and customs of relevant networks facilitated collaboration for mutual benefit.  
To conclude, an innovative regional cluster is likely to have: firms with access to other firms 
in their sectors as customers, suppliers or partners, perhaps operating in formal or informal 
networks; and knowledge centres such as universities, research institutes, contract research 
organizations and technology-transfer agencies (Cooke, Uranga and Extebarria, 1997).  It 
seems, therefore, important for strengthening regional capacities for promoting both systemic 
learning and interactive innovation for regions to manifest such characteristics.   
 
From the findings, the topic of regional innovation systems was barely discussed by the 
interviewees.   Only one scientist mentioned that their organization encountered other 
regional players such as ones in African countries in their commercialization of agricultural 
research output.  These had engaged in the successful commercialization of scientific 
research.  One senior university administrator reported how his university had to co-operate 
with several government departments, including Regional Development Authorities, to 
commercialize its scientific discoveries.   
 
Very little research appears to be being or to have been conducted in Malaysia on the effects 
of regional innovation systems on the fate of CTT.  Apart from the use of regional 
development organizations to monitor and co-ordinate activities and changes, innovative 
regional economic development appears to need sustained economic, financial, social and 
political support. It also needs to be in harmony with environmental developments. Further 
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research should be used to explore the ramifications of this observation in different regions 
and sectors of Malaysia and its economy, and in other societies as well.   
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APPENDIX 1:   
 
RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This appendix presents the interview findings in some detail and reviews a little of documentary 
evidence taken from the companies and other organizations that supplied the interviewees. The 
research questions are again presented in this appendix, in its first section.  In the next section 
the results of the interviews that took place in companies are described.  The following section 
records the findings of the interviews in universities and government research institutes.  The 
fourth section records the findings of the interviews of other interested parties, meaning three 
venture capitalists, two journalists and a politician.  In the fifth, the documentary evidence is 
described and discussed.  In the sixth, some comparisons are made between the various findings 
and they are summarised in general.  Finally, the appendix is briefly summarised.   
 
 
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research findings that indicated in this appendix are supposed to answer the research 
questions.  Two main questions underlying in this study were as follows. First, why have many 
Malaysian firms apparently failed to make use of relevant discoveries, inventions, ideas and 
knowledge produced by Malaysian government research institutes, universities and others? 
 
Second, why do the government research institutes and the universities and other researchers, 
whose work is funded by government and intended to be commercialized by Malaysian industry, 
apparently fail to persuade many companies to use their discoveries, inventions, ideas and 
knowledge?   Thus the two main themes were particularly concerned about the problems of 
company up take and the researchers’ persuasiveness.   
 
However, there were also two other secondary research questions underlying the two main ones.  
First, could there be a specifically Malaysian route to the commercialisation of inventions and 
knowledge? And if so, to what extent is the Malaysian government aware of this and able to use 
it? Second, do Malaysia’s government and its research managers and specialists provide 
information about relevant inventions and knowledge to companies in appropriate and 
persuasive ways?  These two secondary questions will be discussed in Chapter 6, 7 and 8 
respectively.     
 
THE COMPANY INTERVIEWS 
These were 23 company interviews.  The companies consisted of two from mechanical, five 
from electrical and four from chemical engineering, four from pharmaceuticals, two from 
electronics, and one each from five companies in construction, IT and software, biotechnology, 
food technology, and technology transfer.   
 
 
The order of the interviews  
The interview findings are described under eight headings, based on the sectors in which the 
respondents were employed, and generally on the historical periods when the sectors emerged.  
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The first sector is construction (one respondent), the second is mechanical engineering (three 
respondents), the third is electrical engineering and mixtures of electrical and mechanical 
engineering (five respondents), the fourth is chemicals and pharmaceuticals (eight respondents), 
the fifth is electronics and information technology (three respondents), the sixth is biomedical 
and biotechnology (two respondents) the seventh is food technology (one respondents) and the 
eighth is  a technology transfer company.   
 
 
Construction (one interviewee)  
 
Interviewee 1     
This respondent was 50.  His background was in rubber-based technology, in which he had a 
PhD from an English university.   He had 12 years’ research experience in a government 
research institute.  After that he worked as a political secretary for a Malaysia’s foreign minister 
for three years. Then, in 2001, he became the managing director of his present company which 
builds houses and shops in satellite towns, and also other facilities that complete satellite towns.    
 
He was asked about the commercialization of research.  He spoke mainly about his research in 
rubber, because he regards construction technologies as more stable and established.  He began 
by restating the problem of low commercialization of research findings to do with rubber.  He 
spoke of there being a chicken and egg question with there being ‘the usual difficulties with 
finance and technology’.  Although relevant research was often quite advanced and sometimes 
very much so by the industry’s standards the scientists did not know how companies should use 
it and companies lacked the staff and the money to do so themselves.   
 
In universities and research institutes most scientists were motivated mainly by publication.  In 
big foreign companies, technical improvements often did not need any fundamental research, 
but when it did, company employees could either do it themselves, or adapt recent university 
findings. In Malaysia however, companies tended only to be users rather than creators of 
technology.  Even in newer sectors like information technology, Malaysian companies tended to 
use manufacturing techniques from abroad.   
 
His own company in construction and property used designers of houses and other buildings but 
it hardly ever used any new scientific knowledge.  In mechanical and electronic engineering and 
IT, most developments were of a craft and engineering type and they did not often use some 
scientific knowledge.  Even companies that built very sophisticated buildings did not seem to 
rely on scientific research findings.   
 
Mechanical engineering (two interviewees) 
 
Interviewee 2   
This interviewee was an Australian who looked and spoke as if he were about 60.  His company 
made agricultural implements used for cutting vegetation and levelling land and roads.  The 
company was originally an Australian one, which had come to Malaysia in 1976.  It becomes 
partly Malaysian through a joint venture with a local company which had been created by 
Malaysia’s National Farmers’ Association.  The company is still a joint venture, but the shares 
are now split 49:51 between the now wholly owned Malaysian one and a Danish company.  It 
has about 30 employees and it exports about 30 percent of its output, mostly to Indonesia.  Its 
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technology has not changed much since the late 1980s, and there has been a little change in the 
company’s market.   
 
The respondent had worked with the company in Malaysia for 16 years.  He had been to college 
but not university.  His background was in marketing.  The company had two technicians with 
diplomas, and no graduate engineers.  It had a ‘sort of’ R and D department which involved 
three people in a small division or section in the production department.  The innovative 
activities consisted of making improvement to products and processes on a part-time basis. 
Improvements or innovations that the managers thought would be useful were defined as 
projects, with some being more innovative than others.  Usually one or two people from the R 
and D section would work alongside one or two production or marketing people from outside on 
a project.  Usually three or four such projects were running at any given time.   
 
The company’s products consisted of powered and un-powered machines that were attached to 
tractors of different sizes.  The company was very confident about its expertise with such 
machines.  They had long been suppliers to their customers. They were no overseas inputs to 
technical change.  The respondent said, that agricultural machinery is ‘old technology’ and ‘a 
plough is a plough, was a plough 100 years ago, a plough today and it will be still a plough in 
100 years time’  Ploughs were wider than in the past and had been pulled by tractors for several 
decades, but they were still ploughs.  The main source of innovation was customers, although 
most employees had great mastery of the products and had worked for the company for between 
12 to 14 years.  Some had been with the company for 25 years.  They were almost all trained by 
the company rather than being academically qualified.   
 
Interviewee 3  
This interviewee, who was in his mid-40s, was a graduate in civil engineering of an English 
university.  He was involved in building furnaces.  Most of his employing company’s sales in 
South East Asia, but recently the company has collaborated with the Dutch one to supply 
hospital incineration to several countries, especially like Costa Rica, Croatia, Iran and Libya. 
 
The company’s perspective on the process of technology transfer and commercialization was 
very broad.  The prerequisite capabilities for any company to experience technology transfer are 
knowledge and understanding, minimum basic engineering concepts, ideas and abilities 
awareness of changes in relevant technology survive over time.  Such characteristics helped 
interested companies to spend wisely on developing new technology.  However, the company 
had no proper R and D department.  Nevertheless, it did a set of R and D work by using its own 
resources, with definite ideas what it was going to do and about its preferred outcomes. 
 
The company had experience of working with the Malaysian Institute of Nuclear Technology 
(MINT).  They exchanged ideas and had the passion about the same technology, that of 
incineration and combustion.  However working with a government department, it had to deal 
with its bureaucratic systems and procedures.  This ‘slows down’ the company’s desire research 
momentum.  Despite working well on waste management products, it had never worked with the 
Ministry of Local Government and Housing.  Generally, Malaysians and their government and 
their public or private sector organizations and ‘the eyes of these people’ did not see the 
company’s potential and capability in the said technology.  The syndrome ‘where is your 
technology coming from?’ makes the company find other strategies for marketing their product.  
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This was about people tending to appreciate more foreign products than local ones.  They 
mistrusted Malaysian technology.   
 
On the question of the differences between the roles of science and engineering in technical 
change, the respondent felt that the question was too general.  As most people wanted more 
technical change, it was poignant that not many politicians had engineering or scientific 
backgrounds.   In Malaysia engineers and scientists were not being valued enough for their 
devotion and the excellence of their work.  There was a tendency in Malaysia for the ‘the pride 
of being engineers or scientists already diminishing’.    
 
Electrical, Electrical (Energy) and Electrical (Mechanical): (four interviewees) 
 
Interviewee 4   
The interviewee was in his early fifties.  He has a degree in mechanical engineering.  He had 
experience working for Brunei Shell as a maintenance engineer for 14 years on a contract basis.  
He left Shell and started doing his own research on refrigerators.  He is the owner of his own 
company making refrigerators powered by batteries and air conditioner.   The company was now 
supplying refrigerators, relying on demand from existing customers.  The company had not 
reached a stage of large-scale production.  
 
The company was very interested in new technology developed in government research 
institutes and universities.  It visited many exhibitions and found that many research findings 
were applicable to its requirements and to improve its products.  It felt that until the technology 
or product was being exhibited, only it would be directly useful to them.  They could not risk 
adopting it, as these products or processes were ‘very dynamic types of things’, although it was 
true that ‘we need to improve regularly’.  Therefore, these tasks of improvement had to be done 
by the universities.  The main reason was that, regarding ‘most private companies, in Asia in 
general, and in Malaysia particularly, not many actually can spend money on research.  We have 
not reached that kind of mentality yet to allocate a certain portion of profit back into 
research….very unfortunate’.   The result is that all the profits are given back to the owners’ 
pockets.  Making prototypes was very costly and the company had spent a great deal of its own 
money.  Regarding the banks, if the product was too innovative, they were not interested.  This 
was because they are looking for ‘a track record of the product’.  If it was a new product, they 
were not very supportive.  Further, a company must provide collateral even if the funding was 
already government-supported.    
 
Interviewee 5                                                     
This interviewee was a senior engineer and in his mid-40s.  The company manufactured cables 
since 1975.  This joint venture company was formed from a government statutory body and the 
British cable manufacturer, British Insulated Callenders and Cables (BICC).  Then, in 1978, it 
became a joint venture between the first one and an Italian one, that had been formerly known as 
Pirelli Energy Cables and Systems, then the largest cable manufacturer in the world.  The 
company marketed its products both nationally and internationally.   
 
He held a degree in electrical engineering from an English university.  He argued that the 
materials, the principles, and the production characteristics of the electrical technology were 
basically the same since its beginning.  A huge amount of investment was used by the 
technology, and it came from parent companies outside Malaysia.  The owners of the technology 
 349
will not disclose everything about it.  They will then keep certain things secret. Much of the 
machinery used in Malaysia had now and then been disposed of by parent companies.  They 
were exporting their ageing technologies to Malaysia.    
 
On the extent of university and government research institutes roles in R and D, 
commercialization and technology transfer, he argued that there should be a change of focus and 
policy. Since many developing technologies were imported, it took Malaysians time to 
understand and use them fully. The universities and government research institutes (GRIs) 
should focus on home-grown products and technologies.  Malaysia received very established 
technologies from outside that have been studied and developed many years.  To the company, 
‘we are given the technology on a silver plate’.  As the ‘renaissance did not start here’, the best 
way for Malaysia was to focus on new inventions or products that were pertinent to more or less 
all industries.  The objective of this should be to have the capabilities to assist many industries.   
 
On the question of the roles of engineering and science, the interviewee felt that the two cannot 
be separated.  Both were vital for technical change.  It was very important for children to learn 
about and know about these things so that they could focus on their careers or either engineering 
or science.  The interviewee then gave the example of German education for engineers. Germans 
understood the importance of such things at the very beginning of their education. 
 
Interviewee 6:  Electrical Engineering (Energy)  
The third interviewee was a university professor in his early fifties.  He held a PhD in energy 
studies.  He has also been the chief executive of a company owned by his university.  The 
company is funded by the Ministry of Energy. Its function is to promote renewable and efficient 
energy products and services.  It produces solar panels and battery storage units.   
 
The company makes big efforts to commercialize its products.  A few other companies have 
been interested in them.  Although several products had been perfected over the last five years, 
the company still had problems in getting companies to make them, and in convincing 
financiers, like banks and venture capitalists, to help it.  Some of its scientists had difficulties in 
selling ideas, products and projects to others.  Venture capitalists were not very supportive.  The 
respondent said that ‘they were supposed to be investors’ but they were not risk-takers as ‘they 
can’t afford to lose money’.  Therefore most companies wanted, instead, to go to banks for 
finance.   
 
On the roles of engineering and science in technical change, the interviewee felt that both should 
be harmonized and ‘helping each other’.  Engineers were people who solved the problems, but 
scientists might bring different views to the table.  So ‘they have to talk to each other’ as without 
engineers, science could not be very significant.                                                      
 
 
 
Interviewee 7:  Electrical (Mechanical)  
This interviewee was a senior manager of a publishing company.  He held a degree in electronic 
engineering from an English university.  He was 51. He was one of the first Malaysians to be 
sent to the West to get higher technical education.  He has had experience in a leading electronic 
company making integrated circuits for international markets.  He then joined a major 
newspaper company in Malaysia as a senior engineer in charge of production and other technical 
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functions.  He was in influential senior manager with 20 years of knowledge in printing 
operations of newspapers.    He described publishing activities as ‘perishable, [with] on time 
delivery and no holiday’. There is a daily cycle time. This sector is the first to be hit in 
recessions, because most of their income comes from advertisements.  The interviewee and the 
company had a technical philosophy of self-reliance.  He regards this as helping local people to 
gain knowledge and skills.  In the printing sector, he contended that, publishing in Malaysia had 
a ‘very close and small market’ 
 
There was a lack of relevant research in Malaysia, both on technical aspects of printing and on 
journalism.  However, some good research had been done abroad.  Even though its results might 
not be applicable to the Malaysian scenario, ‘it is interesting to find and think about’.  In his 
company the technical staff could only operate and maintain the printing machines.  They could 
not design or upgrade them.  There was also lack of suitable technical staff and knowledge in 
Malaysia.  Human resource staff had real no ability to help his company in this way, yet 
someone needed to document the technical staff’s abilities and tasks.  Otherwise, the company 
would lose centuries of knowledge and the expertise of its staff, many of whom were coming up 
to pension age, which is 56.    
 
The interviewee concluded that although there were many changes in the technology of printing, 
‘the change in science is not crucial’.  For his company, the critical factors were is changes ‘in 
engineering science’.   
 
Mechanical and Electrical (one interviewee) 
 
Interviewee 8  
The interviewee was 44, and an owner-manager of an engineering company.  She held a degree 
in electrical engineering from former English polytechnic.  The company provided various 
mechanical, electrical and telecommunication services to local companies.  The company only 
employed technicians, but because the interviewee is an engineer herself, her expertise is used 
by her company.  However, the company does often employ engineers on a freelance basis on 
projects.     
 
Regarding technology transfer and commercialization, the interviewee said that most Western 
companies practised R and D all the time, whereas Malaysian ones usually imported new 
technology.  Malaysians were not innovative or assertive enough in conducting R and D. Her 
company took note of different specialist technologies of various kinds, from other countries and 
help Malaysian ones to introduce them.  It got involved in agency, distribution and dealership 
kinds of contract.  It acted as a link between originator and user companies.  If a company 
encountered problems in using a technology, eventually it could be referred back to the ‘one 
who originated it’.   
 
Being a relatively small company, it mainly appeared to offer simple, standard and common 
services and consultations on non-specialised products. These products might come from China 
or India, to be made locally.  Many specialised services originated with major foreign companies 
like Siemens or Toshiba.  The interviewee had no contact with university or government 
researchers, which she regretted, because their work could be relevant to her.  The government 
ought to support more Malaysian inventions.  As many Malaysian students studied overseas, 
they should bring back the innovations they had achieved.   
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The interviewee discussed relationship with universities, GRIs, MOSTI, MITI, banks and 
venture capitalists.  Research findings universities and government research institutes were not 
directly relevant to the company, and the former did not do much to publiase their research 
outputs.  As a small company, they did not have any contact with MOSTI or MITI.  She went to 
a trade exhibition in Singapore every year, which was quite useful to the telecommunications, 
broadcasting and IT or electronics parts of her business.  The company was self-financed and 
did not rely on venture capitalists or banks.  The government was right to help industry with 
knowledge of new inventions and discoveries.  Science was mainly relevant to industry, but 
engineering know-how was always vital.   It could be very simple but the need for it was 
fundamental.   
 
 
 
Chemicals (four interviewees) 
 
Interviewee 9   
The interviewee was the managing director of a company specializing in polymer 
manufacturing.  He was in his mid-40s and held a degree in marketing.  He has been in the 
company since its formation in 1993.   The company being funded by government funded 
venture capitalist called National Investment Private Limited Company (PUNB).  This venture 
capitalist had ventured into many small-scale and medium-scale industries.  The company also 
produced customised products like a wide range of plastic parts supplying to Japanese 
multinational companies such as Honda, Yamaha, Sony and Suzuki.  They started as supplying 
to these companies under a vendor programme initiated the by government.  They are 
subcontractors to Malaysian companies like Modenas, Perodua and Petronas.  However it was 
important to own technology, to stay in business.     
   
The respondent felt that national companies should obtain technologies from collaboration with 
any institution.  It made companies liberated and self-reliant to develop their own products or by 
having ‘a complete product’.  Furthermore, while the company depends on Multinational 
Companies (MNCs), the respondent argued that most Japanese companies would prefer to take 
their supplies from Japanese suppliers.  So having the vendor programme, the government must 
make a policy that MNCs must distribute the market share of supplies to national companies in 
at least a proportion of 10 percent.  At the same time, since MNCs are getting tax relief and 
duties from Malaysia  government, it was then reasonable enough that national companies been 
given a chance to penetrate international markets through MNCs.   
 
Finally, the company had secured good support from universities and GRIs.  Following their 
involvement with them, the company been given a grant from the Small and Medium Industries 
Development Corporation (SMIDEC) to commercialize a product from the Malaysian 
Agriculture Research and Development Institute (MARDI).  However, the company felt that 
venture capitalists should have enough money to fund working capital investment.  If ‘venture 
capitalist’ cannot comprehend the need of companies, then companies will have to turn to 
banks’, and at the end, ‘the business will belong to the bank’.   
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Interviewee 10  
The company is a chemical engineering one in Johor, in the south of Malaysia.  The interviewee 
was its manager.  He was in his late 40s. He was an auditing assistant without a degree, but he 
had learnt with the company and had some other accountancy training.  The company employed 
about 300 people and made power transfusion belting for cars and other engineering companies.  
It was the only Malaysia company doing so.  About 30% of its output was exported, mainly to 
South East Asian countries, China, also to Pakistan and India.  The rest was sold in Malaysia.  
The company intended to diversify into rubber-based products.   Most of its present sources of 
natural rubber were in Malaysia. Its synthetic rubber came from Japan.  The company’s 
techniques were very advanced.   
 
Its experience in technology transfer was with a partner, a Japanese company. The innovations 
mainly concern production and quality control and are used to help broaden the product range. 
But the products and processes remained specialised and the company’s expertise and that of its 
Japanese partner was high and so the company had never had sustained contact with universities, 
government research institutes or MOSTI.  However the company did contact Malaysia’s 
Rubber Research Institutes for some advice about rubber processes.     
 
The interviewee argued that innovations and discoveries made in universities and government 
research institutes were not publicised enough to business people. He felt that more innovation 
could be feasible, but that it could need high levels of investment that could be too high for most 
companies.  This was why they refused to take them for commercialization.  On the roles of 
engineering and science in technical change, the interviewee believed that both were vital, 
‘where engineering is in the position of improving the process, and creating new design and new 
machinery.  The science is more about knowledge’.   
 
Interviewee 11  
The interviewee is a Chinese marketing manager in his mid-30s working for a company that 
make plastics products for households and other companies.  He held a degree in business 
administration and a diploma in industrial chemistry, both from Japanese institutions.  He had 
worked for a Japanese company for 12 years after he finished his studies, and, he appreciated 
differences between Malaysian and Japanese technology. He said that water treatment research 
and development in Malaysia was about 30 years behind that of Japan.   
 
Regarding technology transfer, the company used Japanese technology in production.  However, 
it faced a problem of job-hopping by employees who wanted higher wages.  He argued that 
Malaysia’s government was wrong to claim that foreign companies did not transfer technology 
to their Malaysian subsidiaries and other counterparts.  The company had various experiences 
involving technology transfer with foreign supplier companies.   Also, because many Malaysian 
workers did not stay for long with one company, and new technologies that were being brought 
into Malaysia often soon found their ways into other Malaysian companies.     
 
Concerning commercialization of knowledge and inventions from universities and government 
research institutes, the company felt that it was unlikely to work. Most universities were far 
behind the company in plastic moulding technology. The company did not get much information 
from university researchers, either. Most of its innovations came from their supplier in Japan.     
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Interviewee 12  
The last respondent in this sector is a senior personnel manager for a rubber company in 
southern Malaysia.  He was 35.  He had a diploma in business studies, specialising in marketing, 
and had been working for ten and half years in HRM function.  He had worked in Taiwanese 
company for four years in general management, for Matsushita Electronics for in 1998 for three 
years, and for American company for another four years. Then he joined his present company.  
This company makes parts of polymer and natural rubber products.  Their product is used by 
companies making paints, resins and acids.  Seventy percent of its shares are UK owned and the 
balance of 30 percent is state-owned.  The company holds 70 of percent of Malaysia’s market 
share for emulsion paint.  It had its own plant for natural rubber and synthetic rubber, and 
catered for a different market, 70 percent locally and 30 percent for export.  The company was 
not interested in commercialization and technology transfer, because it had its own R and D staff 
and felt that it needed no outside help. Half of its R and D staff were chemists.   
 
On the roles of engineering and science in technical change, the respondent emphasised the vital 
role of engineers for the company.  Their engineers kept improving production processes and 
innovating and solving problems.  As ‘sometimes the new requirements comes from customers, 
whose technical people pass them on to  our engineers, and from our engineers there come a 
solution or a pilot plant’.  Engineering know most about processes and solutions to practical 
problems, and science was more about intellectual standards and precision. 
 
To conclude, this company felt that it had a very strong team of scientists especially chemists, 
and very competent engineers, and it was financially stable, and therefore it did not need any 
help from outside institutions, either private or public.    
 
Pharmaceuticals (four interviewees) 
 
Interviewee 13   
The respondent was an Indian expatriate.  He held a masters degree in chemical science and had 
been working in Malaysia for seven years for two different companies.  He was in his 30s.  He 
worked in R and D with other scientists, including three chemists and four laboratory assistants.  
The company made cosmetics, toiletries, skin care and other pharmaceutical products. The 
company undertook manufacturing contracts for about 40 other companies. The latter used to 
import products from overseas but they had found it cheaper to source nationally from own 
respondent’s company. Some of its work involved reverse engineering.  
 
On commercialization and technology transfer in Malaysia, the respondent argued that since 
research was expensive in terms of time and money, most companies chose simply to buy new 
technology. Yet universities and government research institutes did do useful research. Many of 
their R and D outputs were not commercialized because they did not lead to companies getting 
quick profits.  The company had no contact with universities, government research institutes, 
MOSTI or MITI concerning commercialization and technology transfer.  However it had been 
working with the University of Science of Malaysia on remote testing of its products.     
 
Over the roles of engineering and science in technical change, the respondent said that ‘even 
[with] simple food products, you need a lot of engineering’. Yet to develop virtually any 
product, at least some scientific knowledge was needed.   
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Interviewee 14  
The next respondent was a company general manager. In his 40s, he was trained as a veterinary 
surgeon.  He has working experience in the Malaysian Technology Development Corporation 
(MTDC), a national venture capital organization.  He got his present job as a result of a 
restructuring exercise of one of the MTDC’s venture investment companies.  This company was 
established in 1992, and makes animal vaccines. It has collaborated with University Putra 
Malaysia (UPM) and the government’s Veterinary Research Institute and has been funded with a 
grant from the Commercialization of R and D Fund (CRDF).    It depends totally on the UPM as 
it only makes and markets its products. It had undertaken meticulous marketing to the   
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and China.  However it was in the position of not meeting the 
market demand.    
 
The respondent had noted that although universities had developed products with good added 
value, the products could not sold as the costs of production were so high,  making the product 
unaffordable by most people.  The company improved its products with the help of researchers.  
Most universities did not have enough money to develop the outputs of their researches. Many 
of their ideas were shelved and became redundant.   
 
Interviewee 15  
This respondent was a company director, and was previously a lecturer in Faculty of Medicine 
of University of Malaya.  He was a graduate in medical science and in his 30s. His company was 
a contract research one in biotechnology and life sciences.  It conducts bio-equivalent studies for 
about 50 other companies, both Malaysian and foreign. As someone with both academic and 
business experience, the respondent was a particularly intelligent one. As regards 
commercialization and technology transfer, they were two different phenomena. 
Commercialization was ‘basically towards downstream’ while technology transfer concerned as 
the technical requirements of two different organizations.   
 
The respondent had experience of research with IRPA funding.  He felt that research often had 
no commercial potential as the knowledge produced was more meant for academic, government 
and the national interest and for more national independence.  The researchers and the 
authorities were ‘not as serious as we are’, when compared to company research that complied 
with international standards or was accredited through foreign regulations.  The company had 
never had contacts with universities or government research institutes about their research.   
 
As regards the efforts of the government to increase flows of scientific knowledge, he believed 
that despite the government initiatives to attract Malaysian researchers from overseas to come 
back to Malaysia, they were not strong enough. Malaysian scientists often worked abroad doing 
research that was several years ahead of what their counterparts based in Malaysia were doing. 
To return to Malaysia would be for them to take a step back in time. Malaysian policy makers 
knew all this, and resented t.   
 
Interviewee 16  
The last respondent in this sector was a 30-year-old pharmacist.  She held a PhD in 
pharmaceutical technology.  She worked for a pharmaceuticals company as a senior researcher.  
The company made various pharmaceutical and health supplement products.  It had two sites; 
one is for R and D, and the other for manufacturing. The R and D staff, work closely with a local 
university, and develop products and processes. A lecturer from the university did research for 
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it, and it used university equipment for testing work.  The respondent argued that technology 
transfer from the university and from work done jointly with it was with genuine and successful.    
 
Nevertheless, the respondent also claimed that the company also got important information from 
its marketing staff about market needs.  It also studied its external environment so as to get to 
know market trends and the nature of new technology in pharmaceuticals.  Finally, since the 
respondent was only responsible for company research, she felt that her ability to answer all the 
interview questions was limited.   
 
Electronics and Information Technology (three interviewees)  
 
Interviewee 17   
The first respondent in this sector group was a general manager of a subsidiary company of a 
university.  He was 50 and held a degree in communication engineering and digital 
communication, and a PhD in medical electronics.  His company was established in 1998.  It 
was a joint venture between a local university and an Australian one. The company had 
developed an electronic device from university research.  However, despite the company’s 
confidence in the potential of the product, market surveys suggested otherwise.  So the company 
made other products.   
 
This company was very dependent on collaboration with the university. Most research products 
were not ready to be marketed.  So it was vital, for them to know ‘how far the product can go 
and exactly what the market needs’.  There were many things to be dealt with, such as investor 
support, sales people, design, after-sales services, support services, competitors, share market 
volume and the continuous of the products.  Most business people were not very attracted by 
universities with prototypes. Any prototype could be shown to be well-designed, ergonomic and 
attractive. Product versions could involve through versions one, two, three and so on, before 
potential buyers became seriously interested in them.   
 
The respondent stated that many university scientists embark on work in saturated research 
environments.  Given that resources were often decreasing, scientists needed to have clear 
targets. The respondent had found that university administrators were not keen to promote their 
company products commercially.  As for MOSTI’s role in funding research, the respondent said 
that the process of getting money was very troublesome.  The company had to use its out–of 
pocket money first and then be reimbursed by the MOSTI.  But most companies had little 
money to put up.  However, some were ‘taking advantage of getting funds and building their 
factories’.   
 
In general, venture capitalists were not ready to change their ways of evaluating potential 
investments.  The respondent said that, ‘I guess when they hold the money, and if their money is 
used, they want to have full control’.  The company was interested in taking a bank loan, as 
banks could be willing to lend to them without any collateral.   
 
Interviewee 18  
The respondent in this sector group was in his 30s and the owner of an electronic company. He 
had a deep interest in computing and in working with scientists from a nearby university to 
commercialize their research.  The company had been given some money under the ‘cradle 
investment programme’ of Malaysia Venture Capital Management (Mavcap).  A business plan 
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had been presented that included product potential, product application and product 
development.  However, the business plan was not enough to convince a venture capitalist to 
invest in its manufacture.  The respondent felt that venture capitalist’s requirements in terms of 
rate of return on investment varied from one company to the other.    
 
In discussing commercialization and technology transfer, the respondent claimed that the main 
problem between universities, and government research institutes and business people was 
communication.   Business people are were ones who ‘had money to invest’. If the two sides did 
not work hard together that would lead to no commercialization.  The respondents also pointed 
out that scientists and business people had different views on products that came from laboratory 
research.  Business people saw them as their main concern, but researchers saw the knowledge 
that went into them as more important.  It was easy for business people and scientists to drift 
apart and for governments to lose interest in helping them.  The respondent argued that a 
procedural manual for commercialization should be written, to help expedite the processes and 
minimize the ‘calculated risks ’.   
 
Interviewee 19  
The final respondent in this sector group was a senior manager of a software services company.  
The company worked with its local university.  He was 30 and a graduate in computer science.  
The company had been working directly with the university on a project called the ‘E-commerce 
Solution System’.  It had been funded under Malaysia R and D Grant Scheme (MGS).  The 
reasons why they worked closely with the university were to do with shared abilities, 
experience, knowledge and skill.  The company helped the university commercialize software 
developments, the relevant processes were different from those in other sectors.  Hence in terms 
of technology transfer it includes source codes, programme codes, and also documentation, and 
there was no easy way to do the research.   
 
The respondent claimed that research in IT is ‘so risky …we have the order of the market, which 
has to be followed’.  Although IT research is often praised by companies, market size in 
Malaysia was small and markets were ‘not ready’.  Hence the company had to ‘touch up’ the 
output.  Further, Malaysian university researchers were different from many overseas ones, as 
they are very ‘market-centric’ and they ‘know something that the market needs’.  The 
respondent argued that the barrier between the university and the IT sector was the lack of 
relevant knowledge and the different mind sets.  So ‘people lack enthusiasm to build’.  
University people could not easily set the prospects for new products.    The universities needed 
to focus on and to understand market needs more.    
 
 
Biomedical Science (one interviewee) 
  
Interviewee 20 
This respondent was in his 50s and held an Australian degree in pharmacy.  He had worked for 
several pharmaceutical companies.  He was the first executive director of his company when it 
was established in 1994.  The company was owned by a Malaysian government corporation 
under its investment programme.  The company made biomedical products developed from 
university research.  Its products were mostly initiated in university laboratories, and the 
company relied on university researchers greatly as it did not have its own R and D department 
or scientists. It had improved its products following customer reactions and product failures.   
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The respondent spoke at length on problems of commercialization.  The vital parts of the 
commercialization were the research findings and the researchers.   Companies had to contend 
with the university researchers about any failures or improvements to the products, based on 
their ‘technology know-how agreement’.  He argued that ‘commercialization and technology 
transfer should go hand in hand, in the Malaysian situation’.  Both interested parties were 
obliged to spend large amounts because the ‘the cost acceleration is always there   …before you 
can get results’.  Since it was vital that the product continue to exist, it was the responsibility of 
both sides to work together along for successful commercialization. 
 
Finally, the respondent argued that Malaysian venture capitalists ought to be different in their 
ways of investing their funds.  In the West, venture capitalists did just not match the researchers 
with companies, but also provided seed capital.  This was because they ‘were more able to see 
how good the technology is’.   
 
Biotechnology (one interviewee)  
  
Interviewee 21  
This respondent was a lady in her 30s.  She was an executive director of a biotechnology 
company producing crop enhancers and other agricultural products.  She held a degree in 
business management, and had experience as a government fund manager before she joined her 
present company. The company had commercialized a university research output.   Then the 
company did its own research too.  When she had worked as a government fund manager, she 
had evaluated university research findings.    
 
She was asked about her experience of commercialization and technology transfer from 
university and government research institutes.  She argued that ‘every product, every technology 
has their unique problems’, so that every form of commercialization was relevant.  Second, 
many scientists in universities lacked dedication to their research, and relied greatly on their 
assistants.  They were too used to doing research for years and years.  Ownership of intellectual 
property should be held by the government, since research was funded by them.  To generate 
smooth processes of commercialization, offices of technology transfer should be headed by non-
scientists and marketing people.   
                        
 
 
                                                                                          
Food Technology (one interviewee) 
 
Interviewee 22  
The only respondent in this sector group was a university lecturer.  He was in his 50s and was 
also a managing director of a company making wafers and sugar confectionery products.  He 
had a PhD in marketing from an English university.  He spoke mainly about the drawbacks of 
university research. Most of it was never really commercialized.  It was often too theoretical, 
with marketability and return on investment rarely in the minds of researchers.     
 
There was not much communication between industries and universities in Malaysia.  University 
staff hardly ever dealt with front-line people in companies, with those who might understand and 
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use their findings.  Business people were indifferent about R and D spending.  Most Malaysian 
companies did not appreciate the potential of R and D they only got involved with it when they 
needed to in the short term.  They were not really interested in innovation as such.      
 
Finally on the issue of the flow of scientific knowledge, the respondent argued universities and 
industry did not understand each other much.  They did nor work closely together, as happened 
in the West, when there were ‘good symbiotic linkages between them’.   
 
Technology Transfer (one interviewee) 
 
Interviewee 23  
The only respondent in this sector group was a managing director of and a partner in a 
consulting company.  The company’s functions included intellectual property valuation, patent 
registration, technology licensing and market research. The respondent had worked as chemical 
engineer for Esso.  He had worked for a government fund manager as a chief executive officer 
for 12 years.    He had substantial experience in commercialization of research findings from 
universities and government research institutes.   In his present company, he worked very 
closely with scientists from both kinds of institution, as he appreciated and had a passion for 
discoveries and innovations.               
 
Mostly he spoke about his experience in managing funds for commercialization on behalf of the 
Malaysian government.  Amongst the problems highlighted,  he included the need to realise how 
much work had to be completed on commercialization as it ‘starts from zero’, skilled 
requirement, whether products were sellable or not, the need for a small pools of technology 
expertise ‘to provide necessary inputs to make a production commercials, weaknesses in market 
research, too many scientists working largely on product improvement, the  need for products to 
be good in the first place, commitment to research and knowledge among scientists, the 
complacency of many business people about technology, and a need for levels of research to be 
‘advanced enough to attract international parties’.   
 
The respondent suggested a number of ways to make commercialization and technology transfer 
successful.  Those included a need for universities to develop new technology more and to 
improve product less when working with companies, a need to develop useful models of 
commercialization, to be more focused and efficient in resource allocation, a need to avoid the 
‘not invented syndrome here’,  a need for firms to be good partners in terms of ‘track records’ 
with investment financial capital, the roles of technology brokers in helping out universities and 
GRIs, the use of venture capitalists by each university, and strategic thinking about research 
funding in the IRPA context.   
 
 
THE UNIVERSITY AND GOVERNMENT RESEARCH INSTITUTE INTERVIEWS          
 
Thirty-one interviews were conducted in four universities and three government research 
institutes. The respondents consisted of eight scientists from universities, nine scientists from 
GRIs, eight officers from technology transfer offices, and six top research administrators from 
universities and GRIs.                            
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The order of interviews          
The interviews of scientists consisted of four from the University of Putra of Malaysia, two from 
the University of Science of Malaysia and two from the University of Technology of Malaysia, 
five from the Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology (MINT), two from the Malaysian 
Palm Oil Board (MPOB) and two from the Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development 
Institute (MARDI). The three top research administrators (for example Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Research) were one each from each of the University of Putra of Malaysia, University of 
Science of Malaysia and University of Technology of Malaysia, and the three senior officers (for 
example Directors) from each of three GRIs, four officers of technology transfer offices from 
four universities, and four officers of technology transfer offices from the three GRIs.  
 
Scientists (eight interviewees from universities) 
 
Interviewee 24  
This respondent held a first degree in agricultural science, a masters degree in soil science, and a 
PhD in soil and atmospheric sciences from the USA.  He was deputy dean of his faculty, and 44 
years old.  His research findings were fertilizers for farmers especially for paddy farmers.  His 
commercialization of the research findings was taken by a company. Previously it was 
undertaken by himself and one government agency.  He was the consultant to the company and 
getting feedback from farmers and the company’s staff.  In transferring technology, he gave the 
company the formulae.  He went directly to the users of the products and taught them.  The vital 
element in commercialization was trust.  He felt that scientists should not involve themselves in 
marketing research findings, and that they should concentrate on research.  The company 
concerned managed to succeed in commercialization and plough back some profits into 
university research. The company did not rely on any government grant because of the hassle of 
going through the procedure of applying for grants.   
 
The respondent argued that there were some restrictions or using research grants. For example, 
funds were for specific topics, there were no extra funds for extensions and on the time allowed 
to lapse between the application time and the start of the research as scientific knowledge 
changes over time. By the time the scientist receives their funding, they have to manage the 
differences between the intentions of the research and the changes that they have to make.  He 
added that, ‘…I think scientists are honest people’.  The government had put trust them.   
 
Finally, the respondent proposed some improvements to the management of government 
research grants. There should be coordination between companies and universities on the use 
and benefits of research in terms of knowledge of products, and on grant management by the 
government for scientific research.   
 
Interviewee 25  
The respondent was a researcher for one of the telecommunications service providers in 
Malaysia.  His present job was as university lecturer.  He held a masters degree in electronics, 
and a PhD in electronic engineering.  He was in his middle 40s.  His specialization was in fibre 
optic communications.  He was a head of a photonic laboratory in his university.  He also taught, 
and in the laboratory, there were 11 staff and 23 research students.  His contributions in 
innovation included fibre reflection module.  The laboratory had produced 15 research findings.  
His objectives were to focus either on new knowledge or on the broadening of knowledge.  He 
also wanted to help companies solve their problems in specific area.  Apart of getting the 
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researches published internationally, his goal was also to produce many scientists, especially in 
the photonic area which was the priority area under IRPA.   
 
On his success in research, he argued that some big companies were unwilling to support 
‘university people’ as they thought that ‘there is no business point to them’.  He referred to his 
request to look at the technical system in the telecommunications company. Although the 
university had research findings ready, it could not market it as a ‘university is not a production 
company’.  The other problem was to influence the potential buyers for commercialization, in 
terms of ‘functionality, capabilities, commercial value in after sales service, and 
manufacturability’  However, through his experience working with companies before he joined 
his present job, and his contacts with colleagues, he managed to get some information and 
knows some of companies problems.  In this respect, some national companies may be put off 
university research work because ‘the mentality is to look on foreign products compared 
national products’.  They seemed to have a perspective that foreign goods were superior to 
national one.    This mentality was also present within some government corporate bodies.   
 
Interviewee 26  
He was 52 and deputy dean of his faculty.  He has a masters degree and a PhD, both from an 
English university.  His masters is in solid state physics and the PhD is in electronic and 
electrical engineering specializing in microwaves.  His research findings led to the making an 
instrument called a latexometer microwave, used to measure moisture in latex.  He makes his 
own product and sells it to other firms, since he patented it. He has improved the instrument, 
making it into a multipurpose use, for example with wood, grains and fruits.  However the 
instrument is in competition with other kinds, for example, laser and ultrasonics ones, and 
hydrometers, which are more convenient to use for many rubber latex companies.   
 
On the question of commercialization of the instrument, he said that most companies in 
Malaysia were keen to maximize profits ‘as quickly as possible’. For that reason, research 
findings from universities that needed fine tuning and to be developed from a prototype stage 
onwards could be ignored by them.   He argued that universities should try harder to match up 
companies and researchers, as there was only little response on his instruments from companies.   
 
Interviewee 27  
This respondent was 45 and a lecturer in accounting. She is also the dean of her faculty.  She is a 
social scientist, and also has a degree in accounting, and a PhD in computerized accounting.  She 
did her PhD part-time with an English university.  Her research product is accounting software 
for education.  She was very enthusiastic about it.  Her software was said to be different from 
other industry packages as hers offered simulation.  The simulation works based on accounting 
logic and is used in industry packages.  It was different to a UK package that did some similar 
things. 
 
She spoke about her own experience of the commercialization of her software, which began with 
her own initiative of getting schools in Malaysia to use it.   She has won much recognition for 
her research at national as well as international levels.  However, her inventiveness and 
entrepreneurship were hampered by various factors. First, there was lack of commitment from 
government policy makers, as they did not really look upon university research as fully a part of 
the ‘government agenda’.  Second, some of the public universities were quite reluctant to take 
up her software development in education on accounting because of their ignorance about its 
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nature and potential. Third, educational authorities were not comfortable with change and 
innovation.  Finally, the Ministry of Education was less keen to support and fund innovation that 
involved ‘soft’ social science, as opposed to ‘harder’ sciences and engineering. Given to the 
weakness of commercialization of research, she suggested that there should be a body to co-
ordinate and fund all development processes.      
 
Interviewee 28  
This respondent was a lecturer at University of Science Malaysia. He was 45 and held a PhD in 
polymer technology, and he was specialized in plastic technology. He then came to concentrate 
on latex technology.  His main contribution in research concerned recycling of waste latex in 
Malaysia.  The research took him eight years under IRPA funding to create the method of 
making a special powder and later a product out of it.    The product which has been improved 
since then, has attracted many potential buyers from oil and gas producers.  Therefore he has a 
real intention to commercialize his research, but he insisted that ‘trying to commercialize it is 
more difficult than doing the research’.  This was because it was hard to convince potential 
investors to finance an accessory product compared to a commodity.     
 
The respondent then discussed commercialization of university research at length.  Most 
scientists did not have the ability or time to do all the administrative, promotion and marketing 
needed.  He argued that there should be a mechanism for transferring university research 
findings to companies.  Universities’ technology transfer offices did give a little help in finding 
the right partners from the private sector.  He accepted that most research findings were being 
from controlled laboratory environment.  Most companies in Malaysia needed to see marketable 
products functioning.  He then commented that the government ‘are saying something and they 
are doing another thing’, as he had found that many government policies often did not succeed 
in generating the potential benefits of research findings.  He argued that most research funding 
should be given to basic research.     
 
Interviewee 29  
The respondent held a degree in civil engineering, a masters in structural engineering and a PhD 
in building technology.  He had working experience in a Works Department for a year and a 
half, after graduating from an English university 1982.  He then joined his university as a tutor 
and finished his MSc and PhD by 2000.  His PhD research combined architecture and 
engineering.  He studied building materials concentrating on cellular concrete.  His clients were 
from Chile, Canada, Russia, South Korea, Mauritius and many other countries.  He was the 
pioneer scientist in his university who had successfully commercialized his product before 
making the fact known to his university.  As the machine he designed was a system by itself, the 
university did not sell it widely because ‘there will be competitors that will kill each other’.  His 
system has been well received in the country by a big company developer and its contractor who 
wanted to lessen its costs.    
 
On how his research findings had been commercialized, he had found that his university gave 
insignificant support.  This was because they had limited resources and the staff involved had to 
try to be ‘Jacks of all trades and masters of none’.  He felt that through use of good marketing 
strategies, almost any products could be commercialized successfully.   Therefore he once 
recommended that his university’s technology transfer office should assign some funds for 
upgrading some potential products that had won prizes in an innovation exhibition.  He called 
such a process the ‘second stage of commercialization or semi-commercialization’.   
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Interviewee 30 
The respondent was in his 40s and a lecturer in a chemical engineering and natural resources 
faculty. He held a degree in chemical engineering.  His MSc and PhD were in membrane 
separation.  His main contribution in research was separating particles from liquid that had 
formerly been used for water treatment.  All his work concerned product improvements.  He had 
four patents, and was regarded as the most active researcher in his university. He had been in the 
limelight because of his success in his research and considered that his research was applied and 
‘more relevant to industry’ than fundamental research.  He did it to solve problems and to help 
companies to innovate.   
 
He had experienced real problems in commercializing his research. All of it was done by him 
alone, and then adopted by his university’s technology transfer office.  He argued that no-one in 
his university had so far been referred as an expert at commercialization. Scientists should 
always get involved with companies that have expressed interest in research findings. As 
different products needed different approaches to commercialization, there should be a flexible 
process.  Many links with companies had started with his participation in exhibitions.  The 
respondent had employed his own consultant to help him with commercialization of his research 
findings.   
 
Finally, the respondent noted that any successful commercialization needs study and 
understanding of different kinds of product and process.  Most research findings were not ready 
for commercialization.  Experts should be employed to support scientists involved in the 
commercialization of their findings.  In his university, the technology transfer office had helped 
on a marginal basis.     
                                                                                                                                                                              
Interviewee 31  
The researcher was 45 and was the deputy dean of her faculty.  Her PhD was on fibre-optic 
instrumentation and now she specialized in maritime hydraulics.  Her main contribution to 
research and innovation concerned coastal protection and the apparatus and methods used for 
erosion control.  Her innovation had been patented and was one of her university’s successful 
commercialization products. She was planning to market her product internationally market as 
the Malaysian market was rather small.  However, she needed staff to help her, and too few were 
available.  As a scientist and administrator, she was unable to give enough commitment of time 
for marketing her own product.   
 
She observed that ‘any product from a university that is not investment-ready’ would not be 
taken by companies.  Most companies in Malaysia were hesitant in taking on more research and 
development. They were not risk takers and unwilling to do the later parts of upscaling research 
findings.  Therefore university initiatives to give in seed funding to scientists ‘to polish their 
products’ were vital. Scientists needed help to produce business plans, and to make selling tools, 
for example brochures, videos and presentation materials. 
 
 
Scientists (nine interviewees from GRIs) 
 
Interviewee 32  
The respondent, in his 40s, held a first degree in chemistry and a PhD in material engineering. 
He was a specialist in processing advanced materials and his innovations were mainly of a 
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problem-solving kind.  He intended to produce more value-added products from local resources 
that would to relevant to many industries.  He argued that sometimes businesses are 
considerably ‘way behind the scientific communities in terms of knowledge’. He gave an 
example of the production of nano materials from local resources. But many companies were not 
innovative, commercially or technically.  Some were only interested ‘in how to produce a very 
cheap component’.  Thus the interests of scientists and business people were often conflicting.   
 
He then suggested that scientists, business people and venture capitalists needed to improve their 
communication and interaction. There was a general perception of research in Malaysia in the 
‘sense that we the scientific community at times as only thinking about our interests’.   
 
Finally, the respondent emphasized that he could do research prioritizing without IRPA funds, as 
he could do his research freely to take his own way and do the prioritizing himself.  His 
employers managed their own research funds and have budgets for conferences, and having 
IRPA status was an advantage to them.   
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
Interviewee 33  
This respondent was the head of one of the departments in his institute.  He had a first degree in 
mechanical engineering and MSc in combustion and quality control.  His PhD was in chemical 
engineering from an English university.  After he finished his PhD, he was assigned to a 
management post, and became a leader of a research project.  He claimed that since he became a 
manager, he became more interested in strategic thinking for his department and institute.  His 
specialization was incineration.  From his experience of working with companies, he had 
thought hard about how companies perceived the government in terms of their own benefits and 
purposes.   One company was really committed to working closely with government 
departments or institutes. It put its effort into getting grants and pilot plants for adaptive 
research.  From Malaysian companies’ perspectives, bankers and other investors had a ‘seeing is 
believing philosophy’.  To have a pilot plant was essential for turning research findings into 
products.  However, some companies were dishonest when working with the government.  He 
claimed that some companies ‘always want to have or to win everything and that they just ride 
on the back of the government’.   
 
On the commercialization of research findings, the respondent emphasized that he was willing to 
work with any university or company. The nature of the collaborations was as important as any 
research finding to be commercialized. There needed to be bankability, viability and track record 
from the standpoints of banks. Universities lacked funding for development or pilot plants when 
compared to government research institutes.   
 
 
Interviewee 34  
This head of a department of her institute was 50.  She held a first degree in biology and 
genetics and an MSc and a PhD in radiation biology. Since she finished her PhD in an English 
university in 1982, she had held an administrative role, mainly in R and D management.  
However, she claimed that ‘management, at a certain level has become a routine job, and there’s 
no challenge’, compared to research.  Therefore she came to lead a research group in food 
radiation data and help to develop Malaysia’s national essence tissue and bone bank.    
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As regards the commercialization of her findings about hydro-gel, she found that the process 
took longer time than expected. It had ‘sounded so nice, but yet it was not easy’. Although the 
relevant company had paid her licensing fee, and had been given space in her office to help with 
the building of a pilot plant, the company had failed to market her work.  There were other 
problems for commercialization in the agricultural sector, especially for nurseries.  Since most 
of them were relatively small, they could not afford to diversity as there was ‘not much of 
market and no big market’ for the products of agriculture.   
 
Finally, she argued that researchers in Malaysia ‘have to do everything’.  Therefore special units 
with the right people had to be employed to help commercialization. The commercial partner 
had to be ‘large scale’ rather than the scientist.  However, the research institutes should not 
spend too much on ‘prototypes’ as products might not be perceived well by markets.   
 
 
Interviewee 35  
This respondent was in his 40s, and he had specialized in radiation vulcanization on natural 
rubber. He had perfected an alternative technology for the mechanization of natural latex rubber. 
Apart of his work as a scientist and inventor he was also the leading organizer for national 
innovation competitions among universities and government research institutes.  He was also the 
leader of the Malaysian scientists’ delegations for the same competitions at international levels.  
He had his own pilot plant for his research findings.  He spoke mostly about his ways of 
commercializing his research findings and of the problems involved.  
 
The former included visits to companies and exhibitions, and attending conferences and 
seminars.  Through his interaction with companies, he had managed to convince some of them 
about his research findings. To get through to companies he had needed ‘sincerity, consistency 
and continuous interaction’.  He gave companies samples and asked them to try them on.  He 
perfected his findings using feedback from companies and developed ‘mutual understanding’ 
with them to get their confidence.  He commented that most Malaysian based companies ‘don’t 
have much knowledge about scientific things’.  They just had the finance for materials and 
facilities and for manufacturing and marketing. Their ‘R and D’ units were merely for quality 
control, when compared to what foreign-based companies had.   Therefore it was the 
responsibility of scientists to educate them.   
 
Finally, he argued that most researchers were reluctant to commercialize their research findings 
because of the hard work involved.  Given a choice between working in their laboratories and 
meeting people for the other purposes the former usually came first. 
 
 
 
Interviewee 36  
This respondent is 51, and held a first degree in nuclear physics, a masters in nuclear technology 
and a PhD in materials engineering. All were from English universities. His specialization was 
on the industrial use of radioisotopes. He had become a United Nations expert in his area.  He 
aimed his research towards the oil and gas industry.  Most of his inventions were related to 
problem-solving.  He had led his groups of researchers in many projects related to the industry.  
He spoke mostly of his own experiences in the commercialization of his research. He claimed 
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that all his technologies had been commercialized.  At very beginning of his work, he had 
undertaken many marketing activities like demonstrations, conferences, seminars and road 
shows to promote his research findings, which were to do with problematic areas of oil and gas.  
He had been accepted by all major foreign and national companies in the industry.     
 
On problems of commercializing research, it depended ‘on the project, as there are some 
projects that you just license’. His projects give services to the customers involved with 
radiation products, and they needed recognition and approval from the authorities concerned. 
Generally Malaysian scientists were doing adaptive types of research, as they were fairly easy to 
do.  He commented about his relationships with administrators who helped to organize 
commercialization: that the ‘relationship is not so good, and it can be better’.  This was because 
they did not reward most researchers enough. Although there were many successful scientists in 
government research institutes, they were not getting enough support in terms of money and 
promotion.  However, compared to scientists from universities, they were promoted more easily.   
 
Interviewee 37  
She was the head of a research division of a government research institute concerned with the 
palm oil sector, and she was in her 40s.  Her degree was in chemical engineering and her 
masters in process chemical engineering. She claimed that her unit had been very successful at 
commercializing its research findings.  Her research products were mainly in cosmetic 
formulations, cosmetic toiletries and detergent cleaning products. Cosmetics and personal care 
were the most successful. Her division had 20 memoranda of agreement, with mostly with small 
and medium-sized industries (SMIs). The collaborations were more about the use of palm-based 
materials.  One company took pride in commercializing its products with the help of the 
institute. The company used the institute’s pilot plant and within two years of being assisted by 
the institute, the company had its own pilot plant.  The company had done its strategic marketing 
and managed to sell its products to ASEAN countries.   
 
She spoke positively about her successful commercialization and about how she had 
accomplished it.  They had included ‘one stop centre for R and D cosmetics’, meaning complete 
facilities for formulating cosmetics. Her staff had been to Italy and gained knowledge through 
cosmetics courses and by attending seminars on cosmetics.  Her institute did not charge any up-
front fees to most of their collaborators as they were willing to be compensated by the successes 
of the companies.  Once the companies succeeded, they would pay something to the institute.  In 
the end, ‘the institute is very pleased that we have created a number of SMIs’.     
 
Interviewee 38  
This respondent was also in his 40s. He was a scientist in one of the government research 
institutes serving the palm oil industry. His research findings were widely used in motor 
vehicles.  Elements of reverse engineering were used too. He worked directly with national car 
manufacturers as there was need to use and develop resources and materials.  His worked helped 
Malaysian companies to ‘offer more competitive pricing than other car manufacturers in Asia’.   
 
On the process of commercialization of GRI findings in Malaysia, he said that researchers and 
companies needed to ‘adapt reverse engineering since fundamental research projects normally 
face difficulties in finding good markets for commercialization’.  He argued that researchers 
should meet industry needs and help to solve industry’s problems. He thought that the roles of 
engineering and science in technically change were with related to each other.  He and his staff 
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use science and analysis by formulating the right methods and the uses of suitable raw materials.  
Engineering was more about the design of machines and equipment.   
 
Interviewee 39  
This respondent was a scientist working with an agriculture-related and government research 
institute.  He has an MSc in food engineering from an Australian university.  His research is on 
the mechanization of food machinery.  Users of the findings were individual entrepreneurs with 
small-scale commercial activities and family businesses with traditional food-making processes.  
He also got funding for up-scaling his machines, and for the institutes apart from the IRPA fund 
to do the prototype. He argued that the use of machines helped the business to maintain itself as 
‘there is no competition in term of machine development’.  The machines were improved 
regularly, and could not be easily superseded by others.   
 
He spoke of how commercialization of his research findings helped individual entrepreneurs to 
succeed by providing machines, advice, and training.  He suggested that the government should 
also provide financial support to small businesses as the cost of machines was very high for 
them. Installation procedures could be developed and the business people used to help the 
transfer of technology become easier.   
 
Finally, on technical change in the food industry, normally the main problem faced by the 
industry was about the formulation of ingredients. Food technologists did research to help to 
turn them into commercial products.  Engineers developed machines to make the food products. 
All this was investing in the amount and quality of food production.   
 
Interviewee 40  
This lady scientist was 53, with a degree and in MSc in agriculture science.  Her PhD was in 
genetics. Her research concerned distilled root crops.  The findings had helped to develop 
several varieties of high-yield and good quality cassavas and sweet potatoes. The research had 
also been on downstream products such as flours.  The findings were being commercialized 
using a special unit of the Institute that supplied planting materials, training, and ways of 
mechanizing food production.  She emphasized her view that the Institute’s research was 
focused on market pull rather than technology push. It was also helping SMEs to process sweet 
potatoes into other kinds of food product.   
 
She spoke mostly about problems associated with of commercialization of her Institute’s 
research findings. These included limited land area for economic cultivation of sweet potatoes, 
the readiness of the fresh market for sweet potatoes, the fact that most companies seemed to be 
‘afraid to be pioneers’ in marketing new food products and of how big food companies generally 
had their own research units, and resisted research findings from government laboratories. 
 
Finally, she claimed that commercialization depended on the whole packages of knowledge and 
technology being transferred to companies.  The general public mistakenly thought that GRIs 
offered findings for nothing, and this was hard to change.  Many small companies were always 
hoping to get free findings and help from the government.   
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Technology Transfer Office Senior Officers (eight interviewees) 
 
Interviewee 41  
The interviewee was in his early 50s and held a first degree and a PhD in fuel and energy 
engineering from an English university.  He was the deputy director of the research management 
centre at his university.  He has been in the centre for less than a year.  At first he thought that 
the centre was only responsible for protecting intellectual property.  He then found that although 
the centre was targeted to commercialize one or two products every year, it did not do so.  This 
was because the idea and experience of commercialization were new to them. He would have 
preferred to see the centre changed into a business entity.  The problem of commercialization for 
universities was that the research findings mostly were ‘not tested yet, and would require a 
development stage, which probably [would] need to incubate’.          
 
He went on to argue that working with business people needed a different approach, when 
compared to universities as government entities. Most companies wanted to expedite their 
investments as quickly as possible, to get things done.  However ‘with bureaucratic procedures 
being imposed’ it was not possible for his centre to react quickly to the requirements of 
companies’.  He argued when most universities in the West getting their research funds from 
companies, in Malaysia, most universities were getting theirs from their government.  To find 
the right Malaysian business people to invest in research was difficult.    
 
He also argued that his university’s top authority had no direction and seemed confused in 
determining the ways to engage in commercialization and technology transfer.  Therefore, the 
university’s approach ‘had remained status quo’.  It had not changed much since interest in it 
began some years ago.     
 
Interviewee 42  
The interviewee was 58 and since 2000 he had been the group managing director of the 
technology transfer private company of his university.  He held a first a degree in medical 
science and a PhD in pharmacology from an Australian university.  He was appointed to his 
present post because of his wide experience in his field.  He was a former professor and a dean 
of his university’s school of pharmaceutical science.  He was responsible for the strategy of the 
company, and for formulating and executing its policies.  He emphasized his view that in 
university commercialization and technology transfer ‘there should be a mechanism to help 
scientists to commercialize their product and to do the technology transfer’.  Regarding the 
involvement of scientists in helping companies, he argued that scientists are the ones who know 
what are the problems that face many industries are.  For scientists to take their research further 
in terms of prototyping, problem-solving, trouble-shooting and up-scaling to the requirements of 
industries was a good complement to their research work, showing that it had practical value.   
 
On problems of commercializing research findings, he argued that scientists must have open 
minds and be willing to listen to criticism, and that they ‘must be very open to advice given by 
their top administrators’.  This was because, in general, scientists were ‘very proud people and 
suspicious of any suggestions’.  Furthermore, scientists sometimes put a very high value on their 
R and D, and sometimes refuse to reveal details of their research to companies.  Scientists did 
not like to feel that companies had abused their confidence and trusts.      
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Interviewee 43  
This interviewee was a professor in the department of chemical and environmental engineering 
of his university.  He held a first degree in chemical engineering, an MSc in environmental 
engineering and a PhD in chemical engineering, all from an English university.  He held a post 
as director of technology commercialization in his university’s business unit.  He said that 
commercialization and technology transfer were ‘two different things’.  Commercialization was 
focused on money.  Technology transfer was about ideas and techniques, national or foreign.   
The main problem that he perceived with commercialization was that, a product could be good 
and innovative but it … [could] not [be] ready, or be good and innovative, but too costly’.  
Furthermore, his unit did not have the capacity to be run like a business, and to market research 
findings as the university researchers’ products.   So the findings were usually unknown outside 
the academic world.    
 
The interviewee then noted how diverse scientists were, and how they were not directly ‘in 
contact with industries’ and ‘did not work in the commercial world’.  However, in other subjects 
like engineering, medicine, business, accounting and economics, ‘there is a constant link 
because they have projects’.  He said that, scientists discover something new just to satisfy 
themselves and to increase their knowledge and that this was a kind of capacity building for 
them.  Some scientists were not interested in pursuing commercialization as it ‘takes time, is 
very difficult, and they didn’t see any money in that’.    
 
 
Interviewee 44  
This interviewee was 51, and was an animal scientist interested in animal nutrition and animal 
feed processing technology.  He had worked in his laboratory and pilot plant for animal feeding 
for more than 20 years.  He had tried to commercialize his own findings for national and 
international markets.  He was attached to a company under his institute for four and a half 
years.  He was in-charge of technology development, marketing and commercialization in his 
unit.  He said that research findings that do not make business sense will not attract potential 
commercializers. He named several factors that scientists should look for in seeking successful 
commercialization. They included the novelty of the process, formula, or product, the status of 
the intellectual property, how repeatable the technology is, whether it can be demonstrated, 
whether it is technically viable, and whether it is economically viable.  If it was too expensive, it 
would not interest companies.  Scientists also needed to be excited by the prospect of 
commercialization.      
 
In addition, on the side of companies, he had several reasons for explaining why some 
companies failed to commercialize research findings of government research institutes.  They 
included the fact that some companies did not focus on the technology that they were taking, 
that they broke promises to researchers and others, and that ‘they are low strategic-fit companies 
in terms of distribution, marketing, sales and funding’.    
 
Interviewee 45  
This interviewee was a general manger in his late 40s a subsidiary company of one of the GRI.  
He had a first and an MSc agricultural engineering.  His company focused on commercialization 
and technology transfer.  He claimed that the company was run in a different way to technology 
transfer offices of other companies.  But they were struggling between taking advantages of an 
embryonic stage of R and D and pursuing technology generation and commercialization.   
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On the important characteristics of successful commercialization of work by GRIs, he argued 
that his company had the ‘desire to grow’ and that it was taking on the name of the 
government’s company to get recognition for their findings in the market.   Therefore, there had 
to be a significant business interface between scientists and business people to create a success 
story.  However, by following existing government policies, his company had failed to attract 
outside companies.  Then he said that his company had been operating on the basis of a ‘balance 
between risk and future gain’.   His type of company shared risks on behalf of the government.  
He also argued that since companies were profit-oriented, their capacity ‘to handle new 
technology is less’.  They often did not know and understand know their markets and what they 
wanted well enough.   
 
Interviewee 46  
This interviewee was with two people.  One was the senior officer in the Technology Transfer 
office.  He had been in post for the past two months.  He held a first and an MSc in electrical 
engineering.  The second interviewee, a subordinate of the first, had a first degree in science, an 
MSc in information technology and an MBA in marketing.  He was assisting his senior in the 
interview as he had more experience in their office.  Their job included strategic planning for 
marketing and financial aspects of technology transfer.   Their office now had the same level of 
line authority as other units or departments in the Institute.  This showed that with the new 
structure, the Institute has given more emphasizes to the commercialization of research findings.   
 
Both of them described problems of being in a government institute beginning to be concerned 
with commercialization and technology transfer.  There were no formally approved ways of 
commercializing government activities.  Their institutes had been involved in the 
commercialization for nearly six years, but it had been consisted mostly of service and 
consultancy jobs.  They had managed to generate income for their work and had put it into their 
trust fund.  However, in the processes of commercialization, profit and loss tended to cancel 
each other out.  They said that ‘you can count the revenues, but it does not cover all the other 
things, like operating costs’ and they found, in general, that it was difficult commercialize 
research.  They argued that there was ‘a gap between business people and scientists as the 
former was looking for profits, and the latter for technology advancement’.  Scientists and 
research administrators did not know market needs and the business people did not know what 
to ask for. Their own working environment was not pressurized to make a profit.   Yet it was 
their responsibility now to help industries to sustain themselves by keeping up date.  They also 
said that universities should focus on basic research, while GRIs should focus on applied 
research.   
 
Interviewee 47  
This interview was also given by two interviewees.  The first was its director of Information 
Technology and Corporate Services.  He was in his 50s, and had a first and an MSc both in 
marketing.  The second was a Principal Research Officer in his early 40s.  Both interviewees 
said that their Institute had successfully transferred 250 technologies to business people and that 
about 30 percent had been commercialized. Technology transfer had taken place through 
research papers and their publication, consultancy services, exhibitions and seminars.  They also 
held Customer Days which to which business and other people and could come and discuss their 
needs and requirements for new and supporting technologies. However, commercialization was 
not easy, as most scientists ‘were pure scientists’ who had ‘no knowledge about… businesses’.  
Therefore their scientists had been sent on short business management courses.  The institute 
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had produced several memoranda of understanding or agreements with companies.  Moreover, it 
had also formed a special advice committee to discuss and develop a focus on the research needs 
taken from the business people.   
 
On weaknesses in commercialization, they argued that some research was not related to 
industry, that scientists showed a lack of ‘economic calculation of cost and benefit’, and most of 
them were doing basic research which was of little help to companies.   However, they both 
agreed that efforts in the area of commercialization were time-consuming for most scientists, 
and that therefore, some research findings that had commercial potential would not get through 
to companies.   Finally, it was a waste of government money if some companies failed to 
commercialize relevant discoveries because they were given rights of exclusive use of the 
research findings.  Therefore, companies had to be committed to pursuing and exploring the 
whole process if they wanted the benefits of research findings.   
 
Interviewee 48  
This interviewee was in her 40s and a Professor of Coastal and Offshore Engineering Institutes 
of her university.  She held a senior post in commercialization office.  She was specialized in 
maritime hydraulics and some of her research findings had been commercialized.  She said that 
her office had to be a ‘one-stop centre for transfer of knowledge or technology for industry’.  
She argued that scientists should more inclined to be informed about business so that they ‘will 
tailor their invention or knowledge for a product, otherwise it just be on the shelves’.  She 
herself had 10 years of experience in commercializing research findings and she was 
enthusiastic about commercialization.     
 
On the most important characteristics of successful commercialization, she argued that the 
government should have strong guidelines and policies.  Technology Transfer Offices should 
match scientists with potential partners among business people.  However, most research 
findings needed to be up-scaled, and yet business people were reluctant to invest more for 
development purposes.  Other problems included business people is perceptions of the quality of 
research findings, and a lack of funding for business people’s who wanted to use research 
findings.   Most business had to disburse their money in the process, and this prolonged it.  
Finally, she admitted that her university had yet to offer a really successful set of research 
findings that would definitely give confidence to companies that wanted to be interested in and 
to use research.     
 
Top research administrators (six interviewees) 
 
Interviewee 49 
The interviewee was 53 and a professor of chemical science in his university.  He obtained his 
PhD from an English university. He held a senior administrative post and was in charge of his 
university’s research and innovation program. He has been awarded several fellowships from, 
among others, the Petroleum Research Institute of Malaysia, the Japanese Society for the 
Promotion of Science, and Universite’ Henri Poincare in France.  He was also a Fellow of the 
Malaysian Scientific Association and the Malaysia                   
Institute of Chemical Engineering.  
 
He had prepared some answers in advance for the interview. His university had set up a private 
company for handling knowledge, technology transfer and commercialization of products and 
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processes.  It had multi-disciplinary subject areas and it had developed clusters for research.  
The university had special program that it called acculturation of research.  It meant that every 
scientist was meant to share values about research. He argued that successful commercialization 
depended on the willingness of industries to take up bench-scale research findings into piloting 
and manufacturing.  The government should be more flexible in giving grants to industries and 
universities.  Under the rules and regulations of the University Act, scientists were not rewarded 
enough.   
 
Other weaknesses affecting commercialization included the lack in Malaysia of significant 
companies or products that boosted the universities, when compared to such Western companies 
as Nokia which was synonymous with Sweden.  Therefore, although Malaysia produced many 
research findings there were none that raised expectations.  Venture capitalists were quite 
reluctant to invest as they ‘normally want to see money tomorrow’.    Some of the facilities that 
were supposed to support the work of scientists slowed research activities down.                                              
  
On the roles of engineering and science in technical change, for this interviewee, everything 
started from science.  However, it was the engineers who picked things up from the start.  They 
were the ones who defined expectations and then they asked the scientists for the materials to 
work with.   
 
Interviewee 50   
This interviewee was 53 and a graduate in education specializing in scientific and mathematical 
subjects. He was a senior officer of his university.  He claimed that his university was among the 
universities that received the highest research grants from his government.  He said that the main 
contribution of commercialization is giving services to societies, meaning that ‘they improve 
something, we provide alternative procedures and methods’.  The university had allocated 
£40,000 to help scientists to commercialize its research findings.  However this amount was not 
enough because a ‘cost to commercialize R and D is more expensive than doing it, or the ratio 
one tenth of a hundred’.   
 
The interviewee described the critical factors in the commercialization of university research 
findings.  There included their quality, market viability, functions, strengths, and commercial 
value.  Although the university had undertaken several initiatives to do with commercialization, 
it did not have a big success story to boast about, and he argued that commercialization was still 
new to it. Commercialization’s main weaknesses at his university included the inability of 
university to attract venture capitalists and that of industry to commercialize findings.  Another 
problem between the university and industries was poor mutual understanding.  Some business 
people had said that, ‘Your product doesn’t help us, because your researches are too ideal’.  Yet 
there were research contracts that had helped many companies.   
 
On the roles of engineering and science in technical change, the interviewee emphasized that the 
two complemented each other.  Engineers needed the knowledge from science, because 
‘engineers applied whatever scientists had suggested’.  This is a very conventional STH view 
from someone apparently with little direct experience of industry. Thus the scientists provided 
the knowledge, and the engineers used it.   
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Interviewee 51  
This interviewee was in his late 40s and he held a degree and a PhD in resources management 
and policy.  He was not an engineer or scientist, but an economist.  He was responsible for 
managing, facilitating, coordinating and monitoring scientific research in research management 
office of his university. The centre that he works for has rules and procedures for making sure 
that every grant application meets all government-specified requirements with various levels of 
committee evaluation.  He claimed that out of its 1500 scientists, 50 to 60 percent were active 
researchers.   
 
On technology transfer and the commercialization of university research findings, he felt that 
they were bonuses.  Research projects that reached the end stage of product commercialization 
could be considered fully successful, because ‘they have been able to complete the full cycle 
from idea conceptualization’.  Yet commercialization was not the main aim of research in the 
university.  Its scientists ‘did their research and disseminated it in terms of ideas and formulas, 
and then it will become in the public domain’.  Lecturers had to fulfil their social obligations.  
The university scientists did meet with business people and often worked with them as 
commercial partners. But the original aims of university research were scientific, and many 
scientists did not know much about markets. There was no contact with venture capitalists 
because their objectives were so different.     
 
On the roles of engineering and science in technical change, he said that they could be separated.  
Their functions depended on the types of problems experienced in technical change.   
 
Interviewee 52  
This interviewee, in his early 50s was the director of a GRI.  He had just been promoted to this, 
his highest position, after working for nearly 27 years in the Institute. He held a first degree in 
geology, an MSc hydrology and a PhD in risk management.  The institute had many scientists 
with different backgrounds, such as physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics, and chemical, 
mechanical, electrical and electronic engineering.  It was its policy to collaborate with 
companies. Therefore its research was designed with the needs of end-users or prospective 
customers in mind.  
 
Establishments, whether from the private or public sector, were influenced by both work 
technology push and technology pull. They included companies and institutes like his. Institutes 
like his should always be considering ‘If they want an apple, give them an apple, and if you have 
orange, is no use to them’.  All in all, the market-driven ratio of his institute’s work was about 
80 percent.  At present, the institute was in contact with around 4000 business people or 
companies.   It gained, from fees and payments, 30 to 40 percent of its yearly operating 
expenditure.  The funds gained were returned to them for R and D purposes.   IRPA was one of 
its sources of funding for research.  
 
Regarding commercialization and technology transfer from the Institute, he claimed that the 
only weakness was, being a government entity, it has to abide by rules and regulations, 
especially for spending government money, which most of the time delayed it in its wish to 
operate at the request and to meet the time scales of business people. Its financial policy needed 
to be reformed, to make its commercialization work more effective.                                                                  
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Interviewee 53  
This interviewee, who looked to be in his late 40s, was a head of department in the above 
institute. He held a degree in mechanical engineering and has two MScs in law and in business 
administration.  He was asked to answer certain questions on behalf of his director.  He 
described how the institute’s research was funded by, and designed to benefit, specific industry 
sectors.   
 
He argued that there were no ‘one size fits all’ answers to questions about the levels of research 
findings being taken on by the business people.  The levels varied from laboratory to pilot plant 
scale. It is depended from ‘one product to another product and from one technology to another 
technology’.  Therefore, in commercialization and technology transfer the best way was to try 
‘to try as early as possible, for example, to find a business partner.  This is, there is no point in 
investing so much money and finally finding that there are no takers’.  However the Institute had 
learnt that sometimes business people were unconvincing at the laboratory scale. It tried to do 
more work on the pilot scale, so that business people would say that ‘when you finish at the pilot 
plant scale you are ready for commercialization’.  Finally, he made clear that in 
commercialization and technology transfer, success usually depended on ‘the strategic 
importance of the technology and the significance of the research findings’.    
 
Interviewee 54  
The interviewee was in his early 50s, and also held a senior post in the above GRI.  His first 
degree was in agriculture, zoology, forestry, and wildlife.  He had considerable knowledge of 
fish feeding, pond feeding and fish cultures.  He had been working in the same institute for 
about 30 years. He was responsible for technology promotion and development.  As with 
interviewee 45, he was answering on behalf of his director.  He argued that in his department, 
commercialization meant ‘any technology has been well transferred, diffused and used by the 
client’. It was more specific than various businesses making use of knowledge and techniques. 
The institute had a social obligation to conduct research for the use of the public or smallholders 
in agriculture and food.  It also had to explore any research findings that matched the private 
sector requirements.  These two functions were made explicit about 10 years previously, when 
hitherto the institutes did not do anything with research findings except to publish them.   
 
The interviewee explained that the institute had restructured itself to suit the requirements of 
technical and scientific development and to link research and its end-users. It relied on the 
National Innovation System which was just being introduced.  On the weaknesses in CTT, he 
argued that the IRPA fund was for having to do with research only.  He stressed that ‘no one 
forces us to do the up-scaling of the technology, and to test the technology whether it is 
commercially viable or not’.  Apart from financial reasons, he argued that companies and 
researchers had no experience or confidence in working together.  He also claimed that SMIs 
still needed ‘direct support, subsidies, and soft loans from the government scheme’.   
 
 
VENTURE CAPITALISTS (three interviewees) 
 
Interviewee 55  
This interviewee was the chief executive officer of a fund management company and in his late 
40s.  The company’s biggest shareholder was the Ministry of Finance.  The   company funded 
ventures focusing on ICT and biotechnology.  It had a time limit for operating until 2010, when 
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it would have to be closed down.  Initially it had £400,000 and until the date of the interview it 
had been about £80,000.  Mostly, about 30 percent of the funding goes to company set-ups and 
or ‘goes to the seed’.  The seed fund is for the initial study of a product or process and its 
business plan.  The other 70 percent goes to the extensions for operating companies.  He argued 
that university scientists needed to get business people involved in their funding proposals.  
However, most proposals failed as scientists did not ‘develop what the market wants’.  
Therefore there was a mismatch.  He also argued that some scientists were people who ‘are not 
easy to handle’.  This was because they had high incomes and it was merely a bonus if their 
findings were commercialized.     
 
The company did not have to make any contacts with MITI or MOSTI, but with their parent 
company, as they had been their targets for managing their fund.  He said that generally 
university scientists became consultants to companies and were actually working for their own 
outputs to be used by businesses.  Therefore, it was not the job of fund managements to give 
new companies their funds.  He argued that most scientists were not good doing business and 
they had also time constraints by having to do their main jobs.   
 
Finally, he described problems that arose in assessing funding for companies.  These included 
the facts that some companies were not ready, some were not willing to tolerate intervention of 
third parties, some companies often did not agree with the process of the evaluations by fund 
managers, companies’ business plans and proposals were often not justified and some did not 
agree with the system of punishment by them.  All in all, fund mangers were becoming more 
frustrated about giving funds to business people.   
 
 
Interviewee 56 
This interviewee, in his early 40s, was an accountant by qualification, but had never practiced.  
He had worked in banking before joining his company.  He had been in the venture company for 
six years as its Head of Investment.  He spoke about his company’s background and its working 
with companies in ICT, life sciences and biotechnology, and advanced manufacturing, whether 
it included ICT, life sciences or not.  He said his company did not gave their funds to 
universities but he believed that ‘ideas…technology must be mixed with commercial ones.  
Therefore if there is no mixing of ideas … it will not be successful’.  Companies had to be 
commercial as they were bound to their shareholders.   
 
On the ability of university researchers and their administrators to understand what companies 
need, he mentioned that there was a gap and no link across it, as commercial people knew 
mainly where to find funds, whereas researchers knew how to develop products.  There were 
different objectives that seldom came together.  Some university technology transfer offices 
were administered by lecturers.  They should be managed by people from outside science or 
private sector people, as they might bring different views and objectives.  He pointed out that 
80% of research findings in Malaysian were ‘still on the shelf’.  Malaysia did not seem strong in 
terms of innovation. He added that ‘most of our things are replicas, rather than from our own 
innovators’.   
 
Interviewee 57  
This interviewee was in his 40s.  He held a degree in banking.  He had experience of auditing 
and of a shipping company before joining his present employer, a venture funding company, as 
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Senior Vice-President.  He spoke about his company’s role in assessing applicant’ for venture 
funding.  Other than machines, technology, and ways of marketing things, the ‘people or 
promoter or shareholder of a company form the vital element’.  They could be ‘con people’ and 
might deceive venture capitalists. Technical people from universities might not be good at 
management.  The chief executive officer ‘must know everything in the company’.  However, 
his company had successfully ventured into one ICT company from a university and profited 
from its listing on the stock exchange.   
 
He suggested that universities should establish their own private companies, functioning as 
mediators between researchers, business people and venture capitalists.  The company was then 
‘easier for us to communicate with…and whatever they have stays in the university, rather than I 
go to the university and buy outright’.  He added that a university could have hundreds of 
products and hundreds of companies.  It seemed as if universities did not capitalize on their 
research findings.     
 
Finally, university research findings made by scientists lacked an ‘entrepreneurial environment’.  
This was partly because some of the outputs were only slightly better or ‘above the standard’, 
and might only seem to offer changes in the speed or power the processes, products, and so on.  
This did not do much for commercialization.  However, there was a difference between the 
abilities of scientists in universities and those in GRI   Scientists in the latter had some practical 
elements in them. The universities were more academic.  There was a free market for scientific 
knowledge in Malaysia, of course, as ‘we cannot control that’.  Business people could stay in or 
leave markets whenever they wanted to.   
 
JOURNALISTS (two interviewees) 
 
Interviewee 58  
The first interviewee in this group was a newspaper businessperson.  He held a BA degree.  He 
had experience of working in a publishing company for 30 years.  He spoke about the failure of 
GRIs in helping business people to enhance their products for agriculture or manufacturing.  
Although scientists had done much research, their outputs did not satisfy the expectations of 
most business people, especially in agriculture.  Some research findings were not passed on to 
them.  Some business people were willing to support research that could eventually benefit 
them.  He emphasized a need for ‘a clearance, a mid-way house’ to make sure that research 
benefited potential end users whenever possible.   
 
On the question that many companies seem unable to put scientific knowledge to use, he 
admitted that business people were different from university ones, being more practical and less 
theoretical.  Universities should prepare more of their students ‘for the real world’.  Government 
and business people seemed not to have same objectives as he said that ‘industry is going one 
way; the government is going another’.   
 
In educating qualified people, he argued that the country should produce ‘holistic students who 
understand and not only excel in academic things, but who are also patriotic, creative and more 
generally knowledgeable’. Therefore there must be flexibility in education, where, for example 
people may have than one academic degree, so as to be mobile from one sector or skill to 
another.  He then argued that he was against some of the Malaysian ways of managing, and that 
he supported the Western management, especially the American kind.  He pointed out that 
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Americans were good at ‘selling and that branding’ and they had ‘the biggest and largest 
economy in the world’.                                                                                                  
 
Interviewee 59  
This interviewee was a journalist for a national newspaper.  He wrote its science and technology 
column.  He argued that although the efforts at CTT were very important, it seemed that there 
was ‘not much success in these areas’.  He had encountered one scientist who had ‘had a tough 
time selling his research findings to foreign and national companies’.   However there were 
some Malaysian start-up companies in the IT sector that had commercialized research findings 
successfully.  He claimed that most Malaysian business people tended to opt ‘for the easier route 
of doing business, while others tend to do hard technology’.   
 
He also said that many Malaysians were too much influenced by American management ideas.  
He said that they placed ‘too much importance on the short-term’.  He condemned the use of 
word ‘technopreneur’ that had been developed by Americans.  The idea was that scientists and 
technologists were expected to become entrepreneurs and it had come was from an idea from a 
1998 issue of Business Week, that had discussed Stanford University and its collaboration with 
entrepreneurs.  He argued that it was time for Malaysian government to separate ‘the techno and 
preneur’, to distinguish their roles.   
 
 
THE POLITICIAN 
 
Interviewee 60  
The only interviewee of this type was the Parliamentary Secretary of Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation.  He was 51, with a first degree in electrical engineering.   His MSc 
was in systems engineering, and his PhD was in systems engineering and control, both from an 
English university.  He was a university lecturer and a scientist himself before he went into 
politics.  He spoke about all the parties involved in research and its commercialization.  He 
argued that under the Seventh Malaysian Plan (from 1996 to 2000), the government’s intention 
was to foster capacity building in terms of numbers of university and Government Research 
Institute scientists.  In the Eighth Malaysia Plan (for 2001 to 2006), commercialization of 
research findings became the main focus. He argued that university scientists were only 
knowledgeable about their research and that they had no understanding of commercialization 
and entrepreneurship.  University administrators were focused on patent filing and lacked 
knowledge about marketing their universities’ research findings.  However, those weaknesses 
had been understood and the situations had improved.  Research should generally be begun with 
researchers having their industry partners.   
 
Most Malaysian companies did not have the capacity for carrying out research.   University 
research findings were not ready to be marketed.  His Ministry was now determined that every 
research effort ‘must have demand input or market input’.  In the government’s new Ministry 
restructuring of 2004, the process of research and commercialization had been put together.  
Private venture capitalists in Malaysia were too anxious about taking ‘risks to help 
commercialization of research findings from university and GRI’.  
 
On question of globalization and its problems, he argued that ‘developed countries always 
protect their rights’ when compared to developing countries.  Thus the developing countries 
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were not competitive as they did not maintain any patent rights.  About knowledge workers and 
k-economy, he argued that in any economy, there are cycles.  For any manufactured products, 
the life span was very short.  Business people had to produce more quality products and at more 
competitive prices.  He claimed that ‘in commercialization, companies had to think about how to 
attract people to buy their products, either in terms of packaging and or of design.   
 
He admitted that Malaysian education was more or less the same as British education.  However 
Germany, it was very different.  Germany emphasized competencies and skills more.  Their 
lecturers were mostly experienced at working with business people.  It meant that ‘their lecturers 
have experienced in industry first, and then only become academicians.  Hence they were 
producing more research finding’.  This suggests that he did not understand the German system 
fully, and that he was a rather naive believer in the STH model of technical change.  German 
technical universities hardly ever do scientific research (Hutton and Lawrence, 1981; Sorge and 
Warner, 1986).      
 
Finally, he agreed that American ways of managing often stifled creative people. Developed 
countries used trade barriers against products from other countries, control international markets 
and quality assurance, such as the International Standard Organization (ISO).  He also argued 
that science was more academic than engineering and engineering was more practical than 
science.   
 
 
DOCUMENTARY DATA 
 
Originally it was hoped that policy and other documents, some hopefully unpublished, from 
universities, government research institutes, companies and so on would be important sources 
data for this study.  However most of the organizations visited only made publicity material of a 
bland public relations-centred kind available, or more often, made nothing available.  Only three 
companies were willing to give me policy documents.  Government departments and research 
institutes and universities generally referred me to their widely available plans, publicity 
material and reports, many of which I was familiar with well before starting the fieldwork.  
Therefore I was unable to obtain much that was more than marginally relevant for improving 
understanding of research commercialization, technology transfer and the low take-up issue.   
 
From the government, MOSTI (2003a) provided me with a policy document that included its 
mission statement that is about the National System of Innovation and the rules of relevant 
stakeholders in optimizing the uses of research and development.  This is a very rational and 
managerial document that ‘makes all the right noises’ about flexible knowledge management 
and ‘empowering’ researchers (see also Universiti Sains Malaysia, USM, 2004).   
 
A more critical stance is to be found in a report by the University of Technology of Malaysia 
(UTM) to MOSTI (MOSTI, 2003b).  This noted such problems and commercialization as ones 
concerning the volume and quality of research, difficulties with intellectual property rights, 
inexperience in the design of commercialization strategies and lack of interest from 
entrepreneurs.  However while criticisms appear to be plentiful in Malaysian government circles 
and from politicians (see also USM 2002; UTM 2004; MOSTI 2003b) the assumptions on which 
they are based, that technical change is optimized when it is ‘science-based’, and that innovation 
must be comprehensively and rationally ‘managed’, are left unquestioned.  Hints at the ‘despair’ 
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of researchers (Aton, 2005) about companies’ apparent ignorance of their work, and the 
apparently unreasonable financial and technical expectations of universities (Johari 2006) 
suggest that at least some fundamental questioning might be productive.   
 
Some evidence for slightly more optimism in this context comes from the USM (2003) and 
USM (2004).  These reports have more of a ‘bottom-up’ emphasis on experience, sharing, 
collaboration, and ‘clusters’.  Yet the context remains one in which Malaysian industry is much 
less innovative that that of industries in such established industrial countries as the USA (see 
Stiglitz and Wallsten, 1999, on patents awarded; also see EPU 2006).   
 
Malaysian politicians have argued that manufacturing companies are too ‘reserved to ask for 
what they need from universities’ research’ (Abdullah, 2004).  Politicians have claim that the 
government was not satisfied with R and D returns under the Eighth Malaysian Plan and that the 
policy makers had to ‘improve R and D fund management’ (Jaafar, 2004).  According to Jeffrey 
and Teng (2003) many researchers had produced many innovations, but did not ‘know to market 
their products and whom to deal with’.  However, Stiglitz (2002) suggested that 
commercialization is a politically-motivated notion, and that it did not work on many occasions 
when its advocates, funders and organizers wanted it to. It was a word used to replace and 
reframe innovation by politicians, and by others and in around government who wanted to 
channel, control, structure and monitor relevant processes, and perhaps subconsciously to stifle 
them.  Their mentality was sometimes very convergent, inward-looking and small-minded 
(Hughes 1985).   Child (1982) explained long ago that there is always tension between 
innovation and control in organizational life, and it is possible that those who seek to narrow the 
notion and practice of innovation down by renaming it commercialization are perhaps revealing 
their prejudices and other inadequacies, including lack of direct experience of, or at least 
sympathy for, engineering, industry in general and manufacturing in particular.   
 
Company brochures and policy documents 
During the study the researcher managed to get three company brochures and two policy 
documents, one each from a company and a venture capitalist.  The three company brochures 
were about relatively contained company products’ information.   The policy document were 
relatively contained merely company profiles.  One company policy document did state its 
commitment towards changes and meeting customers’ needs and market demands.  It also 
summarised its history of company, company range of products, human resource management 
programme and health and safety measures.   
 
 
THE MAIN FINDINGS:  A SUMMARY  
 
Companies:  Entrepreneurs and Engineers (n=23) 
Interviewees said that research findings were often not relevant, or not attractive, or there was 
nothing new to them.  Most companies used reverse and imitative engineering design and 
research.  Universities did not have good dissemination processes.   Companies often did not 
have the resources to take up research findings.  Most companies were doing ‘part-time’ and 
‘production engineering department’ research.  Companies wanted to be self-reliant on their own 
technologies. They did not want partnerships with universities and government research 
institutes.  This was partly because the time taken for research findings to be commercialised 
was often much longer than expected, as most findings were generated in laboratory-scale work.  
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Company interviewees claimed that scientists generally thought differently from business 
people.  Further, most companies approached to be risk-averse about funding and about 
spending time on processes of commercializing research findings.  To sum up, most companies 
relied on imported technologies, either from parent companies or foreign partners.  Companies 
were reluctant to engage in, or with, research in the hope of innovating.     
 
Universities and Government Research Institutes:  Scientists, Research Administrators 
and Technology Transfer Officers (n=31) 
Most of the interviewees were concerned that companies resisted change in the area of 
technology development.  As there were no test beds in firms, manufacturing new things or in 
new ways was a problem.  This means that government funding of research did allow for the 
development of the research, but some companies were still not interested.  One respondent said 
that companies refused to co-operate with scientists who worked on the improvement of 
technology.  In addition, interviewees were generally agreed that universities and government 
research institutes were more bureaucratic than companies in their processes for 
commercializing research findings.  Furthermore, one responded, ‘most scientists were burdened 
with multi-tasked jobs that included elements of management, which distracted them from 
thinking about how to help companies’.   
 
Generally scientists and research administrators argued that the IRPA system did not support the 
development part of research findings.  They argued that research funding did not facilitate 
technology up-scaling, yet as it was vital.  This was because business people seldom willing to 
risk the sharing of costs of developing and commercializing research findings.  They also argued 
that, bureaucracy slowed down the pace of commercialization.  As one of the respondents said:  
‘… under [the] government, you know that we have to go through certain financial procedures 
and everything, and then whatever problem exists on the ground about using the technology, we 
cannot solve it right away’.    
 
Many interviewees argued that elements of trust and commitment from both parties were 
important for successful commercialization, but also said that the parties lived in rather different 
worlds. For universities, successful commercialization of their findings was a bonus, not their 
bread and butter.  And as for companies, many would rather be followers of technical changes to 
products or processes, rather than in the perhaps vulnerable vanguard of innovation.      
 
Other Views:  Venture Capitalists, Journalists, and a Politician (n= 3, 2 and 1 respectively) 
Two of the venture capitalists felt that while scientists should understand markets, in doing so 
they should be able to mix commercial and technical information in terms of viability, feasibility 
and the usefulness of research findings.  Most venture capitalists did not work with scientists, as 
the latter could not commit themselves to business development work.  Furthermore, some 
companies depended completely on 20 year-old plant and other physical resources when more 
modern hardware was needed for successful commercialization.  All six of these interviewees 
claimed that there was a gap between scientists and business people in understanding research 
and its commercialization, as they had different perspectives, attitudes and knowledge.   A 
journalist argued that Malaysian universities and GRIs should have private research 
management offices to develop links between the actors involved in commercialization of 
research findings.  However the other journalist argued that Malaysia is lacking in indigenous 
technology.  Generally Malaysian companies are more successful in IT sector than 
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manufacturing.  The politician argued that generally scientists perceived that they are only 
researchers and they are not usually in positions to market their research findings.   
 
 
 
SOME COMPARISONS 
Two common themes have emerged from the data.  They are the most relevant for answering the 
research questions, about company uptake researcher’s persuasiveness. Problems of company 
uptake are very evident in the content analysis and are nicely illustrated by the following 
quotations from interviewees among companies.  One respondent said that ‘the way the 
government system or the institutions system works, is that if they need to buy spare parts, they 
need to go through a quotation process, and this may take some time, and this is why research in 
this country is difficult, and I can see that while technology transfer is often commercially 
viable, we still face problems that are mainly to do with financial resources’.  Another said that 
‘we just buy the machines and the moulds.  We are the market leaders, and we have our own R 
and D.  The university research is on a different track, which cannot be commercialized, and our 
people can’t cope with the ideas being given us’.  Several companies claimed that the several 
markets for new technology were not promising and did not try to use new research findings.  
Larger companies were more likely than smaller ones to recruit researchers and graduate 
engineers for their own R and D departments.   
 
From the data on researcher persuasiveness, it would seem that companies regard researchers as 
being much more interested in their science than in its commercial potential.  Researchers 
preferred presenting papers to seminars and conferences to working with industry, as this carried 
more promise for career advancement.  Company respondents claimed that scientists refused to 
change their perceptions of their own areas of expertise when a more adaptable assumption 
would help with commercialization.  Technology transfer officers also claimed that most 
scientists were not interested in doing business.  Both venture capitalist interviewees said the 
same thing.      
 
The scientists, from both universities and government research institutes, held different views, as 
one would expect.  On the problem of company uptake, one scientist respondent said that 
although ‘the solution was simple, they refused it, and they tried to pull me out.  Many of them 
are afraid to be pioneers’.  However, when, less often, company uptake was successful, 
researchers could be enthusiastic and proud.  One said:  ‘It is a transfer technology meeting.  I 
will give new things to them, new findings based on new experience.  Many companies are 
interested in my presentation, and one of them has already taken up the idea and will 
commercialize it.  What really matters is mutual understanding’.   
 
On the other hand, senior officers of technology transfer offices argued that problems of 
company uptake occurred ‘…because proposals are not convincing at the laboratory scale.  
People in business want to do things fast.  Also many research findings are not be able to be 
commercialised because they don’t have any value for industry’.  The venture capitalists felt that 
research administrators were too bureaucratic and slow and that many research findings take too 
long to increase company profits.  The journalists claimed that there must be more synergy 
between researchers and companies to encourage uptake.   The politician who was a respondent 
claimed that most scientists did not have the experience to commercialise their research 
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findings.   Certainly, scientists only knew how to do research and were not business-minded, 
‘even though their researches have strength’.   
 
All the findings suggest that most companies do not have much interest in taking up university 
and government research institute findings.  Notably, many small companies lack the capital 
needed to realise the commercial potential of research findings.  This is part of more general 
problem, perhaps, of undercapitalization of SMIs.  Venture capitalists find that if the research 
findings belong to highly specialized technical areas, many companies seem unable to produce 
firm enough technical or market-related reasons for the venture capitalists to lend to them.  
Obviously, relevant discoveries, inventions, ideas and knowledge can be inherently high risk and 
high cost, with long-term paybacks.  From company perspectives, quite often the findings 
suggest that the significant problem seems to be gaining an understanding of university attitude.   
 
Scientists also often regard themselves as obliged to understand company attitudes if they want 
their work to be commercialized.  Scientists often argue that universities are not in the business 
of commercializing discoveries, inventions, ideas and knowledge, and this can clearly limit 
universities from reacting quickly enough to meet the demands of companies.   This attitude has 
important strengths, because universities have educational and moral functions, and their 
research is often either not relevant or not yet relevant to industry, and scientists often produce 
their best work when they are free to do what they (and not companies) or university managers 
want.  However much university research does have strong practical relevance and it should be 
put to good use quickly.  Universities do often have rather slow decision-making procedures, 
which times are contrary to the operational methods of companies.   
 
It is difficult from the data discussed above, to see the successful commercialization of 
discoveries, inventions, ideas and knowledge in such simple terms as those of Laparche (2002, 
p. 149) as ‘the result of the application of an “organic paradigm” consisting of the four closely 
interacting factors of legislation, the economic environment and entrepreneurship, technical 
progress and university strategy’.  All parties involved should obviously be willing to work 
together, but economic, political and social activities are nowadays so diverse, interdependent 
and difficult to predict, that simplistic comparisons between the private and the public, between 
business and science, and between flexible and the rigid ways of managing, can confuse thought 
and action more that they usefully inform them.   
 
CONCLUSION 
This appendix presents the results of the research, mainly from interviews along with a little 
documentary evidence.  Interviews were carried out over three months from early October 2004 
to early January 2005.   The respondents came mainly from engineering companies, universities 
and government research institutes, and six were with other interested parties, meaning three 
venture capitalists, two journalists and a politician.  
 
The most significant findings were about resistance to change from the companies.  Companies 
tended to be too under-capitalised or focused on survival to use discoveries and inventions from 
scientific researchers working in universities and government research institutes.  The company 
respondents seemed to be biased towards foreign technology and risk-adverse in general.  The 
necessary underlying element of trusts often also offer seemed to be lacking between various 
parties.  Therefore, the process of technology transfer tends to be slow as the parties involved 
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did not seem to appreciate what they might gain from each other, or to be realistically aware 
there was not, in some cases, much anything to gain.   
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: 
TWENTY-FIVE CONCEPTS 
These concepts are grouped under five main headings: subject classifications; socioeconomic 
development; academic; industrial; and ones linking universities and industries. The reasons 
for choosing them are explained under each of the headings. 
 
 
1. Subject Classifications:  
 
1. a.    Kunst, Technik and Wissenschaft  
These definitions are included because they separate engineering and science, unlike such 
English language terms as applied science and technology.  They make a clear distinction 
between those who make things, techniker or engineers, and those who study them, scientists 
or Wissenschaftler. 
 
1. a. i  Kunst 
Kunst means the fine and performing arts, which are meant to be beautiful and inspiring.  
They are thought in German and in other Continental parts of British arts colleges.  
1. a. ii  Technik 
This word means engineering and technical excellence, and many other practical subjects.  It 
is concern with usefulness and cost, design and use.  It relies unpredictable ingenuity far 
more than on use of scientific principal.  On the Continent university-level technik subjects 
have long been taught in institutions with very high social status.  
  
1. a. iii Wissenschaft 
Wissenschaft means science and scholarship.  Its literal translation into English is 
‘knowledge-ship’.  Its includes all subjects which are concerned with discovering and 
recording the truth.  Examples include history, the study of language and literature (but not 
creative writing), geography, economics, psychology and sociology and political science, as 
well as mathematics and physical sciences.  These subjects are taught in traditional 
universities like Alexander Humboldt University in Berlin and the Sorbonne in Paris.  Their 
outputs are judged in terms of truth or rightness against some scale.  They consist of public 
knowledge (Ziman, 1970) or verifiable knowledge of phenomena (Fores and Rey, 1979). 
 
1. b.    The ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ science and the arts and humanities 
These are included because they appear less than logical compared with the previous 
classification, and because in the cases of the ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ sciences their illogical 
character informs much conventional and/or English language research, thought and rhetoric 
about technical change and commercialization.   
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1. b. i   Science 
Science used to be called natural philosophy.  The word science did not come into use until 
the nineteenth century, with the first use of the word scientist, in 1844, often being attributed 
to the Cambridge University mathematician Whewell.  Science has two-dimensional paper 
outputs and the best short definition of scientific activity is the production of verifiable 
knowledge of phenomena.  The scientist aims to get as close as to truth as possible, and is not 
primarily interested in usefulness or profit.  Science is a non-commercial type of activity, at 
least in principle and the first instance.  However, the term ‘pure science’ is very dubious.  It 
means science that no one will use.  But there are many examples of knowledge once thought 
to have no practical uses or implications that has been used eventually.  It is politically 
motive because its use attempts to distance certain activities and people from the everyday, 
practical concerns of people.   
 
Ziman (1970) defined science as public knowledge. Fores and Rey (1978) defined it as 
verifiable knowledge of phenomena. These definitions are virtually identical. Scientists study 
things. Scientific knowledge is a public good like the air, free for anyone to question and use 
at any time. Since it is impossible to predict whether new scientific knowledge will be used 
or not in the future, the idea of ‘pure’ science is very questionable.  For example, 
astronomical knowledge was once seen as having no conceivable practical use.  However, it 
is now in widespread use in satellite communications.  Bell and Hill (1978) suggested, 
further, and agreeing simultaneously with Ziman and Fores and Rey in the process, that 
science is definable by its method of trying to disprove conjectures as much as by the nature 
of the knowledge that it produces.  
1.b.ii   Engineering 
Engineering is not applied science and it is not a part of science either because it does not 
produce knowledge as its primary output.  Its output consists of hardware and supporting 
software.  Most working engineers will agree that engineering is sensibly called the 
‘industrial arts’ because it is much more art than science (Fores, 1978).  
 
The root of the word engineering is ingenuity. Engineering is a, in fact the, useful art, and it 
is intuitive and unpredictable and private to its creators in many respects. Engineers make 
things, and their work includes the design and technical development of processes and 
products, and the production of three-dimensional artefacts of all kinds. Engineers use 
technical, scientific and other knowledge in their work, but their work is not part of science. 
The output of the latter is verifiable and published knowledge of phenomena in the form of 
scientific papers, books, and so on. The output of engineering consists of useful and 
commercially viable products. Engineering is often ahead of the frontiers of scientific 
knowledge, with there being no science to apply, as when drugs are marketed without full 
knowledge of why they are successful, or when bridges are built without complete certainty 
about their long-term future and safety.  Engineering in one form or other has existed since 
prehistoric humans began to make and use tools. The most comprehensive definition of our 
species is homo faber, the maker and doer (Glover and Kelly 1987).  Engineering also uses 
all kinds of accounting, financial marketing, and people management expertise.  It has many 
branches, for example aeronautical, civil, mechanical, electronic and electrical, chemical and 
mining.  
 
1.b.iii Technology 
This popular word, which in many lay minds, at least, appears to be identified mainly with 
information and communication technology (ICT) is often used to differentiate ICT from 
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apparently older and cruder technologies, like those of electrical, mechanical, mining or civil 
engineering.  However it is more complex word than this suggests, although as shall be seen, 
the gently implied criticism of it being a status-concerned substitute for engineering has more 
than a grain of truth in it.   
 
Dictionary definitions of technology tend to note and stress the relevance of the literal 
translation from the Latin: knowledge or study or the science of technique and/or techniques.  
In both everyday and academic usage, however, and as just suggested, the word generally has 
more practical connotations, ones ‘traditionally’ and more accurately identifiable with 
engineering.   Most practising ‘technologists’ are engineers by qualification, function and 
title, so this is unsurprising.  Fores (1978), an engineer and economist interested in the status 
of engineering across the industrial world in the 1970s, asked how engineering, which 
principally aims to produce three-dimensional objects for sale, could sensibly be described an 
‘-ology’.  He also wondered whether technology means ‘ideas, hardware, or something that 
arts graduates love to hate’.   
 
Such criticisms do, whether they are perhaps too strongly stated or not, provide support for 
the suggestion that technology is a rather vague notion.  If is possible that it is so because it 
means quite literally means so much, so that it is easy to interpret and describe in several 
different ways, usually without straying disastrously far from the truth.  
 
In management and organization studies the term technology has different levels of meaning 
(Loveridge, 2001).  This is also often the case in social science more generally.  At the 
highest level of abstraction, technology means, according to Loveridge, ‘all modes of 
organizing people for the purposes of controlling or co-ordinating their activities, (p. 6375).  
At a slightly lower level (p. 6376) it means ‘bodies of disciplined knowledge [that] have 
emerged in which causal and systematic relations between material and/or social elements in 
specified situations are postulated and related to empirical observations’.  This means, more 
simply, the bodies of knowledge and skill, of virtually all kinds, that enable particular ways 
of producing and driving things to be repeated more or less predictably and reliably.  
Examples could include assembly line technology, biotechnology, chemical process 
technology, information technology, missile technology and waste disposal technology.  For 
Loveridge, with whom I agree on this point, the ways in which those relations and processes 
are categorised and explained conceptually ‘can be seen as constituting more or less 
scientific knowledge in terms of its reproducibility and generalizability’ (p. 6376).  However 
the knowledge used within each type of technology is, of course, mainly technical 
knowledge.  This definition is closest to the literal translations of technology from Latin and 
to most dictionary definitions of technology as knowledge or study of techniques.   
 
A third, ‘lower level’, and more practical kind of definition focuses on the ‘techniques or 
procedures adopted in processing information [about] data on social or material operations’ 
(p. 6376).  Such techniques are useful partly because they drew on past scientific and/or 
practical observations that have come to be seen as reliable.  Such observations and the 
techniques that relied on them were very often ‘codified in… texts and manuals or embodied 
in tacit routines’ (p. 6376).  The techniques and the tacit and other forms of knowledge 
involved was often sector- defining.   
 
Loveridge goes on to call techniques that are incorporated in the mechanical, material or 
electronic design and programming of hardware and software, in other words in machines 
and capital equipment as ‘the most articulated forms of technology’ (p. 6376).  This is his 
fourth way of defining and discussing technology.  From all of his definitions, all of which 
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are used widely, we can see how the word rivals and indeed potentially surpasses culture (qv) 
in terms of complexity.  Clearly it is partly synonymous with technical knowledge or know-
how, but it is self-consciously upmarket and ‘modern’ in the way in which, in use, as well as 
etymologically and in theory, it makes rather biased claims about the science upon which 
practical procedures are, or should be, ‘based’.   
 
Loveridge also discusses ‘technological innovation’ or change and the distinctions between 
product and process or production technology (p. 6376).  On the former, see the discussions 
of technical change and especially that of technological change below for the ways in which 
Loveridge’s discussions of technology is relevant there.  On the latter, Loveridge argues that 
it is important, at the sector or firm level of analysis, to distinguish between the ‘importing’ 
of technological resources and the ‘exporting' to other firms, sectors or final consumers, of 
value added products.  He notes how different researchers had tended to focus on either one 
or the other, with installation and use of ‘imported’ processes ‘or with the invention and 
design of new products’.  However, since the 1970s relationships between the two types of 
innovation had been studied more often, ‘particularly’ in designer-user inter-firm transactions 
within the value chain’ (p. 6376).  
 
The definition of technology used by Bell and Hill (1978) was knowledge about a machine, a 
product, or a method of production.  It could include the underlying knowledge, which has 
been drawn on to produce the machine, product or method.  Methods meant the same as 
techniques.   Some features of technology are products of self-conscious searches for 
information, knowledge and skill.  Many are results of more tacit experience and learning 
that takes place as firms operate, which often consist of very important parts of business 
activities, taking place in production and other technical departments (Itami, 1987).   Sources 
of technology not only came from R and D but also from production, quality control, testing, 
marketing, feedback from users; plant design and construction, feedback from contractors 
and suppliers, scanning relevant academic and professional literature, patents and other 
technical information sources, the recruitment of engineers and scientists, contacts with 
university engineering and science faculties, contacts with government research 
organizations, the acquisition of other firms, or mergers, joint ventures, and cooperative 
engineering, design and other arrangements; licensing and cross-licensing of new products 
and processes, know-how transfer agreements, and from contract research (Freeman, 1992).  
Perhaps the best (short) working definition of technology that emerges from this discussion is 
that it is a generic, cross-sector and/or sector-specific bundle of information, knowledge and 
skill.   
 
1.b.iv The arts and humanities 
Arts subjects in the UK and other former British Empire countries are normally of three 
kinds; the humanities, languages, and the fine and performing arts.  The humanities are often 
thought of as including languages but they are principally those subjects which study 
humankind and its experience, such as geography, history and study of literature and various 
other manifestations of human artifice.  Partly because the social sciences, like anthropology, 
economics, political science, psychology and sociology, study human artifacts like tools, 
products, services, thoughts, motives, attitudes, and social institutions, processes and actions, 
they have often been classified as arts rather than as sciences, rather, that is, as part of what 
would be Wissenschaft in German.  Language subjects often include the study of the 
histories, economies and institutions of the societies of which the where languages are being 
learnt, and they can therefore be regarded both/either as humanities and/or social scientific 
subjects.  The fine and performing arts subjects are more or less the same as the Kunst ones 
in German and on elsewhere the European Continent.  They are more directly vocational than 
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the other arts and humanities subjects.  Those who qualify in them are proportionately less 
likely to teach them than those with other arts and humanities qualifications, or not to use 
what they have learnt at all (or very little) in subsequent employment, or more likely to make 
careers out of them.  What is of specific interest here is the tendency of many arts and 
humanities teachers, researchers and practitioners to distance themselves from the useful 
industrial arts of design, engineering, manufacturing and construction.  In the UK, for 
example, design is taught for industrial and related purposes to engineers and architects. It is 
also taught, separately, in art college or university arts faculties, with a generally and 
significantly less practical and more aesthetic (and at times anarchic or frivolous) emphasis 
(Hudson 1978).   
 
2.  Socioeconomic development: culture; development; and sustainable development 
These are included to help clarify some of the major background assumptions used in this 
thesis.  The specific relevance of each is made apparent in each case. 
Culture 
According to Williams (1976), culture was the most complex word in the English language. 
Traditionally it has often been associated with intellectually and socially prestigious elite 
leisure pursuits, including the often expensive fine performing arts, and their conspicuous 
consumption for predatory purposes, in the pursuit of status and women (Veblen, 1921).  
 
Since the 1960s, one interpretation of the word has increasingly been employed as a category 
in the study of management.  This seems to have been because the countries in which the 
academic study of management largely began, the USA and the UK, started to be overtaken 
economically by Sweden, West Germany, France, Japan and a few other countries from the 
1960s and 1970s onwards, until they began to reassert themselves economically in the 1980s 
and 1990s. From around 1970 British and North American researchers began to study 
comparative management to see what the UK and the USA might learn from Continental 
Europe and the Far East (Dore, 1975; Fores and Sorge, 1978; Macmillan, 1978; Lawrence, 
1980; Jamieson, 1981, Maurice, Sorge and Warner, 1980; Sorge and Warner, 1986; Lee and 
Smith, 1992). Thus management has increasingly been thought of and discussed in cross-
cultural terms. Unfortunately many early comparisons of managers and management in 
different countries tended to be rather shallow and concerned with superficial attitudes and 
behaviour, and researchers often made things worse by inferring values from them (cf. 
Hofstede, 1980). 
 
Further, academics sometimes yielded to pressures from managers and companies to suggest 
ways in which ‘organizational cultures’ could be changed so that employee performance 
might be improved. Organizational culture was often very inadequately and indeed 
illiterately described as ‘the way we do things round here’ and managers were not criticised 
for naively saying such things as ‘I want a new culture by Toosday!’ ‘Culture’ was thus (re-) 
defined as a mechanism of control. In some respects it is, of course, as for example when 
organizations deliberately recruit people with specific backgrounds, such as when the UK’s 
fire services used to recruit heavily from former members of the Royal Navy, or when 
managements try to develop companies and other organizations with ‘family’ atmospheres 
and so on. However Sorge (1982-83, 1985) explored the history of the term to help arrive at a 
comprehensive definition. He discussed the roots of the word in the Latin verb colere, which 
means to grow, in the context of living organisms. He argued that the culture of a human 
group or social institution is made up of everything that it consisted of, everything that 
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characterised it, everything that the people involved were and are. Culture was so all-
embracing and its roots were so deep that appearance was often taken for substance, with 
attitudes and ways of behaving only parts of culture, being thought of as all of it.  
For Sorge (1982-83, 1985), the culture of any human society had three equally important 
components: ideational, material and social. Using France as an example, the ideational ones 
would include French values, attitudes, beliefs, ways of acting, a desire for change to be 
gradual, Parisian rudeness, artistic and design flair, flair at soccer and rugby, French style 
and fashion and French philosophy.  Material components would include French clothes, 
aircraft, buildings, people, cars, crockery, farmland, televisions, harbours, furniture, climate 
and sheep.  Social institutions would include French schools, the French family, the Catholic 
religion, French health care, French machine tool companies and French banks.  Together, all 
such things and many others constitute France and its culture.  What Sorge implied was, as 
many others have stated since, was that countries do not ‘have’ cultures. They are them. The 
same point is often made about organizations.  This all means that, as Sorge (1982-83) 
argued, the more one writes or talks about the culture of something, the more one glosses 
over its essence.  It also means that it is unacceptable to ‘explain’ those aspects of events that 
cannot be explained using familiar influences and logical reasoning by attributing them to 
‘culture’.  For example the performance of a company is often hard to explain completely by 
considering its financing, its material resources, its human assets and liabilities, and so on, 
and by then ‘explaining’, but not really explaining it at all, what remains to be explained by 
referring to its ‘organizational culture’.  But all of these factors, for example material human 
resources, attitudes and ways of doing things, are parts of its ‘culture’, ‘organizational’ or 
otherwise.  So culture should never be used as a residual, for ‘explaining’ that which is less 
easy to explain rationally and conventionally. 
One of the main reasons why culture is so hard to understand is its very deep, old and all-
pervasive nature.  Further, human characteristics develop over many generations and are 
subject to many influences and most of this is of course unknown to the individuals 
concerned, and we only ever really understand our own culture to a limited extent, and the 
understanding of it that we do have is normally very subjective, virtually by definition. 
What is the relevance of these points to the present study?  The main point is that Malaysia is 
unique, like all nations, and therefore just as hard for non-Malaysians to understand as it is 
for Malaysians.  Further, to try to convert the Malaysian economy to something like a 
European Union, or a North American, or some other more ‘advanced’ one is like trying to 
turn a Nissan Micra into large Mercedes car by putting a Mercedes engine in it, or vice-versa.  
Such an attempt would be thoughtless, crude, destructive and in every other way 
impracticable.  To make a Nissan Micra faster and more comfortable, it would be far more 
sensible to develop selected parts of it in highly specific and creative ways, to engage in what 
Sorge (1985) called ‘judicious tinkering’.  Thus to expect Malaysian companies to respond 
exactly like counterparts in older industrialised countries might respond to offers of and 
actual help from university researchers would be naïve.   
 
Development  
In economic terms, development has traditionally meant increasing the capacity, potential 
and output of a national economy. It concerns the capacity of a nation to generate and sustain 
annual increases in its gross national product (GNP). Another is the ability of a nation to 
expand its output at a faster rate than the growth rate of its population. Levels and rates of 
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growth of ‘real’ per capita GNP, example, monetary growth of GNP per capita minus the rate 
of inflation, are normally used to measure the overall economic well-being of a population. 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, much thinking about economic development was focussed on less 
developed countries (LDC) and stressed rapid industrialization at the expense of agriculture 
and rural development (Todaro, 1988).  But standards of living of most LDCs remained 
unchanged in the 1970s, and economic development came to the thought of more in terms of 
reduction and elimination of poverty, inequality, and unemployment in the context of a 
generally growing economy.  Therefore the new definition of development is one of a 
multidimensional process involving changes in social structure, attitudes and national 
institutions, as well as acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, and 
eradication of absolute poverty. 
 
Apart from its uses covering general economic and societal development, and that of LDCs, 
the term development is also used as part of the terms sustainable development (qv) and 
research and development (qv). The first of these is discussed immediately below.  The 
second is discussed immediately after that in the academic subsection (part 3) of this section 
and more.  The word also has a fifth meaning, which includes the second part of R and D, 
and other usually within-firm technical development activities.  The fifth and final meaning 
is discussed briefly below in the industrial subsection of this section.   
 
Parker (1978) saw the development of innovative processes as lengthy sequences of focused 
technical activities through which original concepts are modified until they are ready for 
production and sale.  Such concepts, and improved or new processes and products, can come 
from inventions or scientific discoveries (Cory, 1996). The development of processes and 
products can be described as a chain of acceptance by management in its path from idea 
conceptualisation to marketplace. Haeffner (1979) argued that technical development 
included three components: research results, engineering innovation and product 
development.  Technical development was necessary to the industrial progress and economic 
growth of industrialized nations.  However Haeffner might have more logically put 
engineering innovation first in his short list and called it engineering and process innovation, 
and also to put research results last, partly because to do so would have been to list the three 
items in ideologically and socially neutral alphabetical order, and partly because an 
impression that scientific research needs to precede process and product development would 
have been avoided.   
 
Sustainable development 
 
Sustainable development, as described by the Brundtland Report of 1987, is development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). 
Sustainable development demands that we seek ways of living, working and being that 
enable all people to lead healthy, fulfilling, and economically secure lives without harming 
the environment and without endangering future welfare.  Levine (1998: 688) noted that 
links between R and D and economic performance were generally acknowledged, but that 
environmental problems concerning biodiversity, climate change and pollution are now 
increasingly relevant. Thus, sustainable development goals should be at the forefront of 
coherent national frameworks for development, education, research and industry.  The USA’s 
government’s policy on scientific R and D, for example supported the ability to promote 
sustainable development in various areas, including reproductive health, medical and 
population science, food security through agricultural research and food preservation, storage 
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and distribution technology, resource stewardship, involving sustainable management of 
forest and marine resources, and natural disaster reduction through the development and 
implementation of technologies for preparation, monitoring and mitigation (Levine, 1998: 
679). 
 
For Rauch (1998) sustainable development should have two simultaneous goals: the 
achievement of human development to secure high standards of living; and protection and 
improvement of the environment now and for future generations. According to Kuhlman and 
Edler (2003), national systems of innovation, and by implication, environmental protection, 
tended reflect national political histories, structures and traditions. For example that of 
France is more centralized that those of Germany and the USA.  Developing countries have 
tended to be careless with their natural environments.  Their politicians can have more power 
and more ambition than those in older, wealthier societies.  Such points may have some 
relevance for Malaysia. 
 
3.  Academic:  research and development; and discovery 
Research and development      
This is a rather vague notion which is often used to include many types of technical work, 
often of a quite routine nature, like maintenance.  Most industrial R and D appear to consist 
of development work.  However university and directly government organized and funded R 
and D has become more and more important in the last 50 years, and this is a major focus of 
the thesis.  More details regarding these points are to be found under the same heading in the 
next section.   
 
Discovery 
Discoveries meaning new knowledge about the natural world, are often confused with 
inventions (qv) and vice-versa. Major scientific discoveries occur infrequently and 
unpredictable intervals, although the validity of this claim is of course partly dependent on 
what the word major means. Once made, discoveries open up extensive scope for 
refinements to scientific theories and sometimes they are involved in paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 
1962).  These refinements arose from work undertaken in an ever-widening range of 
laboratories (Hawthorne, 1978).  According to Parker (1979) each industry tended to help 
create its own knowledge base.  Doubts about whether science and engineering operate in 
parallel or together might can be answered as follows: industry may create a range of 
problems for which basic science may not have answers.  Industries tend to be concerned 
only with design, production and development problems, ones of practice and not ones of 
fact or principle.  Technical knowledge built up from experience, is usually sufficient.  This 
is not scientific knowledge.  Discoveries that may help industry may not occur unless those 
concerned are conditioned to think about particular industrial problems and subjects and are 
under pressure to solve them.  The knowledge required is usually interdisciplinary (p. 31), 
and industry is normally more involved with inventions than discoveries. But not all 
discoveries are irrelevant, and some are very important indeed.    
 
 391
 
 
4.  Industrial:  production, design, entrepreneurship, innovation, invention, technical 
change, management of change, performance; success 
 
Production 
Production includes all the activities involved in the physical transformation of artefacts.  
Production includes assembly and testing, and processes such as machining, extruding and 
forging, and its quality and efficiency are usually improved by automation.  Production is 
important in virtually all manufacturing and also in construction, extraction and energy 
supply industries, and encompasses a broad range of activities, for example; heavy industry; 
light industry; high-technology industry; precision technology and specialist production.  
Heavy industry production includes foundry work, where molten metals are cast; large scale 
assembly such as in car plants where pressing machines stamp out car bodies, and robots 
moves, weld and paint; and continuous process oil refineries and petrochemical works.  Light 
industry includes manufacturing furniture, clothing, and food, ‘white goods’ such as 
refrigerators, ovens and air-conditioners, consumer electronics and computer assembly.  High 
technology industries include semiconductors and complex pharmaceutical products.  
Precision engineering involves machining high-value metals to tolerances measured in 
microns, as for example, in aerospace.  Specialist production includes one-off special 
projects, such as air traffic control systems and such products and equipment as prefabricated 
houses or sound systems for musicians.  
 
For many years, at least since the 1950s, production tended to be undervalued in the UK, and 
seen as the cockpit of industrial conflict, as a cost rather than as a source of profit, and as 
offering work unfit for a gentleman or intellectual (Glover and Kelly, 1987).  However, 
relevant priorities, attitudes and behaviour appear to have changed somewhat in the UK since 
the early 1980s (Owen, 1999; Glover, Tracey and Currie, 1998).   Important contrasts with 
Germany, based mainly on 1970s’ evidence, led Lawrence (1980) emphasized how 
production is what defines manufacturing is general, and specifically, so that the type of 
product and production involved in each manufacturing sector defines it.  He emphasized 
how production is the most vital and central function of any manufacturing organization, 
preceded by design, development, marketing and finance and followed by accounting and 
sales.  He also noted how in Germany production generally meant ‘the whole company 
minus sales and finance, so that it included design, technical development, purchasing and 
maintenance, unlike the situation in the UK a generation ago. 
   
Design 
Design is central to technical change, yet neglected in the literature on it.  It is a private act 
because it is intuitive and specific to the individuals who undertake it, unlike the public 
nature of scientific work.  Von Stamm (2003) argued that design is the conscious decision-
making process by which information is transformed into an outcome, be it tangible, a 
product or intangible, a service.  However many would argue that unpredictable ingenuity 
and intuition are vital features of the arts of designing, that much of the ‘thought’ involved in 
unconscious and that much of the knowledge used is tacit (Fores, 1978).   
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Design is the main activity of many engineers, and more central to engineering than even 
production is, but academics concerned with commercialization, technical change, and R and 
D, have tended to neglect it compared with them. It is indeed the core activity of engineering 
(Fores 1978). The act of deciding into what forms material should be manipulated in order to 
have added value is the essence of designing (Archer 1967).   Design is at the very root 
industrial activity (Schwarz 1990).  In Britain, design is seen as separate from industry in 
many ways, because industrial managers, including some engineers, tend to regard it is 
unscientific and intuitive, as of course it is in many respects. Further, designers who have 
been educated in art colleges have tended to evaluate themselves and their work using 
aesthetic more than practical criteria.    
 
In a study by Salford University (1982) of the instrument industry, measurements were made 
of the time to assemble six different types of meter in Japan, West Germany, the USA and 
the UK.  It was concluded that ‘design has an important influence on manufacturing costs, 
and far-reaching changes in design and manufacturing technology were recommended to the 
UK firms’ (Bessant and Grunt, 1985).   In designing new products, the general strategy is 
first, to identify the relevant customer groups; then to discern their needs; and finally, to 
develop product and the technology to meet the customers’ needs.  This general approach is 
appropriate in most cases because most innovations are incremental (Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990). 
 
Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurial action is needed for new knowledge and techniques to be made productive 
and commercially viable,.  According to Kuratko (2001), an  ‘entrepreneur undertakes to 
organise, manage and assume the risks of business’, and more comprehensively and in 
contemporary contexts, is an ‘innovator or developer who organizes and seizes opportunities, 
converts those opportunities into workable/marketable ideas, adds value through time, effort, 
money or skill, assumes the risks of the competitive marketplace to implement those ideas, 
and realizes the rewards from these efforts’, (p. 1763).  The characteristics of entrepreneurs 
included ‘personal initiative, the ability to consolidate resources, risk taking, 
competitiveness, goal-oriented behaviour, opportunistic behaviour, reality-based actions and 
the ability to learn from mistakes’ and also ‘a “dark side” which could result in destructive 
(sic) behaviour (p. 1763).  Entrepreneurial activity inside established businesses is often 
called intrapreneurship.  There is of course nothing new in either entrepreneurship or 
intrapreneurship.   They are useful in not-for-profit organizations: they are also helpful in 
education, government, health care, research, the armed forces and the emergency services, 
and so on. 
 
For present purposes, entrepreneurship is relevant in the research, design, engineering, 
management, finance and marketing that result in the commercialization of discoveries and 
inventions.  As suggested in the last paragraph there is no need to restrict thinking about it, or 
the phenomenon itself, to commercial, for-profit, private sector business activities and 
organizations.    Enterprise can be social as well as economic, and in modern political 
terminology, left-wing as well as right-wing (Keats and Abercombie, 1994).  However there 
would appear to be overwhelming evidence to the effect governments cannot build 
geographical or other clusters of innovative firms, and that such clusters generally products 
of ‘systems of innovation’ in which companies, universities, banks, and other sources of 
venture capital and other finance, and government agencies, facilitate, support and stimulate 
each other to generate innovation, rather than to locate, channel or control it (Saxenian 1994; 
Feldman and Audretsch 1996; Feldman 2003; Clark and Tracey 2004).  Factors which favour 
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sophisticated entrepreneurial industry activity included the presence of highly and relevantly 
qualified people in particular and fecund labour markets in general, and large enough scale 
industrial and other organizations and markets for innovations to take out root and for spin-
off companies to find profitable market niches.  While all or most of these factors may be 
present in LDCs their roots tend to be shallower than in established industrial countries  
Innovation 
Innovation consists of inventions first being used to commercial effect, profitably and for the 
first time.  The process of innovation is viewed as occurring in three phases: generation of an 
idea, problem-solving or development, and implementation and diffusion.  Generation of an 
idea involves synthesis of diverse, usually existing, as opposed to original, information, 
including information about market or other needs and possible technical means to meet the 
end.  Problem-solving includes setting specific technical goals and designing alternative 
solutions to meet them.  Implementation consists of engineering, tooling, and plant and 
market starts-up required ‘bringing an original solution or invention to its first use or 
marketing introduction’ (Utterback, 1982, p. 30). Marquis (1982) argued that about a quarter 
of successful technical innovations required virtually no adaptation of information readily 
obtainable from some source, and that another third were was modifications of existing 
products or processes.  As noted in the previous sub-section, on entrepreneurship, 
innovations tend to be more successful when they occur in the contexts of systems of 
innovation.   
Invention 
This is a simple but important notion discussed at more length in the next section.  However 
a few points should be made here.  First, inventions are created by new syntheses of existing 
techniques and knowledge.  They consist of new products or processes or component parts of 
them.  Invention is not part of science.  It is art, although science often helps, indirectly in 
most cases.  Inventions come about through both scarcities and surpluses of resources, or 
without resource considerations being of any real significance.  Inventors tend to be rather 
different kinds of people from innovators.   
 
The management of change 
 
Commercialization is a kind of organizational change, and to be successful it obviously 
needs to be managed suitably.  Those involved and responsible, such as managers and 
professionals in companies, research administrators and researchers in universities and 
research institutes, and relevant members of government departments and governments, need 
to know about how change in organizations is best managed, including what to focus more 
strongly on and what to handle with a lighter touch.  In general, entrepreneurial attitudes and 
habits tend to help management to handle change well, but stable bureaucratic foundations 
are also very important.  Accurate, detailed and precise technical knowledge is the sine qua 
non; but commercial and financial expertise and awareness are vital too.  The management of 
change needs, above all, to be holistic, meaning that all necessary actions should be taken, 
neither more nor fewer.  More details of the management literature on organizational change 
and of how it relates to commercialization are to be found in the next section, under the same 
sub-heading.   
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Performance 
 
Performance criteria are of several kinds and they operate at several levels: international, 
societal, sectoral, organizational, group and individual.  At the international and sectoral 
levels, influence is often what is evaluated.  For example does an organization, like Honda or 
Ford, or very high-powered and effective managers, like Soichiro Honda or Henry Ford, 
influence industry and technical and managerial and practices and standards for good or ill, 
and in his how widespread a way, and for how long?  Following Child (1984), well-known 
performance criteria include product and service quality, process quality, service quality, 
quality and/or volume of employment, return on investment, profit, ecological friendliness, 
market share, and corporate social responsibility.  Sector-specific performance criteria are 
very numerous: examples might include infant and other patient mortality in health care, 
crimes solved in policing, examination passes in education, output and sales volume in 
manufacturing, enemy aircraft downed in air warfare, or houses built in construction.  There 
are also multiple performance criteria-defining stakeholders such as customers, citizens, 
voters, suppliers, government departments, communities, shareholders, the physical 
environment, parents, employers and special interest groups.  All have different interests in 
the survival as well as the performance of organizations.  Conflict as well as co-operation 
between stakeholders is routine and normal.   
 
The issue of the short versus long term in considering performance is also important, as are 
historical and societal contexts.  Reducing expenditure on market research, technical 
development or training can be useful in the short term but have bad long-term 
consequences, including ones not always easy to foresee.  In the 1970s and 1980s Germany 
and Japan were held up in the UK and the USA as sources of role models of successful 
manufacturing enterprises and technical innovation, as countries in which educational, 
financial and other institutions and techniques of management and organization had been 
designed and run with the long term in mind.  However from an early twenty-first century 
perspective it is reasonable to suggest that the economic and related policies of Germany and 
Japan after their catastrophic military defeats in 1945 were actually much more ‘medium-
termist’, being concerned with national economic and political regeneration and self-respect, 
although long-termist in others too.  It is reasonable to suggest that Anglo-American short-
termism is, in at least one fundamental respect, as ‘long-termist’ as it is possible to be.  Thus 
by eschewing the collectivism of Continental European and Far Eastern societies, and in 
trusting individuals and individual firms to perform, they assume that the pursuit of 
individual self-interest and the creative destruction of market forces will, in the long run, 
optimise societal outcomes. 
 
Success 
Just as innovation is more than invention, success is more than performance.  It may also be 
impossible to measure.  According to Addison (18??), the ancient Roman Cato wrote that 
‘’tis not in mortals to command success, but we’ll do more Petronius, we’ll deserve it’.  The 
point being made here is rather like saying that however able, well resourced and well 
managed and organized people may be, it will all be of no use unless there are markets for 
their outputs, or if their efforts are undermined, subverted or overcome by rivals, competitors 
or opponents, but that at the deepest level it does not matter in an always uncertain and often 
unjust world.  In other words, it may be enough simply to deserve success, because even 
when all possible contigencies are understood and catered and accounted for, achievement 
may still be impossible.  Because what is generally regarded as good and successful human 
behaviour is that which enhances the survival and welfare prospects of our species, the 
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higher the proportion of competent and suitably motivated individuals in a population, the 
greater the prospects of the population as a whole.   
 
According to Landes (1998), economic success, when achievable, is normally a product of 
two phenomena: hard and focussed effort, and a refusal to believe in one’s own mythology or 
propaganda.  Also, although there were many diverse routes to success, like German and 
Japanese perfectionism, British imagination and persistence, and determined, systemic and 
thorough American management, they all tended to look the same from the standpoint of the 
relevant product or service.  Considerable and clear-eyed effort had been applied, with 
appropriate attention to detail and necessary imagination.   
 
As regards technical change, successful inventions are generally those which achieve profit 
and market share, ones which are commercialized successfully. According to Rothwell 
(1974: 258) successful industrial innovation demanded excellent understanding of user 
needs, efficient but not necessarily quick development work, and competent use of outside 
technology and relevant scientific advice, although not always of obviously and directly 
useful kinds (see also Teubal 1990).  Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al (2003) argued, further, 
that involvement of suppliers in technology transfer reduces uncertainty and enhances the 
probability of success.  
 
5. Linking universities and industries: commercialization; technical change; 
technological change, technology transfer 
Commercialization 
Commercialization is a process which seeks to make new scientific and technical profitable 
after it has been produced in universities or other research organizations.  As noted earlier, 
commercialization may, in fact and in practice, be a term that described government over-
control of universities and industry, with innovation potentially stifled rather than stimulated 
(Hughes, 1985).  Government aims for commercialization in Malaysia are generally the same 
as those pursued by governments elsewhere, and it involves the same parties, namely 
government departments, universities and research institutes, companies and so on.   
Technical change  
Technical change affects products and processes (Bell and Hill, 1978, p. 226). Often two 
types of technical change are distinguished, innovation and diffusion.  Most technical change 
is piecemeal and small-scale and may hardly merits the use of the word innovation.  Most 
changes use technical knowledge far more than scientific knowledge. Some does originate in 
scientific research, and some of this is of considerable use to industry and this is the kind that 
most discussions of commercialization are concerned with.  Technological changes use new 
scientific knowledge or techniques used in scientific research and technical change tends not 
to.  As with the more general phenomenon, technical change, technological changes are 
sometimes widely diffused across industries and sometimes not.  From this it follows that it 
is not always easy to distinguish between technical and technological change, with each 
being able to be described, quite legitimately, as a special case of the other.  However given 
the greater prevalence of technical change it will normally be more helpful to regard 
technological change as a special case of it, rather than the other way round.  
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Technological change 
There is awareness that the successes of organizations often depend directly on the effective 
use of technology (Joynt, 2001).  Unfortunately however, technological change is rarely 
distinguished clearly of openly from technical change.  It would be useful to distinguish it in 
a relatively open and formal way by regarding it as a special case of technical change, in 
which, unlike the case with the latter, new scientific knowledge may combine with new and 
old techniques to help generate, not only improved or new processes and products, but new 
and often generic technologies with systemic implications.  There are many examples of 
technical change which achieve this through developments using technical knowledge 
entirely or largely on its own, and lack or relative unimportance of inputs of new scientific 
knowledge suggest that use of the  ‘-ology’ suffix is very often unjustifiable. As regards 
manufacturing, Fores (1978, p. 146) was but one of those to have observed that even the 
most discontinuous types of technical change, known as  (commercially viable) inventions, 
do not typically stem from a new use of knowledge from science.  Instead scientific 
knowledge generally flowed into manufacturing and other engineering sectors through its 
ambient nature, meaning that it is used in a background and surrounding way, as for example 
when knowledge of the melting points of different metals are known and taken into account 
in designing ovens or aircraft.    
  
Technology transfer  
Typical definitions of technology transfer include ‘the process by which a technology is 
applied to a purpose other than the one for which it was originally intended’ or ‘technology 
transfer is putting technology into a different context’ (Bradbury, Jervis, Johnston and 
Pearson, 1978).  According to Brooks (1966), however, technology transfer was the very 
general process by which science and technology were diffused throughout human activity.  
Whenever useful knowledge developed by one person, group or institution was embodied in 
a way of doing things by another person group or other institutions we had technology 
transfer.  This could either be transfer from scientific knowledge into technology, or 
adaptation of an existing technology to a new use. Technology transfer also often refers to 
the transfer of a commercial right to use new technology.  Technology transfer differs from 
ordinary scientific information transfer in that to be really transferred; it must be embodied in 
processes and products. In practice, technology transfer means the transfer of technical 
knowledge, practical know-how, and not just scientific knowledge, but the former tends to be 
played down in discussions of technology transfer, and the importance of the latter to be 
exaggerated.   
APPENDIX 3:  
 
THE SEVEN MOST SALIENT CONCEPTS  
 
Of the 25 concepts discussed in Chapter 3 and Appendix 2, the following seven are regarded 
as the most salient and relevant to be concerned of the thesis, and further points are now 
made about them.   
 
Commercialization and its rhetoric 
 
Previuosly, commercialization was defined, and a doubt expressed about it sometimes being 
an iatrogenic phenomenon (Illich, 1976).  This was, for Illich, a situation in which the 
intended cure for an illness made the problem worse, or was worse, in itself, than it.  
Attempts generated by governments to make institutions more innovative and profitable may 
consist of ambitious politicians taking ownership of problems and employing people at 
public expense in pursuit and conspicuous consumption of prestige, power and status, with 
personal vested interests being served through the persistence of problems, rather than their 
cure.  Normally, the best, most economic, solution to any lack of innovation in industries is 
to ensure that the professionals, managers, technicians, skilled operatives and so on, are very 
innovative people who are able to use universities and researchers when necessary. Anything 
else maybe a sub-optimal.     
 
Technical changes brought about by commercialization may include both process and 
product ones. Most practicable and commercially viable technical changes are instituted by 
engineers, including designers, rather than by scientists, and build on previous ones, more 
than on new scientific knowledge (Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman. 1959; Langrish, Gibbons, 
Evans and Jevons, 1969; Marquis, 1982). Technical change is an often unpredictable process 
involving various kinds of actor, in which the use (if any) of academic knowledge is often 
much more untidy and less rational than those who produce it often appeared to assume 
(Benneworth, 2001). The kinds of commercialization being pursued in Malaysia are of the 
same kinds as what are generally understood by the term elsewhere. They may draw on 
scientific research, but do so in contexts in which it is only one of many inputs to invention 
and innovation. 
 
Brown, Berry and Goel (1991) identified six kinds of commercialization activity.  They 
involved universities and government research institutes contracting R and D to industrial 
partners, working with industrial consortia, licensing knowledge and processes to industry, 
influencing decision makers in industry, working with broker organizations, and generating 
end-user demand.  
 
The study of commercialization can tell us something about the competence of universities. 
Universities have always been providers of academic and professional knowledge of many 
kinds.  However, recent increases in demand for university contributions to economic 
development have been questioned (Matkin, 1994). Researchers have asked, for example, 
whether policy makers invest too much public money in it (Benneworth, 2001, Jolly, 1997).  
Jolly (1997, p. 3) argued that ‘many technologies actually do not make it to market…let 
alone become commercial successes’.  Some ended up in journal articles, while others were 
‘simply forgotten’. Rates of commercialization of some new technologies are sometimes too 
slow. Funding research is not often cheap, so policy makers are sensible to be concerned 
about its potential effects (Jolly, 1997).  
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In Hertzfeld’s analysis of the USA’s National Aeronautical and Space Agency’s (NASA) 
patents from 1959 to 1979, only 1.5 percent of them were used outside the patent agency 
(Hertzfeld, 1989).  We can also ask whether there are markets for the results of scientific 
research and how far firms may invest to develop products which may not be profitable 
(Benneworth, 2001; Larpache, 2002). Many governments have taken measures to encourage 
‘scientific and technological’ advances, without evidence of customer interest.  Further, 
demand from firms is far from uniform, varying considerably, depending on characteristics 
of sectors, processes and markets.  There is, however, reason to believe that demand for 
relevant scientific and technical  outputs will usually be stronger in regions that are richer in 
human and financial capital than in poorer ones (Laparche, 2002). 
 
Entrepreneurship  
Entrepreneurship, as noted previously, is about taking risks in innovative ways, about 
showing initiative and adding value.  It can either mean starting a new organization or 
developing an existing one creatively. Many entrepreneurs seek venture capital or funding to 
start new businesses. Sweeney (1999) argued that entrepreneurial potential is sensibly 
considered as the propensity to establish a new firm, which often exists in communities with 
already high proportions of small independent businesses.  He also argued that it was useful 
to build innovative local social environments as well as to take action to enhance purely 
economic activity. 
 
Cunningham and Lischeron (1991) summarised a few approaches used to describe 
entrepreneurship.  They included an entrepreneurial model which considered the variety of 
central foci or purposes, assumptions, behaviour, skills and situations of entrepreneurs.  The 
‘entrepreneurial model’ drew on a ‘great person’ school, a ‘psychological characteristics’ 
school, a ‘classical’ school, a ‘management’ school, a ‘leadership’ school, and an 
‘intrapreneurship’ school.  The most relevant model here is the classical one, in which the 
central characteristic of entrepreneurial behaviour is innovation.  This sort of technically 
creative entrepreneurship is usually most evident in business start-up and early growth 
phases.  In the USA a pattern of commercialization for biotechnology has been supported by 
the establishment of new biotechnology firms, under entrepreneurs of this type, as spin-offs 
from university research (Senker, 1996).  Many good engineers and scientists are 
entrepreneurial, and effective commercialization is also likely to be so, and in this classical 
way. 
 
So far, strong emphasis has been placed in this chapter on the importance for 
entrepreneurship of such factors as the presence of good numbers of people with relevant 
attitudes and expertise, of venture and other forms of finance, of suitable labour markets, of 
supportive organizations and of relevant product markets.  Such conditions favoured 
entrepreneurial and innovative behaviour and the development of systems and clusters of 
innovation.   
 
Clearly, then, entrepreneurship is relevant for this study as entrepreneurs in business are the 
main people responsible for delivering technological innovation from universities to 
marketplaces.  Entrepreneurship has been defined as an input added to land, labour and 
capital in ways designed to extend theories of production.  Casson (1982) suggested that 
entrepreneurship means dealing with uncertainty and innovation and increasing profits in 
relevant markets.  He argued that entrepreneurs with greater knowledge will have the ability 
to judge their situations with less uncertainty than others. Colombo and Delmastro (2002) 
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found (in the USA) that entrepreneurs with strong educational backgrounds, especially in 
technical and scientific subjects and in particular, entrepreneurs with Ph.D.s in engineering, 
had significantly high levels of involvement in technology incubators. Shane and 
Venkataraman (2003) felt that, despite the traditional literature on entrepreneurship, which 
was person-centric, the role of technology, technical systems and institutions were especially 
relevant for setting up technological firms.  Entrepreneurs had the main role in generating 
‘technology diffusion’.  However the defining characteristics of entrepreneurship included, 
for example, the entrepreneur’s opportunities for growth, and the resources gained by them 
over and above those that they might have been expected to have, because of their personal 
characteristics (Miller and Garnsey, 2000).   
 
For connecting the study of entrepreneurs and their behaviour to macroeconomic views of 
entrepreneurship, the financial/capital school thinking about entrepreneurship is focused on 
the capital-seeking process.  The search for seed capital and growth capital is the main focus 
of this entrepreneurial emphasis. Clearly the venture capital process is often crucial to the 
development of an entrepreneur.  Business planning guides for entrepreneurs often 
emphasize this phase, and there are development seminars in many countries focusing on 
funding application processes.  As we would expect from the microeconomic view of 
entrepreneurship, the venture opportunity school focuses on the opportunity aspects of 
venture development.  Concerns in this area include sources of business ideas, the product 
development and marketing concepts, and creativity and market awareness. According to 
such views, developing the right idea at the right time for the right market is the key to 
entrepreneurial success (Kuratko, 2001, p. 1766). 
Innovation 
Innovation consists of invention plus commercialization.  Whether innovation is mainly 
supply-push, based on technical change, or demand-led, based on social needs and market 
requirements, or both has long been debated.  One view here is that recognition of demand is 
a more frequent factor in successful innovation than recognition of technical potential 
(Marquis, 1969).  Innovation studies literature stresses the role of user-supplier links in 
innovation. Technology push involves commitment to change and opportunities for 
technological activity in an industry. 
 
Suppliers may undertake a whole series of innovations and thus changes may occur 
anywhere along the chain of production (Parker, 1978).  Customer or demand-pull is the 
pressure exerted by purchasers of products.  Innovation is achieved for many reasons and in 
many ways in business. On the job modifications of practice are the main one, through 
exchanges and combinations of professional expertise.  An invention is a new technique, 
device, process or product that has not been made marketable.  Innovation is the use of 
expertise, skill, technical or market knowledge and so on, to improve processes or to create 
new ones, and/or to offer desirable new products and services. A product is new in that its 
attributes are new or improved. Afuah (2003) stated that a new product is always an 
innovation, through the creation of new market or technical knowledge, or because it is new 
to certain customers.  
In this study, innovations are thought of as any changes, continuous or discontinuous, radical 
or incremental, that lead to new, better or more profitable products.  Radical innovations 
refer to new products that result from advances in knowledge/technology. Incremental 
innovations include improvements to process or product design, with or without upgrading 
machinery or the acquisition of new machinery.  Innovation researchers have asked many 
questions about types of innovation activities such as radical or incremental ones (Freeman, 
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1974); changes over life cycles (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978); efforts that result in the 
emergence of dominant designs (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978); changes that have 
‘transilience’ in that they affect existing ways doing things (Abernathy and Clark, 1985); 
changes that are continuous or discontinuous, (Tushman and Anderson, 1986); modular, that 
is occurring in components and subsystems without addressing the systems of which they are 
a part; or architectural, that they attempt systemic improvements without great  attention to 
the component parts (Henderson and Clark, 1990); and sustaining or disruptive (Christensen, 
1997).  
 
Innovation requires efforts to create purposeful, focused change in an enterprise’s economic 
and/or social potential (Srica, 2001).  Innovation is also the successful use of ideas and 
processes to solve problems and to create thinking, ingenuity and focus. The contributions of 
universities to innovation and economic development are much more diverse and recurrent 
than through commercialization of new knowledge, through such activities as providing 
expert and skilled labour forces, technical consultancy services and even forming firms, often 
in technically advanced fields.  The university’s role is recast as the provider of particular 
services to economic development, but is problematic in that it overlooks the role that the 
activity of producing knowledge ‘for its own sake’, or for moral purposes, may play in 
generating economic benefits (Benneworth, 2001, p. 226), as well as in producing active 
citizens who are capable of finding morally and socially beneficial uses for knowledge of all 
kinds.  The OECD’s concept of a national system of innovation is relevant here (OECD, 
1999).  
 
Malaysia’s government has emphasised the economic importance of knowledge being 
transferred through scientific discoveries and technical changes.  However any rapid increase 
in investment in R and D in universities as one of the sources of innovation in the national 
innovation system will only benefit the Malaysian economy if the conditions and processes 
of innovation are manageable.  Unfortunately, attempts to manage innovation, especially by 
people without experience of engineering and marketing, people who work in less obviously 
creative functions like research administration or accountancy, or as civil servants or 
university non-academic administrators, may be too strenuous, and stifle it (Child 1981, 
1984; Hughes 1985).   
 
Innovation performance can be assessed in several ways, such as evaluating interaction 
between science and business, networking and collaboration among firms, roles of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the development and diffusion of new technology, and 
the nature and scale of international trade (OECD, 1999).  Generally, numbers of patents per 
year are indicative of rates of innovation. Mansfield (1986) showed that patent protection has 
less effect on the commercialization of inventions in most industries than in pharmaceuticals 
and chemicals.  In the latter, almost 80% of patentable inventions are patented.   
 
Teubal (1990, p. 270), after conducting a study of user needs, argued that innovation is 
characterised on the market side by at least two types of uncertainty: that of innovator firms 
about user needs and their concrete translation; and that of user firms about product quality. 
Lundvall (1985) argued that relationships between universities which produced scientific 
knowledge and firms as potential users of it may be analysed usefully as one specific arena 
of user-producer interaction.   
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Invention 
Invention means creating new products or other artefacts and/or processes or parts of them.  
It is art rather than science. Invention usually involves at least some design, but is usually 
thought of as more inspired than design.  There are two main schools of thought about 
conditions leading to invention.  One argues that a lack of resources leads people to invent. 
The other argues that only an excess of resources will result in inventions. So in one case 
necessity is the mother of invention, and in the other affluence and leisure are.  This idea of a 
contrast between two schools seems specious.  Both sources should be fruitful, or not, in 
different places and at different times.  Parker (1978: p. 29) argued that in terms of 
originality, basic scientific research might appear, at least to some, to be the activity most 
likely to yield inventions.  However, basic research tended not to generate tangible 
inventions and its main outputs usually consisted of published scientific knowledge.  In some 
non-English-speaking societies few would feel a need to labour what they would regard as 
this very obvious point.  On the whole, scientists discover, and it is engineers who invent, 
although experienced researchers with noses for relevant if unconventional evidence also 
often suggest that sales and marketing specialists, production operatives, skilled workers, 
technicians have very often been highly inventive in industrial contexts too.   
 
For Parker, invention was the first stage in the process of technical innovation.  There were 
three general theories of invention: the transcendentalist, the mechanistic and the cumulative 
synthesis one.  The transcendentalist one gave pride of place to individual activity.  The lone 
inventor with a single creative thought had dramatic effects on the world. The mechanistic 
approach argued that invention proceeds under the force of necessity, where need dictates 
and technology complies.  Economic forces predominated and individual genius is played 
down or rejected.  The cumulative synthesis approach sees invention arising from what 
already exists.  An act of insight is required and here individuals often play crucial problem-
solving roles (Parker, 1978: p. 46).  All three approaches are compatible.  Mathias (1991, p. 
26) felt that inventions were more individual and personally rewarding events than 
innovation and diffusion, and less commercially motivated.   
 
According to Hawthorne (1978), invention meant ‘the idea’, ‘the conception of the design of 
the idea’ or ‘prospective utility’.  He and others have also noted that periods of inquiry and 
synthesis were largely dominated by the degrees of interest of individual engineers, scientist 
or private inventors in creating or exploring something new, and how periods between 
invention and innovation were increasingly influenced by non-technical factors like market 
size and segmentation.  Srica (2001) concluded that the inventor was a person who produces 
ideas, whereas an innovator made new things happen, and was a doer who could visualise 
practical possibilities of an idea and who wanted to see it realized.  
 
It may be concluded that many inventions involve minor improvements to products, 
processes and techniques, with major inventions often very important indeed, but relatively 
rare (Parker, 1978). Individuals are still significant despite the growth of corporate design 
and development.  Scientific research has important but usually indirect links with 
engineering (Mathias, 1991).   
The management of change 
This concept comes from organizational behaviour and development.  Some writers have 
advocated constant proactive change in what are assumed to be increasingly rapid and 
unpredictable environments.  Others have argued that constant change is exhausting and self-
defeating, and often only the product of individual managerial ambition, and that more 
judicious and careful change will be more effective.   It is generally agreed that it is good to 
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anticipate the relevant trends and events, external and internal to organizations.  Changes 
vary from shallow to deep, and from tactical to strategic.  Management writers have argued, 
for nearly 50 years, that organizations should become less mechanistic and bureaucratic and 
more organic and flexible.  They accept that some people find change difficult, and that most 
do not react productively in the medium or long term to continuous pressure and change.   
Resistance to change is due to the differences in interests and values, the understanding and 
perceptions of outcomes, and sometimes to low tolerance of change.  To understand and 
address resistance it is first necessary to analyse the interests and views of stakeholders, and 
usually to involve those active in and/or affected by implementation.   
 
Participative approaches are often time-consuming, but can stimulate commitment and 
creativity.  However, and while ‘soft’ management skills are generally helpful for change 
management, major and urgent corporate transformation can necessitate coercive and even 
dictatorial approaches.  It is important to understand the interdependence and importance of 
all relevant factors, such as the context, substance, politics and processes of change and how 
they affect events from the individual up to the organizational and societal levels of analysis.  
Nevertheless, understanding and analysis alone are likely to be ineffectual, without 
thoroughly planned and executed actions affecting virtually all parts of organizations (Child, 
2005).     
 
Technical and technological change and/or innovation and/or commercialization and 
technology transfer are all overlapping and specific kinds of change.  Grindley (1993) argued 
that they raise considerations of uncertainty, appropriateness, timing and effect.  Uncertainty 
could be inherent in new technology or due to managerial ignorance or lack of ability.  
Technical, manufacturing and marketing abilities were needed along with those of change 
and innovation management.  Innovation management was a special, more focused, form of 
change management.  Appropriateness and timing were interdependent.  Patents and secrets 
would only protect new knowledge and expertise for so long.  The idea of effect was relevant 
because product innovations could open up new markets, process ones could alter cost and 
quality parameters significantly.   
 
Slow adoption or non-adoption of technical changes could lead to organizational death.  
Firms could choose different types of technical change: innovation or adoption; product or 
process innovation; radical or incremental innovation; technology push or market-pull.  
These types of change may not have the same technical/marketing skill requirements, 
unpredictability, or time pressures.  Firm could choose between strategies: leader or follower; 
collaborative or exclusive; open or proprietary; and license-out or manufacture (ibid. p. 61).  
The literature on managing change was not traditionally linked with that on innovation.  Yet 
there was currently a rapprôchement among these strands, as companies sought survival by 
trying to become learning, self-designing and renewing institutions. There was growing 
recognition that innovation requires companies to absorb external information, as well as 
ability to tolerate changes in structure, human resources, and so on.  The most innovative 
organizations were often those that had an internal proclivity for change (Penning 2001: 
3031).   
 
Henderson and Clark (1990) noted how many firms, large and small, were poor at absorbing 
change, even when little adaptation was needed.  Often, in their experience, few if any 
organizational changes were needed to support improvements to processes and products.  
Minor changes to organization structures or practices more often all that were needed, 
although benefits could be considerable.  Sorge (1988) in his praise of ‘judicious tinkering’ is 
also helpful on this important point.   
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In manufacturing, companies cannot negate market forces and technical developments, which 
often drive change and alter the basis of competition (Roth, 1996).  Grindley (1993, p. 61) 
made some further points about change: there must be opportunities and incentives, and 
organizations need to contain mechanisms for responding to market and technical 
developments; and technical change, beyond other forms of change, involves a unique class 
of strategies stemming from its particular characteristics.  As there was no one best way to 
achieve successful organizational change, by making efforts to understand the wide variety 
of change situations and to be familiar with their different characteristics, organizations and 
their members should find it easier to introduce appropriate paths to change.  The growing 
interdependence of organizations meant that successful change management would 
increasingly require negotiation and consultation beyond organizations within which change 
is happening. 
Research and development   
This term normally refers to future-oriented, longer-term activities in science and engineering 
which may be undertaken without much regard for profit.  Statistics on industrial R and D 
may imply things about the state of an industry, the nature of its competition, or the lure and 
prestige of scientific effort.  Some common measures include company budgets, numbers of 
employee-generated patents, or even those of peer-reviewed and other scientific and 
professional publications. The notion of R and D is fundamental to the STH model of 
technical change.  It emphasizes the scientific inputs to it more than the more numerous, 
widespread and in most sectors more influential technical, design and other inputs.  However 
universities and various government and other research institutes are often engaged in major 
elements of R and D.  Such work constitutes university and government R and D for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
 
The history of much industrial R and D began in the USA in the 1950s.  Ideas about good 
practice began to evolve from here. R and D department-produced designs, which matched 
user requirements rather than satisfying ‘their own egos’ (Rothwell et al, 1974, p. 290).  They 
made sure that their designs were practicable, capable of being manufactured, and suitable 
for users’ environments, (p. 290).   
 
An OECD (1993) definition of R and D was: ‘research and experimental development 
comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of 
knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of 
knowledge to devise new applications’.  R and D is generally defined as being the sum of 
three activities; basic research; applied research; and experimental research.  Basic research 
is theoretical and develops hypotheses while acquiring new knowledge without giving direct 
consideration to its use (OECD 1993).  Applied research seeks to ascertain the possibility of 
practical use of knowledge discovered through basic research.  Experimental development in 
this context is the use of such knowledge to develop new materials, equipment, systems or 
processes. According to Schwarz (1990), such definitions, quite reasonably, emphasize only 
the more scientific inputs to and features of engineering.  Unfortunately, however, much lay 
and public use of the term then tends to regard science as the source of all or almost all 
technical change, as when politicians speak about ‘getting ideas out of laboratories and into 
production’.  
 
Research evidence on technical change, invention, innovation and so on has generally led 
researchers to emphasise the importance of market pull and invention or technology push 
compared with discovery or science push.  In the UK only about one in eight engineering and 
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science graduates working in industry, usually as engineers of a kind in the latter case, of 
course, have appeared to be engaged in R and D and most of these were involved directly in 
development (Engineering Council, 2005).  In Sweden, Japan, West Germany and many 
other countries, companies have technical development, design, and development 
departments, not R and D ones.  British government statistics have long suggested that only 
10 percent of innovative effort in British industry occurs R and D departments.  Such 
statistics excluded plant design, plant development, product design and development from 
innovative work (Department of Trade and Industry, 2005).    
 
It is nonetheless still argued by many that technical progress is primarily achieved through 
investment in R and D. For example, Goto (2000) discussed how Japan was more interested 
in the 1990s than in previous decades in university R and D.  In contrast with their own past 
actions, Japanese policy makers now felt that it was a mistake to continue to neglect 
university R and D, because industrial innovation was greatly influenced by R and D 
activities of universities and governments in some other advanced countries.  However 
DeMarchi (1976) argued that the important development component of R and D had been the 
subject of too little attention on the part of policy makers and management researchers.  In 
this study the focus is on university and government research, which tended to contribute to 
basic and generic technologies.  The knowledge and technologies created in universities were 
transferred into parts of industry, which can then use the knowledge and techniques to 
develop products and services, with the former spreading more wisely.  In general, however, 
R and D remains a concept used in varied and vague ways.  
Technology transfer   
Chen (2001, p. 3392) argued that this term was controversial. He also discussed how some 
disagreed about the factors that influence transfer.  Some had argued that technology is not 
transferred unless it is used by the transferee. Others argued that how a transferee deals with 
a transferred technology is irrelevant. However, unless technology transfer led to sales of 
improved products, it could be a more complicated concept than one only concerned with 
trading goods.  By transferring knowledge about how to make a product, a transferor had not 
automatically given up the knowledge but has, rather, shared it with the transferee.  So it was 
not unreasonable to argue that a transfer is not achieved until the transferee understands and 
can work with the technology.  
 
Technology transfer means using new knowledge and technologies in processes, 
organizations and sectors in which they have not been used hitherto.  Many firms, 
universities, and governments have Offices of Technology Transfer (or similar) dedicated to 
identifying research results and technical changes of potential commercial interest, and to 
finding ways to exploit them.   For instance, a research result may be of commercial interest, 
but patents are normally only issued for inventions, and so there will be a need to identify 
companies that use processes that could benefit from the results.  Another consideration is 
commercial value. For example, while there might be several ways to accomplish nuclear 
fusion, the only ones of long-term commercial interest will only be those that produce more 
energy than they use.  Therefore, technology transfer organizations are often 
multidisciplinary, employing accountants and economists, for example, as well as engineers 
and scientists. 
 
A further definition of technology transfer was ‘the transfer of the results from universities to 
the commercial sector’ (Bremer, 1999, p. 2).   This implies that technology dissemination or 
transfer can occur in many different forms.  The publication of results in scientific journals 
and books is the most common form of dissemination.  In some cases the transfer may occur 
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only if the intellectual property is protected and then commercialised in a planned and 
structured way.  In the present study, the main focus is on technology transfer between 
university research laboratories and industries.  The Malaysian government concerned about 
the apparently limited amount of technology transfer of this type.  Several studies have 
suggested that there are many contradictions between university priorities and market needs 
(Bozeman, 1994; Lee, 1994; 1998; Matkin, 1994; Rahm, 1994; Saad and Zawdie, 2005).  
Link and Siegel (2005) have argued that universities that have more attractive incentive 
structures, especially financial ones for practitioners tend to be more efficient in technology 
transfer activities.   
 
Technology transfer is normally a complex and poorly defined process, even if experience 
can make it simpler (Bell 1993; Brown, Berry and Goel 1991).   Geisler, Furino and Kiresuk 
(1990) referred to companies’ problems with internal management, of their technology 
strategies, with relations with other firms and industries, and with universities, and to various 
individual attributes of their founders, owners and managers. Alam and Langrish (1984) 
criticized failings of R and D utilization in government agencies due to technical problems 
such as imperfect technology, marketing problems, difficulties in procuring raw materials, 
and problems with government departments and with competitors allowed to import 
technology.   
 
Technology transfer from universities can consist of policy and/or regulatory support and the 
public dissemination and advancement of knowledge.  In practice much of this is specialised 
and not discussed widely.  Means of technology transfer can include collaborative R and D 
with companies, R and D consortia, and strategic R and D alliances.  Companies’ means of 
commercialization of technology transfer include external investment, prototype 
development, incubator and spin-off.  An incubator is a facility that aids the early-stage 
growth of technology-based companies by providing shared facilities such as space and 
office services and business consulting assistance.  Spin-off refers to start-up companies 
originating from university or research institute where employees with ideas to start their 
own businesses leave the university or research institute and does using their knowledge 
from the university or research institute.  Universities involved in technology transfer help to 
develop consortia, research or technology parks, and targeted forms of industrial marketing 
(Engelking 1992).  
 
In the literature on technical change of the 1970s, there was reasonably solid body of 
evidence on company decisions about the adoption of new technology (see for example 
Rothwell, 1979).  Rothwell listed companies’ reasons for buying foreign-built machines, in 
studies conducted from 1970 to 1979, of hundreds of textile companies in the UK. They 
included cost, specific user requirements, design, performance, reliability, output, operational 
efficiency and back-up service from manufacturers.  Technical factors like how advanced 
design was, user requirements, and operational efficiency, were the most important ones for 
decisions of textile companies about buying such machines.   
 
Sutz (2000) explored the reasons why weak relationships between universities and industries 
existed in Latin American countries.  Privatisations of public enterprises had undermined 
some relationships. Also Latin American economies could be characterised as exchanges of 
goods and services with low technology content.  Enterprises distrusted and were unwilling 
to have closer relationships with public universities, with their stronger research capacities 
and sophistication.  Socio-economic inequality in Latin America was high, with low 
incomes, low attention paid to training and education, and low concern with employee 
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commitment.  Finally, weaknesses in Latin Americans’ national innovation systems were 
associated with their historic neglect of technical change.   
 
We have seen how technology transfer is a rather elastic, general and vague concept in use.  
However the literature on it also shows how varied and interesting a phenomenon it is, and 
suggests how difficult it may be for some LDCs to achieve. 
APPENDIX 4:  
COMMERCIALIZATION IN MALAYSIA  
Support for Commercialization in Malaysia  
 
Since the mid-to-late 1980s, Malaysia’s government has developed a number of institutional 
supports for the commercialization of R and D. The relevant agencies and mechanisms 
include its Intensification of Research in Priority Areas (IRPA) fund, the Industry Research 
and Development Grant Scheme (IGS), the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), the Research 
and Development Grant Scheme (MGS), the Demonstrator Application Grant Scheme 
(DAGS), the Malaysia Technology Park (TPM), the Malaysia Technology Development 
Corporation (MTDC), the Human Resource Development Scheme (HRDS), the Industrial 
Technical Assistance Fund (ITAF) and the Malaysia Industry Government Group for High 
Technology (MIGHT). The existence of these agencies and mechanisms might be seen as 
suggesting that the government has identified the funding, human resources, the technology 
and the advanced information infrastructure needed to develop an environment favourable to 
growth of technically advanced businesses and industries. 
 
The stated purpose of the IRPA is to support R and D activities in the public sector in 
priorities area which the government regards as those most worthy of help. Other purposes 
include funding projects which address the needs of Malaysian industries and encourage 
collaboration efforts among research institutions.  The Industry R and D Grant Scheme is 
meant to help increase private sector R and D and to promote closer collaboration between 
private and public sector research institutes as well as between universities and industry. The 
R and D Grant Scheme is there to help innovative local companies, including joint venture 
companies, to develop multimedia technologies.  The purpose of the DAGS is to encourage 
Malaysians to adapt and customise existing IT and multimedia technologies.  The Malaysia 
Technology Park exists to help in the development of indigenous technologies and the 
commercialization of R and D findings.   It provides links between companies, the 
government, government research institutes and universities.   
 
Under the Human Resource Development Scheme, there are three funds: the Science and 
Technology Human Resource Development Fund (STHRD Fund), the National Science 
Fellowship (NSF) and the Postgraduate and Postdoctoral Programme.  These exist to 
enhance the pool of skilled and trained people in engineering and science.  ITAF helps small 
and medium-scale industries by giving matching grants for consultancy studies, product 
development, design, quality and productivity improvements, and market development. This 
matching grant meaning that 50% of the project cost will be borne by the government and 
the balance by the applicants.  The MIGHT is responsible for exploiting research and 
technology for new business.  The expenditure on these programmes were £0.50 billion from 
2001 to 2005 and £0.78 billion were allocated for 2006 until 2010.  These agencies and 
mechanisms are designed to link universities and industries so as to facilitate exchanges of 
technology.  The government invested a total of about £0.4 billion under its IRPA program 
from 1986, when it was launched, to 2005 (EPU, 2006).   
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Commercialization of Outputs of Malaysian University and Government Research 
Institutes   
 
Research and Development  
Commercialization efforts by Malaysia’s government, companies, universities and research 
institutes are meant to help underpin the medium to long term development of the national 
economy.  Malaysian discoveries and inventions are used to try to boost Malaysian industrial 
development.   The IRPA fund is one of the sources of funding for R and D in universities. 
The Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) was introduced in 1992 due 
to a lack of interest from Malaysian companies. Spin-off and start-up companies were 
established to create critical masses of local companies needed for taking up indigenous R 
and D.   The MTDC also supports the process of commercialization of Malaysian university 
R and D results.  This includes technology transfer consultancy, technology marketing and 
promotion, market and feasibility studies, commercialization project management and 
intellectual property protection.   The MTDC provided funds to 121 companies of about £6.5 
million between 2001 until 2005 under the Eighth Malaysia Plan (EPU, 2006). 
 
IRPA funds support researchers either from universities and government research institutes.  
However, priority was given to universities as government research institutes have other 
government funding.  After researchers publish their findings, then the technology transfer 
offices handle their commercialization of it by either through formation of spin-off 
companies and licensing.  MTDC roles will then direct R and D collaboration with funding.  
The financing part includes buying capital equipment and funding marketing.   
  
Apart from helping companies to acquire further scientific and technical knowledge and 
expertise, through technology transfer, either through spin-off companies from universities 
or direct R and D collaboration, the MTDC also facilitates funding for companies.  The 
Financial Group under the MTDC aims to increase capital available to companies in need of 
capital equipment and funding for marketing, Funding for commercialization of R and D 
comes from the Commercialization of R and D (CRDF) and the Technology Acquisition 
Funds (ATF).   Funding of £14 million was allocated for five years from 2001 until 2005. 
From 2006 until 2010, the budget allocation is £38 million for both funds (EPU, 2006).  The 
CRDF provides partial grants to successful applicants ranging from 50 percent to 70 percent.   
The funding includes market surveys and research, product and process design and 
development, and standard and regulatory compliance and intellectual protection. Out of 162 
applications for this fund from early 1996 to the end of 2000, only 36 were approved. 
 
Besides capital, the Malaysian government, through the MTDC, has set up three incubation 
centres in collaboration with local universities. They include the UPM-MTDC Technology 
Incubation Centre, under University Putra Malaysia, the UM-MTDC Technology Innovation 
Centre and the UKM-MTDC Intelligence Technology Centre.  These incubation centres are 
for the initiation and nurturing of a new technology companies. They offer help with 
technology transfer, spin-off and new venture development.  They play a useful role in 
bringing research and capital together while nurturing and accelerating development of new 
companies.   
 
R and D in Malaysian universities 
 
The number of scientific researchers in Malaysia was estimated at 17,790 in 2002.  Of these, 
10,527 were university employees, 3,914 were in government research institutes and 3,349 
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were in companies.  Malaysia had only 0.15% of its labour force in R and D in 2002 
(MASTIC 2004).  Funding for research in Malaysia is estimated at £173 million a year, of 
which about £8.5 million a year is for the IRPA.  Nearly 50% of the government budget for 
R and D goes to universities.  The universities recorded significant growth in their R and D 
expenditure from 1992 to 1998.  The emphasis is on applied and developmental research.  
Research was concentrated on manufacturing, and on information and communications 
technology (ICT), followed by energy resources (EPU 1999).  Under the IRPA programme, 
the pattern of technology development has changed to advancement of such strategic 
technologies as biotechnology, and also photonics, concerned with generating and 
transmitting light (photons).   
 
A mid-1990s’ government assessment of the benefits and effectiveness of research funded 
under the IRPA indicated that the extent of commercialization of R and D results remained 
low across all sectors (EPU, 1996).  There were a few takers of potential technologies and 
products, as private sector companies wanted to minimise risk on untried and untested 
technologies and products.  University links with companies through collaborative R and D 
efforts were still negligible.  More seemed to need to be done by university and government 
research institute staff to work with more closely with the private sector to generate more 
market-oriented R and D. The National Productivity Corporation (NPC 2003) advocated 
measures for overcoming such problems. They included a databank for research results, 
more emphasis on research related to market needs, more rewards for and recognition of 
researchers, provision of more venture capital and more networking between researchers, 
companies and government officials. The authors of the NPC report felt that some university 
researchers were too interested in academic work.   Some of the NPC’s thinking and 
recommendations seem quite directive and slightly heavy-handed, and might encourage 
doubts in the minds of some about whether innovation actually should be managed or, 
indeed, whether it can be (see Webb, 1992, for example).  
 
 
APPENDIX 5:    
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES    
 
 
Provisional Title of the Study: 
An Investigation of the Commercialization of Discoveries and Inventions in Malaysia 
 
Interview Schedules  
For companies, entrepreneurs and managers  
1. How would you describe the processes of technology transfer, and those of 
commercialization? 
2. How relevant to your company’s work are discoveries made in universities? 
3. And in government research institutes? 
4. Do university researchers, in your experience, invent new processes or products of 
interest to your companies?  
5. And researchers in government research institutes?  
6. Do you have, or have you had, contacts with the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation, and if so have they been helpful to you (why/why not?). 
7. And the Ministry of International Trade and Industry? 
8. And venture capitalists?  
9. And universities? 
10. And government research institutes? 
11. And banks? 
12. How do you value the efforts of the government to increase the flow of new scientific 
knowledge to industry? 
13. Finally, how do you think about the roles of engineering, and of science, in technical 
change? Please compare them. 
 
For university and government research institute researchers  
1. How relevant to industry do you think that your research findings are? 
2. What sorts of time scale are you thinking about? 
3. How widely do you expect your findings to be used in the future? 
4. Are you involved in transferring the knowledge that you produce to companies? 
5. And in transferring technology to them? 
6. What do you think of the ways in which your kinds of research findings are     
commercialized (or not, as the case may be)? 
7. How effective are your relationships with the university administrators who help to 
organize commercialization? 
8. And with equivalent staff of the companies who may use your findings?  
9. Who else, if anyone, is involved with you in commercialization and technology transfer 
and how effective are your relationships with them? 
10. Do you have any further comments to make on the processes of commercializing 
university research findings in Malaysia? 
11.  Finally, how do you think about the roles of engineering, and of science, in technical 
change? Please compare them. 
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For administrators in university technology transfer office and in government research 
institutes 
1. How would you describe technology transfer and commercialization? 
2. Scientists broadly work to discover and introduce knowledge.  How far should they if at 
all, be involved in helping companies to invent ways of such knowledge, and in doing so 
in ways that improve the commercial value of what companies do?   
3. What do you think the most important characteristic of the successful commercialization 
of university/government institutes research are? 
4. And the main problems involved? 
5. What in your experience are the most and least effective aspects of your relationships 
with companies? 
6. What in your experience are the most and least satisfactory aspects of your relationship 
with companies? 
7. How have the processes of technology transfer and commercialization changed over time 
at your university/institute? 
 
For top research administrators (for example Deputy Vice-Chancellors (Research) of 
universities or Directors of government research institutes) 
 
1. How important is the commercial use (actual and potential) of the research findings of 
your university/institute to it, compared with its other outputs? 
2. And for industrial and other sectors like health care, the armed forces, government 
departments, and insurance, where the knowledge that you produce could be used? 
3. What is your university’s/institute’s strategy for commercialization and technology 
transfer?      
4.   What do you regard as being the critical factors in the commercialization of your 
university’s/institute’s research?  
5.   What do you see as your university’s/institute’s main strengths and weakness as regards 
the commercialization of its research findings? 
6.   Do you have or have you had contacts with the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation, and if so have they been helpful to you (why/why not?). 
7.   And the Ministry of International Trade and Industry? 
8.   And venture capitalists?  
9.   And universities? 
10 And government research institutes? 
11. And banks? 
12. How have the processes of technology transfer and of commercialization changed over 
time at your university/institute? 
 13. How do you value the efforts of the government to increase the flow of new scientific 
knowledge to industry? 
14. Finally, how do you think about the roles of engineering, and of science, in technical 
change? Please compare them. 
For venture capitalists/banks 
1. How helpful do you think that the commercialization of new scientific knowledge is to 
the industry? 
2. In your experience of your work in helping companies to fund such commercialization, 
what ideas have you developed about the following:  
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a) the ability of university researchers and research administrators to understand 
what companies need? 
b) the ability of researchers and administrators of government research institutes 
to understand what companies need? 
c) about the abilities of entrepreneurs, managers and companies to use new 
scientific knowledge profitably? 
d) about relevant government policies? 
e) about the two ministries (the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 
and Ministry of International Trade and Industry) involved? 
f) about the roles of intellectual property rights companies? 
g) about the relationships between all or any of you (venture capitalists) and the 
others referred to in the previous questions 2a) to 2f)? 
3.   Finally, how do you think about the roles of engineering, and of science, in technical 
change? Please compare them. 
4.   Is there a free market for useful scientific knowledge in Malaysia?  Please explain 
your answer. 
 
For journalists 
1. The government has actively encouraged companies to use the results of scientific 
research, and university and government research institute researchers to work with 
companies and other organizations to help make this happen.  How important do you 
think these efforts at ‘commercialization’ of scientific research and technology transfer 
are for Malaysia’s economic future? 
2. So far these attempts have not been very successful.  Many companies seem unable or 
unwilling to put new scientific knowledge to use.  Why do you think this is? 
3. Part of the government’s strategy is to increase the numbers of people qualified in 
business, engineering and scientific subjects for many kinds and levels of employment.  
Some thinkers in universities think that this approach can stifle originality and creativity 
and result in there being too many qualified people chasing too few jobs.  They think, 
also, that the main purpose of education is to produce civilized adults, and that a strong 
emphasis on business and industry in education can lead to neglect of its true purpose.  
What do you think of these two criticisms of the policy? 
4. Do you think that Malaysia may, as some have suggested, be being too much influenced 
by Western (mainly American) management ideas, which often seem to be ignored by 
more successful, focused and hard-working business people in the West and everywhere 
else? 
5. Finally, how do you think about the roles of engineering, and of science, in technical 
change?  Please compare them. 
 
For politicians 
1. How important is commercialization to the future of Malaysia’s economy?  Why? 
2. In the processes of commercialization what do you regard as being the main strengths 
and weaknesses of the following participants? 
a) university researchers? 
b) university research administrators? 
c) government research institute researchers? 
d) government research institute research administrators? 
e) companies? 
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f) Your Ministry 
g) The Ministry of International Trade and Industry/the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation? 
h) venture capitalists? 
i) banks? 
j) intellectual property rights companies? 
3. I have found, in the United Kingdom, that a number of experienced Western researchers 
question some of the assumptions made by those who regard commercialization as 
crucial to economic progress.  For example they are concerned about: 
a) the idea that globalization of business is a permanent trend (that international 
trade will grow and grow for ever, and so on).  They accept that globalization 
of communications is happening, but say that international trade in goods and 
services has always grown, and then contracted, and then grown again, and so 
on, throughout history.   
Comments? 
b) They argue that currently fashionable ideas about knowledge workers and the 
so-called k-economy have been advocated and demolished about once every 
generation since around 1780 A. D.   
 Comments? 
c) They criticise the idea that producing more and more ‘relevant’ graduates and 
other qualified people for industry will result in economic success.  They 
argue that many jobs, even many very complex ones, are often best learnt 
mainly on the job, and not by attending schools, colleges and universities, and 
that many formal qualifications produce what in the UK are called ‘glorified 
clerks’, meaning people with academic knowledge but little creativity or skill.  
They point to many examples of a basic education plus hard heads and crafty 
hands, producing industrial success, for example Henry Ford and many of 
those who created Britain’s industrial revolution. 
 Comments? 
4. Some writers have argued that Western (mainly American) ways of managing are too 
controlling and that they can stifle creative people, and that developing countries accept 
them too uncritically. 
Comments? 
5. How important are the roles of engineering, and of science, in technical change? Please 
compare them.    
6. How do you see the future of commercialization and technology transfer in Malaysia? 
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